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Globalization in the 1990s provided both opportunities and challenges for
developing and transition economies. On the one hand, it offered the
chance to achieve economic growth through active involvement in an
integrated and liberalized world economy, but on the other, it led to an
increase in vulnerability to external shocks and volatility, as demonstrated
quite dramatically by the Mexican peso crisis of 1994–5 and the Asian
financial crisis of 1997–8.
This book brings together an international team of contributors,
including Barbara Stallings, Choong Yong Ahn and J.C. Ferraz, to analyze
the different methods employed to manage globalization and develop-
ment, as well as to examine the challenges of development and transition
strategies at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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Introduction
Managing development – globalization,
economic restructuring and social
policy
Junji Nakagawa
Background: opportunities and risks of globalization
Globalization in the 1990s provided both opportunities and challenges for
developing and transitional economies. While globalization offered the
chance to achieve economic growth through active involvement in the
integrated and liberalized world economy, it also increased their vulnera-
bility to external shocks and volatility (Grindle 2000). In consequence,
stakeholders at every level of the development and transition process –
international organizations, national governments and the private sector –
had to review their strategies in order to adjust to the new world economic
environment. As the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994–5 and the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis of 1997–8 showed dramatically, the cost of maladjustment was
not only very high but it also affected many more stakeholders than
before, due to the contagious effects of crises.
By globalization, we refer to the increasing integration of economies
around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows (IMF
2000). Globalization is not a new phenomenon. Some analysts, such as
Frankel (2000: 47–8), argue that the world economy was just as globalized
100 years ago as it is today. But today global commerce and financial ser-
vices are far more developed and deeply integrated than they were at that
time. The most striking aspect of this new trend is the integration of finan-
cial markets, which has been brought about by the innovation of telecom-
munication and information technologies in the past two decades.
Developing and transitional economies can achieve rapid economic
growth if they succeed in making full use of globalization. However, pro-
moting trade, investment and financial flows is not an easy task. Even if
they succeed in promoting trade and attracting investment, many disrupt-
ing factors such as exchange rate fluctuation and short-term capital flight
may endanger national economies. In sum, globalization has made the
rewards as well as the challenges of managing development and transition
far greater than they used to be.
During the 1990s, international financial institutions and influential
actors in the industrial world (the US and UK, in particular) promoted a
common policy package for developing and transitional economies in
their economic policy reform. Varyingly referred to as structural adjust-
ment, neoliberalism, or the Washington Consensus,1 the package emphas-
ized the role of the market in development and transition, with reduced
governmental intervention. Although there have been alternative state-
centered approaches, such as the one presented (with many caveats) in a
much-discussed World Bank study of East Asia (World Bank 1993), the
Asian financial crisis seems to have undermined the attractiveness of this
alternative path. With the adoption of a market-oriented transition strat-
egy in the former socialist countries since 1989, endorsed by the IMF, the
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), this approach has acquired almost universal reach.
Nonetheless, the crises of the 1990s showed that the market-oriented
approach is not a panacea. Rather than a one-size-fits-all solution, it is
necessary to tailor-make economic policies to fit each country. In particu-
lar, the institutional arrangements – both at the national governmental
level and at the individual corporate level – must be taken into account,
since these reflect the historical and structural legacy of each nation.
While some aspects of the new market-oriented approach may have much
to offer, stakeholders in the developing and transition economies must
consider each aspect carefully, rather than adopting them as a whole just
because they fit the current ideological paradigm. They should also take
into account the available international evidence on the timing and
sequencing of policy reform, which can make a great difference in their
impact.
One of the greatest challenges of globalization concerns social policy.
The crises in the 1990s hit the poor the most (World Bank 1998: 80–5),
and governments in crisis had to reconsider their traditional social policy
framework. Some, including those in formerly socialist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, conducted market-based reform of social
security, while others introduced and/or strengthened social policy within
a broader framework of social safety nets. International financial institu-
tions such as the IMF and World Bank played a significant role in these
policy reforms. However, the content of the reforms as well as their
sequencing varied, reflecting each country’s historical, institutional and
structural background.
Based on these premises, this book analyzes the challenges of develop-
ment and transition strategy at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
We will be examining international prescriptions and the strategies of
international institutions, national governments and the private sector.
This multi-layer analysis is justified by two facts. First, market-based pol-
icies have different implications for each level of stakeholders, as a result
of which one policy taken by one level of stakeholders will produce differ-
ent expectations and outcomes for the other levels of stakeholders.
Second, development and transition is a comprehensive and interactive
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process, in which each level of stakeholders has a different role that must
be coordinated and fine-tuned, reflecting the different historical, institu-
tional and structural background of each economy.
The target regions of the analysis are East and Southeast Asia, Latin
America, and Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on middle-income
countries such as Korea, Thailand, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (hereafter “target countries”).
Despite the strong converging force of the market-based policy package,
the three regions differ in the way they have applied the policies, reflect-
ing differences in state-private sector relationships as well as differences in
the trajectory of their economic policy and private-sector behavior.
This book consists of three parts. Part I deals with globalization and the
resulting framework of global governance, focusing on the multilateral
and regional framework for managing development and transition. Part II
turns to economic restructuring, where national governments and the
private sector have been struggling to meet the changing economic
environment. Focuses are on such fields of economic restructuring as
financial sector restructuring, corporate restructuring and foreign direct
investment (FDI). Part III deals with social policy reform in the three
target regions. Together, they provide a thorough overview of the chal-
lenges confronting developing and transitional economies at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. The remainder of this introduction
presents a brief description of each of the subsequent chapters. The final
section offers a concise summary of the main messages of the book.
Challenges to global governance
Part I deals with the multilateral and regional framework for managing
development and transition. Globalization in the 1990s deeply influenced
the existing multilateral framework for global governance, and many pro-
posals were made to renovate it either by improving the existing frame-
work or by establishing supplementary regional frameworks. The four
chapters in this part of the book examine these challenges and proposals
for reinventing global and regional framework for managing development
and transition in the twenty-first century.
Haider Khan (Chapter 1) deals with the IMF and regional financial
architectures. Financial liberalization and financial crises in the 1990s
posed a new set of challenges to these institutions. One critical challenge
relates to the policy diagnoses and policy prescriptions they give to
national governments on how to conduct financial liberalization. In addi-
tion to neo-classical prescriptions, these institutions came to put much
more emphasis on institutional and structural underpinnings supporting
a liberalized financial sector.2 A second challenge concerns crisis manage-
ment. Most agree that crises are inevitable even when national govern-
ments introduce stringent prudential regulation of the liberalized
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financial sector. One realistic measure to deal with financial crises is to
build up monitoring and early warning mechanisms at national, regional
and multinational levels, and to work out a procedure for dealing with
bankruptcy and liquidation in a swift manner. This leads us to the dis-
cussion of an alternative regional financial architecture to supplement 
the IMF.
Based on the theory of evolutionary economics, Khan presents a case
for a hybrid form of global financial architecture (GFA) that allows for the
existence and co-evolution of regional financial architectures (RFAs) with
the IMF. The most important steps ever taken in this direction are a series
of regional financial initiatives after the Asian Financial Crisis: the Manila
Framework Group Meeting, the ASEAN surveillance process, the
ASEAN3 surveillance process and the Chiangmai Initiative. This modest
beginning needs to evolve into a workable RFA, and this requires both the
willingness of the IMF that the RFA should have a certain degree of auto-
nomy, and the viability and cooperation at the national level among the
members of the RFA. A set of realistic reforms of the IMF together with
the formation of RFAs will, he concludes, offer the best chance for the
global economy to achieve both stability and prosperity.
Masahiro Kawai (Chapter 2) discusses the changing role of the multilat-
eral development banks (MDBs), including the World Bank and regional
development banks. He starts from the fact that these organizations are
now facing a challenge greater than ever before, to enable poorer coun-
tries to catalyze successful integration into the global economy and, at the
same time, help reduce poverty, income inequality and the socio-
economic tensions created by such integration. Globalization can be a
driving force for economic growth, poverty reduction and global income
inequality reduction, if accompanied by complementary policy and institu-
tional reforms and a better investment climate. This is where the MDBs
must play a new role as “knowledge banks” and “public goods-providing
banks,” in addition to their traditional function as “money banks,” financ-
ing development and crisis-resolution. They must provide knowledge on
best practices fine-tuned to the specific needs of a particular country. Also,
provision of certain types of international public goods by the MDBs can
be essential to the economic development of developing countries. Some
examples of such public goods include: transportation infrastructure that
goes across borders; containment of communicable diseases; environ-
mental protection; prevention of serious impacts of natural disasters
hitting several countries; and containment of conflict that has the poten-
tial to become a cross-border issue.
Focusing on the World Bank, Kawai analyzes a series of its recent initi-
atives toward this new direction, such as the Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).3 He
puts emphasis on the fact that these initiatives are comprehensive and
long term, and require an active role of an effective, transparent and
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accountable government. He concludes that development assistance pro-
vided by the MDBs needs to extend well beyond the “Washington Consen-
sus,” to address multi-dimensional policy considerations, including the
realignment of policies and institutions to maximize its effectiveness.
Kazuyori Ito (Chapter 3) asks whether and to what extent the
GATT/WTO contributed to political democratization and economic liber-
alization in the target countries. He argues that the GATT did not lead
these countries to trade liberalization because many of them were not
members, and those who were members were allowed to maintain protec-
tionism. Nonetheless, he argues, protectionism and state intervention led
to ever-growing economic distortions, which contributed to the eventual
collapse of the authoritarian, protectionist regimes in the 1980s in Latin
America. Ito calls this the indirect convergent function of the GATT. The
WTO, with its worldwide membership and broader issue coverage, has
pressed the MDT countries to harmonize their economic policies with
those of developed members and has provided technical assistance to
achieve this goal. At the same time, however, due to the differences in
historical, institutional and regional backgrounds, the target countries
have pursued different paths of democratization and liberalization, and
the WTO has provided flexibility to allow this. Thus, Ito concludes, the
WTO has had a diversifying effect. The future challenge for the WTO is
how to promote active involvement of the target countries in the WTO
framework without marginalizing them.4
Isidro Morales (Chapter 4) focuses on regional economic integration,
particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as a
key strategy for advancing and expanding a regulatory framework for
global governance. As the current proliferation of regional trade agree-
ments shows,5 regional economic integration has become an important
means of promoting trade and investment liberalization. NAFTA was
unique in the sense that it was considered by the US to be an interface
between multilateral and bilateral trade/investment policies, and between
a North–South agenda.
To make its balance-sheet, Morales argues, the NAFTA has made the
protectionist pressures of the US more manageable, though some deep-
rooted protectionist interests persist, as in the case of decades-old soft-
wood lumber dispute between the US and Canada. Also, NAFTA has
disproportionately empowered private investors vis-à-vis governments by
means of the investor-to-state dispute settlement procedure under
Chapter 11. He finally discusses the possibility of deepening and widening
the NAFTA. Again, the US priorities will be a decisive factor.
Financial crisis and restructuring
The opportunities and risks of globalization were felt more seriously in
the financial sector than elsewhere in the economy. In their efforts toward
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financial liberalization, most of the target countries relaxed external and
internal financial controls in the 1990s, and their domestic financial
systems became far more integrated into the world financial market. At
the same time, relaxing financial controls often led to macroeconomic
instability (Caprio et al. 2001) and intensified competition between local
and foreign financial institutions, in which the latter more often prevailed
over the former. Without adequate regulation and control, however, the
liberalized financial sector might become more vulnerable to exogenous
shocks and turbulences, which was dramatically shown by the crises in
Mexico, Asia, Russia and, most recently, Argentina.
The first two chapters in Part II deal with this issue. Barbara Stallings
(Chapter 5) begins with a comparative analysis of financial sector develop-
ment and restructuring in Latin America and East Asia, focusing mainly
on Chile and South Korea, which have the most successful domestic finan-
cial sectors in their respective regions. The most interesting point is the
increasing convergence between the financial systems in these two
economies, which would not have been expected a decade ago. Chile has
shown that Latin American countries can match East Asia in the size of
financial markets, but it grew in ways that were more typical of best prac-
tices found in Anglo-Saxon countries than those of the Asian tradition,
such as tight and opaque links between finance, government and firms.
Korea has now taken the lead in Asia of moving in a similar direction, due
to both the financial crisis of 1997–8 and a longer-term trend of financial
liberalization that dates from the 1980s.
An important remaining difference concerns the question of credit
access for small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), in which Korean
SMEs enjoy better conditions, perhaps attributable partly to the con-
tinuation of government controls in Korea, and partly to commercial
banks’ new focus on profitability. Since finance for SMEs is a topic of great
interest for most Latin American countries, she concludes, Korea’s
experience in this area might provide some insight for that region. Like-
wise, Chile’s successful management of its market-based financial sector
over the last two decades could offer useful lessons for Asia.
As a follow-up to Stallings’ general argument, Choong Yong Ahn
(Chapter 6) provides an empirical study of financial liberalization, finan-
cial crisis and financial restructuring in Korea. Expanding on Stallings’
analysis, Ahn describes what Korea has accomplished in terms of restruc-
turing its financial and corporate sectors since the crisis of 1997. A special
focus is given to how Korea has cleaned up the non-performing loans
accumulated in the financial sector. Because of the intertwined nature of
the financial and corporate sectors, he also addresses several important
restructuring issues of still highly leveraged corporations, which are so
critically linked to the creation of sound and robust financial institutions.
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Corporate restructuring and FDI
Globalization in the 1990s offered both opportunities and risks to the
private sector in the target countries. However, the challenges to the
private sector, as well as its responses, varied in each country, reflecting
the different historical, institutional and politico-economic backgrounds.
One of the responses commonly pursued by the target countries was
corporate restructuring and promotion of FDI, though the results of these
initiatives varied, depending on many factors. The following four chapters
in Part II deal with these issues.
Akira Suehiro (Chapter 7) conducts an extensive comparison of East
Asia and Latin America with respect to the role of private firms and eco-
nomic reforms in overcoming the crisis. In Latin America, economic liber-
alization was based on “first generation Washington Consensus” policies,
which centered on macroeconomic changes (Williamson 1990), and gov-
ernments hardly touched on corporate restructuring. As a result, many
state enterprises and large local firms were taken over by leading multilat-
eral corporations. By contrast, economic reforms in East Asia after the
crisis of 1997 put a priority on institutional development, or “second gen-
eration Washington Consensus” policies.
Nonetheless, in practice, Suehiro argues, corporate reform in East Asia
has not always been conducted according to that prescription. Taking
Thailand as an interesting example, he describes how a reformist govern-
ment was replaced by a neo-populist, inward-looking one, which took the
teeth of the Anglo-American model of corporate reform. This is, of
course, not the end of the story. He concludes that East Asian countries
and Latin American countries are facing a fundamental problem of how
to coordinate their internal requirements with globalization in order to
achieve sustainable growth.
Keun Lee (Chapter 8) analyzes family-controlled business groups as an
organizational device for development and transition. He argues that the
classical separation of ownership and control is an exception rather than a
principle, and that it is more common around the world to have family-
controlled firms often taking the form of business groups. He then poses
two questions: why are these business groups developing in so many coun-
tries, and what went wrong with many of them?
Concerning the first question, Lee presents a “developmental device”
view of business groups, whose main strength is to facilitate entry into for-
merly monopolized markets by mobilizing financial resources, technology
and brand names. On the other hand, Lee’s answer to the second ques-
tion provides a rather cautious assessment of the role of business groups
in development and transition. Based on an in-depth analysis of Korean
business groups (chaebol), he asserts that while the business groups are
effective in responding to market failure or economic catch-up, these
benefits come with long-term risks. Specifically, the benefits of economic
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value creation by the business groups tend to decline over the long run as
institutions evolve and markets mature. Family-controlled business groups
tend to be subject to increasingly serious agency problems resulting in
value-destroying, inefficient investment drives, and finally, the existence of
business groups in an economy might hamper the sound development of
a competitive market economy by distorting and manipulating the course
of liberalization and deregulation.
The last two chapters deal with FDI as a key engine for development
and transition. However, their messages are not as promising as those
expected by most policy makers in the target countries. In many cases, FDI
inflows have been disappointingly low. Even when FDI inflows have been
positive, the form and content of FDI have been such that their innovative
effects are limited, and they often create market distortions. This poses a
serious challenge to policy makers, namely, how to attract innovative and
non-market distorting FDI inflows.
Ferraz, Valente and Iootty (Chapter 9) examine how and to what extent
economic liberalization has influenced ownership change and brought
inward internationalization of companies in Latin America. After illustrat-
ing the global and regional trend in the internationalization of capital,
they analyze ownership change in Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Brazil in
the 1990s, featuring privatization and mergers and acquisitions (M&A),
which led to significant ownership restructuring and changes in corporate
control in the region.
As a result, they observe, Latin America is facing a development
paradox since history tells us that local capital and local innovation capa-
bilities have been crucial features of successful and sustained economic
and social development. They conclude that policy makers in the region
are facing challenges as to how to promote a national regime of incentives
and regulations inductive to activities that generate qualifying jobs in a
context of open economies and ownership internationalization.
One of the important policy questions for developing and transitional
economies is what the host government can do to attract FDI. Yuko
Kinoshita and Nauro Campos (Chapter 10) try to answer this question by
examining the locational determinants of FDI in 25 transition economies in
Central and Eastern Europe by utilizing panel data between 1990 and 1998.
They tested three categories of determinants: country-specific advan-
tages such as low-cost labor, large local market, skilled labor force, suffi-
cient infrastructure and proximity to the West; macroeconomic policy and
policy that facilitates business operation; and the agglomeration effect of
foreign investment. To test their weight in the determination of FDI loca-
tion, they adopt the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), with a fixed-effects model as the
supplementary method for comparison.
The results of the regression analysis can be summarized as follows: (1)
Agglomeration effects are the most significant determinant of FDI inflows
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in the region. The effect is greater in CIS countries than in non-CIS coun-
tries, perhaps due to insufficient information about local conditions. (2)
The degree of external liberalization is another strong determinant in
non-CIS countries. (3) Poor quality of the bureaucracy in the host country
is found to be a deterrent factor, even after controlling for agglomeration
effects. This last finding has important policy implications as to what the
host government can do to attract FDI. Once a host country secures
macroeconomic stability in its early stage of transition, the institutional
dimension of the transition process (such as improving bureaucratic
quality) becomes more important when a country tries to promote FDI.
This conclusion is reinforced by the analyses of Suehiro (Chapter 7), Lee
(Chapter 8), and Ferraz et al. (Chapter 9) on East Asia and Latin America.
Challenges to social policy
Until the end of the 1980s, the three target regions proceeded along dif-
ferent paths in the field of social policy. In Latin America, under corporat-
ist governments such as the Valgas Administration in Brazil (1930–8) and
the Peron Administration in Argentina (1946–55), social insurance
systems were developed so that by the 1970s almost all workers in the
formal sector had been covered. In contrast, East Asia, except Japan, was
characterized by low social expenditures, and the social insurance systems
offered limited coverage, supplemented by family support. Central Euro-
pean social policy under the communist regime was an inseparable part of
a total political and economic system. In return for political subjugation,
people were provided by the party-state with “full and quasi-obligatory
employment, universal social insurance and a highly developed, typically
company-based system of services and fringe benefits” (Esping-Andersen
1996: 9). In the 1990s, however, these regions implemented drastic
reforms of social policy, and one of the common causes was the market-
based prescription provided by the IMF and the World Bank. Did this
result in convergence of social policy in these regions? Or, did regional
differences persist due to institutional and other legacies peculiar to each
region? The three chapters in Part III deal with this issue.
Koichi Usami (Chapter 11) analyzes social security reform in Latin
America in the 1990s. According to Usami, this reform, especially in pen-
sions and health care, allowed the incorporation of the private sector into
the formerly public social insurance system. Many Latin American govern-
ments also tried to introduce market principles into social security policy.
This process went in the same direction as the economic policy change, as
it shifted from the import substitution industrialization model to the
market-oriented model. In addition, weakened labor unions lost their
power to sustain the former public social security policy. International
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank supported this
process through austerity programs. Under these circumstances, social
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security reforms have been achieved by strong “delegative democracy”
type governments (O’Donnell 1997: 293–7).
However, Usami asserts, there has not been a complete shift in Latin
American social security system to a market model. In the case of pension
systems, most countries adopted a combination system, which introduced
a private capitalization system into a reformed public pay-as-you-go system.
At the same time, political legacies constrained the reform, as in the case
of slow medical insurance reform in Argentina or slow pension system
reform in Brazil. He finally observes the active role of civil society in the
implementation of urgent anti-crisis social assistance in crisis-hit
Argentina. With the demise of labor unions, the Latin American social
security system of the twenty-first century needs a new social power for its
reform and implementation, and civil society itself will have to bear this
burden.
Yasuhiro Kamimura (Chapter 12) conducts a comparative analysis of
East Asian welfare states. The economic crisis of 1997–8 promoted the
debate on the welfare systems of the region. The policy prescriptions of
international financial institutions, however, split between the one-size-fits-
all approach and the country-specific approach. He, therefore, tries to
overcome this split by answering three questions: Why have the social
expenditures in the region been kept much lower than those of the
advanced welfare states? Has the region followed a single trajectory of
welfare development which can be labeled as the “East Asian welfare
model?” Which direction(s) are the welfare systems of East Asian coun-
tries marching towards? How are they located in relation to the reform
trajectories of the advanced welfare states?
His answer to the first question is that the young population structure
of the region has enabled it to save on the cost of social welfare. However,
he emphasizes, low expenditure does not mean that the welfare systems in
the region are embryonic. There have been various social security
schemes in the region, public, communal and private. Concerning the
second question, he concludes that it is difficult to identify the “East Asian
welfare model” common to all countries in the region. Taking Asian NIES
before 1980s, for example, there was a wide difference in the development
of social security schemes, according to whether inclusionary corporatism
had been established or not. Finally, concerning the third question, he
observes that the welfare systems of East Asian countries are changing,
stimulated by democratization and economic crisis. The magnitude and
direction of the change, however, seem to vary among countries, depend-
ing on the character of democratization and the legacy of inclusionary
corporatism.
Takumi Horibayashi (Chapter 13) analyzes the characteristics of the
Central European welfare systems, focusing on those of Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic. After describing the main features of the tradi-
tional communist welfare systems in these countries, he traces the forma-
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tion and transformation of welfare systems since the political change of
1989. In the early stage of the reform, emergency measures were intro-
duced to deal with the social costs of transformation such as mass unem-
ployment, widespread poverty and deteriorating living standards. This
process overlapped with a transition to the three-tier system prevalent in
Western Europe, consisting of social insurance plans, universal benefits
and social assistance policies. Then, since the mid-1990s, the neo-classical
approach to social policy, inspired by the World Bank, became visible in
the region, the core of which was comprised of two elements: the target-
ing of welfare benefits provision to the truly needy, and the privatization
of the pension system in Hungary and Poland. The Czech Republic main-
tained its public pension system because it did not face serious financial
problems.
Although the neo-classical approach has become a notable element of
post-communist social policy in the region, he concludes, it has failed to
permeate deeply into society due to the legacies of the communist era.
People continued to expect a strong commitment to welfare from the
state, and have resisted attempts by post-communist welfare regimes to
move toward a more residualist welfare state. Finally, he poses an import-
ant question for future research. Now that the three countries have joined
the EU, their future social policy and welfare system depend not only on
their own choice but also on the EU’s choice: whether they seek a “Euro-
pean social model” or they aim only to be a winner in global economic
competition.
Challenges of globalization: a continuing agenda
Globalization in the 1990s brought about more challenges than opportun-
ities for developing and transitional economies in many cases. Stakehold-
ers at every level of development and transition sought to find ways to
adapt to the changing international economic environment, which
necessitated rethinking the adequacy of their traditional strategies and
institutions. A market-based policy package for economic restructuring,
often accompanied by market-based social policy reform and promoted by
the international financial institutions and major actors in the industrial
world, became one of the most important guiding principles in this
process. While providing a number of benefits, it was far from being a
panacea. Rather, it had to be modified and reformulated to meet the dif-
ferent historical, institutional and structural settings of each country.
Based on empirical and comparative analyses, this book will show the
readers varied approaches taken in the target countries.
The message of the book is simple. There is no single, universal pre-
scription for managing development and transition. Each country must
invent its own optimal level of state-market relationship. Financial and
corporate restructuring was a common feature of the 1990s. However, its
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content and sequencing differed considerably, as did its effectiveness in
achieving growth, stability and equity. Social policy had to be reformed in
the direction of privatization, but to varying degrees. In sum, the chal-
lenge was to tailor an optimal strategy for development and transition,
taking into consideration specific historical, institutional and structural
settings of each economy, rather than to adopt a universal prescription.
The challenge is not over. Though some of the countries that experi-
enced serious crises in the 1990s have recovered, many are still struggling
to find better ways for managing development and transition. These
processes must be analyzed continuously. Based on further empirical
analyses, models of best practice must be sought, rather than a single, uni-
versal model. This book, therefore, is not an end in itself. Rather, it must
be the first step for finding better ways for managing development and
transition.
Notes
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sus. See, for example, Rodrik (2001) and Chapters 2 (Kawai) and 7 (Suehiro) of
this volume. Recently, Williamson (2003) has published a new volume, entitled
“After the Washington Consensus.”
2 This new focus has led to the establishment of standards and codes of good
practice on data dissemination and transparency in monetary and financial pol-
icies. See Uzan (2001).
3 For a concise explanation of the PRSP, see IMF (2003).
4 As is shown by the failure of the 2001 WTO Cancún Ministerial Conference to
set the modalities of the Doha Development Agenda, this is no easy task, given
the strong distrust of developing countries as to the welfare-enhancing effect of
the WTO. See Howse (2001: 365–8).
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1 Managing global risks and
creating prosperity




The Asian Financial Crisis (hereafter AFC) and the contagion it created
unleashed a process of questioning the wisdom of the standard recipe
of the Washington Consensus. This is still continuing; but the real costs of
the crises have forced on the policy agenda the question of what kinds of
national and international policies and institutions are appropriate during
the current period and in the foreseeable future. In this chapter, I will
discuss the problems of national macroeconomic policies and governance
within a framework of overall global and regional financial architectures.
Whether state capacities exist for the formulation and implementation of
national economic policies may depend in large measure on the kind of
global and regional financial architecture in existence.
The methodological approach adopted here is that of evolutionary eco-
nomics. The institutions I discuss and the alternatives I propose are all
path dependent. They all also depend on a supporting structure of
complementary institutional network (CIN).1 Global financial archi-
tecture (GFA) and Regional financial architecture (RFA) both depend on
their respective CIN within a global system of nation states. Given the real
interdependence within the system, all actors have some stake in sustained
growth and stability with equity. Thus the central argument of this paper
is that sustainable policies at the national level require a supporting
network of GFA and RFAs. Such national policies in their turn can con-
tribute to the sustainability of the GFA and RFA. It can be shown that
following an evolutionary theory of international financial institutions, two
broad types of possible Global Financial Architectures can be identified.2
In this paper, following Khan (2002c) the first is called an overarching type,
exemplified by the classical gold standard and the defunct Bretton Woods
system. The second is called a hybrid form that allows for the existence and
coevolution of some Regional Financial Architectures as well. The chang-
ing roles of the IMF and national economic policies can be examined
within these two possible financial architectures under globalization.
The role of structural unevenness in the global economy is particularly
important to recognize within the proposed framework of analysis. The
range of economies, the types of polities, the institutional capacities and
resource endowments including technological progress and capacities for
innovation all vary widely. A simple system of gold standard or adjustable
peg or free and flexible exchange rate together with free multilateral
trade under, say, the WTO arrangement may therefore be simplistic. It
may better serve the needs of one group of actors, for example, the
advanced economies with well-developed financial services sectors, than
some others. How best to achieve a synchronized growth and develop-
ment regime that is perceived to be fair by all is indeed a challenging
problem. The GFA is defined here as a system of global financial arrange-
ments for international payments with specific rules and procedures for
the member nations to follow. If there exists a similar institutional
arrangement at the supranational but regional level only then I call it an
RFA. It will be seen that one attractive solution to the problem of global
unevenness is to design a GFA which also includes a number of RFAs as an
integral part of the global financial system.
An important initial distinction also needs to be made between the
crisis management and crisis prevention tasks of GFA and RFAs. Of
course, prevention, as the old bromide goes, is better than cure. There-
fore, the GFA and RFAs are to be judged optimal in the sense of achieving
the highest probability of prevention subject to the constraints of the
system. However, it is not clear that the best GFA and RFAs from this
perspective are also the best in promoting growth or managing crisis. For
example at one extreme, an autarchic system may never have a crisis, but
may not promote much growth. If there is a crisis because of domestic
moral hazards and adverse selection problems, it may be difficult to
manage because capabilities do not exist for crisis management under the
assumption that these crises are rare events. But there could be GFAs and
RFAs that can potentially develop the capacity for both better crisis man-
agement and crisis prevention. In a world of bounded rationality and insti-
tutional uncertainty, there may be considerable room for improvement
along both the dimensions in an evolutionary sense. However, in such a
world the application of the pragmatic principle of prudence would
support the development of crisis management capacities at all times,
since it will be difficult to prevent crises entirely under any type of open
economy GFA and RFAs. The main goals, pragmatically speaking, are to
minimize financial and economic instabilities while facilitating global pay-
ments, trade and investments.
Globalization, marketization and the role of global capital
markets3
Globalization of financial markets has increased the flow of various types
of capital across the borders. Observers have cautioned about the adverse
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effects on market stability. Indeed, even as marketization of finance across
borders proceeds rapidly substantial instability is manifest in the global
financial markets. As resistance to further marketization without regula-
tion grows, the instabilities are likely to spread and result in political and
social instabilities as well.4 For this reason alone, it may be wise to adopt a
new and more pragmatic approach to GFA that can help policy making
for greater well-being in the nations of the world. As mentioned before,
this will help prevent a third type of crisis: a political and social crisis. The
developments in Indonesia during the AFC illustrate how suddenly such
crises can break out. The evolutionary theory developed here actually sug-
gests a pragmatic path-dependent institution-building approach to a
hybrid GFA. But the process is likely to be quite complex.
It is because of such complexities that the term “globalization” which is
so much in vogue today has to be used with caution. When viewed histori-
cally, it appears that globalization is a contradictory process of inter-
national economic integration that was severely interrupted by the First
World War, the Great Depression and the Second World War. The emer-
gence of the Bretton Woods framework can be seen as a way to integrate
the world with respect to trade while controlling the flow of private
capital. The demise of Bretton Woods has set in motion forces of capital
account liberalization that are often the most visible aspects of “globaliza-
tion.” However, even this process is fraught with new instabilities as evi-
denced by the Mexican and – more recently and even more dramatically –
by the Asian Financial Crisis. At the same time integration of trade even
within the standard neoclassical Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model
would imply a fall in the wages of unskilled workers of the North thus
increasing inequality there (Krugman 1996). The South is supposed to
experience a more equalizing effect through trade; but empirically, there
is very little evidence of this happening. Therefore, it is necessary to treat
the rhetoric of globalization with caution. At best, we are experiencing a
“fractured” globalization. Integration of financial markets, for example,
can lead to great benefits for all in a truly liberal world of equal actors.
However, in a world of unevenness the evolutionary paths may lead to
crisis unless institutions are designed properly. Leaving everything to the
markets may produce the supreme irony of ultimately leading to crises
which prevent some very important capital and commodity markets from
functioning.
For these reasons, it is best to ask what roles the global capital markets
are supposed to perform in a world of free capital mobility. The functions
are variously described, but mainly emphasize the transfer of resources
from savers to investors globally. In addition, the agglomeration of capital,
selection of projects, monitoring, contract enforcement, risk sharing and
pooling of risks are also mentioned. All these are legitimate functions of
capital markets. However, despite much talk the crucial problem of hand-
ling various kinds of risks and the inability of simple free markets with
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international capital mobility are nearly always elided. What are some of
the most important of these risks?
Exchange rate risk refers to the possibility that a country’s currency
may experience a precipitous decline in value. This risk is present in any
type of exchange rate regime, with full or even partial currency convert-
ibility. Both floating exchange rates and pegging a currency to another
single currency, or even a basket of currencies present such exchange rate
risk to various degrees.
Capital flight risk refers to the possibility that both domestic and
foreign holders of financial assets will sell their holdings whenever there is
an expectation of a capital loss. Exchange rate risk is one possible avenue
through which such expectations may be formed. As with many types of
expectations formation mechanisms, in a world of nonlinearity, bounded
rationality and uncertainty, a Keynesian type of short-termism takes over.
Investors head for the exit simply on the basis of short-term calculations of
possible loss, and herd behavior is a likely outcome. Financial distress
follows for the hapless country from which capital thus exits in a hurry. In
the extreme situation of large short-term liabilities, the affected economy
may land in a full-blown financial or even economic crisis.
There is thus a systemic risk of financial fragility associated with the
above risks, and the stability of the financial and political institutions. This
type of systemic risk raises the possibility of a financial meltdown. In case
of the AFC, the risk of financial fragility increased over the 1990s through
maturity mismatch of loans. The fact that many of the short-term loans
were in foreign currencies without risk-sharing mechanisms such as cur-
rency swaps in place, created further exchange rate risk, which also
increased the potential systemic risk. This is consistent with the view of
Knight (1998), who affirms that although globalization has brought about
spectacular increase in the flow of capital to emerging markets, the AFC
demonstrates that it can also create financial instability and contagion.
Under fairly realistic conditions, the banking system of emerging
economies can respond in ways that worsen the impact of adverse shocks,
causing severe macroeconomic repercussions and exacerbating systemic
financial and economic fragility.
In the case of the AFC, we also witnessed a fourth kind of risk for
vulnerable economies that others have also recognized.5 This is the risk of
contagion.6 Some countries were unnecessarily victimized simply because
expectations moved against their economic prospects as their neighbors
experienced financial fragility and capital flight. This has important
implications for both global and regional financial architecture. Both GFA
and RFAs should try to minimize the contagion risk. Contagion can
happen even without much financial and trade openness. However, the
more integrated with the rest of the world, or even a region, an economy
is, the more is the risk of contagion. There is some theoretical support for
this last proposition in specific markets that are being globalized. For
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example, some argue that the globalization of securities markets can
promote contagion among investors by weakening incentives of gathering
costly country-specific information because the marginal benefit of gather-
ing information may be decreasing as securities markets become more
global in scope.7
The key problem which underlies the above risk scenarios, long recog-
nized by the practitioners before theorists started to study it, is that given
informational problems and the cost of building enforcing institutions,
capital markets are almost always incomplete. Thus classical theorems of
welfare economics no longer apply even within a closed economy. In a
world of open economies these problems become more severe, and are
directly related to the lack of global institutions of governance. The recog-
nition of this point underlies the various proposals advanced so far. There
are already many proposals for GFAs on the table.8 Even a partial cata-
loging will have to include the many national proposals (e.g. US, UK,
French and Canadian), private proposals such as Soros’ credit insurance
agency, Edward’s specialized agencies, Bergsten’s target zones and so on,
and other international proposals. Among the international proposals
could be included the IMF proposals, G7 and G22 proposals. Although
they vary in scope and degrees of political realism, they share one feature
in common. All of them fall into the overarching type of GFA category.
Although many of the proposals for GFA are possible theoretical solu-
tions, the evolutionary approach looks at path dependence and sequential
selection processes as crucial. We need to recognize that the actual evolu-
tion of such institutions of financial governance will depend crucially on
coordination among the actors, in particular among some key actors in
the global system. This leads us to the consideration of an evolutionary
structural theory of GFA and RFAs.
An evolutionary theory of GFA: two evolutionary types of
GFA
In order to motivate the discussion, we can return to some aspects of the
AFC. In distinguishing among the countries that managed to survive the
AFC and those that did not, John Williamson, one of the proponents of
the “Washington Consensus,” pointed out that whether or not these coun-
tries had liberalized their capital accounts could be construed as crucial.
Those that had not, survived.9
All Asian crisis countries had accepted the IMF’s Article VIII obliga-
tions, as evident from the historical documents. But as some have pointed
out, liberalizing the trade and liberalizing the financial sector have differ-
ent policy implications.10 In line with the discussion in the previous
section, theoretically, one should carefully distinguish the welfare impacts
of financial market liberalization in an uneven world from such impact in
a smooth world of equals with information symmetry. Indeed, next to
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unevenness, the most critical element is the role and the presence of asym-
metric information. In a financial market, gathering, selecting, using and
providing information are central to its proper functioning, yet it is pre-
cisely here that market failures from asymmetric information can arise.11
But the evolutionary structural theory goes further than simply cata-
loging moral hazard and adverse selection problems. On the explanans
side are also the asymmetries in the size, structure and capabilities of the economies
and polities. These asymmetries constrain some polities, particularly the
economically disadvantaged ones, from developing as quickly as possible
in an equitable manner. The recent UNCTAD report on the poorest
underdeveloped countries points this out empirically.12 The theoretical
significance of these features of the real world is that no uniform set of
rules can work for all the economies and polities in the world. A fortiori, it
follows that for GFA and RFAs to serve these poor countries as well as the
rich countries equally well, special provisions should be in place.
It may appear that the least developed countries are only a special
case. But that is not the case. The NIEs, the European social demo-
cracies, Japan and so on, each in its own way, is also different. This poses
the real theoretical challenge: how can we even attempt to theorize in
the face of such diversity? The way out is through a consideration of the
basic needs of the system and asking if these can be satisfied better
under arrangements that are different from the IMF and the “Washing-
ton Consensus.”
Recent work by Barry Eichengreen and others shows that it is possible
to move beyond the post Bretton Woods situation.13 In contrast with the
conservative Meltzer report, all of these authors emphasize the need to
strengthen the IMF in certain dimensions. However, not all of them recog-
nize the crucial need also for the RFAs and the role they can play in creat-
ing an enabling environment for the state to implement beneficial
economic policies. A completely evolutionary theory of GFA recognizes
the need for RFAs from both an evolutionary and a structural perspective.
Given the lack of political resolve, a point made forcefully by Eichengreen
among others, there is little chance of creating institutional structures in the
manner of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement. The recent path of 
the world economy does not lead to this immediately. At the same time,
the recent path does not lead only to neoliberalism. It is possible to both
reform the IMF, as Eichengreen suggests, and to create new RFAs to com-
plement such reforms. Thus this theory leads to the question of identify-
ing a spectrum of GFAs. Most important among these are those that
combine the GFAs like a reformed IMF with appropriate RFAs.
Formally, the heuristic argument presented above can be established
via a careful consideration of path dependence during evolution of the GFA.
In order to do this in a conceptually rigorous manner, the concept of path
dependence itself has to be refined and formalized in a specific way. I have
developed this idea elsewhere, and will only sketch the conceptual path to
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be followed briefly.14 Briefly, there can be completely deterministic (CD),
completely stochastic (CS) and partially deterministic (PD) characteriza-
tions of path dependence. Eschewing the formal apparatus of graph
theory and neural network dynamics which can be used to describe these
rigorously, we can simply say that in deterministic path dependence there
is only one choice of path. Everything is as it should be, since there are no
bifurcations at any point in history. In fact, we can make a stronger state-
ment. At no point in history is there even a possibility of even a bifurcation.
Most people will see this as an extreme, and in the case of human institu-
tional design, perhaps as an unrealistic case.
The purely stochastic case is all random mutation. Again, there is no way
that conscious choice can play a role here. Blind chance determines the
outcome. The last type of path dependence, that is, the PD variety, leaves
some room for evolution to be a result of at least some kind of boundedly
rational human activity. In this case, a complex set of human activities
including learning and improving policy-making capabilities can influ-
ence which network of paths are followed over time. While the number of
available paths at any point in history may be large, they are never infinite.
Therefore, combinatorial mathematics will in most cases show the exist-
ence of the most likely evolutionary outcome. However, the caveat that
large, seemingly random fluctuations (e.g. a war) can throw these calcula-
tions off is always a (rare) possibility.
Fortunately, barring such events as wars, revolutions, complete melt-
downs of financial systems and so on, there are not at present an unman-
ageably large number of outcomes that are possible for the GFA. In fact, if
we are willing to assume a continuum with nothing but an overarching
global architecture for international finance with regional impurities
added as another type, we have just two types of possible evolutionary out-
comes for the institutional history of GFAs from a theoretical point of
view. In terms of Aoki’s theory of comparative institutional analysis framed
in evolutionary game theory, there are multiple institutional equilibria;
but the selection process specified here leaves only two broad types of
equilibria to be considered.15
The first type, which can be created at special evolutionary moments,
can be called Overarching GFAs. Gold standard under the UK hegemony
and Bretton Woods under the threats of a postwar depression are two
examples. Recent history does not support the hope that such events are
about to happen again. Therefore, a second type of evolutionary path
resulting in a hybrid form should be recognized. This is the hybrid coexis-
tence of a GFA together with one or many RFAs. We can call this type a
hybrid GFA for shorthand reference. Once again, Asia after the AFC is a
good place to begin the analysis.
In the Asian case, as many have observed, the financial sector liberaliza-
tion followed the pre-AFC GFA by default. There were some short-term
gains of the policy, but ultimately it resulted in severe instability. More
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generally, as Kaminsky and Reinhart show,16 based on the episodes of 76
currency crises, of which 26 are also characterized by banking crises,
financial sector liberalization can result in a boom-bust cycle by providing
easy access to short-term financing. Proponents of liberalization suggest
some sort of micro sequencing in order to prevent such adverse con-
sequences. With some variations, the most commonly suggested sequence
is: improve the quality of regulation, make sure it is enforced and then
improve the supervisory mechanisms. Once the markets are liberalized,
the level of a bank’s minimum capital requirements can be brought closer
to what the Basle Accord requires.
As one author, who, of course, does not use the same terminology as
developed here, nevertheless points out, there is a contradiction in this
type of GFA arrangement.17
But when the Asian crisis countries liberalized the financial sector in
the 1980s, the aforementioned preconditions (assumptions) were not in
place. Yet, they were rushed to liberalize by the IFI. Ironically, when at the
early stage the policy showed favorable impacts, for example higher eco-
nomic growth, greater access to financial services, the IFI applauded it.
But when the crisis hit, the very same countries previously praised were
swiftly placed into the category of those with misplaced development strat-
egies. All of a sudden, nothing was right with these countries. When con-
fronted with such an embarrassing contradiction, the international
institutions are quick to claim that they actually saw the faults, and had
already reminded the governments about the existing flaws (e.g. weak
banking system, unsustainable exchange rate system, and widespread
corruption).18
An IMF recommendation during this period led to the increase in
interest rates. Because of the common prescription under the GFA, this
occurred in all Asian crisis countries. Such high rates created more moral
hazard and adverse selection problems, thus showing that the incentive
system has indeed been altered, and led to the undertaking of bad risk by
the banking sector. As Azis correctly points out:
Under these circumstances, the amount of investment credits going to
risky sector rose (adverse selection), the incidence of bail out in the
absence of free-exit scheme also increased (moral hazard), and the
subsequent banks’ franchise values (expected returns) declined. All
these are precisely what the “pre-conditions prior to liberalization” are
expected to avoid. Thus, the implicit logic is inherently self-conflict-
ing, i.e., expecting bank’s prudent behavior while allowing “franchise
value” to fall. The suggested preconditions, although seemingly
logical, simply do not match with the prevailing institutional con-
ditions.19
Azis points out further:
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The IMF persistently argued for liberalizing the sector and meeting
the pre-conditions simultaneously. A study by the Fund on the
sequencing of capital account liberalization using the case of Chile,
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, for example, stresses the importance
of proper sequencing if benefits from the liberalization are to be
achieved and the risks to be minimized. The study also argues that
financial sector liberalization, especially capital account liberalization,
should be a part of a coordinated and comprehensive approach, in
which the sequencing of regulatory and institutional reforms is criti-
cal. The design of macroeconomic and exchange rate policies should
also play a vital role (Johnston et al. 1997). While intuitively making
sense, such conclusions are too broad, far from being practical. No
one would argue against the importance of making liberalization
policy (or any policy for that matter) consistent with the prevailing
macroeconomic policy. But how you do it remains unanswered. The
information contained in such a study is of limited value to policy
makers. Yet, while many countries still had problems to meet the
stated preconditions, they were pushed to accelerate the liberalization
policy by recommending one or two new measures to safeguard. More
often than not, these measures are based on the practice of developed
countries that have different institutional conditions [emphasis
mine].20
Here the author correctly pinpoints the failure to recognize unevenness as
a key feature of the failure of the IMF to prescribe the correct medicine.
In fact, the IMF did much worse: it prescribed the wrong medicine, a set
of measures that worsened the impact of the AFC. This situation illustrates
the danger of being in the grip of a (pseudo-) universalistic theory that
simply cannot be applied in the real world of unevenness without serious
distortions that may cause great harm. An alternative is to work with our
type-two hybrid combination of GFA and RFAs. Again, Asia can be used as
an illustration. There are many aspects one could focus on; I choose to
look at the debt and capital flows situation prior to the crisis in specific
countries.
As both Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show, the borrowing in short-term market
and the increased flow of foreign capital both occurred almost simultan-
eously in these countries. As the real exchange rate appreciated, competi-
tiveness suffered, and vulnerability to sudden reversals of capital flows
increased. It must be emphasized that these were systemic features that
went largely unnoticed by the IMF or the private sector. As is well known,
in a nonlinear system the vulnerability to sudden shocks is a logical possi-
bility. In case of Asia, this became an empirical reality of nightmare pro-
portions.
With most debtors being in the corporate sector during the AFC, the
capacity to invest became severely constrained. The debt-deflation scenario
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Table 1.1 External debt outstanding (US$ billions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
ASEAN-4
External debt 144.3 166.1 180.9 194.1 221.8 257.0 274.5
Short-term debt 25.7 33.8 41.7 49.6 58.2 69.8 80.4
(% of total debt) 17.8 20.3 23.0 25.6 26.2 27.2 29.3
Long-term debt 118.6 132.3 139.2 144.5 163.6 187.2 194.1
(% of total debt) 82.2 79.7 77.0 74.4 73.8 72.8 70.7
Indonesia
External debt 69.8 79.9 88.3 89.6 96.6 116.3 118.1
(% of GDP) 65.9 68.4 69.0 56.6 54.6 53.3 52.0
Short-term debt 11.1 14.3 18.1 18.0 17.1 24.3 29.3
(% of total debt) 15.9 17.9 20.5 20.1 17.7 20.9 24.8
Long-term debt 58.7 65.6 70.2 71.6 79.5 92.0 88.8
(% of total debt) 84.1 82.1 79.5 79.9 82.3 79.1 75.2
Debt-service ratio 30.9 32.0 31.6 33.8 30.0 33.7 33.0
Malaysia
External debt 16.0 18.1 19.8 23.2 24.8 33.2 31.6
(% of GDP) 37.6 37.9 34.6 37.1 37.5 40.3 38.1
Short-term debt 1.9 2.1 3.6 6.9 6.2 7.3 7.5
(% of total debt) 11.9 11.6 18.2 29.8 25.0 22.0 23.7
Long-term debt 14.1 16.0 16.2 16.3 18.6 25.9 24.1
(% of total debt) 88.1 88.4 81.8 70.2 75.0 78.0 76.3
Debt-service ratio 10.3 7.7 6.6 7.7 7.7 6.1 6.0
Philippines
External debt 30.3 32.2 33.3 35.7 39.3 39.5 45.7
(% of GDP) 69.1 71.5 62.3 66.1 61.3 53.2 56.0
Short-term debt 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.0 5.7 6.0 6.3
(% of total debt) 14.5 15.2 15.9 14.0 14.5 15.2 13.8
Long-term debt 25.9 27.3 28.0 30.7 33.6 33.5 39.4
(% of total debt) 85.5 84.8 84.1 86.0 85.5 84.8 86.2
Debt-service ratio 27.0 23.0 24.4 25.5 18.5 15.1 15.4
Thailand
External debt 28.1 35.9 39.5 45.7 61.1 68.1 79.0
(% of GDP) 32.9 36.4 35.5 41.7 45.3 47.0 49.9
Short-term debt 8.3 12.5 14.7 19.7 29.2 32.2 37.3
(% of total debt) 29.5 34.8 37.2 43.1 47.8 47.3 47.2
Long-term debt 19.8 23.4 24.8 26.0 31.9 35.9 41.7
(% of total debt) 70.5 65.2 62.8 56.9 52.2 52.7 52.8
Debt-service ratio 16.9 13.0 13.7 18.5 15.6 11.7 14.5
Sources: Compiled by the author with data from International Financial Statistics (1997);
World Debt Tables (1996).
became the reality because the price effects of depreciated exchange rates
did not occur until much later, if at all. Hence, the initial currency crisis
became first a more general financial crisis and then a full-blown economic
crisis. In Indonesia it also became a social and political crisis.
The AFC showed that the composition of capital flows matters. The fact
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Table 1.2 Net capital flows (% of GDP)
1983–8 1989–95 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China
Net private 1.2 2.5 1.7 0.9 4.5 5.6 5.2 4.7 3.7
capital flows
Net direct 0.4 2.9 0.9 1.7 5.3 5.9 4.8 4.6 4.3
investment
Net portfolio 0.2 0.2 0.1 – 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2
investment
Other net 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.6 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.8
investment
Net official 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
flows
Change in 0.4 2.2 3.7 0.5 0.4 5.6 3.2 4.0 4.5
reserves
Indonesia
Net private 1.5 4.2 4.6 2.5 3.1 3.9 6.2 6.3 1.6
capital flows
Net direct 0.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.8 2.0
investment
Net portfolio 0.1 0.4 – – 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.4
investment
Other net 1.0 2.6 3.5 1.4 0.7 1.9 3.1 2.7 0.1
investment
Net official 2.4 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.0
flows
Change in – 1.4 2.4 3.0 1.3 0.4 0.7 2.3 1.8
reserves
Malaysia
Net private 3.1 8.8 11.2 15.1 17.4 1.5 8.8 9.6 4.7
capital flows
Net direct 2.3 6.5 8.3 8.9 7.8 5.7 4.8 5.1 5.3
investment
Net portfolio n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
investment
Other net 0.8 2.3 2.9 6.2 9.7 4.2 4.1 4.5 0.6
investment
Net official 0.3 – 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
flows
Change in 1.8 4.7 2.6 11.3 17.7 4.3 2.0 2.5 3.6
reserves
Philippines
Net private 2.0 2.7 1.6 2.0 2.6 5.0 4.6 9.8 0.5
capital flows
Net direct 0.7 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4
investment
Net portfolio – 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 5.3
investment
continued
that there were sudden reversals of capital flows during 1997 and 1998 led
many to believe that most capital flows in the region were of portfolio
investment type. Reversals of such capital can strain the region’s financial
system sufficiently to cause or exacerbate its collapse. However, while it is
true that portfolio investment was on the rise, data indicate that foreign
direct investment (FDI) remained the largest in all Asian crisis countries.
As shown in Table 1.1, in all Asian crisis countries foreign debts increased
persistently until the onset of the crisis. These are debts of the private
sector from foreign private lenders. Regional monitoring with the help of
a theory such as the one proposed here could have caught the problem
and a regionally, ultimately globally, coordinated solution could have
been attempted. But this was never a possibility under the then existing
circumstances. We now know that financial and balance-of-payments crises
became interlinked precisely because of the existence of foreign-currency-
denominated liabilities (foreign debt) in the domestic financial system.21
This hindsight can be used to develop RFAs in Asia, Latin America and a
few other regions.
In Asia, a “Washington Consensus” policy mix of monetary tightening
and fiscal restraints was imposed as part of the IMF conditionalities. The
experience during the Mexican Crisis in 1995 had convinced the Fund
that such a policy mix was appropriate for Asia as well, despite the fact
that the pre-crisis conditions in Asia were quite otherwise.22 Another
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Table 1.2 continued
1983–8 1989–95 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Other net 2.7 0.9 0.2 0.6 1.1 2.5 2.4 8.5 4.5
investment
Net official 2.4 2.0 3.3 1.9 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.8
flows
Change in 0.5 1.1 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.9 0.9 4.8 2.1
reserves
Thailand
Net private 3.1 10.2 10.7 8.7 8.4 8.6 12.7 9.3 10.9
capital flows
Net direct 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.3
investment
Net portfolio 0.7 1.3 – 0.5 3.2 0.9 1.9 0.6 0.4
investment
Other net 1.5 7.4 9.2 6.8 4.1 7.0 10.0 7.7 12.6
investment
Net official 0.7 – 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.7 4.9
flows
Change in 1.4 4.1 4.3 2.8 3.2 3.0 4.4 1.2 9.7
reserves
Source: Compiled by the author with data from World Economic Outlook (December 1997).
element emerged in Asia that was indeed new. The IMF suggested a rather
radical and fundamental change in the countries’ institutional structure.23
In the event, neither set turned out to have been well-conceived.
As already observed, the Fund’s insistence on severely tightening the
monetary policy by raising the interest rates turned out to be incorrect
and counterproductive. Its arguments for remaking many institutions in
Asia did not make evolutionary sense although all would agree that
ending corruption, curtailing special business privileges and imposing the
practice of good governance, including good corporate governance, were
good overall goals.24 But quite apart from the well-known fact that this falls
outside the Fund’s mandate, such adjustments at the time could result in
further instability. In the words of Morris Goldstein, an ex-IMF staff
member: “both the scope and the depth of the Fund’s conditions were excessive. . . .
They clearly strayed outside their area of expertise. . . . If a nation is so plagued with
problems that it needs to make 140 changes before it can borrow, then maybe the
fund should not lend.” 25 Although not a conscious advocate of the evolu-
tionary theory advanced here, Goldstein’s long experience and solid sense
of institutional matters led him to the right conclusions in this matter.
Before leaving the question of the analytical distinction between the
two types of GFAs, it is instructive to ask whether the theory of the second
best is relevant in making this distinction. Although the language of evolu-
tionary theory is different, this can be done in a way that throws further
light on why the hybrid form is important. In a first best world without
frictions, information problems and market imperfections, an overarching
GFA is indeed optimal. However, once we depart from any of these we are
in the second best world. Interestingly, given these imperfections, at least
along some dimensions, a hybrid architecture with RFAs can (locally)
improve upon the surveillance problems that an overarching GFA will
face. As long as local information gathering and monitoring can be
improved under a (local) RFA, there is an advantage to having an RFA. In
the world of second best, this can be called “the principle of localism.”26
Towards a workable hybrid GFA: RFAs, the IMF and
national policy management during transition
But how is the transition towards a hybrid GFA to be effected? What con-
ceptual modifications are necessary to the way in which we have become
accustomed to thinking under the present institutional order? The
present and following sections are all intended to answer these questions.
The present section will consider some general issues and the possible
formation of RFAs while the following two will address how the IMF can
be modified and what such a modified IMF together with an Asian RFA
could have done to handle the situation before, during and after the AFC.
If the argument presented so far is valid, then several propositions can
be accepted. First, there may be more than one evolutionary possibility; so
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there may not be a unique, global optimum set of institutions. Second, the
goal of achieving stability and sustainable growth in a world of scarce
resources leads to exercising prudence as a principle, particularly when
costs are distributed unevenly over space and time. Third, a combination
of global institutions with regional and national level institutions may
provide more public good than focusing simply at the global level. The
case for RFAs has so far rested implicitly on the third proposition. I now
wish to elaborate more on this point and link it to the formulation of
national economic policies and institution building at the national level as
well. It is best to focus again on a concrete case such as post-crisis Asia to
give substance to the formal argument.
Since the crisis, the IMF, the World Bank and the national policy-
making bodies have been in intense consultation. The individual East
Asian economies have taken numerous measures such as improving bank
supervision, allowing greater exchange rate flexibility and so on to inocu-
late themselves against future capital account shocks. However, most of
them are still vulnerable to large negative capital account shocks. The
national strategy of having a very large stock of foreign reserves to deal
with large capital flight may work. But it is an extremely expensive strat-
egy. No one can foretell how frequent such crises may be, and how expen-
sive; but if the past is any guide, even infrequent crises can be quite
expensive to manage in this manner. This is not to say that such measures
should not be taken. On the contrary, these measures are and should be a
part of the transitional national management strategy. However, more is
clearly needed. It seems that following this logic, an increasing number of
East Asian policy makers are realizing that although they may not have the
capacity to change the international financial architecture immediately,
creating a regional financial architecture may be an attainable goal. There
can be a whole range of regional financial cooperation policies leading to
more permanent institution building. These could begin with a peer
review process such as the G7 process. Using this as the reference point, a
move to mutual liquidity provision and some form of enforcement
mechanism could be adopted. These could be enhanced through
exchange rate coordination and an enhanced surveillance process. Ulti-
mately, such a process could evolve into an RFA that could have its own
institutional and organizational structure.
In the Asian case, such an evolutionary process has already started. The
most important steps taken so far are: the Manila Framework Group
Meeting, the ASEAN Surveillance Process, the ASEAN3 Surveillance
Process, and the Chiangmai Inititative-related Surveillance Process.
It can be said that the performance of the Manila Framework Group as
a mechanism for regional financial cooperation and regional financial
surveillance has not yet reached its potential. The reasons are related to
institutional incapacity which has prevented the parties from specifying
clearly the objectives of information exchange and surveillance. Con-
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sequently, no priorities, targets and rules have been set for the process of
information exchange and surveillance. Most importantly, there is no
actual peer review process; the surveillance process seems to be simply
general discussion of the global and regional economic outlook. Finally,
there seems to be no attempt to formulate any country-specific or region-
wide recommendations for policy actions – a point to which I will return
at the end.
The other processes also have much room for improvement and actual
prospects for improvement, as shown by the Chiangmai Inititative-related
Surveillance Process. In addition to an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrange-
ment (ASA) that includes all ASEAN members and a network of bilateral
swap agreements among ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South
Korea, the initiative has opened the door for further discussion about con-
crete policy coordination and institution building. In so far as the swap
arrangements are concerned, currently 10 percent of the swap arrange-
ments can be disbursed without IMF involvement.
Even with this modest beginning, there is now a need for the swap-
providing countries to formulate their own assessments about the swap-
requesting country. Costs of such information gathering can be
economized through regional cooperation. Such a move will also make it
possible to pre-qualify members for assistance if and when the need for
such assistance arises. This will also help fight contagion and prevent
capital flight when actions are taken promptly before a crisis point is
reached because of avoidable delays. Acting in accordance with the prin-
ciples of prudent management stated earlier, there could be a regular
policy dialogue at the deputy minister level. Finally, at the organizational
level, the evolutionary approach could lead to the establishment of an
independent surveillance unit to serve as the core of an RFA, and to lead
the policy dialogue. The proposed policy dialogue process should pay
particular attention to the root problems in East Asia’s weak financial
systems (e.g. prudential supervision, risk management and corporate gov-
ernance), and actively promote the development and integration of long-
term capital markets. At this point, it is not essential to pinpoint any
further the precise organizational blueprint for such an RFA; but the
point that the process underway can result in an appropriate institutional
structure with proper organizational design is important to grasp. Evolu-
tionary economic theory suggests that an open architecture will be better
able to absorb future shocks, learn from them and modify itself.27
There are two key aspects of such an interrelated architecture that will
crucially affect the workability of a possible RFA in Asia or in any other
region. First, the willingness of a reformed IMF to permit the RFAs to have
a certain degree of regional autonomy. For this the complementarity and
burden-sharing aspects of the GFA with RFAs need to be recognized. This
is a special case of complementary institutional network (CIN). Second,
and another instance of CIN, is viability and cooperation at the national
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level. A slogan accompanying globalization is that the nation state can no
longer act on its own. This may be true in certain areas of macroeconomic
policy, but on a wide range of issues from tax policies to environmental
policies the national governments can, within limits, formulate and imple-
ment policies. In the area of finance, even under WTO rules, there are
possibilities of not only policy maneuvering but also of institutional
reform and new institution building. In addition to addressing such
matters as prudential supervision, risk management and corporate gover-
nance, the need for building other institutions for risk sharing, human
development and policy dialogues within the nation loom large as tasks
during the transitional management at the national level.
One final observation regarding the creation of an RFA within Asia is
necessary before moving to a discussion of the future of the IMF in the
next section. To put it in the most concrete and perhaps provocative way,
could the Chiangmai Initiative foreshadow an East Asian Monetary
System?
The AFC has led to a collapse of the dollar pegging most of the
economies in East Asia had before the crisis. The East Asian economies
prefer a certain amount of exchange rate stability due to their multilateral
trade dependence. They also see some advantages to be gained from
coordination against speculative attacks, and preventing competitive
devaluations in the region. However, fixing rates with respect to one
another like the EMS earlier also carries dangers. Furthermore, the US
dollar is still the most important vehicle currency in the region. There-
fore, whether something like a yen bloc, or even an Asian Currency Unit
(ACU) can be created in the near future is doubtful.
At the same time, the experience of the AFC points towards closer
coordination and a concerted effort to reduce volatility in the currency
and financial markets. Since there are asymmetries among the countries
in the region, the more advanced countries need to take the lead and
ensure that in times of asymmetric shocks, the less advanced countries will
have resources to call upon. Thus any kind of step towards an RFA will
have to involve adequate reserves and the ability to provide liquidity and
other resources to countries that need these in times of crisis.
The changing role of the IMF within a hybrid GFA
In this section I want to address what is perhaps the most important insti-
tutional and policy question that arises from the proposal for a hybrid
GFA. What will be the role of the IMF, and how will this new role differ
from its present or neoliberal role? As mentioned already, the handling of
the AFC by the IMF has raised important issues of global governance. The
Fund has been criticized by the left, the right, and also the center. I have
already alluded to some of the ways in which the IMF will need to change
its ways if the hybrid form of GFA I am suggesting here is to become a
32 Haider A. Khan
viable option for institution building. Elsewhere, I have pointed out the
need for adhering to some basic principles as the IMF transforms itself in
an “extended panda’s thumb” manner.28 Chief among these principles are
the principle of symmetry and the principle of burden sharing. These are
described briefly below:
1 The principle of symmetry, that is, the surplus and deficit countries
should be treated equally. However, it was not realized in the past; nor
is it likely to be realized in the near future. However, there are various
ways to pursue this as a goal even under the current setup of the IMF.
If serious efforts are made to follow this principle by a reformed IMF,
that will be an important step towards a new and better GFA.
2 The principle of burden-sharing, that is, during episodes of crisis manage-
ment, the IMF will share the management burden with the RFAs and
through them also with the affected countries and their neighbors.
It should be kept in mind that in keeping with the “extended panda’s
thumb” argument both the principles recognize the practical impossibility
of the IMF being transformed into a global central bank in the near
future. What the IMF cannot do now and will not be able to do in the
foreseeable future is to follow Bagehot’s dictum to lend freely against
good collateral at a high interest rate in time of crisis. Unless SDRs
become the commonly accepted and easily expandable means of settle-
ment, this role will remain foreclosed. It is unlikely that the principal
shareholders of the IMF will allow such a change to occur.29 Also, com-
pared to a national central bank dealing with a problematic domestic
financial institution, the IMF has a limited ability to force corrective
action. Yet, there will clearly be a role for IMF lending, and the conse-
quent moral hazard will need to be recognized. But just as the moral
hazard from having fire fighters ready to fight fires does not compel
thoughtful communities to abolish fire stations, the global community
also cannot abolish the IMF, or reduce its resources simply because there
is a moral hazard problem associated with such institutions. The second
principle above, the principle of burden sharing with the RFAs, national
governments and the private sectors should go some distance towards
both increasing the overall resources available, and mitigating the moral
hazard.
While the Fund cannot now, or even in the near future, be expected to
act as a global central banker, pressures for increasing the net supply and
poor country allocations of SDR will have beneficial effects. Even if the
increases are not significant in the short run, the tendency will keep alive
the eventual goal of forming a global central bank, as Keynes had envi-
sioned. More practically, putting pressure on the IMF to emit new SDRs in
order to finance the stabilization of primary (and perhaps other) com-
modity prices will lead to benefits for both the developing and the
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developed countries in the intermediate run. The stabilization of these
prices will help many developing countries avert balance of payment disas-
ters. Furthermore, to the extent that the unusual price increases, such as
the oil price increase in the 1970s, create general inflationary pressures,
such pressures can also be averted. A smooth international transactions
pattern will thus be consistent with domestic price stabilization as well.
In addition, the Fund can make a concerted effort to manage the
private creditors. Most important from the point of view of managing
crises will be the incorporation of new provisions on loan contracts so that
orderly workout procedures become feasible. The Fund can also lend into
arrears as a means to provide debtor-in-possession financing. Such a provi-
sion, along with more direct measures vis-à-vis the creditors, can help to
bring the creditors to the bargaining table during a crisis.
Such measures to manage the creditors should also be complemented
by increased surveillance of financial markets. Strengthening supervision
is one aspect. Arriving at independent assessments of financial risk is
another, related aspect of moving in this direction. However, it is import-
ant to realize that even after adopting this stance, the risk of crises will still
remain. Not all crises can be foreseen, much less prevented. The best that
can be done is to draw the countries, the private sector and the RFAs
together in an effort to strengthen the financial structures, including
information gathering and processing capabilities. A cooperative structure
where the Fund recognizes the need for hybridity will also help to reduce
the reaction time.
Reducing the reaction time can help only if the policies undertaken
cannot do much harm even if they are not successful in achieving their
positive aim. The IMF has been correctly criticized for suggesting a “one-
size-fits-all” policy package. Here again, a changed institutional structure
with a more flexible IMF will mean a case-by-case approach where the
RFAs will play a significant role. National economic policies such as
requiring borrowers to unwind positions in increasingly risky situations,
curbing excessive foreign borrowing, limiting portfolio investment, cau-
tionary policies towards derivatives and off-balance sheet items may need
to be examined as serious policy options. Tobin tax, or individual country
taxes of the Chilean variety should also be given serious consideration.
The mantra of free capital movements together with the refrain that there
is no alternative needs to be revised appropriately to incorporate the avail-
able tools that the Fund can help countries use to mitigate the risks
arising from such capital movements.
It is not clear that the Fund can do much in instituting a more stable
exchange rate regime. The pegged rate system, advocated among others,
surprisingly, by the Wall Street Journal, will create one-way bets for specula-
tors. Free floating, on the other hand, can lead to disasters when
exchange rates collapse suddenly instead of finding a new stable equilib-
rium. Such perverse dynamics was observed during the AFC, particularly
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in the Indonesian case. Neither currency boards nor perfect flexibility can
prevent vulnerable currencies from collapsing. Rather, a managed float
before any signs of crisis appear together with a prudent management of
the financial and real sectors would seem to be both pragmatic and feasi-
ble at this point. Strengthening the capacities of central banks will have
better pay off here than urging the IMF to twist the arms of the countries
through conditionalities.
In Asia, in addition to the high interest rate standard recipe, the IMF
seized the crisis as an opportunity to dismantle what remained of the
particular mix of institutions that had historically evolved to create the so-
called “Asian Model of Development.” Widespread and massive bank clo-
sures, enterprise restructuring, opening up sectors to foreign ownership,
tearing down labor institutions in the name of flexibility and attacks on
living standards seemed to be a part of an overarching agenda. This type
of radical restructuring under duress is not the way to apply the principles
that are being advocated here.
In spite of widespread criticism from many quarters, the IMF remains
committed to capital account liberalization as an ultimate goal. The AFC
and similar crises have merely given it pause to consider proper sequenc-
ing before liberalization. The structural evolutionary theory together with
the “extended panda’s thumb” argument point to a more nuanced, less
global approach. Some economies may be ready for capital account liber-
alization; others are not. The IMF needs to distinguish among them care-
fully, and not adopt capital account liberalization as a principle enshrined
in its revised Articles of Agreement.
It goes without saying that proper sequencing, better monitoring and
management of debt, greater transparency in both government and
private sector operations and more effective regulation of domestic finan-
cial institutions are all desirable policy goals. Also desirable are domestic
tax policies that do not encourage excessive reliance on short-term capital
inflows. However, in a world of unevenness some countries may also
require temporary capital controls through various means. The IMF,
instead of taking a dogmatic approach that says “no” to any form of capital
control, should set up facilities for examining the impacts of different
alternatives. In doing so, it should also pay attention to the principle of
symmetry so that the borrowing countries do not always and everywhere
have to take the initiative. At the same time, both capital inflows and out-
flows need to be controlled to some extent.
A reformed IMF together with the RFAs could take the lead in provid-
ing the overall framework within which individual countries could pursue
policies most advantageous from a systemic point of view. For example, as
alluded to already, the hybrid GFA could have a framework agreed to by
the member countries of the IMF so that when a crisis hits lenders would
be subject to credit standstills and orderly workouts. This would clearly
force the creditors to shoulder some of the responsibility for the crisis.
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Such an arrangement, in all likelihood, would also reduce the need for
large IMF loans. Another part of the new IMF responsibilities could be the
collection of a global Tobin tax. Although no panacea, such a tax would
almost certainly reduce returns to very short-term capital movements. A
further consequence of a Tobin tax could be a somewhat more stable
exchange rate system. Adoption of a securities transactions tax is also not
a far-fetched idea. Even Lawrence Summers wrote academic articles
before he joined the government advocating modest taxes on these trans-
actions.30 As any international monetary economist knows, the “impossible
trinity” of international capital mobility, fixed exchange rate system and
an independent monetary policy cannot all be pursued together. Slowing
down short-term capital movement need not prevent long-term capital
from flowing across borders. However, fixed exchange rates must be given
up if countries are still to pursue independent monetary policies. Thus, a
return to the old IMF is neither necessary nor desirable. The trans-
formation of the IMF as a handmaiden of the neoliberal agenda in the
1980s shows that something like an “extended panda’s thumb” process
was already at work in the post Bretton Woods system IMF. Given suffi-
cient political wisdom and will that process can be reversed towards creat-
ing a transformed IMF that can serve the cause of financial stability for
global prosperity much better than it has done during the last decades of
the twentieth century. This new IMF will adopt a more flexible approach
towards national policies. It will recognize that in periods that seem to be
leading towards a crisis there may need to be policy shifts such as a shift
towards some types of capital controls. The present Articles of the IMF
actually allow some forms of capital controls when countries are in dis-
tress. Instead of dismantling, these provisions have to be made realistic
and applicable whenever the financial system seems vulnerable. Thus flex-
ibility and context-dependent policy making will be the key features of a
hybrid system. To begin with, debt rescheduling, moderation in fiscal-
monetary policy mixed with an expansionary bias for most economies and
gradual restructuring of corporate sectors with strengthening of standards
and corporate governance are steps that the IMF can encourage the
economies to take without interfering directly with policy making in spe-
cific countries.
Other measures that the IMF can allow or even encourage national gov-
ernments to pursue could include requiring lending institutions to hold
different levels of provisions for countries with different estimated levels
of riskiness measured by such factors as the state of the banking system
and the level of reserves relative to short-term debt. As many have
observed, risk assessment by the credit rating agencies also leaves much to
be desired and could be improved if the IMF provided some guidance and
input. Another, more practical measure would be to impose different
levels of taxation on earnings from overseas investments with different
maturities. Although as stated in the previous sentence, it will not be so
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sensitive to individual country risk, it will nevertheless curb some of the
tendencies towards short-termism. It should be mentioned that the Basel
Committee regulations in effect during the AFC may have been a culprit
in this respect. These regulations gave a lower weight to short-term
foreign lending (20 percent) for capital adequacy purposes than for loans
with a maturity period of over one year (100 percent). A new IMF could
make such rules less biased by coordinating its guidelines with BIS, and
being guided by a better theory than the one underlying the Washington
Consensus.
Summary and conclusions
The history of financial crises shows that they cannot be prevented once
and for all in a monetary economy with unpredictable ebbs and flows in
capital movement. This history also shows that financial markets have
short memories and limited long-term learning capacity. Thus there needs
to be – within the limits of human fallibility – a well-designed set of institu-
tions capable of dealing with the tendencies towards financial instability
and crisis.
In times of crisis, there are well-meaning suggestions of radical institu-
tional restructuring that fade away when the immediate crisis is over. Only
a few farsighted or worrying types may still voice lingering concerns. The
AFC, the proposals for an overarching type of GFA – to use the terminology
developed here – and the subsequent fate of these proposals is a case in
point.
Given these features of the real economic world, an evolutionary
approach admits of multiple evolutionary equilibria, and a need for realis-
tic institutional design that recognizes path dependence without the dis-
abling and in most cases incorrect slogan that there is no alternative. Such
an approach applied to recent economic history leads to the identification
of two broad categories of global financial architectures. The hybrid variety
advocated here on the basis of both realism and systemic efficacy would
nevertheless involve much institution building that is always fraught with
the danger of politics-gone-awry.
The dismantling of Chilean capital controls in 1998 is a case in point.
In this particular instance, a balance of payments crisis prompted the
loosening of capital controls instituted earlier. It can be argued that the
situation of policy and institutional reversal occurred because the interest
groups favoring liberalization following a particular world view were
strengthened.31 Such interests in Chile included at that time holders of
foreign exchange, exporters, foreign creditors and investors, and the IMF
and other international financial institutions. Thus the political problems
of coalition building and ensuring the least cost cooperative outcome
need attention. The limited achievements and remaining problems that
can be seen from the Asian example discussed here should provide
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concrete motivation to think further about such problems of designing
institutions in the real world currently.
From the policy perspective, it is important to know if the existence of
an Asian RFA would have helped in any way during the AFC. This is really
a counterfactual question which asks: suppose there existed an RFA for
Asia during the AFC, how would it have responded to the crisis that would
have been different?
In contrast with the behavior of the IMF, within the proposed hybrid
GFA, a regional financial architecture, had it been present, could have
done at least the following on the basis of applying an evolutionary theory
of financial instabilities under globalization:
1 Through constant regional monitoring, it would have sensed the
danger ahead of time. Even a regional monitoring unit alone would
have been able to do better than the IMF team in Asia.
2 Through constant formal and informal contact with the officials in
member governments and the private sector, it would have sized up
the possible extent of the problem earlier and better than did the
IMF.
3 Through prompt and early action, it would have provided liquidity to
the system, and punished bad management in coordinated measures
with the national governments.
4 It would have been able to start regional discussions about bankruptcy
and work out procedures by keeping in close touch with the history
and legal issues facing particular countries.
5 It would have been in a position to use both moral persuasion and
toughness to keep both regional creditors and debtors in line.
The fundamental requirement for this, however, was an actually existing
RFA with enough liquidity and technical expertise. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank provided quite a bit of liquidity to Korea in particular, but did
not even have a monitoring unit when the crisis broke out. Furthermore,
the autonomy and integrity of any future RFA, in Asia and elsewhere, are
issues that need discussion. The relationship between the RFAs and the
IMF also needs to be further specified. These are matters that are of
necessity evolutionary by nature. In this paper, I have tried to specify some
principles that may help in selecting the more beneficial evolutionary
path.
Once there is a regional financial architecture for Asia, for instance, it
could be a regional lender of last resort. It could also perform effective
surveillance functions. In addition, it could promote financial and corpor-
ate restructuring that is necessary, but almost impossible for the IMF to
do. Finally, in the event of a future crisis, a more timely response could
come from such an RFA already in place.
The proposed “extended panda’s thumb” argument points to the possib-
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ility of using our knowledge and ingenuity to utilize existing institutions
together with some new ones to achieve desirable goals. In case of the
GFA, this argument strengthens the case for developing the hybrid variety.
Using both the existing global institutions such as the IMF, albeit in a
modified form, and building upon existing regional initiatives may offer a
better chance of creating a beneficial makeshift hybrid GFA than the text-
book type pie-in-the-sky schemes correctly dismissed by Eichengreen.
However, Eichengreen does not consider the role of RFAs in his otherwise
excellent analysis. One way to read the present paper is to see it as filling
this gap by using the “extended panda’s thumb” principle along with
other arguments. A set of realistic reforms of the IMF together with the
formation of RFAs will offer the best chance for the global economy to
achieve both stability and prosperity.
Notes
1 For a rigorous statement in terms of evolutionary game theory, see Aoki
(2000), and also Khan (2002c).
2 For specific models and arguments see those developed in Khan (2001 and
2002c). Khan (2001) formalizes various types of path dependence. In Khan
(2002c) a specific argument called “the extended panda’s thumb” is advanced
to urge the utilization of the existing IMF with some modifications in a new,
hybrid GFA.
3 This and the next section draw heavily upon Khan (2002c).
4 See Polanyi (1944) for a classic discussion of marketization of money, labor
and land, and the resulting resistance that he calls “the double movement.”
5 See for example, Knight (1998).
6 Of course, the risk of contagion is always present whenever a financial crisis
breaks out. Whether actual contagion is observed depends on a number of
factors including the domestic economy’s ability to fight off speculative attacks.
7 See for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1999).
8 As Eichengreen (1999) documents, these range from individuals to national to
international agendas.
9 Williamson (1998).
10 See for example, Bhagwati (1998).
11 Stiglitz has been one of the pioneers of such “information theoretic” approach.
For further analysis, see Stiglitz (1994).
12 See UNCTAD (2002), particularly sections 5 and 6.
13 See in addition to Eichengreen (1999) cited earlier, Azis (1999), Khan (2004a,
b), Sachs et al. (1996), Sachs and Woo (2000), Summers (2000), Tobin and
Ranis (1998), Yoshitomi and Ohno (1999).
14 See Khan (2001 and 2002c). A more readily available exposition is given in
chapter 8 of my book, Global Markets and Financial Crises (2004a).
15 See Aoki (2000: 43–59), particularly his discussion of institutions as a kind of
codification of evolutionary equilibrium strategies, 57–9.
16 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
17 Azis (2002).
18 Azis (2002: 3).
19 Azis (2002: 3).
20 Azis (2002c: 3–4).
21 See Krueger (2000).
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22 Tobin and Ranis (1998) were among those who believed that the IMF pro-
grams in Asia were based on the Fund’s experiences with Mexico in 1994.
23 Azis suggests: “The experience with policy adjustments of this kind in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union (from communism to market economy)
had inspired the Fund to do the same thing in Asia” (2002: 7).
24 See Khan (1999a, b, 2001) on Asian corporate governance reform, and the
sketch of an evolutionary theory.
25 New York Times, 21 October 2000.
26 I am grateful to Barbara Stallings for very helpful discussion on this point.
27 Although the terminology used is different, Kuroda and Kawai (2002) describe
the case for strengthening regional financial cooperation in East Asia in terms
that lend support to the “open architecture” view with a regional component
advanced here from an evolutionary perspective.
28 See Khan (2002c).
29 However, this should not be ruled out completely. Pressures for increased
supply of SDRs will be beneficial in specific ways as argued below.
30 See Summers and Summers (1989).
31 See Dean (1998).
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2 Globalization and economic
development
The role of multilateral
development banks
Masahiro Kawai
Introduction: what are multilateral development banks?
There are a number of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the
world. The World Bank is a global MDB, while the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African
Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) are major regional MDBs (see Table 2.1).1
These MDBs typically have two groups of members: one group includes
developing countries that need external official financing for their eco-
nomic development and, hence, are potential borrowers from the MDBs;
another group consists of developed countries that have the capacity to
finance the development needs of the former group and, hence, are
potential creditors.
Financing for the construction of economic infrastructure such as
transport, power generation and distribution, and irrigation and water
supply has been sought by MDB borrowing members and was once a
mainstay of MDB operations for those who lacked such infrastructure for
economic development. More recently, the upsurge of financing capacity
in the private capital markets has led MDBs to withdraw from some infra-
structure financing in favor of private sector financing. The financial
crises in the emerging market economies in the 1990s and the first five
years of the 2000s have also posed new challenges for the MDBs in crisis
prevention, management and resolution from developmental perspec-
tives. The World Bank’s relationships with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) as well as with regional MDBs are also focus issues.
The MDBs are in need of reforming their operations, particularly in
order to enhance their aid effectiveness in assisting developing countries’
development, growth and poverty reduction strategies in the context of
globalization. The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next
section reviews the functions of the MDBs. The third considers the issue of
globalization and its impact on economic development and poverty reduc-
tion. The fourth focuses on the effectiveness of development aid. The fifth
takes up the World Bank’s approach to aid, development and poverty
reduction. The sixth examines agendas for MDB reform. The final section
provides concluding remarks.
Functions of the multilateral development banks
A common characteristic of multilateral development banks (MDBs) is
that they are financial institutions with the objectives of financing long-
term economic development and providing policy advice for economic
and institutional reform in their developing members. The former objec-
tive includes: (1) the financing of projects needed for long-term develop-
ment of hard infrastructure and institutions; (2) the provision of fiscal
support to developing members that need to pursue policy and institu-
tional reforms – often, but not necessarily, as a result of financial and eco-
nomic crises; and (3) the funding of economic reconstruction after
disasters such as wars, conflicts and natural disasters. The latter objective
involves advice in a wide range of financial, sectoral and institution-
building activities, technical assistance and training, and research and
analytical work for the client countries.
The World Bank
The World Bank Group is the only global MDB, which includes the IBRD,
IDA, IFC and MIGA. It is a global institution in the sense that its member-
ship is open to all members of the IMF, another global international
financial institution.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was
created together with the IMF following the 1944 Bretton Woods meetings
held by the Allied Countries at the near-conclusion of World War II.
Its initial task was to provide financing for the reconstruction of war-
torn countries in Europe and then Japan. Its role was subsequently
expanded to cover wider development financing especially as the decolo-
nization process gathered pace. Over time the majority of the World
Bank’s project operations have been concentrated in developing-country
members.
The IBRD has been operating as a money bank by raising funds from
the international capital markets at AAA terms and by lending such funds
to members at more favorable terms than are available to them in the
market. Considering the need to provide more concessionary (or “soft”)
financing to the poorest members, the World Bank established the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA) in 1960. The IDA receives donated
funds from richer members and lends such funds to qualified low-income
countries at zero interest with a lengthy grace period and repayments over
40 years. Since then the IBRD has been lending funds to upper middle-
income countries and the IDA to qualified lower middle-income and low-
income countries.
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Table 2.1 Organization of multilateral development banks (as of December 2001)
Organization World Bank Group Asian Development Bank
IBRD IDA IFC MIGA OCR ADF
Year Established Dec. 1945 Sept. 1960 July 1956 April 1988 Aug. 1966 June 1974
Head Office Washington, DC (USA) Manila (Philippines)
Objectives Sustainable economic Economic Promoting Poverty reduction with focus 
development and development private FDI on sustainable economic 
poverty reduction through through development, social 
through concessional investment guarantees development and 
loans and technical and loans against non- good governance 
assistance (TA). to the commercial through loans and 
private sector. risks. technical assistance.
Membership
Number 183 162 175 155 60
Eligibility IMF IBRD ESCAP members and non-
members members regional developed 
UN members
Capital (million) $189,505 SDR 8,647 $2,450 $1,957 $43,834 $19,963
Shareholders (%)
USA 16.9 20.9 24.1 16.5 15.9 16.7
Japan 8.1 18.7 6.0 6.8 15.9 37.6
Germany 4.6 11.0 5.5 3.8 4.4 6.5
England 4.4 7.3 5.1 4.6 2.1 4.3
France 4.4 7.3 5.1 5.1 2.4 4.8
Canada 5.3 7.1
Loans
Annual (million) $10,487 $6,764 $5,357 $2,000 $3,977 $1,362
Outstanding (m) $118,866 $86,572 $10,909 $5,179 $28,659 $14,832
Terms of Lending
Interest Rate LIBOR zero Market rate – LIBOR 1.0% (grace 
75–80bp 60bp period)/1.5%
Maturity (years) 15–25 LLDC & 8–12 Within 15 15–30 24 or 32
IDA-only: 
40 Others: 35
(grace period) (3–5) (10) (20) (3–7) (8)
Service Charge – 0.75% – 0.50–1.25%
Commitment fee 0.75–0.85% – 0.50–1.00% 0.75%
No. Professionals 3,436 825 65 749
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan.
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Inter-American Development Bank Group African Development Bank European Bank Reference: IMF




Dec. 1959 Dec. 1959 Jan. 1993 Mar. 1986 Sep. 1964 June 1973 April 1991 Dec. 1945
Washington, DC (USA) Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire) London (UK) Washington, DC
Economic and social Promoting Economic Economic development Economic Monetary 
developments of private development and social progress of transition of cooperation,
central and south investment through African member the central exchange 
American countries through investment countries through loans. and eastern rate 
through concessional assistance to and loans to European stability, ST 
loans. small sized private countries financing 
firms. SMEs. through loans, for BOP 
investment, imbalances.
guarantees 




46 28 38 77 26 plus 60 plus EC 183
IOA members, and AfDB and EIB
non-regional IMF 
members
$100,959 $9,480 $1,231 $704 $28,495 $14,231 EUR 20,000 SDR 213,700
30.0 50.8 40.6 25.8 6.9 12.2 10.0 17.4
5.0 5.6 40.6 3.5 5.7 14.2 8.5 6.2
1.9 2.4 2.4 2.0 4.3 10.0 8.5 6.1
1.0 1.8 – – 1.8 3.6 8.5 5.0
1.9 2.2 1.2 3.2 4.8 2.8 8.5 5.0
4.0 3.1
$7,411 $443 – $128 $1,099 $1,472 EUR 3,656 SDR 7,680
$44,951 $6,637 – $381 $8,554 $7,602 EUR 6,327 SDR 50,300
6.38% 1–2% Market rate 7.16% zero LIBOR – SBA, EFF: 
50–600bp 3.07%
– PRGF: 0.5%
– SBA, EFF: 
3–10
PRGF: 10 (5.5)
15–30 25–40 Case by case 5–12 20 50 5–15
(4–5) (5–10) (5) (Max 5) (10)
0.75%
0.75% 0.5% 0.50–1.00% 1.00%
1,243 53 587 613 1,799
Recognizing the role of private sector investment in the development
process, the World Bank established the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), a lending institution to operate exclusively in the private sector,
which provides loans and equity investments for suitable projects. In 1985,
the World Bank initiated a second agency to support private sector invest-
ment, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), to offer invest-
ment insurance. The objective is to enhance the flow of capital and
technology for productive purposes to developing countries under con-
ditions consistent with their developmental needs.
The initial operational focus of the World Bank strongly reflected the
conditions of the founding countries and their key representatives, creat-
ing an essentially North Atlantic and European institution. In one sense
this was natural because the United States and Western European coali-
tion was a major driver of European economic reconstruction. In addi-
tion, in terms of personnel, competent professional staff with adequate
technical and analytical skills was available only in these countries. Over
time, however, the World Bank Group has attracted highly qualified
professional staff from all over the world, including from developing
countries.
Regional development banks
While the lending focus of the World Bank shifted towards developing
countries, US–European dominance made the “developing” post-colonial
African, Latin American and Asian members feel that their economies
should obtain complementary support that would give them greater prior-
ity for development. Consequently, moves began for establishing new
regional development banks to provide additional assistance to Latin
America, Africa and Asia. Later, when the trading and investment arrange-
ments under the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) broke
up, a need arose to found a new regional development bank for the tran-
sition economies in the former Soviet Union and nations of Central and
Eastern Europe.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1959. It
began operation as an essentially North–South American partnership with
the United States as its largest shareholder (30 percent), followed by
Japan (5 percent) and Canada (4 percent). From the beginning the IDB
adopted both Ordinary Capital (OC) loans and Funds for Special Opera-
tions (FSO) loans, the latter of which emphasized concessional terms. In
1983, IDB members created the Inter-American Investment Corporation
(IIC) to provide loans and investments to private small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) at market rates. While the United States, Canada and
Japan are important developed-country members, many Latin American
countries are among the top ten shareholders, including Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Colombia.
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The African Development Bank (AfDB) was created in 1964 based on the
principle of self-sufficiency. While it did not admit non-African member
countries initially, it later decided to enlarge membership by including
non-regional developed countries. Many African countries are among the
top ten shareholders, including Nigeria (as the top donor), Egypt, South
Africa, Cote d’Ivoire and Morocco. Major developed country donors are
the United States, Japan, Germany and Canada. The AfDB introduced
African Development Fund (AfDF) loans for the poorest members on
concessional terms.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1966 under the
leadership of the Japanese government. Modeling itself closely after 
the World Bank, it welcomed members from North America, Europe and
the Pacific. Japan and the United States have been the largest share-
holders with equal shares (16 percent). The ADB also includes major
developing-country members, notably China (third) and India (fourth),
although China joined later and India refrained from borrowing for many
years. The ADB adopted an arrangement with its Ordinary Capital
Resource (OCR) loans and Asian Development Fund (ADF) loans, with
the latter on very concessional terms. ADF finance is used only in the
poorest countries or where there are special circumstances that require a
high level of concessionality. In order to operate more directly with the
private sector, the ADB established a private sector lending division to
facilitate private investment by sponsoring venture and capital funds.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was estab-
lished in 1991 in order to foster private sector investment in the transi-
tion economies in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet
Union – or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.
Unlike other MDBs, the EBRD incorporates a political mandate for pro-
moting democracy and an exclusive economic mission of assisting trans-
itions from planned to market economies. It is not required to make
sovereign loans or loans with government guarantees. The top ten share-
holders are all major industrialized countries – such as the United
States, Japan, France and Germany – except that Russia is the seventh
largest shareholder.
MDBs as banks for development, poverty reduction, reconstruction and
crisis-resolution
The objectives of most MDBs, including those of the World Bank, IDB,
ADB and AfDB, are to help developing countries achieve sustainable eco-
nomic development and poverty reduction. These objectives are only
implicit for the EBRD in its special mandate to foster economic transition
and democracy. The MDBs also function as banks for economic construc-
tion in post-conflict countries as well as for structural reform in crisis or
non-crisis developing countries.
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Sustainable economic development
Economic development is often captured by both increases in per capita
income and improvements in social conditions. It also involves a series of
societal transformations at all levels, that include:
• Shifts of economic resources (capital, labor and management skills)
away from traditional rural sectors towards industrial and services
sectors, particularly in urban areas;
• Greater weight of private sector economic activity;
• Emergence of an educated middle-class population in urban areas;
and
• Institutional developments that support the functioning of a market-
based economy, including a newly defined role of the government,
the rule of law, a sound financial system, human development – in
terms of education, health and nutrition – and economic infrastruc-
ture.
In previous decades, the international development community focused
on physical capital accumulation and construction of hard infrastructure
(1950s–60s), improvements in social conditions in areas such as educa-
tion, health and nutrition (1970s), management of macroeconomic and
structural policies (1980s), and institution-building and human develop-
ment (1990s) as the most important elements affecting economic develop-
ment. In the aftermath of the collapse of the socialist system in Central
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the international
community has begun to stress the need to set up sound institutions for a
market economy. As a result, the MDBs are now increasingly concerned
with public sector governance, social sector protection, human develop-
ment, environment protection and infrastructure sectors with an emphasis
on policy and institutional reforms.
Poverty reduction
Today, poverty reduction has become the overarching objective of many
MDBs. Following the World Bank’s World Development Report 1990: Poverty
there has been a fundamental re-orientation of development assistance
toward addressing poverty by focusing on growth, productivity, human
capital and income distribution. This report argued that the principal ele-
ments of an effective poverty reduction strategy are: (1) rekindling eco-
nomic growth, particularly labor-intensive growth, which should provide
opportunities for the poor to become more productive; (2) increasing
government expenditure on education and human capital to equip
people to take advantage of those opportunities; and (3) provision of a
social safety net for those who are left behind. The 2000/2001 WDR, sub-
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titled Attacking Poverty, refocused on poverty but from wider, multi-layered
perspectives and recommended three actions: (1) promotion of
opportunity; (2) facilitation of empowerment; and (3) enhancement of
security.
The basic approach assumes that economic development in any mean-
ingful sense cannot be achieved without resolving the problem of poverty.
The established view sees poverty reduction as not only raised and increas-
ing income and consumption but also high achievement in education,
health, nutrition and other areas of human development. In this sense,
economic development represents “a transformation of society, a move
from old ways of thinking, old forms of social and economic organization,
to new” (Stiglitz 2000).
Transition to a market economy
Transition to a free market is another important objective for countries
that were once socialist economies. Replacing a planned economy with a
market requires wholesale institutional change, including market infra-
structure and institutions that support the underpinnings of a market
economy, legal systems that facilitate and protect market transactions, and
social sector protection mechanisms to absorb risks associated with market
adjustment. The EBRD was created to specifically address the transition
issue for Central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries, while the ADB
also handles transition economies in East Asia and Central Asia. Some
countries – namely those in Central and East Asia – are undergoing both
economic development and economic transition at the same time. A com-
prehensive strategy is needed for these nations in order to minimize the
transition costs without incurring undue risks of labor dislocations and
worsening poverty.
Economic reconstruction
The MDBs play an important role in reconstructing economies damaged
by wars, conflicts and natural disasters.2 Recent activities in this area
include those in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and the tsunami-
affected countries in the Indian Ocean. Economic reconstruction in these
countries entails nation-building, starting from the establishment of a
functioning government, basic economic and social infrastructure, and a
whole set of market infrastructure and institutions.
Crisis response and resolution
A crisis is an event that marks a serious discontinuity in a country’s
performance or policies or that might require exceptional support from
the International Financial Institutions – particularly the IMF, the World
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Bank and relevant regional MDBs. Examples of such events include an
imbalance of payments, interrupted debt service payments, a financial
sector collapse, a loss of fiscal control and rapid inflation, a sudden and
sharp drop in economic activity, a loss of capital market access, abrupt
policy reversals, political turmoil and natural disasters.
Once a crisis occurs, it is important to prevent it from evolving into a
full-blown economic crisis, by maintaining market confidence through
economic stabilization and putting into place needed policy reforms. In
response to a crisis, the IMF, the MDBs and bilateral donors often provide
liquidity support to contain it. Liquidity from the IMF is added to foreign
exchange reserves, while resources from the MDBs are directed to fiscal
support to be mobilized for counter-cyclical fiscal policy programs, bank
recapitalization, social sector protection or speedy recovery from the crisis.
MDBs as money, knowledge and public goods banks
The MDBs are often said to perform three different, though related, func-
tions. Each MDB serves as a:
• money bank,
• knowledge bank, and
• public goods bank.
As money banks, or development finance institutions, the MDBs primarily
provide long-term funds for development to their client countries at rates
more favorable than those available in the market. The capital-scarce poor
countries are particularly in need of this type of financing, and even some
middle-income developing countries need additional financing due to their
limited access to international capital markets. Second, as money banks, the
MDBs provide fiscal support for policy, institutional and structural reforms
either at times of financial and economic crises in developing countries or
in the absence of such crises. This type of financing, that is, a structural
adjustment loan, used to be accompanied by “policy conditionality” and
often by IMF programs.3 Third, the MDBs provide financial assistance for
economic reconstruction when civil war, natural disasters or other events
devastate an economy. Recent examples include Kosovo, East Timor,
Afghanistan and, more recently, Indian Ocean countries hit by the tsunami.
As knowledge banks, the MDBs provide economic analyses, policy
advice and technical assistance by mobilizing global or regional know-
ledge on best practices (and bad examples and failed attempts as well) on
particular issues – financial sector supervision, corporate governance,
pension schemes, anti-corruption measures, water and forestry resource
management – and tailor them to the specific conditions and needs of a
particular developing country. The MDBs act as knowledge banks either
in conjunction with their roles as money banks, as public goods providing
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banks or independently of any such functions. The MDBs, particularly the
World Bank, are increasingly emphasizing knowledge, because without it
they cannot identify high-value added investment projects (i.e., those pro-
jects that induce significant policy and institutional reforms) nor can they
provide effective policy advice to their client countries.
Another important role of the MDBs is the provision of international
public goods. An international public good is any good, service, system of
rules or policy regime that generates shared benefits for the participating
countries as a result of coordinated actions by the participating countries
and organizations. Provision of certain types of international public goods
by the MDBs can be essential to the economic development of developing
countries. Some examples of such public goods include: transport infra-
structure that goes across borders; containment of communicable dis-
eases; environmental protection; prevention of the serious impacts of
natural disasters hitting several countries simultaneously; and contain-
ment of conflict that has potential to become a cross-border issue. The
World Bank is best suited to provide global public goods, while the
regional MDBs are best suited to provide respective regional public
goods.4 Global, regional and national public goods are often complement-
ary to one another and, hence, cooperation both among the MDBs –
particularly between the World Bank and the regional MDBs – and
between the MDBs and the national governments is essential.
Globalization, growth and poverty reduction
In recent years, there has been a wide range of criticism against inter-
national organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank and
several regional MDBs which promote economic liberalization and global-
ization. These organizations are now facing a greater challenge than ever
before to achieving their shared objective of enabling poorer countries to
catalyze successful integration into the global economy and, at the same
time, help reduce poverty, income inequality, and the socio-economic ten-
sions created by such integration.
Poverty reduction
Most MDBs have shifted their overarching objectives to poverty reduction.
Even the IMF has begun to focus on poverty reduction as an important
objective for low-income developing countries.5 Poverty reduction is hard
to reject, even for many market-oriented economists.
Strategies for poverty reduction
There are basically two views on poverty reduction. The mainstream view
sees systematic poverty reduction as possible only through sustained
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economic growth and productivity increases. Without economic growth,
there will be no systematic poverty reduction. The other view argues that
economic growth does not necessarily alleviate poverty and that poverty
reduction is possible through microeconomic interventions that target the
poor, such as community-based social programs, micro-credit schemes,
and provision of social services that are essential to the poor. According to
this perspective, poverty reduction requires a marked increase in the pro-
vision of basic services for the poor in the areas of education, health and
nutrition, and marked attention to the social foundations for the develop-
ment process.
A balanced position would be that while sustained economic growth is
needed for systematic poverty reduction, growth is only a necessary –
though not a sufficient – condition for countrywide poverty reduction. In
order for economic growth to lead to poverty reduction, growth must be
accompanied by a higher demand for unskilled labor. Economic growth
accompanied by the development of unskilled labor-intensive sectors,
particularly in light manufacturing and agriculture, is likely to result in
poverty reduction. Poverty reduction is only possible through raising the
rate of return on assets the poor have or have access to, such as unskilled
labor and small plots of land. Once market-based growth and develop-
ment is achieved, key social goals will also be achieved over time.6
Measuring poverty
Poverty is often measured by the number of people – or the share of such
people in the total population – living below a certain threshold level of
income or consumption, such as $1 a day or $2 a day. Though there are
several problems associated with these measures,7 the general trend is cap-
tured by World Bank data summarized in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 reveals that between 1981 and 2001, there was some reduc-
tion in poverty worldwide. The most successful region has been East Asia
and the Pacific, whether China is included or excluded, while other parts
of the developing world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa and to some
extent Latin America and the Caribbean, have shown disappointing
performance. The table indicates that there are still 1.1 billion people in
the world living on less than $1 a day and 2.7 billion people on less than
$2 a day.
Poverty reduction is also accompanied by improvements in various
social and human conditions concerning education, health and nutrition.
Some of these are captured by the Millennium Developmental Goals
(MDGs), which the international community has endorsed:8
• Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – by halving, between 1990
and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Achieve universal primary education – by enrolling, by 2015, all chil-
dren in a full course of primary schooling.
• Promote gender equality and empower women – by eliminating
gender disparities in primary and secondary education preferably by
2005, and in tertiary education by no later than 2015.
• Reduce child mortality – by reducing by two-thirds, between 1990 and
2015, the mortality rates among children under five.
• Improve maternal health – by reducing by three-quarters, between
1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.
• Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases – by halting and
beginning to reverse the rising trend in HIV/AIDS, malaria and other
serious diseases by 2015.
• Ensure environmental sustainability – by integrating the principles of
sustainable development into country policies and programmes and
reversing the loss of environmental resources; by reducing by half, by
2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation; and by achieving, by 2020, a
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum
dwellers.
• Develop a global partnership for development – by addressing the
special needs of the least developed countries.
Impact of globalization on growth, poverty and income distribution
Implications of globalization for developing countries have attracted con-
siderable attention among policymakers, international organizations, aca-
demics and researchers, mass media and civil society from both developed
and developing countries. While globalization appears successful in
raising living standards for a large number of people around the globe,
there is a fear that its benefits are distributed unevenly in favor of the rich,
that it has been widening the income disparity between rich and poor
nations as well as between the rich and the poor within nations, and that it
makes many developing countries vulnerable to the vagaries of global
capitalism. Opponents of globalization often argue that it has harmed
developing countries by increasing poverty and widening income inequal-
ity across countries and within countries.
A preponderance of the statistical evidence appears to support the
proposition that a group of “globalizing” developing countries that have
integrated their economies with the rest of the world has achieved faster
economic growth and significant poverty reduction. A statistical assess-
ment of global poverty conditions and global income inequality is
complex because it involves various types of aggregation problems.
Nonetheless, if countries are population-weighted and incomes and con-
sumptions are expressed at the internationally comparable PPP dollar –
which is a well-accepted procedure for many economists – then the data
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demonstrate there have been improvements in poverty reduction and
reductions in income inequality at the global level.9
Growth, poverty and global inequality
Nonetheless, experts agree that there is no definitive relationship among
globalization, economic growth, poverty and income inequality. It is also
hard to establish that globalization is always good for growth, for the poor
and for fair income distribution (Birdsall 2002).
As noted by Dollar (2002), five successful countries – China, Vietnam,
India, Bangladesh and Uganda – have all benefitted from increased
integration in terms of faster economic growth and significant poverty
reduction, while many Sub-Saharan African countries have failed to
integrate themselves with the world economy, to grow or to reduce
poverty. Faster growth and significant poverty reduction in low-income
Asia contributed to a reduction of global income inequality while slow
growth in Africa contributed to a rise in global inequality. The net result is
a modest global decline in inequality with the former outweighing the
latter.
This finding about the average is important, but it would be more infor-
mative to uncover what is happening behind the average. The relevant
questions are why have certain countries such as China, India, Vietnam
and Bangladesh been successful in generating growth and poverty reduc-
tion under globalization and why have others such as Sub-Saharan coun-
tries not done so. The issue here is not only whether and how countries
have implemented external liberalization policies and other complement-
ary policy reforms – such as domestic deregulation and institution build-
ing – but also how they have nurtured private sector-led development,
particularly private investment in labor-intensive manufacturing indus-
tries, under globalization.
National income inequality
One of the common claims about globalization is that it leads to greater
inequality within countries and hence fosters social and political polariza-
tion. Dollar finds that changes in national income inequality are not
related to any of the measures of integration. For example, greater trade
integration is associated with rises in national inequality in some countries
and declines in others. Among the five successful countries that have
actively pursued integration with the international market, only two
(Vietnam and Uganda) have revealed an improvement in national income
distribution in favor of the poor.
One may argue that national income inequality induced by globaliza-
tion may be a natural phenomenon that takes place anyway in the course
of economic development and structural changes. Labor, capital and
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other productive resources naturally migrate away from less productive
sectors of the economy to more productive ones. Income inequality facili-
tates such resource re-allocation and would eventually disappear in the
long run. So it appears that there is nothing to worry about. Nonetheless,
to the extent that rising income inequality becomes a source of social
tension, there is room for public policy to play to mitigate the negative
effects of globalization through social protection and investment in educa-
tion and health.
Policy implications of globalization
On balance, globalization can be a driving force for economic growth and
poverty reduction, if accompanied by complementary policy and institu-
tional reforms and a better investment climate. On the other hand, global-
ization may aggravate national income inequality and can be disruptive, by
producing winners and losers and widening their gap.
Maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of globalization
There is no way to stop the globalization process. Doing so would be
highly counterproductive. To the extent that globalization provides
significant benefits as well as costs, policymakers should focus on how to
manage the process of globalization, by maximizing its benefits and mini-
mizing its costs. Table 2.3 summarizes the benefits and costs of globaliza-
tion for developing and developed countries.
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Table 2.3 Benefits and costs of globalization
Benefits Costs
Developed countries • Greater efficiency of • Pressure for domestic 
resource allocation industrial adjustment and
dislocation
• Increased consumer • Potential for greater 
benefits domestic income inequality
• Potential for loss of policy
autonomy
Developing countries • Access to developed • Potential for greater 




• Greater efficiency of • Greater vulnerability to 
resource allocation external shocks
if accompanied by 
structural reforms
The discussion in this section has focused on “real” globalization, that
is, integration through trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) with the
international market. In practice, it is quite important to make a clear dis-
tinction between “real” and “financial” globalization, the latter referring
to integration through financial sector opening and capital account liber-
alization. Financial globalization calls for greater care on the part of poli-
cymakers, because it amplifies shocks and turbulence affecting a country.
Sequencing of liberalization, provision of financial safeguards and the
choice of exchange rate regime are some of the added policy issues that
the authorities must pay attention to.
Implications for developing countries
If a developing country wishes to benefit from globalization, it must liber-
alize trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes, pursue a variety
of complementary structural reforms – including privatization, deregula-
tion and increased competition – and strengthen policy capacity to
manage economic and social risks due to globalization, including social
protection and financial safeguards. Simply maintaining sound macroeco-
nomic policy and pursuing external liberalization and domestic deregula-
tion is not enough for this purpose. A country must go beyond the
“Washington Consensus” (see below) and focus on wide-ranging reforms
of institutions and policy frameworks and strengthen market infrastruc-
ture so as to be able to benefit from globalization at smaller costs. In addi-
tion, the country must set market friendly environments for private sector
activity, particularly private investment, by ensuring political and social
stability, increasing business predictability, establishing the rule of law 
and intellectual property rights and providing necessary industrial infra-
structure.
At times, globalization can be disruptive, by forcing certain industries
to shrink, which may call for public policies – social protection, training of
displaced workers and investment in education – to mitigate these nega-
tive effects. Provision of social safety nets is clearly an important compo-
nent of globalization policy and the associated market reforms – it
cushions the damage done to the most severely affected, it helps the
momentum of these reforms and it avoids a backlash against the distribu-
tional and social consequences of globalization. Where informal social
safety nets based on families and communities play an important role, the
public sector must find a complementary mechanism to support the exist-
ing informal arrangement.
Implications for developed countries
The developed countries can help developing countries benefit from
trade and investment openness by maintaining a sound economic and
58 Masahiro Kawai
financial management, open market access to their exports of agricultural
and labor-intensive manufacturing products, and providing capital to
developing countries. The developed countries must be ready to accept
industrial adjustment on their part by making their labor markets more
flexible. Provision of technological, organizational and  management
know-how through foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial to enabling
developing countries to accumulate knowledge and participate in the
innovation process. All of these have been noted as important ways
to encourage the economic development of developing countries in
the context of “policy coherence for development” (see Fukasaku et al.
2005).
Essentially, developed countries must pursue policies that are con-
ducive to the economic development and poverty reduction of developing
countries, by maintaining stable macroeconomic and financial conditions,
liberal trade and investment regimes and open market access, steady flows
of long-term risk capital – such as FDI – to developing countries, and
steady transfers of production technology, management know-hows and
organizational skills. Such policies, if combined with their official develop-
ment assistance (ODA), can be quite effective in inducing market-based
growth and development in developing countries.
Given that many developing countries have problems in their initial
conditions – low levels of infrastructure, unattractive geography, poor
health and agricultural conditions – the developed countries, by providing
ODA, can assist them to overcome these unfavorable initial conditions
and pursue private sector-led development. ODA can have a greater posit-
ive impact on the recipient economies if it stimulates private investment,
total factor productivity and economic growth.
The post-Washington Consensus and developmental agendas
The World Bank is often blamed, together with the IMF, for forcing devel-
oping countries to pursue liberalization on both the domestic and exter-
nal fronts too hastily or prematurely, through imposing “policy
conditionality” attached to their loans. The liberalization cum openness
approach is often called the “Washington Consensus.” The consensus
emphasizes that once prices are right, sound macroeconomic environ-
ments are ensured, an open trade and FDI regime is achieved and govern-
ment involvement in productive activity is minimized (see Table 2.4),
economies will grow and develop.
The “Washington Consensus” is the “lowest common denominator of
policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to
Latin American countries as of 1989” (Williamson 2000).10 It emerged as a
set of policy prescriptions designed mainly for Latin American countries
in the 1980s that suffered from external debt problems resulting from bad
macroeconomic management. The World Bank introduced adjustment
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Table 2.4 New and old Washington Consensus
Washington consensus (Old) Post-Washington consensus (New)
Objective: Standard economic goals of Objective: Institutional reforms to 
maintaining low inflation, fiscal support market-based economy and 
discipline, a viable balance of payments, promote development and poverty 
economic growth, domestic and external reduction while securing 
liberalization and equitable income macroeconomic stability.
distribution.
Maintaining macroeconomic stability Maintaining macroeconomic stability
1. Fiscal discipline: Public sector budget 1. Fiscal policy: Limited fiscal deficits. 
deficits should be small to be financed Increased domestic savings through 
without recourse to the inflation tax. fiscal discipline. Increased educational 
Public expenditures should be spending, especially at the primary and 
redirected from politically driven secondary level. Reinvestment of public 
areas (defense, indiscriminate resources in well-designed social 
subsidies, white elephants) towards programs.
areas with high economic returns 
and the potential to improve income 
distribution (primary health, 
education and infrastructure).
2. Monetary policy discipline: Low 2. Monetary policy discipline: Low 
inflation through money supply inflation through an independent. 
control. central bank.
3. Tax reform: Broadening the tax base 3. Tax reform: Tax system reform, 
with improved tax administration and introducing, among other elements, a 
lower marginal tax rates to sharpen land-use tax that takes ecological 
incentives and improve horizontal considerations into account.
equity without lowering realized 
progressivity.
4. Exchange rate discipline: A unified 4. Exchange rate policy: No “one-size-fits-
exchange rate (at least for trade all” exchange rate regimes, bringing 
transactions) set at a level sufficiently back floating rates or using fixed rates 
competitive to induce a rapid growth as nominal anchors. Maintenance of 
in non-traditional exports. competitive exchange rates.
Three pillars of structural reform Structural reform and institution
building
A. Abolition of protectionist policies
5. Trade liberalization: Replacement of 5. Trade and investment liberalization: 
quantitative trade restrictions by tariffs Continued liberalization of trade and 
and progressive reduction of tariffs to foreign direct investment within 
a uniform low rate in the range of multilateral and regional 
10–20 percent. arrangements.
6. Financial liberalization: Abolition of 6. Financial system reform: Well-
preferential interest rates for privileged sequenced liberalization of the 
borrowers, achievement of a moderately financial system. Effective regulatory/
positive interest rate, and market- supervisory frameworks to be put in 
determined interest rates. place, and consolidation of banking
supervision.
loans in the early 1980s in exchange for which the recipient government
would accept “policy conditionality” for the purpose of macroeconomic
stabilization (fiscal discipline), liberalization of trade and FDI, deregula-
tion of domestic markets and market-oriented structural reforms – like
privatization of public enterprises. With one exception – the protection of
property rights – the “Washington Consensus” ignored the potential role
that institutional reforms could play in accelerating economic and social
development and poverty reduction.
The international community is now increasingly realizing that these
prescriptions based on the “Washington Consensus” alone cannot achieve
economic development and poverty reduction in the medium term unless
domestic policies and institutions are adequate and supportive of the
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Table 2.4 continued
Washington consensus (Old) Post-Washington consensus (New)
7. Foreign direct investment liberalization: 7. Capital account liberalization: Well-
Abolition of entry barriers of foreign sequenced liberalization of capital 
firms and opportunities for competition account to maximize its benefits and 
between foreign and domestic firms on minimize the costs.
equal terms.
B. Deregulation
8. Deregulation of domestic markets: 8. A competitive market economy: Creation 
Abolition of regulations that restrict of a competitive market economy 
entry of new firms or competition, through privatization and 
and adoption of regulations that can liberalization, including the labor 
be justified by solid criteria such as market.
safety, environmental protection or 
prudential supervision of financial 
institutions.
9. Property rights: Provision of secure 9. Redefining property rights: Provision of 
property rights. access to property rights for all society
members.
C. Abolition of government intervention
10. Privatization of public enterprises 10. Institution building: Creation of
strategic institutions such as
independent central banks, strong




11. Reduction of the government size 11. Good governance : Clean government
without corruption, absorbing social
risks.
Note
Produced by the author from Williamson (1990, 1994, 2000), etc.
functioning of a market economy. In other words, the deregulation and
opening of the economy does not automatically guarantee the emergence
of a healthy market economy. For this, a set of structural underpinnings
supporting market-based activity needs to be developed, including the
rule of law, effective bankruptcy procedures, a well functioning financial
system and competition policy to limit the monopoly powers of privileged
firms. These require the active role of an effective and accountable
government. Part of the reason for the failure of Russia’s economic tran-
sition in the 1990s can be attributed to inadequate attention given to insti-
tutional aspects of transition and development.
The post-Washington Consensus states that maintaining stable macro-
economic conditions and liberalizing and opening the economy
would not be enough to make the economy develop; these must be sup-
ported by complementary structural reforms and institutional underpin-
nings. Developing good institutions is key to successful economic
development. “Institutions” are “the rules of the game” (North 2000),
including organizational rules, formal laws and informal conventions
sanctioned by members of society. Among them, public sector institutions
are the most critical and governance the most important to economic
development.
This view also reflects the lesson that while the first-generation reforms
were successful to some extent, deeper progress requires second-genera-
tion reforms (Table 2.5). The latter reforms go much deeper in terms of
the nature of reforms and country stakeholders involved.
Effectiveness of development aid
Enhancing aid effectiveness
Impact of aid on savings, investment and growth
In the early literature on the effectiveness of aid, foreign aid was perceived
as an exogenous variable to the financial resources of the recipient
country, which would eventually contribute to growth.11 The simplest
hypothesis was that each dollar of foreign resources in the form of aid
would result in an increase of one dollar in total savings and investment.
The underlying theoretical framework was the Harrod–Domar growth
model or the two-gap model. In the Harrod–Domar model, foreign aid
was considered to raise both savings and investment by relaxing a savings
constraint. In the two-gap model, foreign aid would contribute to greater
savings or imports or both by relaxing savings and/or import capacity con-
straints. In this simple world, fungibility of aid resources was not allowed
for, and aid for consumption was not considered in this aid-effectiveness
analysis. In a later model, these two factors were incorporated and the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Over the last few years, a new set of aid-effectiveness studies have
appeared. First, these studies work with panel data for a number of years
and a large number of countries. Second, measures of economic policy
and institutional environments are included directly in the reduced form
growth regressions alongside traditional macroeconomic variables, reflect-
ing recent shifts in thinking over development assistance. Third, the endo-
geneity of aid and other variables is often addressed explicitly. Fourth, the
aid–growth relationship is often allowed to be non-linear.
Importance of good policies and institutions
Following the new approach to the effectiveness of aid, a World Bank
report on aid effectiveness (World Bank 1998) concluded that official aid
achieved growth and poverty reduction only if it induced a country to
reform economic policies and institutions.12 Collier and Dollar (2002)
conclude that countries with strong economic policies – defined as low infla-
tion, budget balance or surplus and trade openness – and high quality insti-
tutions – defined as the rule of law, effective public bureaucracy and
minimal incidences of corruption – benefit the most from aid by achiev-
ing the highest growth rates. Moreover, ideas (or knowledge) are more
effective than financial flows in generating reforms and in improving the
quality and efficiency of public services. The report concludes that “well-
designed assistance can help countries find the policies that they need,
and help communities improve important public services that make for a
better life today and contribute to long-term development.”
By now it is clear that economic development involves a multi-
dimensional transformation of society; to the extent that funds are fungi-
ble, “the net benefit from financing any individual project is . . . the net
benefit of the marginal government program” (Stiglitz 1999). What deter-
mines the success or failure of development assistance is not the choice of
a particular project, but the whole set of policies and institutions adopted
by the recipient country, including its own governance structure.
Emerging consensus
The international community seems to share a consensus that develop-
ment aid works under the following conditions:
• The right policy environment in the recipient countries. This means that
recipient countries must commit themselves both to peace and politi-
cal stability and to sound macroeconomic, structural and social poli-
cies, good governance, and the rule of law. The resulting enabling
environment would attract private capital, particularly foreign direct
investment, which complements official aid.
• Recipient country ownership of development. Strong country ownership of
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its own development strategy is instrumental because without it policy
and institutional reforms for economic development and poverty
reduction cannot be effective.
• Donor coordination of assistance efforts. The donor community needs to
pursue harmonization of policies and procedures in order to reduce
transaction costs and focus its assistance efforts on the countries with
sound economic management and good governance.
• Donor–recipient partnership. The donor community and recipient coun-
tries must work together, by involving other stakeholders, in achieving
the common goals of economic development and poverty reduction
as the only objectives. This reflects the past experience that aid-
effectiveness is reduced when aid is tied to other often politically
motivated objectives of donors.
To achieve this, the MDBs need to be important development partners
and enhance efficiency and effectiveness of their activities.
East Asian development experience
The early successful globalizers in East Asia – including the high-income
industrializing economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan) as
well as the middle-income ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indo-
nesia and the Philippines) – have achieved rapid economic development
and remarkable poverty reduction over the last 30 years. China and
Vietnam have been following similar patterns of development. East Asia’s
historical experience reveals that three essential elements contributed to
their successes:13
• Political stability, sound policies, right institutions and national owner-
ship;
• Outward orientation with a focus on private sector development and
the investment–trade nexus; and
• Effective development assistance.
Political stability, sound policies, right institutions and national ownership
First, political stability, sound policies and right institutions played an
essential role in the economic development process in East Asia for two to
three decades leading up to the financial crisis in 1997–8. Needless to say,
the crisis has revealed inadequacies and weaknesses of economic gover-
nance systems, particularly in the financial and corporate sectors across
crisis-affected East Asia, which should have been strengthened through
appropriate regulatory and supervisory frameworks in a way commensu-
rate with the pace of globalization. Nonetheless, the East Asian economies
until the age of financial globalization had institutional capabilities that
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facilitated sustained growth, rapid development and poverty reduction.
Important was the presence of sound policies, workable institutions and
stable and predictable policy regimes.
In addition, the East Asian states had clear national ownership over
long-term economic development programs, liberalization and deregula-
tion and structural reforms. Rigorous implementation of policy and insti-
tutional reforms backed by national ownership was an important driver of
successful economic development. Strengthening institutional capacities
and human resources was indispensable in their efforts to enhance
national ownership.
Outward orientation with private sector-led investment–trade interactions
Second, the East Asian economies embraced the notion of globalization
by adopting outward-oriented policies with emphasis on private sector
development and investment–trade linkages. Many of them initially
focused on import substitution and then shifted to export promotion. A
major mechanism for export sector growth was through expansion from
sales in domestic markets to sales in international markets. Successful
domestic market development that was made possible by product and
factor market integration and the creation of spatially concentrated clus-
ters of firms, supplier networks and distribution systems was thus a basis
for successful export expansion. Export expansion in turn helped each
economy overcome the limits of the domestic markets and the foreign
exchange constraints, and promoted learning and technology upgrading,
economies of scale and production networks. It was also accompanied by
liberalization of imports, foreign direct investment (FDI) and use of
foreign technologies and ideas. Formation of regional trade–FDI linkages
has been a natural consequence of their market-based, outward-oriented
policies.
These East Asian economies emphasized the role of investment – in
capital equipment, human resources and market knowledge – and its
nexus with trade as a basis for sustained economic development. Their
governments focused on the creation of a favorable investment climate,
reduction of the risks and uncertainty of investment activity and ensuring
the availability of finance for productive investment opportunities. Their
pro-growth development strategy was supported by the mutually reinforc-
ing interactions between investment and trade. Investment – by both
domestic firms and foreign multinationals – and trade stimulated each
other, thereby contributing to output growth. Output growth in turn stim-
ulated further investment and trade.
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Effective ODA
Third, external development assistance was used effectively in East Asia.
As Table 2.2 indicates, the number of people living in extreme poverty –
below $1 per day at 1993 PPP – in East Asia declined substantially from
470 million in 1990 to 270 million in 2001. The amount of official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) that East Asia received during this period
totaled US$113 billion, or less than US$10 billion per year on the average
(Table 2.6). This ODA performance in East Asia is outstanding – in
achieving rapid economic growth and poverty reduction – in comparison
to any other part of the developing world. For example, a total of US$192
billion was disbursed as ODA in Sub-Sahara Africa during 1990–2001 but
the number of poor rose (from 230 million to 320 million) rather than
declined.
The reason behind the successful ODA performance in East Asia was
that it was used as a catalyst to support the broad, nationally owned devel-
opment programs.14 These programs focused on overcoming the unfavor-
able initial conditions – particularly low levels of industrial and social
infrastructure such as power, telecommunications, transport, water, health
and education – of the recipient countries, providing them with a basis for
pursuing private sector-driven, outward-oriented, pro-growth strategies.
ODA in East Asia essentially helped create a favorable investment climate
and interacted positively with the recipient countries’ political stability,
stable macroeconomic policies, predictable business environments and
right institutions.
Lessons for other developing countries
There are three challenges and lessons for low-income countries in East
Asia and other regions. First, trade and investment openness is key to
success. Second, developing economies need to enhance domestic institu-
tional and entrepreneurial capacities to proactively respond to favorable
external environments. Third, ODA can effectively support this process if
combined with efforts to improve domestic policies, institutions, gover-
nance, human resources and capacities, and industrial and social infra-
structure.
These lessons from the East Asian experience may not be readily trans-
ferable to other developing countries because of East Asia’s favorable geo-
graphy and some initial conditions. But what matters is not the amount of
money to be used, but how external aid helps the country’s own develop-
ment programs, in building government capacities and institutions for
development.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The World Bank approach: CDF and PRSP
The World Bank’s approach now extends well beyond the traditional
“Washington Consensus,” the agreed set of measures that are typically
called for in the first stage of policy reform.15 To accelerate the process of
economic development and poverty reduction, deeper policy and institu-
tional reforms are necessary – hence the reason behind the need for the
second-generation reforms. These reforms focus on improving the quality
of investments in human development, promoting the development of
sound and efficient financial markets, enhancing the legal and regulatory
environment, upgrading the quality of the public sector and consolidating
the gains in macroeconomic stability thorough fiscal strengthening. Such
institutional reforms take time and are complex. A well-functioning
market economy cannot be created overnight.
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)
The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) has been put
forward by the World Bank under the leadership of its former president,
James Wolfensohn. This initiative suggests a broad, holistic and long-term
approach to development. It supports a balanced approach to develop-
ment in line with each country’s specific current needs, and seeks to
respond to a broader development agenda through stronger partnerships
in order to achieve greater development effectiveness. Table 2.7 summa-
rizes its conceptual framework. Its approach can be summarized as
follows:
• A comprehensive, long-term approach to development. The approach has
to be holistic in nature, addressing the multidimensional nature of
sustainable, equitable growth and poverty reduction. Such an
approach involves promoting macroeconomic stability, a transition to
open markets, good governance and sound institutions, investing in
people through education and health, protecting the environment
and creating a business climate to attract foreign and domestic invest-
ments.
• Country ownership is an objective in itself and a necessary condition for
sustainability of development and poverty reduction efforts. Country-
owned reforms, based on broad societal foundation and participation,
are more likely to survive periods of hardship.
• Partnership of all development actors, with country governments at the
apex, and external partners participating where they add value and
have a comparative advantage, to ensure efficient use of development
resources.
• Outcome focused, linked to performance and built on transparency on the
part of donors and recipient countries alike.













































































































   
   








   








   
   
   
   
   
   
   












































































































































































































































































Focus on country ownership
It is alleged that policy and institutional reforms for economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction cannot be effective without strong country
ownership. Such reforms often require elimination of rents on the part of
privileged sectors, firms and individuals so that they are likely to encounter
political resistance. Hence, for it to be successful, the government must be
committed to such reforms. If the political base of the country is strong,
the reforms can be successful – as in the case of Korea under Kim Dae-
Jung. If the political base is weak, on the other hand, the reforms
encounter difficulties – as in the case of Indonesia. Unilateral conditional-
ity that is imposed upon a country from external forces would not work
without strong country ownership. To deepen country ownership, consulta-
tion processes involving parliaments, business community, academics, news
media, labor unions and civil society are important, thereby encouraging
participation and forming a broad-based coalition for reform.
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative
In the low-income developing countries, the CDF and the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PRSP) have become recognized as the major instru-
ments to focus on pro-poor growth. The PRSP is a new process through
which the developing-country government describes its own detailed and
comprehensive strategy for poverty reduction. It is an element of the
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) – the World Bank’s business plan that
is the main forum for Bank–client interaction – and a basis for the CDF.
The PRSP describes a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social
policies and programs to promote growth and reduce poverty in a frame-
work of enhanced country ownership, transparency and stakeholder par-
ticipation, while presenting an assessment of associated external financing
needs and major sources of financing required. It also provides a decision
point prerequisite to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initi-
ative. It is linked to the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) of the
World Bank and the analogous Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF)
of the IMF. PRSC is provided in support of a PRSP, in early stages of
implementation, for the express purpose of enabling the country to
pursue the poverty reduction strategy it has laid out.16
As of January 2005, 43 countries had finalized PRSPs and 13 others had
prepared Interim-PRSPs (see Table 2.8 and Appendix Table 2.9). For the
middle-income countries, PRSPs are not required, but their governments
are encouraged to produce PRSP-like documents.
Going beyond the CDF and PRSP
There is no doubt that the PRSP initiative has made a positive contribu-
tion to settling coherent frameworks for economic development and
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poverty reduction in low-income countries. But simply introducing a new
procedure will not change the reality of developing countries unless it is
accompanied by substantial improvements in the way in which the inter-
national community and the developing countries approach the develop-
ment agenda. Most important is for the developing countries to articulate
their own long-term development programs and put the PRSP in this
context so as to utilize external aid in the most effective way.
World Bank Instruments
The World Bank has two main categories of lending instruments: invest-
ment loans and development policy loans. Investment loans have a long-
term focus (five to ten years) and provide financing for specific
development projects. Development policy loans have a short-term focus
(one to three years) and provide quick disbursing funds for policy and
institutional reforms.
Investment loans
Investment loans provide financing for a wide range of activities aimed at
creating the physical and social infrastructure necessary for sustainable
development and poverty reduction. Over the past two decades, invest-
ment loans have, on average, accounted for 75 to 80 percent of all Bank
loans.
The nature of investment loans has evolved over time. Originally
focused on hard infrastructure and engineering services – such as irriga-
tion, communication and transportation – investment loans have come to
focus more on institution building, social development and building the
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Table 2.8 Progress on Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), January 2005
Poverty Reduction Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
(43) Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyz
Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia and
Montenegro, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia
Interim Poverty Bangladesh, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African 
Reduction Strategy Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominica, Guinea-
Paper (I-PRSP) (13) Bissau, Indonesia, Lesotho, Macedonia FYR, Sao Tome
and Principe, Sierra Leone
Source: World Bank.
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market infrastructure needed to facilitate private sector activity. Projects
range from urban poverty reduction (involving private contractors in new
housing construction, for example) to rural development (formalizing
land tenure to increase the security of small farmers); water and sanitation
(improving the efficiency of water utilities); natural resource management
(providing training in sustainable forestry and farming); post-conflict
reconstruction (reintegrating soldiers into communities); education (pro-
moting the education of girls); and health (establishing rural clinics and
training health care workers).
Funds are disbursed against specific foreign or local expenditures
related to the investment project, including pre-identified equipment,
materials, civil works, technical and consulting services, studies and incre-
mental recurrent costs. Procurement of these goods, works and services is
an important aspect of project implementation. To ensure satisfactory
performance, the loan agreement may include conditions of disburse-
ment for specific project components.
Development policy loans
Development policy loans provide quick-disbursing assistance to countries
with external financing needs, to support structural reforms in a sector or
the economy as a whole. They support the policy and institutional reforms
needed to create an environment conducive to sustained and equitable
growth. Over the past two decades, development policy loans – previously
called adjustment loans – have accounted, on average, for 20 to 25
percent of total Bank lending.
In June 2004, the World Bank replaced the previous adjustment loans
of different types – such as structural adjustment loans (SALs), sectoral
structural adjustment loans (SECALs), programmatic structural adjust-
ment loans (PSALs), and rehabilitation loans (RILs) – by development
policy loans (DPLs). While the DPL has consolidated these separate
lending instruments into one, the older formats are still effective for the
ongoing and pre-appraised projects. Development policy operations in
PRSP countries may continue to be called “Poverty Reduction Support
Credits (PRSCs),” because this is by now a well-established “brand name.”
The main core of the DPL is the former SAL and SECAL.
The former SAL was introduced in 1980 and the former SECAL in
1984. The SAL was a policy-based loan extended for the purpose of
reforming the client economy as a whole, while the SECAL was a policy-
based loan extended for the purpose of reforming certain sectors of an
economy. They were fast-disbursing loans in exchange for the implemen-
tation of certain policy changes called “conditionality.” The programmatic
structural adjustment loan (PSAL) was introduced later to assist govern-
ments in forestalling potential distortions and in implementing long-term
reform that addresses systemic social, structural and institutional issues.
The PSAL has supplied funds directly to the treasury of the recipient
country once criteria were met, with renewable stages (tranches), con-
tinuation generally being contingent on satisfactory use of the previous
tranch. The government has been able to use the funds for poverty reduc-
tion purposes as it sees fit.
Long-term structural focus and “conditionality”
The development policy loan (DPL) has three main features: country
ownership, long-term focus and evolved conditionality. On country owner-
ship, the World Bank moves away from a very prescriptive list of policies
that were part of the early adjustment loans – that used to focus largely on
fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, market deregulation – to a much
broader range of issues. DPL operations now generally aim to promote
competitive market structures (for example, legal and regulatory reform),
correct distortions in incentive regimes (taxation and trade reform),
establish appropriate monitoring and safeguards (financial sector
reform), create an environment conducive to private sector investment
(judicial reform, adoption of a modern investment code), encourage
private sector activity (privatization and public-private partnerships),
promote good governance (civil service reform) and mitigate short-term
adverse effects of development policy (establishment of social protection
funds).
As many of these issues involve longer-term structural change, the DPL
encompasses a much broader and longer-term focus of this work. In this
sense, the Bank is increasingly finding it useful to use programmatic
operations, which assist a government program with a series of loans, each
building on the preceding loan to support sustained and sequential struc-
tural and/or social reforms. As a result, “policy conditionality” is no
longer an imposition by the Bank on the borrowing country but rather
has now evolved into a mutual commitment device which holds borrowing
governments accountable for reliably making progress toward their own
poverty reduction strategies and the international community reliably pro-
viding financial support to help achieve these results.17
Funds are disbursed in one or more tranches into a special deposit
account. Tranches are released when the borrower complies with stipu-
lated release conditions, such as the passage of reform legislation, the
achievement of certain performance benchmarks, or other evidence of
progress toward a satisfactory macroeconomic framework. Funds may be
disbursed against a positive list of specific imports needed for the opera-
tion, or subject to a negative list of prohibited expenditures – for example,




A wide range of criticisms on the role of the MDBs comes both from the left
and the right.18 Those on the left claim that the MDBs are a vehicle for glob-
alization that is dominated by multinational corporations, large private banks
and financial institutions, imposing needless “conditionality” and hurting
the poor. Those on the right claim that the MDBs are ineffective in alleviat-
ing poverty in poor countries and are crowding out private investment in
middle-income countries. Several committees have been seeking ways and
means to reform international organizations, including the MDBs.19 The G7
countries have also been proposing measures to reform the MDBs.
Meltzer Commission’s proposals
The so-called Meltzer Commission (International Financial Institution
Advisory Commission 2000) made some of the most radical recommenda-
tions. They include:
• The World Bank should get out of loans and move to grants and small
technical assistance programs for the poorer countries – to become a
“World Development Agency.”
• The World Bank and the regional MDBs should withdraw altogether
from lending to middle-income countries with investment grade
ratings or per capita income over $4,000 and scale back lending to
countries with per capita income over $2,500.
• The World Bank should focus its operations on poverty reduction for
African nations, and the IDB and ADB should take over World Bank
tasks in their respective regions.
• The MDBs should be precluded from financial crisis loans.20
• The MDBs should adopt a performance-based assistance in order to
ensure that aid resources are used effectively.
G7 proposals
Considering the important role of the MDBs in the promotion of eco-
nomic development and poverty reduction, the G7 countries have been
trying to improve the delivery and effectiveness of the MDBs’ aid since
2000. Reform proposals were put forward in a report produced by the G7
Finance Ministers in Rome (2001), and transmitted to the Heads of State
and Government. They can be summarized as:
• Coordination. The MDBs must improve coordination, at the country
and institutional level, in order to achieve a more selective approach
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to development issues, while promoting greater complementarity and
avoiding undue overlapping or duplication of efforts.
• Internal governance. The MDBs must enhance internal governance,
accountability and transparency in order to strengthen their role in
the fight against poverty and retain institutional credibility.
• Review of lending instruments and pricing policies. The MDBs must review
their lending instruments and pricing policies in order to focus on
operations targeted at poverty reduction, to be selective in countries
with access to private capital, and to enhance the development impact
of the resources available.
• Focus on good governance. In their assistance to recipient countries, the
MDBs must put good governance at the top of their list of activities,
with particular focus on public sector management, accountability
and anti-corruption measures.
• Focus on financial sector reform. The MDBs must help developing coun-
tries strengthen their financial sector, particularly in developing insti-
tutional capacity and appropriate strategies to meet international
standards and codes.
• Focus on the provision of international public goods. The MDBs must
become more involved in the provision of international public goods
to accelerate development and poverty reduction.
Some of these G7 proposals have already been addressed, such as the
review of lending instruments by the World Bank.
Articulation of development strategies for MICs, LICs and HIPCs
A “one-size-fits-all” approach would be inappropriate, particularly when
the recipient countries are diverse in their income levels, stages of institu-
tional development and policy capacities. The MDBs face several chal-
lenges in their relationships with middle-income countries (MICs) and
low-income countries (LICs), particularly highly indebted poor countries
(HIPCs).
Middle-income countries
Though the Meltzer Commission recommended that the MDBs should
get out of middle-income developing countries – largely emerging market
economies – there is a strong case for the MDBs to stay engaged.21 First,
although many middle-income countries have investment grades at
normal times, their access to the international capital markets is often
unstable and volatile as well as quite limited and costly at the time of
global market turbulence or crisis, thereby exposing them to financial vul-
nerability. Thus the MDBs must continue to assist middle-income coun-
tries at the time of financial and economic crisis when access to
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international capital markets tends to be blocked. Second, despite their
relatively healthy economic conditions, these nations have large popula-
tions of poor people. Being home to nearly 80 percent of the world’s
poor, they need external financing for those projects targeted at reducing
poverty. Third, lending is an important instrument to induce recipient
governments to pursue policy and institutional reforms – together with
their policy commitments – for achieving internationally desirable policy
goals, including human and social development, environmental protec-
tion and good governance.
Nonetheless, there is no clear instrument to serve as a middle-income
country counterpart to the PRSP. There are tentative indications that this
will take the form of a “Letter of Development Strategy (LDS)” or a
“Letter of Development Policy.” The LDS (or equivalent) can serve as a
cornerstone of a constructive development partnership once it evolves,
like a PRSP, into a comprehensive development strategy prepared by
middle-income countries themselves and presented to the international
community. At this point, it is not clear if the actual form would be as
structured as that of the PRSP; it might vary in accordance with the widely
varied circumstances of this group of countries (see Akiyama and Akiyama
2001).
Low-income countries
For low-income countries, achieving the Millennium Developmental Goals
(MDGs) would be a great challenge for their poverty reduction and
human and social development, which the MDBs can help greatly. For
these countries, country ownership of development programs and
reforms, partnership among major stakeholders and performance-based
allocation of development resources should be the most important priori-
ties. The World Bank’s PRSP process is an important coordinating vehicle
for these efforts. Performance-based allocation that is currently used by
some MDBs to allocate concessionary loans need to ensure consistency
across MDBs and other donor institutions.
For highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), debt relief is an integral
part of the external assistance package. Eliminating unsustainable debt
would be needed for these countries to get on a development path. But
simply eliminating debt would not be enough for development and
poverty reduction. The most significant challenges arise because many
poorest countries, particularly those in Sub-Sahara Africa, often lack the
necessary prerequisites and institutional capacity – such as functioning
government and economic institutions, basic human resources and basic
education and health facilities – to be able to mobilize resources effect-
ively. The international community and the MDBs need to explore more
creative mechanisms to induce them to launch effective policy and institu-
tional reforms and capacity building. Given that a performance-based
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approach is unlikely to direct a large sum of aid resources to these coun-
tries, workable initiatives need to be developed in partnership between
donors and recipients in order to ensure that limited aid – mainly in the
form of grants – be well targeted.
Other challenges
MDB coordination
Greater coordination among the MDBs in producing coherent country
strategies is underway. One way to ensure this coordination is to encour-
age consultation by holding a coordinated country strategy meeting
among the MDBs and with major stakeholders. Some healthy competition
among the MDBs is desirable at the intellectual level as long as their
collective outcome can lead to mutually consistent and coherent strategies
with the promotion of economic development and poverty reduction.
With undue competition at the strategic and operational levels, however,
an appropriately rigorous approach taken by an MDB to policy reform
and pricing could be undermined. There needs to be strong coordination
among them.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been agreed upon
between the World Bank and each MDB so that their activities are well
coordinated. Their presidents hold a regular meeting every year. Opera-
tional vice presidents in each of the regional MDBs and their World Bank
counterparts meet regularly to discuss operational cooperation, including
dispute resolution. Similarly, several key senior managers in the MDBs
meet regularly to discuss their fields of responsibility, share information
and experience, and seek coherence in approaches. MDBs also coordinate
with other international organizations such as the IMF, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the OECD and the WTO.
Such efforts continue to be important.
Regional MDBs should focus more on the provision of regional public
goods and regional issues that would not be covered by the World Bank. A
regional approach taken by the ADB, such as the Greater Mekong Sub-
Regional Program and ASEAN3 financial cooperation, would be a good
example for such provision. Of particular relevance is the provision of
public goods or economic infrastructure that would cover several coun-
tries within a region, where the relevant MDB can play a significant facili-
tator role in promoting inter-governmental cooperation. Sharing of
regional knowledge, good practices and key experiences by regional
MDBs is certainly quite useful in providing regional public goods in an
effective way. A greater challenge would be the case where public goods
cover two or more regions because more significant coordination by the
MDBs would be necessary.
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Poverty reduction and the Article of Agreement
Although poverty reduction has become the most prominent overarching
objective of many MDBs, it is not one of the purposes stipulated in the
World Bank’s Articles of Agreement. Poverty is not even mentioned there.
The World Bank has addressed this problem through a creative redefini-
tion of the term “development” which it has a mandate to promote.
Poverty reduction is such an accepted objective now that its legal under-
pinnings have not been questioned, but the World Bank may need to
strengthen its legal basis on this issue.
In response to the changing economic environments at the regional
and national levels, regional MDBs must also sharpen their own develop-
ment strategies in a way that serves most effectively for their clients while
embracing poverty reduction as the most important overarching objective.
This necessitates a sharpened focus on the provision of regional public
goods so as to complement the operations of the World Bank, which
should focus on the provision of global public goods.
Concluding remarks
The multilateral development banks are financial intermediaries that
channel financial resources they raise in the international capital markets
to developing countries at concessional terms. In this sense, taken
together they function as a “money bank.” Recently they have intensified
their non-lending activities in recognition of the critical importance of
ideas or knowledge, even more than financial assistance, in generating the
necessary reforms to achieve sustainable development, economic transi-
tion and poverty reduction. Thus, the MDBs, as a group, have increasingly
functioned as a “knowledge bank.” They have put an increasing emphasis
on policy advice based on international best practices, technical assistance
and training and research and analytical work. The group of MDBs is also
functioning as a “public good-providing bank” because globalization has
increased the demand on MDBs to provide international public goods.
While recent research shores up continued relevance of the “Washing-
ton Consensus,” this paper has argued that the old consensus reforms are
not enough. Development assistance needs to extend well beyond the
“Washington Consensus,” to address multi-dimensional policy considera-
tions, including the realignment of policies and institutions to maximize
its effectiveness. The MDBs need to work jointly and with the developing
countries as well as with other stakeholders. They need to focus on their
essential comparative advantage to benefit their developing member
countries.
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A2.9 Country Progress on Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), January 2005
Countries/regions Interim-PRSP PRSP PRSP progress report
Albania May 2000 November 2001 May 2003;
April 2004
Armenia March 2001 November 2003 –
Azerbaijan May 2001 April 2003 May 2004
Bangladesh March 2003 – –
Benin June 2000 December 2002 –
Bhutan – August 2004 –
Bolivia January 2000 March 2001 –
Bosnia and October 2002 March 2004 –
Herzegovina
Burkina Faso – May 2000 Sep. 2001; Sep. 2002; 
Dec. 2003
Burundi November 2003 – –
Cambodia October 2000 December 2002 August 2004
Cameroon August 2000 April 2003 April 2004
Cape Verde January 2002 – –
Central African December 2000 – –
Republic
Chad July 2000 June 2003 –
Congo, Dem. March 2002 – –
Rep. of the
Cote d’Ivoire January 2002 – –
Djibouti June 2001 March 2004 –
Dominica November 2003 – –
Ethiopia November 2000 July 2002 December 2003
Gambia, The October 2000 April 2002 –
Georgia November 2000 June 2003 –
Ghana June 2000 February 2003 March 2004
Guinea October 2000 January 2002 April 2004
Guinea-Bissau September 2000 – –
Guyana October 2000 May 2002 December 2004
Honduras April 2000 August 2001 December 2003
Indonesia March 2003 – –
Kenya July 2000 March 2004
Kyrgyz Republic June 2001 December 2002 April 2004
Lao PDR March 2001 June 2004 –
Lesotho December 2000 – –
Macedonia, FYR November 2000 – –
Madagascar November 2000 July 2003 July 2004
Malawi August 2000 April 2002 October 2003
Mali July 2000 May 2002 April 2004
Mauritania – December 2000 March 2002; June 2002
Moldova Nov. 2000; Apr. 2002 May 2004
Mongolia June 2001 July 2003
Mozambique February 2000 April 2001 February 2003
Nepal – May 2003 –
Nicaragua August 2000 July 2001 Nov. 2002; Nov. 2003
Notes
1 In addition, there are several sub-regional MDBs, including the Andean Devel-
opment Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the
Caribbean Development Bank, the East African Development Bank, the Islamic
Development Bank, and the West African Development Bank.
2 After all, the World Bank was created as a post-war reconstruction bank for
Europe and other economies damaged by World War II.
3 As will be explained in a later section, this situation is changing as a result of
the introduction of development policy loans that replaced various types of
adjustment loans.
4 The “principle of subsidiarity” rests on the notion of “fiscal equivalence,” which
indicates that the decision-making jurisdiction should coincide with the region
of spillovers, so that those affected by the public good determine its provision
decision. See Olson (1969).
5 The IMF transformed the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)
into the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999, by underlin-
ing the importance of poverty reduction in IMF programs in poor countries.
The World Bank also renamed the Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) the
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) in 1999.
6 See also McCawley (2002).
7 Measurement of per-capita income (or consumption) and its interpretation,
however simple it appears at first sight, can be fraught with problems. For
example, the poverty headcount in developing countries is very sensitive to: the
precise level of the poverty line because income distribution in the vicinity of
developing-country poverty lines is typically flat; the PPP conversion rate used
because the implied consumption basket may be inappropriate for the poor
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A2.9 continued
Countries/regions Interim-PRSP PRSP PRSP progress report
Niger October 2000 January 2002 July 2003
Pakistan November 2001 December 2003 –
Rwanda November 2000 June 2002 June 2003
Sao Tome and April 2000 – –
Principe
Senegal May 2000 May 2002 –
Serbia and – February 2004 –
Montenegro
Sierra Leone June 2001 – –
Sri Lanka – December 2002 –
Tajikistan March 2000 June 2002 March 2004
Tanzania March 2000 October 2000 Apr. 2001; Mar. 2003; 
Apr. 2004
Uganda – March 2000 March 2002; August 2003
Vietnam March 2001 May 2002; Nov. 2003 November 2003
Yemen December 2000 May 2002 –
Zambia July 2000 March 2002 March 2004
Source: World Bank
due to the inclusion of many non-essentials that are cheap in developing coun-
tries but are irrelevant to the poor; and the assumed rate of change in the con-
sumption of the poor – which tends to be overestimated particularly in Asia –
because there are large discrepancies between consumption estimates from
household expenditure surveys and estimates from the national income
accounts. In addition, the application of a $1 (or $2) per day standard to both
urban and rural areas in a given country may be misleading because of differ-
ences in consumption baskets. Based on some of these observations, Wade
(2002) claims that the margin of error is so large that we do not have definitive
knowledge as to whether there has been real progress on poverty reduction,
and that the number of people in extreme poverty may be significantly higher
than the World Bank’s estimate.
8 The Millennium Declaration was adopted by all the United Nations member
states at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000. The goals
formulated in the chapter on development were taken up by UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan when he presented his “Road Map for the Implementa-
tion of the Millennium Declaration” to the UN General Assembly in
September 2001. Annan identified and quantified inter alia eight measurable
development goals with 18 targets. They are known as the MDGs.
9 Dollar (2002) identified five statistical trends in growth, poverty and income dis-
tribution in the developing countries: (1) Poor country growth rates have accelerated.
During the period 1980–97, the population-weighted average growth rate of the
poorest one-fifth of countries in 1980 (4 percent per capita per annum) has
been higher than that of the richest one-fifth of countries (1.7 percent per capita
per annum). This is in contrast with the experiences for the prior two decades
(1960–80), where the growth rate for the poor group (1.8 percent) was lower
than that for the rich group (3.3 percent). (2) The number of poor people in the
world has declined significantly, the first such decline in history. Over the period
1977/78 to 1997/98, there has been a large net decline in the number of poor
due to massive poverty reduction achieved in China and India, which more than
offsets an increase in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. (3) Global inequality (among
citizens of the world) has declined modestly over the last 20 years. Measures of global
inequality, such as the global Gini coefficients, have declined modestly since
1980, reversing a 200-year-old historical trend toward higher inequality. Rapid
growth in Asia (China, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam) has been a force for
greater global equality because that is where the majority of the world’s extreme
poor lived in 1980 and they benefitted from the growth. (4) There is no general
trend toward higher or lower inequality within countries; in particular, among developing
countries inequality has decreased in about as many cases as it has increased. There is no
pattern of rising or declining inequality within countries, though there are some
notable cases in which inequality has risen. (5) Wage inequality is rising worldwide.
There is a general pattern of rising wage inequality, that is, larger wage increases
for skilled and/or educated workers relative to those for unskilled and/or less
educated workers. This trend does not contradict the preceding one because
wages are a small part of household income in developing countries, which make
up the bulk of the world in terms of countries and population.
10 It must be noted that the “Washington Consensus” as defined by John
Williamson (1990) does not include complete capital flow liberalization or full
currency convertibility on the capital account, though it includes FDI liberal-
ization.
11 See Hansen and Tarp (2000).
12 See Burnside and Dollar (2002). But Hansen and Tarp (2000) claim that aid
and good policies can independently increase the recipients’ growth rates. See
also papers in Tarp (2000), Lesnik and White (2000) and Easterly (2003) for
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criticisms of the Burnside–Dollar exercise. McGillivray and Morrissey (2000)
discuss the issue of fungibility.
13 Some of these elements, but not all, and others have been analyzed by the
World Bank (1993). See also Fukasaku et al. (2005).
14 The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and Japan are major aid donors
in East Asia. See Kawai and Takagi (2004) for the assessment of Japan’s ODA in
recent years.
15 As Williamson (1994) himself acknowledges, there were many policy issues on
which different views existed, including: speed of trade liberalization; capital
controls; need to target the current account; pace and extent of inflation
reduction; smoothing of business cycles; incomes policy and wage and price
freezes (sometimes called “heterodox policies”); elimination of indexation;
correction of market failures; size of tax revenue and public sector spending as
a ratio of GDP; desirability and extent of deliberate income redistribution; role
for industrial policy; diverse models of a market economy – Anglo-Saxon
laissez-faire, European social market economy or Japanese-style responsibility
of the corporation to multiple stakeholders; and priority of population control
and environmental preservation.
16 The first one was given to Uganda in May 2001.
17 This change reflects the recognition that a large number of structural adjust-
ment loans (SALs) in African and other low-income countries were a failure. In
these countries, “policy conditionality” was not effective as an instrument for
reform and non-compliance with “conditionality” rarely punished in any effect-
ive or consistent way (Killick 2004). See also Gilbert et al. (1999).
18 See Krueger (1998) and Banerjee and He (2003) for these issues.
19 See Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks (1996) for earlier issues.
20 Also supporting this recommendation, Nunnekamp (2002) suggests a transfer
of the PRGF from the IMF to the World Bank.
21 See also the Commission on the Role of the MDBs in Emerging Markets
(2001), which was co-chaired by José Angel Gurria and Paul Volcker.
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3 Is the international trade regime




In managing the stability and development of a national economy, the
appropriate level of government regulation of market transactions has
always been a central question. Although it is true that market regulation
policies have been adopted intensively in Western countries since the late
nineteenth century, the socialist and developing countries that appeared
on a large scale in the last 50 years have shown an unprecedented adher-
ence to state leadership in managing economic and social development.
Since the late 1970s or early 1980s, however, these countries have been
confronted with the great transformation of their economic systems from
state-centered to market-oriented. While voluminous debates have sur-
rounded this drastic change in development strategy, this chapter exam-
ines whether and to what extent the international trade regime1 (the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO)) contributed to economic liberalization in these
countries. To sketch the complex functions served by the trade regime will
be helpful in clarifying the relevance of international norms and rules to
the domestic policymaking process in these countries.
It is convenient to divide the postwar period into two; before and after
the mid-1980s, when most of the developing and socialist states began
shifting their development strategies toward liberal market economic reg-
ulatory environments. The international trade regime has served dual
functions in each period. The next section reveals that the dual functions
of the regime before the 1980s were “to tolerate deviation from liberaliza-
tion principles” and “to stimulate spontaneous liberalization.” The former
function originates in the tolerant and exceptional treatment granted to
developing countries that needed to restrict trade and to protect infant
industries. In this respect, the international trade regime exercised very
little direct influence on the removal of restrictive regulations to inter-
national trade. At the same time, however, we can identify the latter func-
tion of the regime in this period. It was the very tolerance of protectionist
measures under the old regime that paved the way to macroeconomic
crises in these countries. The international trade regime functioned, in an
unexpected manner, as a precondition for leading these countries toward
radical liberalization in the 1980s.
In addition, it is important that the international trade regime has
facilitated trade in goods and services among advanced industrial coun-
tries, and has contributed to the dramatic increase in the amount and
value of international trade. This gradually formed an external environ-
ment of “globalization” or “internationalization” of commercial activities
that has raised the opportunity cost of rejecting involvement in the free
trade circle and missing out on the advantages of gains from trade that
reduced transport costs and lowered tariff barriers have engendered.2 This
is another indirect effect of the international trade regime on domestic
economic policy choices in these countries.
The third section examines the dual functions of the regime after policy
reform; “integration and harmonization” and “technical assistance and
preferential treatments.” The former function is premised on the
improved comprehensiveness of the regime in membership and issue
coverage as a result of active participation by the developing and transi-
tional countries. It is, however, the unprecedented organizational, norm-
ative and ideological unity of the international trade regime that requires
the latter function. Most of the developing countries lack the financial
and human resources or experiences necessary to harmonize their eco-
nomic institutions and policies with international norms and, therefore, to
implement and administer WTO obligations effectively. Therefore, the
regime implicitly obliges advanced industrial countries to provide tech-
nical assistance and preferential treatments to developing and transitional
countries. These correlative requirements of harmonization and technical
assistance will continue to catalyze the unprecedented interaction
between the international trade regime and policymakers in developing
countries. We can never fully understand the highly internationalized
character of the liberalization processes in these countries without paying
attention to the dual functions of the international trade regime.
In this way, this chapter will examine how the international trade
regime has legally and politically affected the process of liberalization in
the developing and transitional economies, with the emphasis placed on a
regime’s dual, apparently conflicting, functions. In the concluding
section, several aspects of divergence among developing countries will be
presented briefly.
Before policy reform: the dual functions of the regime
In this section, it is argued that, while developing and transitional countries
have entered into the economic liberalization process in the 1980s, the
international trade regime did not explicitly foster this process. Rather, it
induced them to stick to, rather than abandon, their market-intervening
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development policies through a general tolerance for deviation from free-
trade obligations. At the same time, however, this generous attitude of the
regime has paradoxically provided, in an indirect manner, an essential
precondition for leading these countries toward the drastic liberalizing
reform. This dual feature of the international trade regime will be exam-
ined below.
Existing theories about the function of the international trade regime
There exist two systemic theories that attempt to explain country-level
trade liberalization in the anarchic world where centralized authority is
absent and commitments to cooperate are not guaranteed. The first is the
“theory of hegemonic stability,” which claims that the presence of a single
dominant state leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all countries in
the international system (Snidal 1985: 579). Charles Kindleberger con-
tends that the maintenance of free-trade regimes can be directly attri-
buted to the leadership provided by the dominant state, Britain in the
mid-nineteenth century and the United States in the mid-twentieth
century, for example (Kindleberger 1981). Without hegemonic leader-
ship, there may not be sufficient provision of a facilitating environment
for free trade. Since such an environment is a public good,3 everyone
benefits from a stable, low-risk international trade environment, but it is
expensive to maintain. According to this theory, it is indispensable for the
maintenance of an open international trade regime,4 though these public
goods, once provided by a benevolent hegemonic state,5 are available for
other countries to “free ride.” In sum, hegemonic stability theory claims
that the cooperative actions of trade liberalization can be possible thanks
to the unilaterally provided public goods supporting the establishment of
an international trade regime. As for the developing and transitional
countries, they were able to keep restrictive trade practices as long as the
stable international trade system was provided by American hegemony in
the latter half of the twentieth century, but they began liberalizing after
the dominant power of the United States began to decline in the 1970s.
Therefore, the theory of hegemonic stability cannot explain why these
countries shifted their economic policies from restriction to openness,
and how the international trade regime influenced this process.
To account for the survival of the international trade regime and the con-
tinuation of cooperative behavior given the decline in American hegemony,
there evolved an alternative school of thought: “Liberal-Institutionalism.”
Robert Keohane contends that, in many of the issue areas of international
relations, countries share common interests, the realization of which
render all the members better off if all (or most) cooperate. They do not
share incompatible interests, the satisfaction of which by one country will
be the loss of another.6 Even if common interests exist, however, countries
might be unable to cooperate and to reach a Pareto-optimal solution
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when nothing would guarantee the prevention of any country from
“defecting” from cooperation and gaining extra benefits. In order to over-
come this failure (aptly modeled as a Prisoners’ Dilemma), countries
develop institutional mechanisms that inhibit cheating by providing
information, reducing transaction costs and raising the cost of defecting.
Thus, by means of constructing an appropriate international trade
regime, countries are able to open their economies and reach mutual
gains without worrying about the sudden closure of trading partners’
markets. With respect to the developing and transitional countries,
however, they were not satisfied with the “mutual gains” that would be
obtained by cooperating with advanced industrial countries. Rather, they
sought a privileged position in which they could foster the growth of their
own industries, through protection from international competition, in
order to catch up with developed countries. Therefore, even if active par-
ticipation in, and full compliance with, the international trade regime
could bring the developing and transitional countries some “absolute
gains,” such gains were not sufficient for them to accept full involvement
in the regime, since they were interested in “relative gains” vis-à-vis
advanced industrial countries.7 We have to conclude that the institutional-
ist approach to the international trade regime is unable to explain 
the cause of liberalization reforms in the developing and transitional
countries.
What, then, is the appropriate description of the political functions
served by the international trade regime in the liberalization process in
these countries? My argument is that the “dual functions” of the regime
must be considered; the first was, a visible and direct function which
helped these countries to reinforce their state-interventionism; the
second, an invisible and indirect function which nonetheless constituted a
factor behind their ultimate turn toward market liberalization. The rest of
this section will describe these dual functions in turn.
The direct function of the regime: tolerance for deviation
From the beginning of the GATT, advanced industrial countries as well as
developing countries have been allowed to adopt several exceptional
measures to protect domestic markets from foreign competition.8 But
developing countries, in pursuit of “relative gains” against developed
countries, demanded further exceptional treatment from the major
obligations of the GATT. During the Cold War, Western developed coun-
tries were eager to incorporate newly independent countries into the
Western camp by securing participation of these countries in the GATT.
The need for the “enclosure” of the Third World necessitated advanced
industrial countries making substantial compromises on exceptional treat-
ment. Consequently, developing countries remained virtually outside the
fundamental GATT obligations and maintained a highly restrictive trade
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system for several decades. Most socialist countries, on the other hand,
did not intend to be members of the GATT. Thus, the fundamental
GATT obligations to liberalize trade were meaningless for most of its
members.
The reason developing countries desired trade restrictions are found in
the prevalent strategies of centrally planned and domestically driven
industrialization. In the 1950s, most developing countries were highly spe-
cialized in the production of primary commodities for export, while
importing manufactured products. Policymakers in these countries
regarded these strategies as indispensable to overcoming specialization in
primary commodities, improving domestic productive capabilities and
industrializing domestic economies. Countries, it was believed, facilitated
industrialization by protecting their domestic “infant” industries. A
market-oriented system was thought to harm their economies’ develop-
ment, and governmental intervention in domestic and international
markets was regarded as indispensable for the management of the
national economy through strategic industrial policies (Krueger 1995:
3–8). A number of developing countries adopted the import substitution
industrialization policy, though some countries in East and South East
Asia abandoned the strategy relatively early, and shifted to export-oriented
industrialization. Despite this bifurcation, however, almost all policy-
makers in developing countries sought to retain manipulative instruments
to intervene in markets, especially by means of restrictive measures. The
GATT, while enshrining a fundamental principle of trade liberalization,
was required, for the reasons described above, to accept the state-interven-
tionism of developing countries, and allowed many exceptions to the
rules. The following are notable.
Balance-of-payments restrictions
Although Article XI of the GATT prohibits member countries from adopt-
ing quantitative restrictions, Article XII prescribes that each state may
restrict the quantity of imports in order to safeguard its external financial
position and its balance of payments. Because the conditions for applying
restrictive measures of Article XII are rather strict, developing countries
demanded mitigation of the requirements, leading to the attachment of a
separate provision on balance-of-payments restrictions for developing
countries at the 1954–5 Review Session, namely, Article XVIII: B. Under
this provision, developing countries are permitted to use quantitative
restrictions in order “to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the imple-
mentation of its programme of economic development,” which means
restrictions are almost always possible.9 In addition, periodic reviews by
CONTRACTING PARTIES10 over all restrictions under the Article gradu-
ally became ritual and meaningless. Moreover, developing countries
adopting import-substitution policies failed to increase export earnings to
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support import-substituting industries which demand foreign exchange
for importing capital equipment and intermediate goods (Krueger 1995:
8–9). Since most developing countries suffered from constant foreign
exchange shortages, Article XVIII: B was quite easy to apply. In fact, from
1974 to 1987 developing countries declared almost 3,500 quantitative
restrictions under the balance-of-payments exception (Finger and Winters
1998: 376–7).
Non-reciprocity
While Article II of the GATT requires member countries to maintain
tariffs below the levels of “scheduled” concessions, it is one of the major
principles of the GATT to incrementally reduce the existing general level
of tariffs through periodic multilateral negotiations, or “rounds.” In addi-
tion, such negotiations are supposed to proceed on a reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis, as declared in Article XXVIII bis. Developing
countries, however, were naturally very reluctant to offer tariff concessions
that are equivalent in value to those offered by developed countries, since
they felt they had to maintain high tariff barriers to protect domestic
infant industries that confronted import competition. In the 1954–5
Review Session, developing countries demanded exceptional treatment to
the principle of reciprocity. This demand was accepted and materialized
in Article XXVIII bis: 3, which reads that “the needs of less-developed
countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist their eco-
nomic development” shall be taken into account.11
This does not mean that developing countries cannot benefit from
mutual tariff concessions among advanced industrial countries, since
Article I of the GATT ensures any advantage granted by any member shall
be accorded unconditionally to all other members (General Most-Favored-
Nation treatment: MFN). As a result, most developing countries became
bystanders in round negotiations, while free-riding on outcomes. Until the
Uruguay Round began, less than 30 percent of all the tariffs in developing
countries were on the GATT’s reduction schedule. By contrast, 80 percent
of developed countries’ tariffs were scheduled for reduction (Finger and
Winters 1998: 368). Average tariff rates in developing countries were also
higher than those of developed countries, which were close to zero at the
beginning of the Uruguay Round.
Special and differential treatments
The main purpose of exceptional GATT treatment was to obtain permis-
sion for import-decreasing restrictions in developing countries. It had
become obvious, however, by the end of the 1950s, that the import substi-
tution strategy would not be sufficient for promoting economic develop-
ment, because it led to shortages of foreign exchange necessary for
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importing intermediate goods. Thus, it became important to dramatically
increase export earnings. This led to the demand for the non-reciprocal
opening of advanced industrial markets through preferential tariff rates.
This meant active, unilateral, and non-reciprocal trade liberalization by
advanced industrial countries in order to give developing countries more
improved access to their markets. The UNCTAD II of 1968 declared the
establishment of the “Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).” Later, in
1971, the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT finally waived the provi-
sions of Article I (MFN) for a period of ten years, making possible the
implementation of the GSP. At the same time, another decision also
waived Article I, allowing developing countries to accord preferential
treatments with respect to products originating in other developing coun-
tries. In sum, by the end of 1971, the MFN was invalidated not only in
North–South trade but also in South–South trade (Carreau and Juillard
1998: 276). These two provisional waivers were made permanent in the so-
called Enabling Clause of 1979, and plenty of preferential tariff reductions
were adopted by developed countries. The Enabling Clause also author-
ized exceptional treatment for developing countries in GATT rules
dealing with non-tariff trade barriers, such as the Subsidies Code, the
Government Procurement Code and the Standards Code. Accordingly,
developing countries received a wide variety of “special and differential
treatments,” which exempted them from the obligation to liberalize non-
tariff measures and regulations.
The non-reciprocal, preferential treatment was so tolerant that policy-
makers in developing countries found it possible to maintain tariff and
non-tariff measures, sheltering domestic markets from exposure to inter-
national competition in a GATT-consistent manner. Thus, it is clear that
the international trade regime did not compel or persuade policymakers
in developing and transitional countries to liberalize their economic
systems; rather, its direct function was to tolerate and even encourage
them to deviate from fundamental GATT principles and engage in
intense market-control policies.
The indirect function of the regime: stimulating spontaneous
liberalization
A variety of factors have been pointed to as causes for the trend toward
reduced market intervention in developing and transitional countries
since the 1980s. Frequently mentioned are the following: a growing sense
of disillusionment with past development strategies in the face of a deep
economic shock caused by the global recession in the early 1980s; the
financial, political and ideological pressure exercised by international
creditors like the IMF, the World Bank and transnational private banks;
the dissemination of neoclassical economic ideas among officials, tech-
nocrats and academic economists in developing countries, many of whom
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were trained in North American universities.12 On the contrary, consider-
ing the role of the GATT described above, the international trade regime
seems to have been quite irrelevant, or even detrimental to the shift
toward market liberalization. Here I reveal, however, another aspect of the
dual functions of the international trading regime, which indirectly
pushed them toward drastic reforms.
Inviting macroeconomic collapse
Under the import-substitution strategy, developing countries had to
import capital equipment and intermediate goods, while restricting
imports of consumer goods. However, they were doomed to suffer from
foreign exchange shortages, since their export earnings were insufficient
to finance imports. Things worsened for several reasons. First, nominal
exchange rates were fixed at unrealistically over-valued levels in order to
import capital goods or commodities less expensively, which disadvan-
taged exporting sectors. Second, foreign aid and investment devoted to
export-promotion was quite limited. Finally, domestic import-substituting
producers with monopoly positions in the sheltered market were free
from competition in the world economy, which resulted in perpetually
low competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages and the resulting large
current account deficits threw most developing countries into debt to
international financial institutions and transnational private banks.13 This
made these countries vulnerable to crisis when the early 1980s global
recession dried up international loans and raised interest rates in inter-
national financial markets. This enabled international financial institu-
tions, other creditors and neoclassical economists to intervene in the
economic policies of developing countries. Indeed, these actors exercised
direct influence on the correction of the misguiding policies. In this
respect, the drastic policy reform toward economic liberalization in devel-
oping countries seemed to take place completely outside the international
trade regime.
But we should also pay attention to the indirect functions served by
GATT practices. As the trade regime tolerated the maintenance of import
restrictive measures and, despite such conduct, ensured automatic MFN
benefits, the cost of pursuing market-control policies was kept to a
minimum. Without the generous tolerance for free-riding on the fruits of
the GATT, such market-controlling development strategies might have
been abandoned much earlier before it led to destructive fiscal imbalance
and macroeconomic collapse. In other words, the GATT, through a series
of self-contradictory protectionist exemptions, functioned as an essential
precondition for enabling drastic liberalizing reforms in developing coun-
tries. By no means was this paradoxical consequence intended, the inter-
national trade regime could be said to have contributed in an indirect and
unexpected way to the pivotal policy change in developing countries.
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Evoking broad opposition to the protectionist policies
According to classical international trade theory, unilateral trade liberal-
ization is sufficient for a country as a whole to become better off. The
principle of reciprocity or mutuality, asking for trading partners’ equival-
ent concessions, has an affinity with mercantilist ideas that detest import-
ing foreign products without obtaining equivalent opportunities to
export. Reciprocity as a principle of international trade, however, has
important political implications. When bargaining is reciprocal, exporters
in a country will support the concession by their government in order to
obtain concessions from other governments. Accordingly, a country’s
export coalition will be a strong constituency for trade liberalization.14
As an effective political instrument, reciprocity was not available in devel-
oping countries, since the GATT exempted developing countries from the
principle of reciprocity. Therefore, even if policymakers felt the need for
trade liberalization, they could not find enough domestic supporters to
push the effort forward. On the contrary, they have been confronted with
protectionist requirements from interest groups, which were strengthened
by the official recognition of non-reciprocity.15 Protectionist rent-seeking
activities, even when aimed at pursuing self-interest, and irrelevant to the
development of infant industries or national interests, became extremely
hard to turn down (Hudec 1987: Ch. 9). Politicians and government offi-
cials in developing countries had to continue economically irrational
market controls such as restricting imports, managing inefficient state-
owned enterprises, and subsidizing noncompetitive domestic producers.
Consequently, most developing countries suffered from large fiscal deficits
and increased money supply, which invited inflation. Thus, even if politi-
cians and policymakers in developing countries were aware of the destruc-
tive effects of market-intervention policies, the international trade regime
hindered them from changing their policies toward liberalization. Indeed,
in many developing countries, elaborate relationships of patronage or cor-
ruption were reinforced between politicians and import-competing sectors,
which sought parochial benefits from protectionism at the expense of long-
run national development. As a consequence, macroeconomic deteriora-
tion as evidenced in fiscal deficits and high inflation finally aroused broad
domestic opposition. We should note that the realization of drastic liberaliz-
ing reforms in this way would be attributed in part to the international trade
regime, which encouraged politicians and protectionist beneficiaries
through the extension of non-reciprocal treatment. This was a major indi-
rect function of the international trade regime.
Promoting globalization
At least among advanced industrial countries, the international trade
regime has facilitated and promoted trade liberalization. Multilateral
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negotiations worked fairly well along the principle of reciprocity to
promote substantial reduction of tariffs in these countries. In addition,
revolutionary progress in transportation and communications has reduced
transaction costs in international trade. These promoted “globalization,”
which has dramatically increased international trade.16 Accordingly, the
opportunity costs of insulating a country from the world economy have
risen. Enterprises in a country with high tariffs and other restrictions
cannot take advantage of less expensive products in world markets. Nor
can they transfer stages of their production processes overseas, because
high trade barriers make inter- and intra-firm transactions very costly.
Thus, import restrictions deprived domestic industries of advantageous
opportunities, strategic perspective and, consequently, international com-
petitiveness. Furthermore, notwithstanding the existence of the MFN
clause, it was rather difficult for competitive industries in developing
countries to obtain substantial concessions from advanced industrial coun-
tries, unless their government would offer meaningful concessions. Con-
sequently, the industries in developing countries with specific types of
comparative advantage were precluded from getting into the large
markets of advanced industrial countries. The loss of these potential
GATT benefits was so remarkable that some policymakers and entre-
preneurs in developing and transitional countries, realizing these
opportunity costs, carried on a vigorous campaign for liberalizing reforms.
This fostered the decline of those who clung to “statist” development strat-
egies.17 Accordingly, the international trade regime exercised an indirect
and exogenous influence on the shift of political opinions about desirable
economic policies for development.
To sum up, the visible and direct function of the international trade
regime before policy reforms was to encourage policymakers and private
sector actors in these developing countries to concentrate on, and cling
to, market-intervening and protectionist policies by exempting these
countries from most of the obligations of the GATT. On the other hand,
the regime indirectly influenced the shift of economic policies in these
countries by leading to fiscal and monetary crises, evoking wide social
opposition to the systems’ poor economic outcomes, and promoting an
alluring global free-trade system. We should note that these dual functions
of the regime, which were, in fact, both sides of the same coin, jointly con-
tributed to policy reforms in these countries, although these complicated
and hidden functions of the regime have not yet been well explored.
After policy reform: the dual functions reversed
The emerging domestic conditions of the developing and transitional
countries described in the previous section, combined with the rapid
erosion of their bargaining position caused by changes in the inter-
national political environment, namely the end of the Cold War, led these
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countries to deep integration with the international trade regime. On the
other hand, the process of integration entails another problem that may
once again differentiate the position of developing and transitional coun-
tries inside the regime from that of advanced industrial countries. This
contradictory character of the contemporary international trade regime
will be explained in this section.
The primary function: integration and harmonization
Once developing countries decided to abandon market-control policies
and to open up their economies to the rest of the world, policymakers
increasingly came to see the advantages in working within the GATT. An
agreement to launch a new round was reached in 1985 with the strong
support of developing countries. Indeed, they participated in the Uruguay
Round with unprecedented aggressiveness.
Lowering walls for trade
The Uruguay Round Balance-of-Payments Understanding encourages the
tariffication of existing quantitative restrictions and the gradual phasing-
out of balance-of-payment measures. Developing countries had already
recognized the need to get rid of such restrictions as a necessary step in
the process of policy reform and by June 1996 only three developing
countries, Tunisia, India and Pakistan, maintained import restrictions
declared under Article XVIII: B (Finger and Winters 1998: 376–7). In
addition, developing countries agreed at the Uruguay Round to reduce
their tariff rates by an average of 8 percent, whereas advanced industrial
countries reduced theirs by an average of 3.2 percent.18 In the Uruguay
Round, developing countries were not bystanders, nor free-riders on
developed country tariff reductions, but were, for the first time, active
participants, willing to offer concessions on their side.
New issues
The United States was eagerly seeking to extend GATT rules into such
“new issues” as enhancing trade in services, liberalizing trade-related
investment regulations, and improving protection of intellectual property
rights. In contrast to the “traditional” issues dealt with under the GATT,
namely the removal of border trade restrictions such as tariffs and quanti-
tative limits, these “new” issues are seeking to coordinate numerous
behind-the-border policies formerly regarded as a matter of domestic
jurisdiction (Haggard 1995: 2). Most developing countries approved of
incorporating these new issues, because they faced strong incentives to
coordinate their domestic regulations with those of advanced industrial
countries in order to regain access to foreign investment and borrowing
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markets. In addition, since the final package of a series of agreements in
the Uruguay Round had to be accepted in its entirety (“single undertak-
ing”), developing countries were able to exchange the acceptance of new
issues in exchange for concessions from advanced industrial countries in
such areas as agriculture, textiles and clothing, which were politically
volatile issues in developing countries. In this way, agreements were made
that expanded the scope of the international trade regime dramatically
and stimulated further integration and harmonization of domestic eco-
nomic institutions in each country.
Tightening up the discipline
As some developing countries began to export their products in great
volume, advanced industrial countries faced strong demands for the pro-
tection of threatened domestic industries. The policymakers had recourse
to GATT rules regulating “unfair” trade such as dumping and subsidies
(antidumping and countervailing duties, or “ADs and CVDs”). On the
other hand, since the GATT rules regarding safeguards were difficult for
developed countries to employ, developing countries were, in turn,
encouraged to carry out voluntary export restraints (VERs), whose legality
was dubious in the GATT system. Furthermore, the Congress of the
United States passed the 1974 Trade Act containing Section 301, as
amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This
legislation sought to force other countries, through threat or imposition
of sanctions, to liberalize or coordinate their policies concerning new
issues with those of the United States. In order to reduce these unilateral
or bilateral pressures exercised by advanced industrial countries, in
particular by the United States, developing countries sought to clarify and
tighten the discipline regarding ADs, CVDs and safeguards, and to
strengthen the GATT machinery of dispute settlement (Haggard 1995:
43–4). This pursuit of discipline resulted in clarified and tightened agree-
ments in these areas.
Aggressive participation by developing countries transformed the GATT
into a truly global and comprehensive trade regime. The organizational
character of the regime was strengthened as well, which led to the establish-
ment of the WTO. Member countries have generally showed respect for,
and compliance with, the rules of WTO agreements. The increased use of
the WTO dispute settlement procedure by developing countries represents
the diffusion of rule-oriented approaches.19 In addition, the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM) enables the periodic collective assessment of
member countries’ trade policies and practices covered by WTO agree-
ments. Pressures from other countries will contribute to the coordination of
trade policies through future WTO agreements.
For those countries recently admitted to the WTO, transitional
economies in particular, the accession procedure is an important
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opportunity for harmonization. When a country submits a request for
accession a working party is established, and the submitted memorandum
about the foreign trade system and relevant legislation of the applicant
country is examined in detail. If the examination in the working party is
sufficiently advanced, member countries may initiate bilateral market-
access negotiations, the result of which will apply to all other members
through the MFN clause. This accession procedure helps policymakers in
each applicant country to ensure that their laws and regulations conform
to WTO agreements.
Therefore, as a result of the economic liberalization reform in the
developing world, the international trade regime achieved a global and
comprehensive character. Member countries have clearly recognized that
they should comply with the rules and procedures of the regime, and the
developing and transitional countries in particular have become aware of
the benefits of compliance. By complying with the rules of the WTO, poli-
cymakers in these countries are able to arrange a favorable environment
for foreign direct investments, to weaken domestic political forces requir-
ing protection and to check and contain unilateral and bilateral pressures
from advanced industrial countries. Accordingly, the integration and
harmonization, without deviation from fundamental principles, of each
country’s economic institutions, regulations and policies with multilater-
ally negotiated norms have become the primary function of the inter-
national trade regime.
The complementary function: technical assistance and preferential
treatments
The fact that developing and transitional countries have become import-
ant constituents of the international trade regime indicates that, without
ensuring their confidence in, and satisfaction with, the regime’s opera-
tion, the organizational process as a whole could break down at any time.
Such a condition is considerably different from that of the former GATT
regime, which developed countries could manage autonomously. This
change in organizational character was already realized at the 1999 Seattle
WTO Ministerial Conference that failed mainly because of disagreement
between developing and developed countries. Recognizing the crisis of
the regime, advanced industrial countries initiated confidence-building
measures within the WTO, and the General Council decision of the WTO
in May 2000 supported these initiatives.
Capacity building
As explained above, each country is required to coordinate and harmo-
nize their non-tariff domestic institutions with international norms. But
those countries lacking in financial and human resources, or lacking the
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requisite experience in administering or implementing WTO obligations,
find it difficult to fully and quickly harmonize their regulations.20 Thus, a
number of WTO agreements prepared “special and differential treat-
ment” for developing and transitional countries, permitting transition
periods for full implementation. Most of these treatments expired by the
end of 1999, but many developing members requested their extension
(WTO 2001: 24). To help policymakers in those countries to improve
their ability to fulfill their WTO obligations, advanced industrial countries
have arranged various capacity-building programs. The Integrated Frame-
work (IF) is one of the most important institutional mechanisms for the
delivery of trade-related technical assistance to least developed countries
(LDCs).21 In addition, several developed countries supported the creation
of the Advisory Center on WTO Law, which assists developing and LDC
members to use the dispute settlement procedures in order to promote
adherence to WTO provisions.
Market-access improvements
Since 1974, major developed countries have provided unilateral duty-free
treatment to a number of goods from developing countries (GSP). Some
of the GSP programs have recently been extended: the EU “Everything
but Arms (EBA)” program; the United States’ African and Caribbean
access programs; and Japan’s 99 percent initiative for industrial products
(WTO 2001: 41–2). Although these preferential systems were provided,
developing countries often lack the domestic capacity to exploit the
market-access opportunities that would allow the expansion of their trade-
related sectors. Thus, advanced industrial countries have also provided
bilateral assistance programs in order to assist capacity-building efforts in
these areas.
These “special and differential treatments” and technical assistance do
not mean that there exists essential disagreement between developed and
developing countries about what constitutes a desirable economic system
nor about the importance of the fundamental norms and principles of the
international trade regime. In order to accomplish the primary function
of global integration and harmonization of economic institutions and
policies, the regime implicitly obliges advanced industrial countries to
provide technical assistance and preferential treatment to developing and
transitional countries so that they can manage market-oriented economic
policies more effectively. Only through these efforts will policymakers be
able to comply with, and make use of, WTO laws more properly, and
increase confidence in the regime.22 Without the assistance and differenti-
ation, they would find it very hard to fulfill the same obligations as those
of advanced industrial countries, which would likely lead to the break-
down of the regime. Therefore, the necessity of providing these additional
measures can be regarded as an indispensable “complementary” function
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of the regime that aims to bring developing countries inside the regime.
In this regard, the differential treatments provided by the WTO for devel-
oping and transitional countries are quite different in character and goals
from those of the GATT. This represents vividly the “reversed” character
of the dual functions of the WTO regime in contrast with the GATT.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis examines the functional implications of the inter-
national trade regime. In reality, however, the way each state has liberal-
ized its economic system varies significantly. Each country or region has its
own historical background, political circumstances, comparative advan-
tages and political-economic ties with other countries or regions. These
characteristics have diversified the processes and outcomes of the liberal-
ization process in each country. The international trade regime, on the
one hand, offering the opportunities of multilateral negotiations and a
common frame of reference, ensures the homogeneity of the otherwise
infinitely diversified processes and outcomes of liberalization. On the
other hand, the regime in some respects enables, or even encourages, the
diversified, characteristic and path-dependent forms of policy reforms in
each country or region. Here I briefly examine how and to what extent
the regime contributes to such divergence.
Divergence among issue areas
The developing and transitional countries as a whole by no means share
common interests on all issue areas on the negotiating table. The varying
interests among these countries emerged during the process of the
Uruguay Round. They have demonstrated a tendency to rely increasingly
on regional positions or issue-area coalitions such as textiles and clothing
or agriculture (Jara 1993: 11). A new range of bargaining options has
emerged allowing a selection of partners on an issue-specific basis (Tussie
1993b: 183).
The problem of agricultural trade liberalization created the issue-
specific coalition in the process of the Uruguay Round, namely the Cairns
Group in which developed and developing countries crossed old bound-
aries and converged.23 Agricultural products had been granted special
treatments under the GATT; export subsidies and quantitative restrictions
were permitted under Article XVI and Article XI, respectively. The net-
exporting countries of agricultural products that were eager to liberalize
the rules of the regime assembled to strengthen the bargaining positions.
On the other hand, policymakers in other countries who are politically
responsible for protecting their inefficient agricultural sectors desperately
fought to avoid rapid (or any) liberalization. In this regard, since there
were both exporting and importing countries of agricultural products
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within developing countries, they could not share common interests on
the issue.
As for the “new issues” mentioned in the previous section, the East
Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) welcomed the introduction
of these issues into the GATT regime. Since the NICs had abandoned the
import-substitution policies, they pursued export-led growth with both
public and private foreign capitals. In order to attract foreign investments
continuously, policymakers in the NICs had to liberalize and rationalize
their economic regulations and policies as soon as possible. In addition, a
multilateral process was desirable for countries that had been increasingly
threatened by bilateral pressure from the United States over the new trade
issues. On the other hand, those countries that clung to the traditional
import-substitution policies and extensive market-controlling strategies
(India and Brazil in particular), but also including socialist governments
(Cuba, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, Tanzania), contended that a number of
Tokyo Round issues such as safeguards, textiles and agriculture were
unfinished, and that negotiation on the new issues would be premature.24
Many developing countries supported the NICs’ approach.25
The heterogeneity of the issue-specific interests of developing and tran-
sitional states represents, in part, the divergence in past developmental
strategies, variation in comparative advantage, or variation in relationships
with advanced industrial countries, particularly with the United States.
Trade liberalization did not necessarily mean a simple, homogeneous and
mutually profitable process for all developing and transitional countries.
How then, could the international trade regime and multilateral trade
negotiations under its auspices manage the divergence among these coun-
tries? First, the comprehensiveness of the international trade regime
allowed enormous issue areas to be incorporated into the multinational
negotiations. Second, the “single undertaking” principle enabled the
package-dealing negotiation, exchanging concessions across issue areas.
Therefore, despite the heterogeneity of preferences among these coun-
tries, policymakers in each country could seek to obtain beneficial conces-
sions at the expense of many other issue areas.
Divergence among regions
Regional agreements are often one of the most powerful driving forces for
trade liberalization. As multilateral trade negotiations have become more
and more difficult with the multiplied members and issues, policymakers
feel more inclined toward regional cooperation, which can be negotiated
by a limited number of countries and issues and greater similarity in
historical experiences, geographical situations and economic systems. The
international trade regime basically permits such regional cooperation so
long as it does not preclude multilateral liberalization efforts. Article
XXIV of the GATT provides rules for free trade zones and customs
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unions. However, the requirements under Article XXIV, such as the
restriction on discriminatory and trade-diverting effects, have been unilat-
erally interpreted and seriously distorted (Jara 1993: 24). In fact, regional
cooperation usually has intense discriminatory and trade-diverting effects
against the rest of the world. Moreover, some regional regimes can influ-
ence the liberalizing processes of member countries, as seen in the EU-
accession requirements on eastern and central European countries. Thus,
variation in the location of developing and transitional countries pro-
motes divergent liberalization paths. The international trade regime,
having been tolerant toward various forms of regional integration, has
contributed to the expansion of such regional uniqueness.
Variation in domestic political conditions
Domestic political circumstances and institutions naturally affect the
decision-making processes and policy outcomes. In a country that is liber-
alizing its former market-controlling protectionist system, policymakers
will be put into conflict with traditionally protected groups, such as subsi-
dized industries or protected farmers. Some governments may have broad
political latitude to pursue drastic liberalizing reforms, while other gov-
ernments may have to give in to protectionist demands in order to remain
in power, which will necessarily act as a continuing constraint on liberal-
ization. The international trade regime, since its establishment, has
enabled member countries to choose a “compromised” style of trade liber-
alization, particularly in the form of elaborate trade remedies that permit
members to protect seriously endangered domestic industries from inter-
national competition. As a result, developing and transitional countries
can launch trade liberalization reforms, while protecting, if necessary,
some economically noncompetitive but politically powerful industries in a
GATT-consistent or WTO-consistent manner. Increased use of antidump-
ing measures26 or safeguards by developing countries reflect such incre-
mental political processes of “compromised” trade liberalization.
Therefore, we can say the highly flexible character of the international
trade regime has provided members with various methods to achieve
trade liberalization, reflecting diverse political environments within which
policymakers must make decisions.
In analyzing the contemporary development strategies adopted in
developing and transitional countries, it is necessary to pay attention to
the external influences, assistance and even pressure from international
organizations, as well as to pay close attention to the domestic decision-
making processes. This chapter illustrates how and to what extent the
international trade regime has affected the formation and transformation
of the development strategies in these countries by proposing that we view
the trade regimes as characterized by different “dual functions.” Recogniz-
ing these synchronic and diachronic functions of the regime is helpful for
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more integrated studies of the way these countries have managed develop-
ment in the last half century. It also sheds light on what their strategies
will be in the future. At the same time, the framework presented here has
to be complemented by individual case studies that explore the different
ways development has progressed in each country, region and specific
political situation. Such analyses will improve understanding of the mul-
tiple roles that the international trade regime played in various stages of
the development process.
Notes
1 An international “regime” in this chapter refers to a set of fundamental prin-
ciples, norms and values in a particular issue area (international trade here),
and some concrete agreements that spell out the rules and procedures neces-
sary to achieve the goals expressed in those principles (Krasner 1983).
2 See Krueger (1998: 3). Frankel also notes these two characteristics as the main
causes of “globalization,” saying that “[t]he two major drivers of economic
globalization are reduced costs to transportation and communication in the
private sector and reduced policy barriers to trade and investment on the part
of the public sector” (Frankel 2000: 45). On the other hand, Keohane and
Milner identify reduced transaction costs as a cause of “internationalization” of
trade, with lowered trade barriers as its “effect.” They refer to inter-
nationalization as “the processes generated by underlying shifts in transaction
costs that produce observable flows of goods, services, and capital,” whereas
“the liberalization of foreign trade and investment policies, the deregulation of
domestic markets, shifts in fiscal and monetary policy, and changes in the insti-
tutions designed to affect these policies” are included in “possible changes”
provoked by economic internationalization (Keohane and Milner 1996: 4). As
for the developing and socialist countries, we can see not only declined costs of
transportation and communication but also lowered government barriers in
advanced industrial countries by virtue of the international trade regime as the
given external environment, which then would induce the developing and
socialist countries to change their economic policies and institutions.
3 According to Kindleberger, public goods for stabilizing the international
economy are a market for distressed goods, a steady flow of capital, a manage-
ment of the structure of foreign-exchange rates and so on (Kindleberger 1981:
247).
4 This assumption of hegemonic stability theory that the collective action
problem surrounding the supply of public goods for an open international
trade regime are impossible to overcome has been a target of intense assaults
by critics. They contend that, as Thomas Schelling’s notion of “k-group” sug-
gests, it is possible for two or more secondary powers to produce international
collective goods after hegemonic power have declined because they have an
incentive to avoid the collapse of the regime and consequently become willing
to participate in collective action (Snidal 1985: 597–612); (Lake 1993: 462–7).
Certainly it may be possible for two or more states to act collectively, but spe-
cific conditions must be achieved before public goods are actually provided.
Therefore, whether or not the secondary powers of the European states or
Japan have succeeded in the role of providing public goods after the decline of
American hegemony is yet to be examined and demonstrated.
5 Krasner, who also presented a variation on hegemonic stability theory, does
not assume a hegemonic state is benevolent, but coercive. A hegemonic state
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“can use its economic resources to create an open economy. . . . It can withhold
foreign grants and engage in competition, potentially ruinous for the weaker
states.” Here the hegemonic power uses its superiority to force other, smaller
states to contribute to maintaining the trading system that satisfies its self-
interest (Krasner 1976). In this case, what matters will be the relative ability of
the hegemonic state to pressure subordinate states rather than the absolute
ability to provide public goods. Both coercive and benevolent nature, however,
can coexist in a hegemonic state (Snidal 1985: 585–90; Lake 1993: 467–8).
6 Keohane 1984: Ch. 5. See also, Oye (1986); Axelrod and Keohane (1986).
7 This kind of “gains” problem can occur among advanced industrial countries,
of course. Krasner argues that there can be many ways to achieve mutual gains,
and some may give a larger share to one state, while others give a larger share
to another. Since there are many points along the Pareto frontier, distribu-
tional conflicts can happen over which point along the frontier should be
chosen (Krasner 1991; Powell 1994: 334–43).
8 With the enlargement of suffrage and the democratization in Western Europe
since the late nineteenth century, governments came to assume much more
direct responsibility for domestic social security and economic stability. They
could not maintain the laissez-faire liberalism pervasive in the mid-nineteenth
century any longer but, rather, had to manage international economic transac-
tions carefully so that domestic industries and their employees might not be
beaten by foreign competitors. This “welfare-state consensus” was shared by
most states in Western Europe, and constituted an implicit, but fundamental,
principle of the GATT (Ruggie 1982: 379–98; Ikenberry 1989).
9 In contrast, Article XII requires members to apply it only when they face
“imminent threat” and “very low reserves.” For a comparison of the provisions
of Article XII and Article XVIII: B, see GATT 1994: 346.
10 Expressed all in capitals to signify the contracting parties acting jointly under
the GATT agreement.
11 Furthermore, Article XXXVI: 8, contained in Part IV (Trade and Development)
of the GATT added in 1966, states that “the developed contracting parties do not
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed con-
tracting parties.” Although, from the viewpoint of legal terminology, Part IV did
not create any new rights or obligations between developing and developed
countries, it reveals how bitterly the fundamental GATT principles were deprived
of their legitimacy by the assault from developing countries.
12 On international constraints on domestic policy choices of developing coun-
tries, see Stallings (1992). Others place emphasis on the domestic political dis-
tribution of interests for the sustainability of liberalizing reforms induced by
external factors (Biersteker 1992; Kahler 1992).
13 The external debt of developing countries rose from $141 billion in 1974 to
$313 billion in 1978, $546 billion in 1982, and $620 billion in 1983 (Krueger
1995: 31).
14 On the political function of reciprocity, see Krueger 1998: 5–6.
15 Abbott argued that, under the international trade regime, public officials can
act to further their nation’s interest as a whole, and can avoid destructive pres-
sures from protectionism. See Abbott (1985). But when it comes to the func-
tion of the international trade regime in developing countries, the regime
made it difficult for policymakers in these countries to reject protectionist
demands, and even helped protectionist interest groups to justify the claim
that trade barriers are necessary for economic development.
16 Frieden and Rogowski describe various types of “exogenous easing” of inter-
national exchange (Frieden and Rogowski 1996: 26–7).
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17 The pro-liberalizing effects of “globalization,” however, vary across countries
due to different institutional as well as political-economic conditions in each
state. This point will be explained in the concluding section.
18 Among developing economies, South Asian and East Asian countries agreed to
large reductions, 16.5 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. Furthermore,
although only 22 percent of all sorts of tariffs in developing countries had been
“bound” under the GATT before the Uruguay Round, the number rose to 72
percent under the Uruguay Round agreement (Krueger 1995: 50). Although
the average tariff reduction of Latin American countries in the Uruguay Round
was rather small (2.4 percent), they carried out significant unilateral tariff
reductions in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Mexico reduced the average
tariff rate from 23.5 percent in 1985 to 11.0 percent in 1988, Costa Rica from
22.3 percent in 1986 to 15.9 percent in 1992, Argentina from 30 percent in
1988 to 9 percent in 1991, and Brazil from 32.2 percent in 1990 to 14.2 percent
in 1994 (Schatan 1993: 83; Rodriguez 1993: 109; Tussie 1993a: 128; Abreu
1993: 151).
19 “Between January 1995 and March 2001, there were 228 complaints, with about
one quarter of the notifications coming from developing countries. More
recently, nearly one half of the 46 complaints received during the 15 months
from January 2000 through March 2001 were notified by developing countries”
(WTO 2001: 2).
20 WTO (2001: 23). See also, Krueger (1995: 54–5).
21 The IF originated in October 1997 under the auspices of six agencies, namely
the ITC, IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank and WTO. The major goals of
the IF are to prepare a multi-year country program, to hold a Round Table
meeting and to evaluate results regularly by the staff of the six agencies and
officials of developing countries.
22 Cullet also argues that “differential treatment is mostly based on mutually
accepted non-reciprocity” whose eventual aim is the “empowerment of weaker
actors” (Cullet 1999: 553–8). In addition, he notes that “differential treatment
. . . is no longer linked to the call for an overhaul of the economic and legal
system. . . . In practice, differential treatment has thus become the price to be
paid to ensure universal participation in . . . agreements concerned with global
problems” (Ibid.: 570–1).
23 The group consisted of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and
Uruguay.
24 About the history and implication of the activities of these countries (the G10),
see Kumar (1993).
25 These countries were regarded as the G20. They played a major role in gener-
ating a negotiating text for the Punta del Este meeting of the GATT in Septem-
ber 1986 (Haggard 1995: 43).
26 As of 1999, the number of antidumping investigations by developing countries
is no less than that of advanced industrial states. The European Union and
India each reported the highest number of initiations, at 68. Canada and Aus-
tralia initiated 18 and 23 investigations respectively, while Brazil and South
Africa each initiated 16 investigations.
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4 The governance of global issues
through regionalism





The core argument of this chapter is that the regionalization process for-
malized under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has
become a major strategy of US trade diplomacy for advancing and
expanding a new regulatory framework for dealing with the pressures of
globalization. These pressures feature the re-organization of corporate
competitive strategies, as well as a new disciplinary body for regulating
market access in trade, investment and other related issues. The first part
of this chapter suggests that regional clubs are called for to play a major
role in better internalizing global rules at the bilateral level. I argue that
regional regimes, such as NAFTA, are becoming the major locus upon
which new governance mechanisms are being grounded, mainly in the
trade and production domains. The second part is aimed at explaining
how Washington conceived NAFTA as an interface between multilateral
and bilateral policies, and between a North–South agenda. A third section
attempts to calculate a balance sheet of regional experiences, at least in
some key domains. Our goal is to explore the benefits of the trade regime
as a policy tool for facilitating the governance of specific issue-areas.
Lastly, the final part is devoted to the analysis of the potential deepening
or widening of the regional mechanism.
Institutional regionalism as the foundation of global
governance
Globalization and regional regimes
Globalization, understood as a reconfiguration of space, time and produc-
tive organization, has eroded the notions of state–state cooperation
grounded on state-centered hegemonic architectures, mainly due to the
transformation that states themselves are witnessing. One of these major
transformations has been the fragmentation of state power and authority.
Today, state authority is not bound to a specific territory, as the classic
concept of sovereignty was. State authority is now overlapped, in its own
territory and beyond it, by multi-leveled layers of authoritative institutions
that remain distinct in spite of being intertwined with the state. This
explains why the term governance is becoming more accurate for explain-
ing the new relationship that globalization is establishing between states,
power, markets and non-government actors. We understand governance
as the capacity for steering, shaping, managing and leading the impact of
transnational flows and relations in a given issue-area, through the inter-
connectedness of different polities and their institutions in which power,
authority and legitimacy are shared (see also Rosenau 1997).
A major trait of governance is that in most cases power and authority is
exercised as a means for steering, shaping and inducing a certain behav-
ior, or a certain approach, in order to deal with transnational problems,
rather than imposing a coercive action. Governance means that institu-
tional attributions and capabilities are distributed, although in an asym-
metrical way, throughout a net of linkages. If global governance in certain
issue areas is to be assured in the post Cold-War era, the regional club
seems to be the most adequate device for dealing with it. Regional clubs,
that is, principled-regimes or organizations grouping different states
around common interests, reduce the political cost of building and main-
taining a minimum threshold of governance on specific global issues, such
as trade, finance, technology, monetary policies and so on. The major
goal of the regional club is to make members become institutionally con-
sistent with the structural transformations taking place in their external
environment.
Economists have argued about the advantages and attractiveness of
these policy regimes.1 They stress mostly the supply of “public goods”
these regimes normally provide, that is, goods that are in general terms
non excludable and non-rival in their consumption (Kaul et al. 1999: 5).
Most of these goods have intangible properties, like peace, security,
macroeconomic or financial stability, trade openness and so on. Public
goods could be offered at the national, regional and global level. The
boundaries between these functional levels are not only defined by geo-
graphic considerations, but also by the positive externalities they may
provide to the global system even if public goods are supplied locally.
Lastly, the economic argument says that public goods have supply prob-
lems, because private agents cannot bear the cost if they cannot reap the
benefits of providing such goods. There is a “market failure” problem that
makes state intervention and cooperation highly desirable.
Various institutional economics approaches have also suggested that
“global” public goods could be by-products of a pressing demand for insti-
tutional change. If we assume that markets are, above all, transactions gov-
erned by institutions under a polity, those institutions are doomed to
change once major actors have realized that the costs of maintaining them
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are higher than the anticipated benefits of transforming them. For cen-
turies, markets, either local or “international,” were organized under
national lines and priorities. Over the past three or four decades, financial
markets began to be organized according to a cross-border rationale,
which later was extended into the production and consumption domains.
The digitalization of informational processes and the emergence of the
virtual space as a territory of exchange moved banks and companies to
restructure their corporate operations according to transnational guide-
lines. Hence, policies governing markets according to national calcula-
tions became inefficient and more costly to maintain in some areas.
Market actors started to press for a redefinition of market polices at “mini-
lateral” and regional levels, conforming to a so-called demand for regime
creation (Lawrence 1996).
The role performed by regional regimes explains in many ways their
impressive proliferation during the past years. During the last decade,
more than 70 regional agreements on integration or trade cooperation
were reported to the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO) (The Economist
1998: 19). The bottom line on these different types of clubs has been to
create, through different means, a minimum of policy convergence
towards trade, investment and financial openness. Some of these agree-
ments, such as the European Union (EU), NAFTA and MERCOSUR have
formulated wider goals with more sophisticated mechanisms of enforce-
ment. At the same time, these clubs have become an alternative option
between unilateral and multilateral actions that provide more easily
achieved gains than unilateral or multilateral agreements.
The nature of principled regimes
Regimes are important because of their direct impact on the exercise of
relational power, that is, in the way regimes shape actors’ policy options
and behavior. As Keohane has stated, they create “patterned behavior”
through which actors do not have to recalculate their options each time
they take a decision (Keohane 1984). In this sense, regimes shape policy
change both internationally and domestically. They facilitate policy con-
vergence around shared values and rules that make sense to collective
action, and they restrain local actors from undertaking policy options that
undermine agreed upon rules.
Principled regimes are not politically neutral. Rather, they are the
product of political bargaining that reflects both the interests of state-
bureaucracies and the interests of domestic constituencies. A whole liter-
ature highlighting the double-edged diplomatic game, both international
and domestic, suggests that any agreement facilitating cooperation is pos-
sible if a coalition of interests is at stake (Putnam 1988). This explains why
all regimes encompass a set of “shelter” domains and devices, through
110 Isidro Morales
which states or specific local actors escape to the governance of the
regime (see Rugman and Verbeke 1994). These sheltered domains are the
product of a political exchange that makes the regime feasible and sus-
tainable. In the case of NAFTA, Canada sheltered its cultural industry, the
US some high technology sectors and Mexico the oil and energy indus-
tries as part of their strategies to make NAFTA possible and sustainable.
If the regional club is not politically neutral, but the product of a poli-
tical coalition, clustering interests that express themselves at international
and domestic levels, regional clubs are thus nested on political asymme-
tries and bargaining capabilities. Nobody doubts that without US leader-
ship and hegemony the foundations and functioning of the so-called
Bretton Woods system would have been impossible. This very same leader-
ship has been crucial in order to transform and adapt the new system
once the impact of globalization became manifest. The US has played a
major role in redefining both multilateral and “minilateral” rules on the
economic front, as witnessed by the launching and conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, the creation of the WTO, and the creation of NAFTA.
Although political asymmetries explain the creation and trans-
formation of principled regimes, their adaptability and sustainability
depend on the anticipated gains, both political and economic, that
members can expect. These anticipated gains must be higher than those
potentially obtained through unilateral or multilateral action. Nobody
doubts that small countries have benefitted from their membership in the
EU, regardless of whether or not France, Germany or Italy remain the
major players. Canadians and Mexicans agree, although on different
bases, that the two of them have benefitted from NAFTA, in spite of the
dominant US role. As long as anticipated benefits are obtained and some
asymmetries balanced, though not eliminated, regimes remain durable,
sustainable and open to further transformations.
However, the effectiveness of governance through principled-regimes
will depend not only upon the degree of interconnectedness among the
different polities and institutions in a given issue area, but also on their
capacity to construct and maintain a community of shared beliefs that
gives consistency to the agreement. In fact, the legitimacy and mainte-
nance of the whole club remain anchored, in the long run, to matters of
interconnectedness and shared values. As Manuel Castells (1997: 171) has
already suggested, the major attributes for making a network perform
effectively are its connectedness (its ability to transmit noise-free commu-
nication among its members), and its consistency (the sharing of interests
between the network goals and the goals of its components). If a regime
could be compared to a network of shared authority and power, and of
informational and other institutional resources, the strategic role they
play in the construction of a new economic order lies in their ability to
remain interconnected and consistent. How is this reflected in the case of
NAFTA?
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NAFTA as a US-led building block: promoting policy change
and convergence
From free trade to fair trade: leveling the playing field
Though NAFTA was discussed and legitimized using an economic ratio-
nale (welfare gains from liberalizing trade and investment) in the US,
Canada and Mexico, it was mainly nested as a major strategy of US trade
diplomacy aimed at including new fields under GATT jurisdiction. Since
the early 1980s, and during the past two decades, Washington has fol-
lowed a three-tier approach on foreign trade issues: multilateral, unilat-
eral and “minilateral” (Saborio 1992). At the multilateral level, the US
made significant efforts to end the Tokyo Round and to initiate the
Uruguay Round in order to negotiate a more ambitious global trade
agenda. At the unilateral level, the US Congress activated old jurisdictions
and initiated new ones in order to abate, though with a wider and
enlarged meaning, unfair trade practices. And finally, at the “minilateral”
or regional level the US first engaged in free trade talks with Canada, its
main trade partner, and later included Mexico in what later became
NAFTA. Both the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and
NAFTA had the role of widening the agenda on trade negotiations and
abating unfair trade practices.
This three-level approach to US trade diplomacy made trade negotia-
tions and bargaining appear at times contradictory, at times complement-
ary. However, in many respects Washington committed to a cross-cutting
agenda, the common aim of which was to “level the playing field,” as it was
called. This concept was the rationale under which both multilateral talks
under the Uruguay Round were pursued, and bilateral negotiations with
both Mexico and Canada were undertaken. Though through different
means, this was also the rationale under which Capitol Hill mandated
and/or activated unilateral relief vis-à-vis unfair trade practices.
By framing key policy initiatives under the major goal of “leveling the
playing field,” Washington sent the message to its major partners that non-
compliance with old principles (such as non-discrimination or Most-
Favored-Nation treatment) (MFN), or with new ones (such as “barring
structural impediments” to trade), will be punished either at the multilat-
eral or unilateral levels. In other words, with the notion of leveling the
playing field US trade diplomacy aimed at obtaining symmetrical treat-
ment from its trade partners; that is, a similar treatment to that given by
the US. The quest for “symmetry” of treatment is deeply rooted in the
policy debates of the 1970s and 1980s, under which key economic prob-
lems and transformations were perceived as the costs of supporting “free
riders” in the international economic arena.
The very best example of this new trend inaugurated at the unilateral
level was the Trade Act of 1974 and its Section 301, through which Wash-
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ington enlarged the notion of “unfair trade” practices. This section
defined two types of targeted practices: those that violate agreements that
the US has with any of its partners, and those that are “unjustifiable,
unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States
commerce” (Grier 1993). In order to restrain the proliferation of these
newly defined unfair trade practices, Congress gave the President the
ability to apply trade sanctions in order to make offending parties abide by
them. These sanctions could consist of denying or modifying any trade
concessions or increasing any tariff or non-tariff barrier.
The use of economic sanctions for making states respect agreements is
not new in US foreign trade diplomacy. What became new in this legisla-
tion was the power given to the US President for imposing sanctions even
in those cases when no violation exists, that is, when foreign practices are
being judged as “unjustified, unreasonable and discriminatory.” Discrimi-
natory practices were already proscribed under the GATT, but the first
two practices were not. Washington understood as unjustifiable those pol-
icies or practices that are inconsistent with international agreements; that
is, practices that are not illegal – according to bilateral or multilateral
agreements – but that play against the rules of the game as understood by
the US. “Unreasonable” was defined as any act, policy or practice that,
although not violating the international legal rights of the US, is otherwise
unfair or inequitable (Grier 1993). Through such a broad and vague defi-
nition, almost any economic practice against US interests could be tar-
geted by unilateral sanctions (see also Goldstein 1993: 195).
Section 301 and its later refinement by the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (the so-called Super 301) have never been per-
ceived as protectionist in the US. By prosecuting practices that either
violate legal rights or discriminate against the US, or that are just simply
“inconsistent” or “inequitable” to US practices, the US Congress sent the
message to the world that it was not targeting the entry of imports, but
rather the enhancement of exports by inducing partners to play by the
rules. Congress was, however, cautious and granted to the President the
discretionary power for using sanctions. If the Executive judged that
national security concerns were at stake, or that the use of sanctions would
imply political costs, sanctions could be waived.
This explains why petitions under this section have been rather few
(Goldstein 1993: 216–17), compared, for example, to other “classical”
unfair trade remedy practices such as antidumping (AD) and countervail-
ing duties (CVD). However, the importance of Section 301, Super 301,
and other similar legislation was that they enlarged the conceptual scope
through which “unfair trade practices” were portrayed in the US. “Unfair”
meant not only a violation of an agreement or a discrimination against a
partner, but also practices that were inconsistent, unjustifiable, unreason-
able and inequitable to US commerce. By using the “threat” of imposing
trade sanctions for abating “unfair” practices, Washington aimed to
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expand market access by “leveling the playing field” with the rest of its
trade partners. Traditional tools such as AD and CVD were preferred
instead as a mechanism for dealing with unfair practices. Unlike the
authority stemming from Section 301, procedures for imposing AD and
CVD levies are quasi-adjudicative and therefore not entirely subordinated
to political or strategic consideration by the White House. The Depart-
ment of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission
(ITC) make final decisions on these procedures, with no interference by
the US Trade Representative (USTR). AD petitions became a major tool
for American producers seeking relief from “unfair” practices. CVD peti-
tions increased as well, though the rate of acceptance was less than that of
AD (Goldstein 1993: 217–19). The flexibility introduced by Congress
for activating these mechanisms made them a major sign of US “neo-
protectionism.” These trade strategies were portrayed by critics as the pro-
liferation of “managed-trade” deals across different industry sectors.
The activation of AD and CVD, combined with other relief mechanisms
and the enactment of Super 301 in 1988, increased the uncertainty over
access to the US market. By increasing the uncertainty, and consequently
the costliness of accessing its own market, the US increased the incentive
for its trade partners to join trade negotiations either at multilateral or
bilateral level. Incentives to address US complaints increased once trade
partners realized that market access was not the only issue. By legitimizing
the use of unilateral retaliation as a means for enhancing exports, the US
also increased the costs for their trading partners of keeping the status
quo in their respective trade policies. This explains why the US could
simultaneously pursue multilateral and “minilateral” trade negotiations
while maintaining an aggressive unilateral trade agenda.
The road to NAFTA
The opening of the “minilateral” track in US trade diplomacy was nested,
so to speak, in the midst of mounting unilateral trade actions propelled by
Congress since the first half of the 1970s, followed by the new profile of
the multilateral agenda the White House tried to advance since the mid-
1980s under the GATT. The first step was to reach a Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA) with Canada. For the US, to strike a whole trade package with
Canada, at a time in which American unilateralism was increasingly criti-
cized by many countries, was a way to curb domestic protectionist pres-
sures at home and demonstrate renewed commitment toward a liberal
and open trade agenda. At the same time, it was a way to advance what
Washington understood as leveling the playing field with its major part-
ners at bilateral, regional or multilateral levels.
As for Canada, going into trade talks with its powerful neighbor and
most important partner had both domestic and foreign policy implica-
tions. The Canadians entered into bilateral negotiations once the
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Trudeau years were over and the Conservative Party won the elections in
the fall of 1984. The Conservative Party, with Brian Mulroney as Prime
Minister, came into power with a new policy agenda, which in many ways
announced the end of the “inward oriented” option that prevailed during
the 1970s.
Mulroney’s Conservative administration made clear the end of an eco-
nomic policy based on natural resource exploitation. The new policy goal
was to increase Canadian competitiveness in manufacturing and services,
and for that, elimination of domestic non-tariff barriers was necessary in
order to attract foreign investment. Thus, for Mulroney, entering into
bilateral trade negotiations with the US had the dual aim of locking in
domestic policy changes that signaled the end of the Trudeau era, and
negotiating a whole package for guaranteeing market access to its major
trading partner.
In parallel to the progressive dismantling of the remaining tariffs
between the two countries within a span of ten years, the importance of
the CUSFTA was that it revealed that the core of what Washington was
negotiating at the multilateral level could be obtained more rapidly and
effectively at the bilateral level. Canada and the US agreed, for example,
to eliminate most tariffs on agriculture, an opening that both Europe and
Japan had been very reluctant to accept under GATT rules (see Hart
1989: 131). On the sectoral level, ad hoc agreements were reached in the
fields of the automotive, wine and spirits and energy industries. The latter
became fully deregulated, ending the state-led energy policy followed in
previous years. In relation to government procurement, a reduction of the
threshold established in the GATT was obtained,2 although this threshold
only included federal government purchases, not state and local ones.
In relation to unfair trade practices, a mixed balance was achieved.
Although Canada wanted to negotiate a common code regulating subsi-
dies and dumping, no common jurisdiction could thereafter be obtained
in this agreement, or under NAFTA. What was obtained, by contrast, was
the introduction of an alternative dispute settlement mechanism under
which arbitration panels could substitute for domestic courts in reviewing
administrative decisions related to dumping or subsidies. As previously
stated, it was in the area of unfair trade legislation that the US Congress
and trade agencies did not have the counterbalancing authority of the
White House. Hence, much of the so-called “neo-protectionism” of the
late 1970s and 1980s was the by-product of a flexible interpretation and
implementation of the rules regulating dumping and subsidies. Although
no better definition of subsidy could be obtained under the CUSFTA,
what Canadians obtained from this agreement was the right to challenge
American administrative agencies under bilateral panels whose power was
precisely defined by the two countries. All this was stipulated under
Chapter 19, considered by some Canadians as the jewel of the agreement.
By substituting domestic courts with arbitrated panels for challenging
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administrative decisions, it was anticipated that the “overzealous” use of
American legislation for masking protectionist interests could eventually
be reduced. The way Chapter 19 was designed, in fact, made possible that
the panelist’s awards could be expedited, be decided on an adjudicative
basis and be binding to both parties. Such an effective and expeditious
dispute settlement mechanism had not been possible to reach at the mul-
tilateral level.
The CUSFTA also included a more flexible dispute settlement mechan-
ism embodied in Chapter 18 addressing any action that could violate,
impair or nullify the agreement. In this case, a so-called “Free Trade Com-
mission” (composed of cabinet-level representatives of the two govern-
ments) mediates for the disputing parties in order to facilitate
consultations and reach a possible mutually satisfactory solution. If a solu-
tion is not reached, the conflict can be addressed by a panel whose goal is
to draft an “action plan” under which the disputing parties can negotiate a
solution. If this does not occur, the plaintiff has the right to impose eco-
nomic sanctions equivalent to the damage infringed upon it. In so doing,
the CUSFTA legitimized the use of trade sanctions as a means of compen-
sating the breach or the impairment of what was agreed upon. Until then,
the use of trade sanctions for compelling partners to comply with the
rules remained a unilateral decision, mainly by the US, as long as 
the decisions taken under the GATT panels remained declaratory, due to
the rule of the “positive consensus.”
Finally, the CUSFTA made what Michael Hart considers a “cautious
start” on what was defined at the time on the “new issues” such as services,
business travel, investment, intellectual property rights and financial ser-
vices (Hart 1989: 75).
Mexico and NAFTA
Two years after CUSFTA came into force, Mexico and the US initiated
negotiations for a rather similar agreement. Once Canada joined the
negotiations, under the condition that nothing that was agreed upon in
CUSFTA would be revised, Washington confirmed its “minilateral”
approach not only to its major two trading partners, but also to the rest of
the Western Hemisphere. In fact, parallel to the opening of the NAFTA
talks, President George Bush launched in Miami his so-called Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI), aiming at the creation of a whole free
trade area with the rest of the continent. The fact that Mexico accepted
negotiating an integration package with Washington earmarked the
beginning of a new era of Inter-American cooperation, ending traditional
Mexican suspicion vis-à-vis US foreign policy towards Latin America that
prevailed during the Cold War. Thus, NAFTA became not only an inter-
face between US unilateral and multilateral trade policies, but also a
bridge between a North and South agenda. Through NAFTA and the EAI
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Washington initiated a building bloc in order to internalize and make
more acceptable its trade agenda to developing countries.
Mexico joined NAFTA for similar reasons to those that explained
Canada’s signature of the CUSFTA. Although less industrialized and
developed than Canada, for Mexico the US has become its major export
market and source of investment, as is true of Canada. The surge of “con-
tingent protectionism” in the US from the mid-1970s increased bilateral
commercial tensions. Similar to what happened with Canadian exports,
Mexico was suddenly threatened by dumping and countervailing duties in
the US. As with Canada, the decision in Mexico to negotiate came from a
new political administration that made economic liberalization its major
political banner. Entering into trade negotiations with the US had the
intention of locking in the domestic economic reforms the Mexican
government initiated in 1986, but that gained decisive momentum during
the Salinas de Gortari years (1988–94). At that time, the government
decided to negotiate a CUSFTA-like package in order to obtain major con-
cessions that otherwise could not be won.
Although the content of NAFTA as well as the organization of negotia-
tions were highly influenced by the US–Canada deal, the scope of the
negotiations widened. The liberalization of tariff barriers to trade in goods
was designed and decided upon following the CUSFTA model. Sectoral
provisions were better specified, for example, in the agriculture, textile,
automotive and energy industries. Similar to Canada with respect to its
cultural industries, Mexico refused to open its energy sector.
As for additions, NAFTA explicitly deregulated service sectors, including
finance, over which Mexico was originally reluctant to negotiate. Whole new
chapters were drafted on property rights and investment measures. A great
innovation introduced by NAFTA was in fact its Chapter 11, through which
private corporations could directly challenge government decisions con-
cerning expropriation and investment regulations against international tri-
bunals. Another innovation was the negotiation of two side agreements
dealing with labor and environmental issues. These two agreements were
nested in the original NAFTA agreement once Bill Clinton became US
President, and were intended to obtain the support of the US Congress in
passing the agreement. Through these two side agreements, Mexico
accepted the use of sanctions, in the form of fines, if there was a “persistent
failure” to comply with its domestic environmental legislation. A similar situ-
ation was accepted if there was a “persistent failure” to comply with labor
legislation regulating minimum wages, safety and security standards at work
and child labor. Canada refused to accept sanctions from another country
and agreed that any claim regarding a failure to comply with its environ-
ment and labor standards would be handled by their domestic courts.
Notwithstanding, NAFTA became the first trade agreement legitimizing
the use of sanctions in order to induce a country to comply with its respec-
tive labor and environmental legislation.
NAFTA in the governance of global issues 117
The governance of economic openness at the regional level
Market access: outcomes and problems
Although the goal of this chapter is not to assess the economic impact of
NAFTA at the regional level, Figures 4.1 to 4.4 suggest that the agreement
has been successful at least in fueling trade exchange between Canada
and Mexico and their common major trading partner. Mexico has benefit-
ted the most from the deal. Mexican exports to the US have grown at
higher rates than in pre-NAFTA years, notwithstanding that export expan-
sion started when Mexico joined the GATT (Figure 4.3); US exports to
Mexico have also grown considerably, though this growth seems to have
been steady since Mexico joined the GATT. As for Canada, CUSFTA and
NAFTA have not modified previous commercial trends (see Figures 4.1
and 4.2), probably because tariffs between the two countries were already
low (at least lower than tariffs prevailing between the US and Mexico),
and their economies were already integrated in terms of production
chains. We should also consider that Canada and Mexico’s trade with the
US is mainly intra-industry as multinational corporations have internalized
cross-border markets through intra-firm transactions. This may also
explain why, from 2001 to 2003, two-way trade from these two countries to
the US slowed down as a consequence of the recession witnessed in the
latter country at the turn of the century. Furthermore, monetary and
exchange-rate policies have had a bigger impact on trade flows than the
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partially explained by the major peso devaluation of early 1995, and the
concurrent strength of the US economy.
Nonetheless, as long as trade among the economies keeps up its
momentum, there are grounds for arguing that NAFTA works. The fact
that Washington has nominally agreed to act as “paymaster” for this
venture, witnessed by the financial bailout offered to Mexico at the begin-
ning of 1995, has reinforced the supportive coalitions under which
NAFTA was built.
In terms of an architecture for the regional governance of trade and
investment flows, we should ask ourselves whether NAFTA has guaranteed
access to the American market for both Canada and Mexico; or leveled
the “playing-field” among the three partners. In general terms we could
say that NAFTA has made US protectionist policies more manageable.
The incorporation of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms,
designed to operate either on adjudicative or conciliatory bases, has modi-
fied the institutional context within which protectionist policies were
processed before the trade agreement was signed (Morales 1999). Of the
three cases arbitrated and finalized under Chapter 20, panel awards con-
firmed the complaints of Canadians (one complaint) and Mexicans (two)
against the US. Arbitration panels under Chapter 19, that is those review-
ing the imposition of AD and CVDs by national administrative agencies,













































































mitted, out of these 37 have been finalized, 31 have been suspended or
the claiming Party has dropped its complaint, and the remaining cases are
still waiting for a decision or remain active. Most of the disputes under this
chapter are related to dumping procedures, rather than subsidies, and
most of the reviews target US agencies.
Though panel procedures concerning dumping and subsidies have not
been as speedy as anticipated, panelists have proved to be professional
and balanced. Six out of 16 cases reviewing US agencies decisions have
been completely remanded by panel awards, and four partially remanded.
The rest have been fully confirmed. That is, more than 50 percent of all
awarded cases reviewing administrative decisions of US authorities have
been judged as inconsistent with US legislation. This rate of “success” bene-
fitting either Canada or Mexico was much more elusive before NAFTA,
according to the empirical record (Goldstein 1996). We could even say
that, at least in the field of unfair trade practices, the playing field has
been leveled vis-à-vis the other NAFTA partners. One out of 14 final
awards reviewing Canadian agencies has been fully remanded, four have
been remanded in part, and the rest of them fully affirmed. One out of
seven cases involving Mexico has been fully confirmed, and the rest of
them fully remanded or remanded in part. (See: http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/.) In other words, Mexico is still on the learning curve in man-
aging its unfair trade legislation.
NAFTA has indeed corrected some protectionist biases of the administra-
tive agencies of all three partners; however, it has failed to eliminate
strongly rooted protectionist interests in the region, mainly those coming
from the US. The saga of the softwood lumber dispute between Canada and
the US epitomizes the nature of conflict involving trade disputes among the
partners. As is well known, US lumber producers have claimed since 1981
that Canadian imports of lumber are subsidized and causing damage to
their production.3 The controversy reached its climax when it was handled
under the rules of the CUSFTA. Panels reviewed and remanded both the
DOC’s decision on subsidies and the ITA’s decision on material injury. In
the case of subsidies, panelists did not find that Canadian stumpage fees
were provided on a specific basis, nor that the ban on exports of logs from
British Columbia had specific benefits that made it necessary to consider a
countervailing duty. However, US agencies held firm in their position,
which led to a second remand from the panelists. The second remand con-
firmed the panel’s original position, but this time panelists split along
national lines.4 The US finally activated the Extraordinary Challenge Com-
mittee (ECC) agreed under the CUSFTA (and passed into NAFTA) and the
judges confirmed the panel’s decision although not by unanimity.
As for the test of injury, the panel determined that there was no evid-
ence, according to US laws, that Canadian lumber imports were damaging
the US industry. This decision had to be remanded two more times before
US agencies finally accepted it, without any split in the members of the
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panel. These two awards provided evidence, as Gilbert Gagné asserted,
that the definitions of “subsidy” and “injury” in US law and practice had
become so flexible as to accommodate almost any petition for a trade
relief (Gagné 1999: 85). Canada had joined CUSFTA precisely to make
more transparent both the interpretation and implementation of US
trade legislation. In this sense, the work of the panel groups and Chapter
19’s mechanisms (i.e. the role of the ECC) were successful.
However, the role of the CUSFTA panels could not avoid the politic-
ization of what had already become the most sensitive trade dispute
between the two countries. The US government invoked Section 301 of
the 1974 Trade Act in order to force a deal with the Canadians. Once the
dispute was handled under the CUSFTA mechanism, proceedings were
initiated in order to challenge the constitutionality of the panel’s decision
in US courts. Once panels finalized the case, the US government delayed
the reimbursement of duties collected, and the CFLI threatened to
reopen the case as soon as possible. All these political pressures ended up
with the signing, in 1996, of a new ad hoc agreement through which
lumber exchange between the two countries became subjected to a tariff-
rate quota.5 The agreement created its own dispute settlement mechan-
ism, which permitted contending parties to circumvent the dispute
mechanisms of the CUSFTA and NAFTA.
The five-year peace agreement expired on 31 March 2001, and in early
2002 the DOC announced, yet again, an affirmative determination of
dumping and subsidies against softwood lumber coming from Canada. In
April 2002, the Canadian government requested a panel review under
NAFTA of the US final subsidy and antidumping determinations. In
January 2003, the WTO established another panel at Canada’s request to
resolve on the methodology used by the DOC to determine the margin of
dumping. All panels have remanded in part US final decisions and
methodology. A NAFTA panel found, for instance, that US ITC determi-
nation was unsupported by “substantial evidence and inconsistent with US
law” (cf. http://www.international.gc.ca/). As of December 2004, the US
has resisted the panel awards, either by using appellate mechanisms or by
simply inducing panelists to remand previous remands (see Anderson
2004 and Inside US Trade 2004). All these pressures and legal fights will
probably lead to a revised version of the agreement reached in 1996.
Many other trade-related disputes have emerged among NAFTA part-
ners without being resolved under the formal dispute settlement mechan-
isms. Take for example the tomato and avocado disputes between Mexico
and the US, or the Helms Burton Act that involved both Canada and
Mexico against the US. In the first case price and quota undertakings – to
some extent similar to those established under the softwood lumber case –
were negotiated. In the second, consultations were activated under
Chapter 20, and the White House eventually declined to enforce the
extra-territorial consequences of the Law.
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A recent case, involving cross-border trucking services between Mexico
and the US, shows how domestic protectionist pressures could compro-
mise US principled-obligations to its partners. In line with NAFTA
requirements, the US should have permitted cross-border trucking ser-
vices and related investment for Mexicans in border states at the end of
1995, and subsequently throughout the US as of 1 January 2000. Until
recently, the US government denied access to any carrier or investor
coming from Mexico, while entry barriers have already been removed to
Canadians. The denial by US agencies was grounded on an over-
interpretation of Articles 1202 and 1203 of the NAFTA, by which parties
grant National and MFN treatment to trucking services. Through these
articles, a Party commits itself to grant a no less favorable treatment, “in
like circumstances,” to services provided by nationals or by other parties.
US agencies alleged that the inclusion of the phrase “in like circum-
stances,” limits the national treatment and MFN obligations
to circumstances with regard to trucking operations which are like,
and that because “adequate procedures are not yet in Mexico to
ensure U.S. highway safety,” NAFTA permits Parties to accord differ-
ential, and even less favorable, treatment where appropriate to meet
legitimate regulatory objectives.
(NAFTA Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty 2001: 3)
Mexico rejected this questionable interpretation of Articles 1202 and 1203
of the NAFTA, because it would have meant that Mexicans had to adopt
the same standards in its regulatory trucking system to those prevailing in
the US, an issue that was neither raised nor discussed during the NAFTA
negotiations. The Mexicans argued that the US inaction was motivated
not by safety concerns but by protectionist pressures coming from organ-
ized labor in the US. The panel rejected the way US authorities abusively
interpreted clear principles such as national treatment and “MFN” for
masking protectionist interests. Very recently, the US government has
accepted the panel ruling, which does not delete the obligation of
Mexican trucking services to comply with US safety standards.
These disputes suggest that leveling the playing field among partners is
far from achieved. This is not because Canada and Mexico are not as
market-oriented as the US wishes they were. Rather, the US remains a pro-
tectionist country pressing for unilateral arrangements when sensitive
trade issues are at stake. Does this mean that both CUSFTA and NAFTA
have failed to deliver on the promises they originally made? After years of
US-led free trade diplomacy, Canada and Mexico are still learning to cope
with the two fronts opened by this venture. NAFTA not only promotes US
foreign trade interests abroad, but also attempts to work as an institutional
constraint to deter protectionist pressures at home. The first goal has been
successful so far, as witnessed by trade performance and the institutional
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changes it has provoked in Canada’s and Mexico’s economic organi-
zation. As for the second goal, NAFTA is still far from leveling the playing
field among partners, this time vis-à-vis US practices. US protectionism has
become more manageable under NAFTA, but it is still far from being
policed by commonly agreed-upon rules. However, managed-trade solu-
tions have become the second best solution by which market access is not
necessarily guaranteed, but it is at least negotiated. For avocado and
tomato growers, lumber producers and suppliers of cross-border trucking,
these managed-trade solutions become less costly than making the US play
by the rules. That is, when dealing with US-sensitive issues, NAFTA institu-
tional obligations and enforcement mechanisms have helped to defuse
the problems and facilitated compromise.
Investment access: outcomes and problems
A second goal of NAFTA was to empower market actors vis-à-vis govern-
ments. For Washington, this goal was still framed in the wider principles
of its trade policy, aimed at leveling the playing field with its trade part-
ners. If partners should be as open as the US economy, this openness
should include the financial and service sectors. This was achieved when
NAFTA partners accepted extending the principles of national treatment
and MFN to investors, investments and services operating in the region. As
for Canada and Mexico, the empowerment of market actors came from
two fronts. By signing CUSFTA and later NAFTA, both countries engaged
and/or deepened market-oriented reforms in their own economies. The
most dramatic case was Mexico’s, where economic reforms initiated and
accelerated by then-President Salinas, became irreversible thanks to the
new agreement, which according to Mexican legislative tradition, became
part of its own Constitution.
The empowerment of private actors was also done at the judicial and gov-
ernance level. Chapter 11 of the Agreement defines rules of thumb for
dealing with foreign investors. Apart from granting national treatment and
MFN status, under this chapter performance requirements are prohibited,
nationality constraints are banned for the selection of CEOs and administra-
tive boards of firms, free monetary transfers are guaranteed and expropria-
tions or measures tantamount to expropriations are also proscribed, except
under very specific circumstances. Chapter 11 also enables firms and investors
to activate a panel dispute against a state, without having to go through their
own governments if any of the above rules are breached. No other arbitration
mechanism within NAFTA makes such an empowerment of private actors as
this. Final awards of arbitrated panels activated under Chapter 11 are binding
and, in case governments neglect them, the complaining party has the option
to activate a panel mechanism under Chapter 20.
Chapter 11 did not exist under CUSFTA, so in many ways it was envi-
sioned as a device for deterring Mexico’s discretionary policies concern-
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ing nationalization and foreign investment. In many ways, this chapter has
meant a challenge to Mexico’s and in some way Latin America’s state-
centered law paradigm regarding the treatment of foreign investments. It
does substitute national tribunals for international arbitration when
corporate property rights are at stake, and it overlaps with other legal
systems still prevailing for national investors.
But the most controversial issue generated by this chapter has been its
unanticipated, “perverse” effects. Conceived as a mechanism for making
state policies concerning investments and investors more accountable, the
current record shows that these same investors have changed the defen-
sive mechanisms of the chapter into an offensive tool. One of the most
controversial cases, the so-called Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, showed that by
skillfully interpreting the ambiguities of the agreement, private firms can
overrule government policies aimed at the protection of the environment,
a goal that ironically NAFTA is also promoting. NAFTA ambiguities stem
from a broad definition of investment and the absence of a narrowly
framed definition of expropriation.
There is indeed very little limit to the scope of what Chapter 11 defines
as an investment. The latter could be understood as a business, shares in a
business, a loan to a business, real estate bought for business purposes and
the broad concept of “interest” arising from the commitment of financial
or human resources to economic activity. In the case of S.D. Mayers v.
Canada, for instance, a Tribunal ruled the scope of investment as includ-
ing such assets as market share and access to markets in the host state, sug-
gesting that almost any kind of business activity can constitute an
investment that is subject to protection (IISD 2001: 23).
Chapter 11 prohibits three types of expropriations: direct expropria-
tion, indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation.
The record of cases under this chapter suggests that the latter two defini-
tions have become the same. The Ethyl Corp. v. Canada becomes relevant.
When the Canadian government banned the importation of a chemical
component (methylcycloentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl: MMT), as well
as its inter-provincial trade, alleging environmental reasons, Ethyl Corp., a
subsidiary of an American firm, sued the Canadian government alleging
that the ban amounted to an expropriation of its business in Canada, for
which it should be fully compensated. Although the Canadian govern-
ment justified the ban by its concern over the potential toxic properties of
magnesium, a component of MMT, the Tribunal ruled for the compensa-
tion of the firm and the Canadian government overruled the ban.
The argument that environmental legislation could be interpreted as
tantamount to expropriation is new, and has raised concerns that any
foreign-owned corporation could use similar arguments to attack new
environmental regulations that have a potential impact on its profits. In
fact, Chapter 11 has been used by firms as a two-edged sword: for protect-
ing their rights, and for constraining governments from enacting policies
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addressing public concerns. The fact that disputes under this chapter are
settled in a secret manner, with no obligation of governments to distribute
information, and with important effects on public policies, has led some
environmental organizations to talk of a “democratic deficit” in the field
of the deregulation of investment.
The use of sanctions for complying with domestic legislation: the case of
labor and environment
NAFTA has provoked numerous competing or alternative agendas coming
from domestic political actors, interest groups and non-state actors. It
seems as if the pace towards “continentalization” of the economy could
also be occurring even as debates among interests are working on agendas
that are sometimes complementary to, and sometimes alternatives to,
NAFTA. A major characteristic of these agendas is that they are still rooted
in national-based discussions. A further “continentalization” of produc-
tion, exchange and capital mobility in North America under the prin-
ciples of open regionalism will probably reinforce reactive strategies to the
externalities provoked by cross-border regionalism. A divide between
proactive and reactive policies vis-à-vis US-market-driven integration has
already become the source of domestic and cross-border tensions within
North America. However, this divide mainly reflects the interests and
political calculations of US-based organizations, which coalesce as support-
ing or blocking any trade-related initiative coming from the government.
In the US, labor unions, principled organizations and other grass-roots
movements have traditionally opposed NAFTA and a further opening of
the US economy. They argue that giving preferential access to the US
market has led to the loss of jobs in the US, and the degradation of
environmental and social conditions. The arguments and votes of these
organizations were so powerful that President Clinton in 1993 had to
negotiate two side agreements, one for labor rights protection and
another for environmental protection, in order to get NAFTA accepted by
the US Congress.
In spite of the good record on trade performance of these three coun-
tries, these same advocate groups have criticized NAFTA and pressed Con-
gress to impede the granting of fast track authority to the President. The
refusal to concede for some years the so-called Trade Promotion Author-
ity (TPA) was translated into a “vote of confidence” on NAFTA.6 Though
some of the claims of these groups do not pass the economic and histor-
ical record, they have proved to be politically efficient for shaping the per-
ception of the average US citizen in relation to NAFTA and other
outward-looking initiatives. According to polls performed in mid-1997, 66
percent of Americans believed that free trade agreements between the US
and other countries cost jobs to the US, 58 percent agreed that foreign
trade has had a negative impact on the US economy because cheap
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imports have cost wages and jobs; and 81 percent said that Congress
should not accept trade agreements that give other countries a leverage to
overturn US laws (School of Real-Life Results 1998).
The weakness of the labor-environment reactive coalition lies in the
job-creation/job-loss debate. Growing and competitive imports coming to
the US will always imply the export of non-competitive jobs abroad, with
or without trade agreements. Furthermore, job losses are not only a con-
sequence of trade; macroeconomic and monetary policies could become
more decisive for shaping the job market. By contrast, the strong argu-
ment for this inward-looking coalition lies in environmental protection,
further reinforced by the “perverse” effects that were revealed by some
Chapter 11 awards.
Grass-roots movements have, however, become empowered by trade
integration, but these movements still reflect the interests of civil society
groups that have a say in US politics. Some groups existing either in
Canada or Mexico, striving for the defense of the welfare state or of
collective indigenous rights, are still peripheral to the debate about the
governance of externalities provoked by the integration process.
Challenges and opportunities for the future
Though the drive towards integration in North America does not follow
the European model, the evolving scenarios for the coming decades seem
to reveal trends similar to those prevailing in Europe. Like the communi-
tarian project, North America seems to be split between critical choices: to
maintain the status quo or to head towards a deepening and/or widening
dilemma.
Although keeping the status quo seems to be the favored option of
NAFTA critics and detractors, this scenario seems difficult to maintain. A
major point of this essay is that NAFTA, like any other regional economic
regime, must be seen as a compromise forged between current policy
options. As long as this linkage role is perceived as desired and necessary,
regional regimes will remain attractive vis-à-vis other governance devices.
Conversely, if new governance architectures become more attractive and
preferable in terms of policy opportunities, regionalism will lose its
appeal. Thus the so-called “demand” for regionalism will remain linked to
the attractiveness and effectiveness of alternative governance mechanisms.
In the case of NAFTA, I have argued that this works as a compromise
between unilateral and multilateral US policies, and as an intersection
between North and South relationships. In other words, NAFTA is closer
to a policy functional regime than to a real organization promoting and
governing integration. It remains a major device of US trade diplomacy,
through which Mexican and Canadian interests became accommodated.
In this sense, keeping NAFTA as it is, that is, betting on the status quo, will
depend on how trade and investment issues are handled at the trilateral
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level and how related and exogenous issues, affecting NAFTA, could be
handled using alternative governance mechanisms.
Understanding that NAFTA is mainly US-driven, the future of regional-
ism in North America raises the following questions:
1 What changes are in US interests? That is, how likely is it that Wash-
ington political elites will perceive the need to move from a regional
economic regime toward a more integrative model, in which shared-
authority mechanisms are put in place?
2 How might domestic and international constraints facilitate or
restrain a push for change by American political elites? Here, the role
of Congress becomes crucial. Just think about the difficulties the
Clinton administration had obtaining the TPA in order to provide
decisive momentum to a panoply of multi-level negotiations, either
within the WTO, NAFTA or bilaterally.
3 How will Mexican and Canadian interests be articulated and accom-
modated vis-à-vis US policy preferences?
US priorities will remain a decisive factor in the future of North American
regionalism. After 11 September, for instance, security and the struggle
against terrorism became the priority in US foreign policy. A major con-
sequence has been the redefinition of “secure borders,” in which the
expansion of the so-called “security perimeter” has included Canada and
soon will include Mexico. Canada is currently talking about “intelligent
borders” in order to justify the American presence of customs and security
officials within its own territory. How Mexico will be integrated in this
expanding trilateral architecture is not yet clear. This suggests, however,
that when US interests are at stake and Washington attempts to redefine
the rules of the game, trans-border initiatives are being set up and inter-
nalized at the regional and hemispheric level.
In another completely different move, Mexico attempted to launch
“NAFTA-plus” talks, when President Fox came to power and pushed the
migration and development agenda at the bilateral level. Although migra-
tion also became a priority in the US agenda, September 11 subordinated
any policy initiative coming from Mexico to the imperatives of Washing-
ton-framed security policy. Nonetheless, Mexico and Washington could
strike a deal on development policies under the so-called Alliance for
Prosperity which was launched at the Monterrey Summit in March 2002.
This initiative established four pillars (See Sojo et al. 2002):
1 It calls for better access to private investment for small and medium
size enterprises. A major goal of the program is to reduce the cost of
transferring remittances from Mexicans living in the US. According to
this plan, Mexican migrants can now help to finance private construc-
tion projects, mainly private dwellings, for their families living in
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Mexico. Projects for which credit is obtained in the US and disbursed
in Mexico are also being considered. Efforts to fund the selling of US
franchises and tourist-oriented development projects are also envis-
aged.
2 Technology transfer projects are being discussed such as having
American universities offer courses on finance and administration,
among other topics, for small and medium size businesses in Mexico.
The promotion of Mexican handicrafts in the US, through institu-
tional mechanisms, is also being considered. The goal is to improve
entrepreneurial skills in Mexico.
3 Investment in infrastructure, targeting transport, power transmission
and telecommunications is another objective. The promotion of US
scholarships in order to enhance human capital in the US is being
considered.
4 Improved institutional interconnectedness, through linkages between
federal government institutions and regional and multilateral organi-
zations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the
Eximbank, the World Bank and other organisms, is desired.
A development approach like this remains loyal to the Washington Consen-
sus policy options that were framed during the 1980s and have inspired
structural reforms in Latin America and various trade associations, includ-
ing NAFTA. That is, they bet on a corporate-led agenda in which entrepre-
neurial skills and market mechanisms are the backbone of development
policies. In contrast with the European model of integration, under this
scheme there is no room for discussing the need for, say, structural funds
for the most deprived regions within North America, nor targeted policies
for maintaining social cohesion and regional balances. Furthermore, this is
not a trilateral initiative, but a bilateral one. In this sense, sensitive key issues
for Mexico, like migration or income and welfare disparities, will continue
to be dealt with according to the priorities of the US. For Washington, there
is no need to raise these issues at the trilateral level, as it was for its policy
aimed at leveling the playing field with its partners.
These two examples suggest that keeping the status quo within North
America will remain difficult. There are areas, such as security, in which a
trilateral move is already in the making, and there are other ones, like
migration and economic equalization, in which bilateral relations will
remain more important. This does not mean that discussions already
opened in terms of creating a Trade and Investment Tribunal, a Customs
Union, and even a Monetary Union will keep going, and will eventually
gain momentum (see Pastor 2001). However, to “deepen” NAFTA solely
in the trade and investment arena will further imbalance the representa-
tion of interests of societal groups. As it works now, NAFTA remains a
corporate-led device fueling economic growth regardless of the social,
political and cultural unbalances this may provoke.
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The representation of corporate interests is already unbalanced in
North America. Take for example the over-representation of corporate
rights under Chapter 11 through which the governance of investment
flows is privatized by granting firms the right and power to directly sue
governments when their corporate rights are at stake. Under the
experience of NAFTA, firms have been able to stop and renege on
environmental policies enacted by states that play against their interests.
In some cases, public interests have been subordinated to the primacy of
private corporate interests thanks to this over-representation of corporate
rights. Thus, a corporate-led, deeper level of market integration risks
deepening both integrative and fragmentation trends in North America.
Take the case of Mexico, in which preliminary data demonstrate that
people in northern Mexico and in urban centers located in the central
plateau are benefitting from export-oriented industries. Income gaps are
widening between northern Mexico and the South. But this is occurring at
the regional level as well. Some studies identify the creation of a dynamic
continental region within North America, located from the Great Lakes
area up to New York (Paelinck and Polèse 1999). This continental area
encompasses key US states like Michigan and Illinois, and two key Cana-
dian provinces, Toronto and Quebec. This is a kind of hub, with major
spokes to California and Texas, where most Mexican and American
exchanges take place. In other words, corporate-led integration is not
evenly integrating the three countries but, rather, linking different pro-
ductive spaces across the continent. How this reconfiguration of the pro-
ductive space will impact social and political organization in North
America remains to be seen.
Last but not least, there remains the issue of expanding NAFTA. As a
potential starting point for a North and South agenda, NAFTA has
become a blueprint for the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). Launched in parallel with the NAFTA negotiations by former
President Bush in 1990, former President Clinton and current President
George W. Bush have made of this initiative a major policy goal for the
hemisphere. Once President George W. Bush obtained the TPA from
Congress, in 2002, the Doha Round and FTAA negotiations gained
momentum. The US agenda for the FTAA negotiations appears to be very
similar, both in content and strategy, to the agenda pursued more than
ten years ago when NAFTA negotiations were begun. Similar to those
years, “minilateral” negotiations became intertwined with US multilateral
positions within the WTO and bilateral approaches, as witnessed by the
US–Chile negotiations. Similar to past negotiations, “minilateralism” pre-
tends to promote an agenda more ambitious than what can be negotiated
within the multilateral forum. In this sense, the optimal goal for the US is
to get a “Doha-plus” agreement at the regional level. Similar to the
NAFTA negotiations, the US, and more concretely, the US Congress is,
once again, setting the timing and the coverage of the negotiations. A deal
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must be struck in June 2005 at the latest if Congress is to renew the TPA
for two more years.
Both FTAA and the Doha Round pretend to deepen disciplines and
commitments reached on the Uruguay Round. Apart from phasing out
remaining tariffs in manufacturing, further liberalization is sought in
areas such as investments, services, property rights, government procure-
ment and agricultural products. Regarding agriculture, market access
should be widened and the sensitive issue of regulating or suppressing
export subsidies and domestic supports should be addressed. Finally, the
mechanisms for surveillance and enforcement of agreed-upon rules,
mainly regarding investment and property rights, remains another sensi-
tive issue to be resolved.
Since trade negotiations are commanded by the principle of the “single
undertaking” and consensus norms, the common denominator that can
be reached within multilateral forums is normally lower than what can be
obtained in “minilateral” ones, let alone within bilateral deals. This
explains why Washington still maintains the three-tier approach to trade
negotiations (multi, mini, bilateral). In each of them, Washington pre-
tends to optimize the minimum it can get. After years of thorough negoti-
ations, it is already clear that what Washington anticipates obtaining from
the Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) increases in relation
to the forum where negotiations take place. Within bilateral negotiations
Washington increases its leverage to obtain the most it can from its
partner, but at the same time the negotiating party has the opportunity, in
accordance with its bargaining capabilities, to “customize” an agreement
to its own preferences. In multilateral negotiations Washington obtains
less as relatively weaker countries can increase their leverage by creating
building blocks (as for example the G 20), for defending their interests.
“Minilateral” negotiations, such as those for a FTAA, remain in an ambigu-
ous middle ground.
The proliferation of integration mechanisms has provoked the emer-
gence of different trade and policy “hubs” across the region. By signing
bilateral agreements and participating in different regional schemes,
Mexico and to some extent Canada, have become hubs themselves.
Doubtlessly, Brazil has become another one with respect to MERCOSUR.
Venezuela and Colombia attempt to play their own sub-regional roles. In
June 2003 Washington signed an agreement with Chile that came into
force in January of 2004. In many respects, the deal remains close to what
was negotiated within NAFTA.
The US–Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has become Washington’s
“NAFTA-plus” approach for other bilateral and “minilateral” negotiations,
both within the western hemisphere and outside. In June 2004 USTR
reached another FTA with five Central American (CA) countries, the
coverage of which was extended to the Dominican Republic in August of
that year. The agreements are a replica of the US–Chile FTA, customized,
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of course, to the particularities of CA and Caribbean economies. Though
61 percent of CA goods enter the US duty-free under the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI), CA countries were interested in signing an agreement
with the US in order to widen and make permanent their access to the US
market.7 The deal aims to lock in domestic economic reform in the region
as well as improving the institutional environment for attracting invest-
ments.8
The reasons Washington signed a Central America Free Trade Agree-
ment (CAFTA) were politically and strategically motivated. US sales to this
region represent only 1 percent of overall exports. Washington clearly
sends the message that “NAFTA-plus” deals can still be struck in the
region, replacing protracted negotiations pursued either in Geneva or in
Puebla.9 In fact, in spite of the reactivation of the Doha negotiations
during the summer of 2004, it is clear that it will take years to negotiate
the suppression of export subsidies and the reduction of domestic sup-
ports in developed countries, a hot issue at the WTO negotiations. As for
the FTAA, during the ministerial hemispheric meeting held in Miami in
November 2003, the final communiqué of that meeting called for a two-
tier FTAA: one encompassing a common set of rights and obligations
accepted by the 34 members, and another one negotiated, “à la carte,”
amongst interested members. From then on, FTAA negotiations have
legitimized the “hub and spoke” approach followed by the US and Merco-
sur’s preferences for negotiating trade and disciplinary rules in the WTO
to the detriment of the FTAA. The US–Chile FTA and CAFTA represent a
de facto enlargement of the NAFTA area. They constitute the general
framework under which the second tier of the FTAA will be constructed.
It is clear that NAFTA countries, Chile, Central America and probably
Caribbean countries as well – excluding Cuba – will join a US-led initiative
along these lines.
Conclusion
Globalization and regionalism seem to be two faces of the same coin. The
first invokes a technological revolution that is transforming our notions of
space, territory and time, and the second refers to the policy mechanisms,
rules and paradigms through which global issues are being governed by a
cluster of countries. In this sense, NAFTA has been successful as a device
for changing the rules of the game in trade and investment matters and
for inducing participating partners to adapt their own economic regula-
tory mechanisms to a benchmark defined by Washington at the multi-,
mini- and unilateral levels. As long as the US economy keeps innovating
and growing, North American integration defined according to US stand-
ards will remain legitimate and a blueprint for future negotiations, at both
WTO and FTAA talks.
As it stands, the future of North American integration will remain
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rooted in the primacy of market-oriented mechanisms and corporate
rights protection. Regional imbalances in income, health and education
gaps (mainly between Mexico and its two partners), welfare policies, and
differences in administrative organization within each country that affect
cross-border issues, will be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. “Continentalism”
will remain subordinated to American interests, as demonstrated by the
magnification of the security agenda after the September 11 attacks. Thus,
the challenge for “followers” will be to devise the institutional mechanisms
for accommodating their own priorities within the continental agenda. To
balance against the corporate-led integration scheme currently prevailing
in North America, social, labor and welfare-led agendas remain important
for future integrative efforts in the region. The integration path is acceler-
ating fragmentation trends, similar to what globalization is provoking in
other parts of the world. Thus, bridging gaps, increasing social opportun-
ities and maintaining social cohesion remain challenges to be handled in
the future, either at the local, federal, regional or multilateral levels. The
European experiment has shown that this governance challenge can be
addressed with great success. Though the North American experience is
grounded on different circumstances, its success and achievements should
not be that different.
Notes
1 As we know, these policy mechanisms are institutional arrangements normally
bound by agreements or organizations through which consultation, negotiation,
monitoring treaty compliance and other types of information are facilitated
among members. As Stephen Krasner in a classical definition conceived them,
regimes embody a set of principles, rules and decision-making procedures, both
formal and informal, around which expectations of participants converge in a
given issue-area (Krasner 1983: 186).
2 The GATT required that government purchases above US$225,000 be subject
to competitive bidding. The CUSFTA reduced the threshold to US$25,000.
3 There are differences in the regimes of land ownership between the two coun-
tries and in the political organization of Canadian provinces vis-à-vis US federal
states. Although US trade agencies decided in 1983 that timber allocation and
stumpage rights were not countervailable, in 1986, once the powerful Coalition
for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI) was created, a renewed file submitted to the
Department of Commerce (DOC) found that both the allocation of timber and
stumpage fees were provided on a discretionary and specific basis, and were
hence countervailable. Canada has since alleged that stumpage fees are a
matter of public development policies, and that US agencies cannot decide how
provincial governments must manage their natural resources. Anticipating the
final decision of the Department of Commerce, the Canadian government
decided to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) under which a tax of
15 percent was imposed on Canadian softwood lumber exports. That tariff was
terminated in late 1991 at which point the DOC initiated its third countervail-
ing investigation, which, as expected, was affirmative. This time Canada decided
to challenge the US decision under Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA (see Ek 2001
and Gagné 1999).
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4 The dissident vote came from the two American panelists. For further informa-
tion on this issue, see Davey 1996: 172–82.
5 Above that quota (which was fixed as 14.7 billion board feet per year with no
tax), a progressive taxation was imposed on lumber imports suggesting that the
aim of the US government was to restrain Canadian exports, regardless of
whether they were subsidized or not.
6 In July 2002, the TPA was finally voted on by Congress.
7 CBI is a Washington-led trade architecture of unilateral concessions to CA and
Caribbean countries. These concessions are fragile because the US Congress
may widen or narrow, unilaterally, their scope and duration.
8 For a general review of what is at stake in CAFTA, see Salazar-Xirinachs and
Granados (2004).
9 The current city, in Mexico, where FTAA negotiations take place.
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5 Financial sector development in
Latin America and East Asia




The financial crises in Mexico (1994–5) and several East Asian countries
(1997–8) focused attention on the role played by the financial sector in
economic development.1 While the crises themselves provide dramatic
evidence of the negative link between finance and development, the posit-
ive relationship is also of growing interest to both researchers and policy-
makers. The increased interest in finance contrasts with the approach in
the earlier postwar period, when development economists concentrated
on topics such as industrialization, technology transfer and international
trade – the so-called real sector of the economy. Finance was generally
assumed to accommodate the needs of production.
The burgeoning new literature that has emerged since the crises deals
with many aspects of the financial sector in developing economies (for
recent reviews, see World Bank 2001a; Levine 2004). Three of them are of
particular relevance for our discussion in this chapter. The first involves
the structure of the financial sector. Do banks continue to dominate
financial transactions, or has diversification toward capital markets begun
to take place? A second topic concerns ownership of the banking sector.
Do public banks still play a major role, or has there been a shift toward
private ownership? If private banks have become more important, what is
the new balance between domestic and foreign institutions? A third topic
focuses on access to finance. Is access limited to governments and large
firms, or are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) also able to
obtain credit?
Debates on the structure of the financial sector began with respect to
the industrial world. Contrasts were drawn between countries where
capital markets played a dominant role (the United States and the United
Kingdom) and those where banks were the main source of finance (most
of continental Europe and Japan). While the political science literature
found significant differences between market- and bank-based systems in
terms of the implications for government policy (Zysman 1983), the eco-
nomics literature tended to argue that both systems could work equally
well (Allen and Gale 2000). Following the crises, these debates were trans-
lated into the developing-country context through a large World Bank
project (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001). Again, the conclusion was that
both banks and capital markets could provide needed finance; the import-
ant point was how well any given system functioned.
Despite these conclusions at the academic level, policymakers became
concerned about financial diversification. International organizations –
including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Litan et al.
2003), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2002), and the
regional development banks (Kim 2001) – began to analyze the advan-
tages of domestic bond markets. Several were stressed: establishing a
market-determined interest rate to help investors calculate opportunity
costs; increasing investment choices and thus raising the volume of
savings; and avoiding the need to borrow abroad and thus assume exces-
sive foreign exchange risks. Other experts concentrated on more specific
institutional needs. From the government’s perspective, a bond market is
useful to finance fiscal deficits without increasing inflation and for
running monetary policy. Private borrowers, both firms and households,
need access to bond markets to obtain long-term finance for investment
or mortgages. East Asian government officials argued that the crises in
their region would have been less severe if domestic bond markets had
provided an important source of credit. They followed up with action
plans to stimulate regional markets and arrangements of various types
(Yoshitomo and Shirai 2001; Ito and Park 2004). In Latin America, the
reaction was slower, but calls to stimulate capital markets have also begun
to appear there (Dowers and Masci 2003; World Bank 2004).
A second set of debates that assumed a prominent place in academic
and policy circles after the financial crises of the 1990s focused specifically
on the banking sector and asked about ownership characteristics. The
traditional view among developing countries in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries had been that state-owned development banks were
necessary for at least two reasons. First, private banks would not be willing
to finance the long-term, high-cost projects necessary for industrialization.
Second, private banks would not provide financial services for small firms
or poor households. At the same time, foreign banks were seen as likely to
take resources out of developing countries rather than bring them in
(Cárdenas et al. 2000; Bulmer-Thomas 2003). 
The post-crisis literature has a very different perspective. It argues that
public banks are the main source of the problems in the banking sector
and that foreign banks can help resolve these problems. In particular, it
claims that public banks operate on the basis of political criteria rather
than being concerned with developmental or even social objectives. Given
such motives, credit is considered likely to fund inefficient projects, which
– even if they are actually carried out – will have low rates of return at the
microeconomic level and undermine productivity and growth at the
140 Barbara Stallings
macroeconomic level. Empirical studies have found high state ownership
of banks to be correlated with low growth rates, low efficiency, low profits,
high volumes of non-performing loans and corruption (La Porta et al.
2002; Caprio et al. 2004). The literature on foreign banks makes claims
that are nearly the mirror opposite. Foreign banks are said to be more effi-
cient, more profitable, less corrupt and with fewer non-performing loans
(Litan et al. 2001).
A third debate of interest addresses the question of access to finance.
Again the focus is mainly on banks, since it is generally agreed that only
large borrowers – whether from the public or private sector – have access
to the capital markets. The issues are closely related to those on owner-
ship; that is, how do public, private-domestic and foreign banks compare
in the allocation of credit to poor households and SMEs? While we saw
that one of the traditional justifications for public banks was providing
credit to vulnerable groups, the new literature calls traditional claims into
question. On the one hand, it questions whether public banks actually pri-
oritize low-income households or small businesses as opposed to political
supporters. On the other hand, it attempts to qualify the criticisms of
foreign banks with respect to access. The empirical evidence on this topic
is less voluminous than that on the other two topics. One study that is fre-
quently cited agrees that foreign banks are more likely to finance large
firms than small ones, but that the latter nonetheless are getting more
credit than they would otherwise have had. Other researchers suggest that
if foreign banks concentrate on large firms, this may encourage other
banks to seek out smaller clients (Clarke et al. 2001).
This chapter analyzes the financial sector in general, and these three
topics in particular, in the context of a comparison between Latin
America and East Asia. Overall, significant differences have characterized
the development strategies and outcomes in the two regions. The most
obvious difference is that East Asian economies have grown far more
rapidly than those in Latin America. Given the positive relationship
between finance and growth, it would be expected that East Asian coun-
tries would have more credit available than their Latin American counter-
parts. In most instances, this expectation is borne out, and the financial
sectors in Latin America and East Asia look quite different, as we will see.
Interestingly, however, our comparison of the two most successful
countries in the two regions – Chile and South Korea – finds a different
relationship. Since Chile and Korea are often viewed as the paradigmatic
cases of market-oriented development strategies in Latin America and
state-led strategies in East Asia, we were surprised to find important and
growing similarities between the two in recent years. We explore this
puzzle in the following pages. The chapter begins with a broad overview of
the financial sector in the two regions. We then focus on the Chile–Korea
comparison. Here we examine financial crisis and governmental response
in the two cases. Then we turn to the financial sector per se and look first
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at the development of the banking, bond and equity markets. This is fol-
lowed by an examination of the differences in ownership and in perform-
ance. Finally, we address the issue of access to credit for households and
SMEs. The concluding section returns to the topic of convergence and
suggests some reasons why this process might be occurring.
Historical evolution of the financial sector in Latin America
and East Asia
Since the mid-1980s, there has been an interest in comparing Latin
America and East Asia. Initially the comparisons centered on broad issues
of development strategy and concentrated on what were then four highly
successful “newly industrializing economies” in the two regions – Brazil
and Mexico, Korea and Taiwan.2 Later, more specific comparisons were
introduced. The course of the 1980s, which represented a major setback
for Latin America through a decade-long debt crisis while East Asia con-
tinued to surge ahead, meant that the comparisons were of primary inter-
est to Latin America. How could they catch up with East Asia? What policy
lessons could be learned? The Asian crisis of the late 1990s redressed this
imbalance somewhat in that the Latin American countries had more
experience with crisis management. The financial sector was one area, in
particular, where East Asia seemed to have something to learn – both in
positive and in negative terms.
In both regions, economists described the financial system during most
of the postwar period as “repressed,” which implied heavy government
control of the banking sector. First, the authorities set interest rates on
both deposits and loans. The real rates were often negative, at least ex post,
as inflation exceeded nominal rates. Second, reserve requirements were
high, so the commercial banks had little freedom to expand their port-
folios. Third, governments issued administrative directives for the alloca-
tion of a substantial share of commercial bank credit. Fourth,
government-owned banks were responsible for a large amount of the
lending that took place. Fifth, complicated capital controls placed strict
limits on the interactions between local borrowers or lenders and the
international economy.
One by one, Latin American countries began moving away from this
pattern in an attempt to increase the size and efficiency of the banking
sector. The main changes were to free interest rates to be set by market
forces, to lower reserve requirements, to limit or end directed credit and
to privatize or close government-owned banks. A related institutional
reform was the tendency toward making central banks autonomous of
finance ministries. In addition, the capital account was opened, so that
foreigners had easy access to the local financial systems, and local indi-
viduals and firms could make their own decisions on seeking funds
abroad. Chile was the first country to move in this direction. Shortly after
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the military coup in 1973, the government began an overall liberalization
program of which financial reform was a key element. Other countries fol-
lowed in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was this early reform experience
that made the Latin American financial sector of interest to East Asia.3
In East Asia, the financial sector was an important part of the economic
model that produced the “East Asian Miracle.” The banks served as the
main channel between governments that decided which industries to
promote and firms that implemented the strategies. In many cases,
government-owned banks held a large share of deposits, which obviously
facilitated control of credit, but in addition governments engaged in
“administrative guidance” to steer private-sector credit to priority projects.
Three types of targeting have been identified: targeting firms or indus-
tries, targeting types of firms (especially exporters or SMEs) and targeting
social objectives. While subsidies of various kinds were provided as part of
the credit arrangements, these may have been more carefully allocated
according to performance than in other regions (World Bank 1993; see
also Amsden 1994; Fishlow et al. 1994; Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001).
Some steps toward liberalization were taken in East Asia in the late
1980s and early 1990s, but many elements of the old domestic controls
remained. Where more change came about was in external liberalization,
so that banks and firms alike could access the international capital
markets. In other words, international financial liberalization often pre-
ceded domestic liberalization, resulting in banks and firms taking on large
amounts of foreign-currency debt without necessarily understanding the
implications. Many experts attribute a large share of the blame for the
crisis to this sequencing.
Despite the commonalities of the repressed financial systems in the two
regions, an important difference divided them. For a variety of reasons
that are beyond the scope of this chapter, East Asians traditionally had
savings rates that were nearly double those of Latin Americans as a per-
centage of GDP. The average for the 1990s, for example, was 34 percent
for East Asian and Pacific countries but only 20 percent for Latin America
(World Bank 2001b: Appendix Table 13). All else equal, the higher
savings rates meant that East Asia would have deeper financial markets
than Latin America, and this was indeed the case.4
Table 5.1 shows financial depth (measured as the sum of bank loans
and bonds outstanding plus stock market capitalization, as share of GDP)
for a sample of Latin American and East Asian countries in 1990 and
2003. It indicates that financial depth in 1990 was 76 percent of GDP in
Latin America compared to 137 percent in East Asia, or 80 percent higher
in the latter. By 2003, the gap had exceeded 100 percent as financial
depth increased to 226 percent of GDP in Asia compared to only 108
percent in Latin America.
Focusing on individual countries, an important contrast appears. With
the exception of Indonesia and the Philippines (the only low-income
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countries in the Asian sample), financial depth in all the Asian countries
exceeds the Latin American average. Although there are differences
among them, all are making progress toward strong financial sectors that
can help support economic growth. In the Latin American sample, by con-
trast, two groups stand out. Brazil and Chile have financial sectors that are
at a similar level to those found in the Asian countries. The others –
Argentina,5 Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela – trail far behind; two
even slid backwards over the period. Since this second group of Latin
American countries is a fairly heterogeneous one, more in-depth analysis
is needed to understand the reasons for the low level of development of
their financial markets.
The greater average financial depth in East Asia is reflected in several
recent surveys of entrepreneurs in the two regions. The World Bank’s
“Investment Climate around the World” survey asks businesspeople in all
regions about the principal obstacles they face. In Latin America, lack of
finance was listed as the third most important problem, behind taxes and
regulations and political instability. In developing Asian countries, with
their deeper financial sector, finance was much lower on the list of obs-
tacles (Batra et al. 2003). A survey by the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) reinforced the World Bank result. The IADB study showed
that in 18 of 20 Latin American countries, access to credit was reported by
businesspeople as their most serious problem (IADB 2001: Part II).
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Table 5.1 Latin America and East Asia: financial depth,* 1990 and 2003
Region/country 1990 2003 % change
Latin America** 76 108 42
Argentina 42 98 133
Brazil 111 170 53
Chile 155 247 59
Colombia 40 76 90
Mexico 108 82 –24
Peru 23 55 139
Venezuela 54 26 –52
East Asia** 137 226 65
Indonesia 53 82 55
Korea 148 234 58
Malaysia 261 412 58
Philippines 60 119 98
Taiwan 172 270 57
Thailand 130 237 82
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, online version (for bank claims and stock
market capitalization); BIS website for bonds outstanding.
Notes
* Financial depth is the sum of bank loans, bonds outstanding and stock market capitaliza-
tion as a share of GDP.
** Unweighted average for regional totals.
Finally, another IADB project compared the development of new firms in
Latin America and East Asia. Again, the finding was that lack of finance
was much greater for Latin American start-ups than for those in East Asia
(Kantis et al. 2001).
Financial crisis and government response: Chile and South
Korea
Moving from a broad regional overview to our two main countries of inter-
est, we begin the comparison with a brief analysis of the financial crises that
Chile and Korea suffered and the response of the two governments; these
processes set the stage for the rest of the analysis. While many of the ele-
ments are surprisingly similar, a significant difference is the time period in
which the two crises took place. The Chilean crisis occurred in 1981–3,
while Korea’s crisis was not until 1997–8. During the intervening 15 years,
important changes took place in the international environment, both in
terms of the greater sophistication of the financial markets and the willing-
ness of the IFIs to provide assistance. Although the Chilean economy in the
early 1980s was far less sophisticated than its Korean counterpart in the late
1990s, and Chile’s record of economic growth prior to the crisis was quite
poor in comparison with Korea’s, the problems they suffered and the way
the two governments tackled the crises had much in common.
Both crises resulted from a mismanaged financial liberalization process,
both internal and external. On the internal front, the freeing of interest
rates, the end of directed credit and the privatization of state-owned banks
were accompanied by a disregard for prudential regulation and supervi-
sion and sometimes by outright illegal activities. The combination resulted
in inordinately rapid increases in credit, large loans to “related” clients
and inadequate provisioning for potential losses. Eventually, these ele-
ments set the stage for a crisis. The situation was made worse by a simulta-
neous external financial liberalization, which was also mismanaged. A
fixed exchange rate was maintained, which led to massive capital inflows
and exchange rate misalignment, and improper sequencing favored short-
term over long-term inflows. The rapid pace of liberalization exacerbated
both problems. In addition, domestic firms (financial and non-financial)
were allowed to enter the international markets to seek finance, creating
currency mismatches, over-leveraging themselves, and endangering their
future if/when the exchange rate had to be devalued.
Following major crises, even the most laissez-faire oriented govern-
ments had to step in to stop the hemorrhaging. In both cases, similar steps
were taken. A first set included the takeover of non-performing loans, the
recapitalization of the banks, and liquidations or mergers, bringing in
foreign institutions. Later, in an attempt to prevent future crises, regula-
tion and supervision were stepped up, greater information and trans-
parency were required and better corporate governance was introduced.
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The Chilean crisis erupted in 1981, the result of the most extreme kind
of financial mismanagement, when the military government set out to elimi-
nate virtually all regulations. The year after the banking crisis began, the
situation was complicated by a balance-of-payments crisis, and the fixed
exchange rate was devalued. The financial crisis was marked by the insol-
vency of the majority of the private national banks and finance houses,
which were taken over or liquidated by the Banking Superintendent. By
mid-1982, the crisis had become a systemic one, extending to many of the
largest corporations, which also ended up in government hands.
Resolution of the crisis involved various measures to assist banks and
debtors as well as the reprivatization of the institutions that the govern-
ment had intervened. The overall operation is estimated to have cost
more than 35 percent of GDP. In the aftermath of the crisis a new attitude
emerged with respect to regulation and supervision of the banking sector.
The Banking Law of 1986, which became an example for the region, rein-
forced the powers of the Superintendent. It required that portfolios be
ranked by risk categories and that provisioning be made for higher risk
credits. It also increased the transparency of the process. It tightened pol-
icies with respect to credits to “related” parties, defining the term more
strictly and limiting such loans. Capital adequacy requirements were left at
the previous levels, but definitions were tightened. Deposit insurance was
eliminated for term deposits, so as to make depositors more vigilant, but
all sight deposits were covered, as were accounts of small depositors.
In 1997, the Banking Law was modified to bring it up to date with inter-
national and domestic trends that had emerged over the preceding
decade. At this time, Chile adhered to the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio
advocated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); BIS risk cate-
gories were also adopted. Banks were permitted to increase their inter-
national activities: setting up subsidiaries abroad as well as engaging in
new activities such as administering mutual funds, leasing, factoring and
financial advising. They were also allowed to provide guarantees to clients
in the international market. Finally, conditions were created for more
banks, both national and foreign, to enter the Chilean market after a
decade of closure.
As a consequence of the thorough cleanup of the banking industry and
the improved system of regulation and supervision, the Chilean financial
system functioned well in the 1990s. It is essential to point out, however,
that this good performance also depended on the context in which it took
place. On the one hand, macroeconomic policy contributed to a stable
and growing economy, which had a strong positive interaction with the
financial sector. On the other hand, the capital account of the balance of
payments was managed so as to limit volatility from the international
economy. All of these were necessary elements for the positive outcome.6
The Korean crisis was more unexpected. Indeed, Korea appeared to be
an unlikely candidate for a financial crisis, as it had been one of the
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world’s most successful economies in the postwar period. Until the late
1980s, however, the bank-dominated financial sector had had little auto-
nomy, since the country’s economic authorities often used the banks in
the pursuit of their overall policy goals. An important shift occurred in
1993, with the deepening of the financial liberalization begun the previ-
ous decade. Although the government had intended to move slowly, the
process accelerated, partially in response to Korea’s application to join the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In
that context, both external and internal debt grew very rapidly, and insuf-
ficient attention was paid to the sequencing of reforms, leading to a shift
toward short-term debt.
After the Thai crisis of July 1997, foreign creditors reconsidered their
loans to Korean entities and began to withdraw. At the same time, many of
the corporate conglomerates (chaebol) also failed, resulting in a systemic
crisis. The government initially tried to handle the situation on its own,
announcing deposit guarantees and providing liquidity to financial institu-
tions. The size and speed of the crisis, however, drove it to an agreement
with the IMF, which influenced but did not totally determine later steps.
In a first phase of restructuring, in early 1998, public monies were used to
close or reorganize troubled banks and dispose of non-performing loans
through the asset management company, KAMCO. This process had to be
repeated in late 2000 as a result of the worsening of corporate problems.
In addition, banks were encouraged to recapitalize themselves, and
foreign investment laws were changed to allow foreign participation. The
number of banks and other financial institutions was reduced.
Another set of reforms involved strengthening prudential regulations,
including accounting, auditing and disclosure requirements. The defini-
tion of NPLs was tightened, coming closer to international standards, and
capital adequacy ratios were brought up to BIS levels. Corporate gover-
nance was also improved, with outside directors as well as checks and bal-
ances between management and board members. It is interesting to note
that a number of the reforms had been presented to the Korean legis-
lature before the crisis, but not approved. It was only in the aftermath of
the crisis that support could be mobilized.7
The outcome of the restructuring process was positive from the point
of view of economic growth and of traditional financial performance
indicators. Profitability returned, capital adequacy ratios increased and
NPLs were reduced. In addition, as will be discussed later, there was a
significant shift in bank portfolios toward more consumer lending and
fewer corporate loans. This latter trend, however, was carried to an
extreme and resulted in a classic boom (2001–2) and bust (2003–4) cycle.
The most active lenders were credit card companies, often owned by the
major commercial banks. One of the credit card companies itself had to
be rescued, but these recent problems in no way reached the significance
of the 1997–8 events.
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Structure of financial markets: Chile and Korea
The financial crises centered on the banking sector in Chile and Korea,
but there is another important part of the financial sector that must also
be taken into account. Indeed, both countries have been trying to
promote development of the capital markets (bonds and equity) as a com-
plement to the banks, and there has been an expansion of the capital
markets in many emerging markets.8
Experts cite a variety of reasons to justify efforts to promote capital
markets.9 First, domestic capital markets reduce the need to borrow from
abroad, thus limiting exchange rate risk and vulnerability to shifting
market sentiment. Second, they offer savers new instruments, potentially
attracting new savers, both domestic and foreign. Third, they match the
need of investors (including institutional investors as well as the produc-
tive sector) for longer maturities. Fourth, they increase transparency in
the financial markets and provide a source of information on risk and
yield. And, finally, for the particular case of government bonds, they aid in
carrying out fiscal and monetary policy.
Nonetheless, despite the advantages they offer, there are also stringent
requirements for establishing and maintaining strong capital markets,
which many developing countries have difficulty meeting. To do so, a
country needs a strong legal system, a good financial infrastructure and
substantial transparency and good corporate governance. In addition, if
the markets are to operate properly, a large and liquid secondary market
is needed for bonds and equity to make investors comfortable about
making long-term investments.10
Both Chile and Korea have been promoting capital markets for many
years. Table 5.2 shows the extent to which capital markets in the two coun-
tries have developed in comparison to banking. At the beginning of the
1990s, bank loans outstanding in Chile represented 73 percent of GDP, or
a little less than half of the total financial markets (155 percent of GDP).
Bonds outstanding were 37 percent of GDP, and stock market capitaliza-
tion was 45 percent. The Korean pattern was very similar, although bank
loans represented a slightly smaller share of GDP; overall, the markets in
Korea in 1990 represented 148 percent of GDP. By the beginning of the
new decade, things had changed in some ways. Chile’s banking sector had
not grown, but its bond and especially its equity markets had, so the
overall total for the three markets reached 247 percent of GDP. The
increase in Korea was of about the same magnitude, but the composition
was quite different. Bonds were the leading growth sector, followed by
bank loans, with equity markets trailing far behind. The overall market
size for Korea in 2003 was 234 percent of GDP. It is interesting to note
that most of the growth came after the financial crisis, as part of the
government’s attempt to strengthen the financial sector.
Both governments undertook special efforts to promote capital
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markets, although they focused on different mechanisms. Chile worked
indirectly through the creation of a set of institutional investors, deriving
from the privatization of its pension system in the early 1980s. These
investors demanded long-term assets and are generally credited with pro-
viding a strong boost for both the stock and bond markets. In addition,
several laws passed during the 1990s aimed at improving corporate gover-
nance and providing tax incentives for investors. Recently, Chile has fol-
lowed Korea in setting up a special stock exchange for small and
medium-sized firms (Cifuentes et al. 2002; Walker and Lefort 2002).
Korea has also taken steps to promote its capital markets. While it had
markets of significant size before the crisis, it has advanced since then as
part of the overall recovery strategy. A first step was the full opening of
domestic financial markets to foreign investors, who now account for over
40 percent of stock market capitalization (New York Times, 21 May 2004).
Second was the modernization and expansion of the government bond
market in order to finance the restructuring of the economy. Third, new
institutions were created, including the Kosdaq market (for new firms) as
well as derivatives markets. Fourth, corporate governance and trans-
parency were improved substantially. In addition, more as an autonomous
movement than a policy, corporate bonds have expanded to provide
resources to deal with the crisis (Kim and Park 2002; Shin 2002). Finally,
Korea joined its neighbors in policies to promote regional markets and
greater financial integration.
As already indicated, an important prerequisite for proper capital
market functioning is an active secondary market. Without liquidity,
investors hesitate to risk their money since they will have difficulty exiting
if they want to do so. In this area, Chile and Korea are quite different, as
the latter has a much higher turnover in its capital markets. One reason
may be related to the role of institutional investors in Chile. Given their
need for long-term assets, they tend to buy and hold rather than trade. So,
while they have been an important stimulus to the growth of the primary
markets, they are less helpful with respect to the secondary markets.11
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Table 5.2 Chile and Korea: financial development, 1990 and 2003 (% of GDP)
Financial market Chile Korea
1990 2003 % change   

1990 2003 % change
Bank loans 73 71 –3 66 106 61
Bonds outstanding 37 57 54 38 74 95
Stock market 45 119 164 44 54 23
capitalization
Total 155 247 59 148 234 58
Sources: Same as Table 5.1.
Ownership in the banking sector: Chile and Korea
One of the most important consequences of the financial crises in both
Latin America and East Asia was temporary and permanent changes in the
ownership structure of the banking industry. The temporary changes were
in the direction of greater government ownership, as the authorities saw
no alternative but to assume control of many banks in order to prevent a
meltdown of the financial system as a whole. In general, these changes
were not meant to be permanent, only a way to stabilize the situation and
clean up the banks before returning them to the private sector. The more
permanent change was toward greater foreign control. This came about
because the domestic private sector was generally incapable of providing
the needed resources to recapitalize the banks. In recent cases of financial
crisis, there was also pressure from the IFIs to change legislation to permit
greater foreign ownership.
The ownership structure of banking is important for several reasons.
One is that foreign banks are believed to be more efficient and to bring
deeper pockets and more modern technology. At the same time, there is
fear that they will cream off the most profitable clients and leave others
without access to credit. Public-sector banks, by contrast, are said to be
driven more by political than business motives and are perhaps less effi-
cient as well. Some of the motives attributed to public-sector banks were
mentioned earlier: promoting key industries, increasing exports and pro-
viding access to groups that would not otherwise have been able to obtain
credit. Local private owners, then, are in the middle between the other
two. They are more interested in making profits than in furthering social
objectives, but they are often considered to be less efficient than their
foreign competitors.12
Table 5.3 displays some rough estimates of the changes of ownership in
the banking sectors of Chile and Korea from the mid-1990s to 2003. In
looking at the table, it is important to keep in mind the timing difference.
That is, for Chile, the period covered is well beyond the financial crisis,
and the banks that had been taken over by the government as part of the
rescue efforts had long since been reprivatized. Thus, the dominant
change during the period shown was the move toward greater foreign
control at the expense of the domestic private sector, while the single
government-owned commercial bank more or less maintained its share of
the market. In Korea, by contrast, the period runs from the pre-crisis
through the middle of the reprivatization. The years in between included
a substantial increase in government ownership during the crisis, which
has been declining in the last few years, together with a burgeoning of
foreign ownership.
In the mid-1990s, by best estimate, local businesspeople dominated the
Chilean banking sector. Nearly 70 percent of the sector was under private
domestic control, with the remainder more or less evenly split between
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the public sector and foreign owners. By 2003, this picture had changed
substantially. While the public-sector bank share fell slightly to about 11
percent of total assets, the more significant transfer occurred from local
private owners to foreign banks. Foreign ownership rose from 16 percent
to 57 percent, while private domestic ownership fell from 69 percent to 32
percent.
This shift was part of a larger process by which foreign capital – espe-
cially from Spain – entered Chilean (and other Latin American) markets.
Other sectors where similar trends can be found include telecommunica-
tions, transportation, electricity, other utilities and some parts of the
industrial sector (ECLAC 2000). In banking, the biggest players were the
two main Spanish banks: Santander and BBVA. After a series of mergers
and takeovers, Santander now owns the biggest bank in Chile, while BBVA
owns the fifth largest. Together, they account for nearly one third of the
market, and they also participate in other financial services such as
pension fund administration. Two US banks (Citibank and FleetBoston,
the former Bank of Boston) are the oldest foreign institutions in Chile,
whose presence dates back nearly a century.13 Other foreign banks in the
Chilean market are from Canada (Scotia Bank), Holland (ABN Amro),
Germany (Deutsche and Dresdner), Britain (HSBC) and Japan (Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi) (ECLAC 2003).
The pattern shown for Korea, as mentioned above, is influenced by the
fact that the government is still in the process of reprivatizing the banks it
acquired during the crisis. The government share was nearly constant
between 1994 and 2003, at slightly more than 30 percent. In addition to its
(falling) stake in the commercial banks, the government share both
before and after the crisis includes the so-called specialized banks: Korean
Development Bank, Korean Export-Import Bank, Industrial Bank of
Korea. Although not defined as commercial banks by Korean regulations,
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Table 5.3 Chile and Korea: ownership of assets in banking sector, 1994 and 2003
(%)
Owner Chile Korea*
1994 2003            

1994 2003
Public sector 15 11 32 31
Private domestic 69 32 62 24
Foreign 16 57 6 44
Total 100 100 100 100
Sources: Author’s estimates, based on country data, Fitch Rating reports, Montgomery
(2003).
Note
* Includes national and regional commercial banks, foreign bank branches and specialized
banks.
they nevertheless meet the normal criteria, as they take deposits and make
loans. The major change was in foreign ownership, which rose from 6
percent to 44 percent.14 Thus, as in Chile, the private domestic sector was
squeezed, falling in Korea from 62 percent in 1994 to only 24 percent in
2003. While the ownership pattern in the two countries still looks differ-
ent, if current trends continue, those differences may be substantially
reduced within a few years.
One of the interesting points about foreign investment in Korean
banks is the type of institutions involved. While we have already seen that
foreign owners in Chile are major international commercial banks from
various parts of the world, few of these players were initially present in
Korea. Rather the foreigners included private equity companies (e.g. the
Carlyle Group, Lone Star and Newbridge), investment banks (Goldman
Sachs), other financial institutions (the German insurance giant, Allianz)
and a group of Korean expatriates who live in Japan. The only major inter-
national commercial banks with a Korean presence in 2003 were JP
Morgan Chase, BNP, Standard Chartered and Commerzbank. Since then,
however, two of the private equity companies have sold their shares to
commercial banks, and a third is expected to do so soon.15
Financial market performance: Chile and Korea
Up till now, we have been looking at the structure of the financial
markets, both in terms of the division between banks and capital markets
and in terms of the ownership structure of the former. Now we continue
looking at the banks and ask about their performance on various standard
indicators. Here we find significant – but, again, decreasing – differences
between the two countries.
Table 5.4 presents data on five indicators. In order to capture the
impact of the crisis and the recovery in Korea, we show three time points:
1995–6, 1997–8 and 2004. The five indicators include: (1) the capital ade-
quacy ratio set by the Bank for International Settlements (the minimum
level for countries adhering to the 1988 BIS agreement is 8 percent capital
as a share of risk-adjusted assets); (2) the level of non-performing loans
(NPLs) as a share of total loans; (3) and (4) two measures of profitability
including the return on total assets (ROA) and the return on equity
(ROE); and (5) an indicator of the extent to which banks are extending
credit, and thus contributing to economic growth, as measured by loans as
a share of total bank assets.
As seen in the table, Chile’s performance record consistently exceeded
that of Korea before – and especially during – the crisis. Since then Korea
has made a very strong recovery and now matches Chile on many indic-
ators. In 1996, Chilean banks were much more profitable than their
Korean counterparts, and their NPLs were much lower. (The BIS ratio was
not available, since Chile did not adhere to the BIS agreement till 1997.)
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In addition, the higher loan/asset ratio in Chile indicates that the banks
were fulfilling their major role of providing credit rather than following
the less risky strategy of investing in securities.
As would be expected, Korean performance fell dramatically in 1997–8
on all of the indicators. The BIS ratio fell below the international stan-
dard, and NPLs surged (at their peak in annual terms, NPLs were nearly
14 percent in 1999). Moreover, both measures of profitability became
negative. Chile, in the meantime, was only mildly affected by the Asian
crisis, seeing its performance deteriorate in small measure, but not so as to
cause concern. As a new member of the BIS agreement, Chile’s capital
adequacy ratio was well above the minimum 8 percent.
By 2004, which was a good year for both countries, the indicators had
become very similar. Korea had made a substantial recovery, thanks to the
government’s decisive steps to bring the crisis under control. The BIS
ratio again exceeded the minimum, NPLs had fallen below 3 percent of
loans, and profitability had surged. Chile more or less maintained its pre-
vious good performance, with profitability rising a bit, while the NPL ratio
deteriorated by a small amount. The loan/asset ratio in the two cases was
now just about the same, at nearly 70 percent.
Access to finance: Chile and Korea
Studying access to finance is a more difficult task than the topics
addressed heretofore. The data are much harder to compile, and compar-
ison across countries is more complex because of differing definitions of
target groups. This section makes a preliminary attempt to compare the
Chilean and Korean records in this area by looking at the types of loans
provided by the banking sector (the share to businesses versus house-
holds) and the degree to which small and medium-sized firms have been
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Table 5.4 Chile and Korea: financial performance of banking sector, 1995/6–2004
(%)
Indicator Chile Korea*
1996 1997–8 2004**        

1995–6 1997–8 2004**
BIS ratio n.a. 13.0 13.5 9.2 7.6 10.8
NPLs 1.0 1.2 1.7 4.7 6.7 2.7
ROA 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.3 2.1 0.8
ROE 15.5 10.5 16.4 4.0 33.4 16.2
Loans/assets 73.4 74.7 69.9 52.6 45.3 69.2
Sources: IMF country reports and Fitch Rating reports.
Notes
* National commercial banks only.
** Data are for the first half of 2004.
able to obtain access to credit. Both of these topics focus on the banking
sector, since the capital markets serve only the largest and most creditwor-
thy clients (including governments). Thus, banks are the institutions to
which individuals and small firms must look.
The first panel in Table 5.5 examines the distribution of total bank
loans among businesses, consumers and mortgages. (It excludes loans for
other purposes, such as trade credit and inter-bank loans.) Beginning with
the pre-crisis period, we find a fairly similar pattern between the two coun-
tries: 71 percent of loans went to businesses in Chile compared to 65
percent in Korea. The biggest difference concerned consumer lending,
where 20 percent of Korea’s loan book involved this activity, while Chile’s
only included 12 percent. Mortgage lending, another form of lending to
households, provided some compensation as mortgage lending accounted
for 17 percent of bank loans in Chile versus 14 percent in Korea. Perhaps
the biggest surprise in these data is that a lower share of credit went to
business firms in Korea than in Chile, given the stereotype of Asian
economies as more oriented to producers than consumers. This latter
point is dramatically reinforced in the post-crisis data. By mid-2002,
corporate loans in Korea had fallen to less than 48 percent, while con-
sumer credit had risen to 41 percent. Mortgage lending fell slightly, to 12
percent. In Chile, over the same period, lending patterns changed only
marginally, with a small shift from consumer credit to mortgages.
The abrupt change in credit patterns in Korea is a major effect of the
bank and corporate restructuring process that has been going on since
1998. Several trends have all pushed in the same direction. First, the
government has tried to discourage the traditional link between the banks
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Table 5.5 Chile and Korea: access to finance, 1997 and 2000–1 (%)
Loans Chile Korea
1997 2000–1           

1997 2000–1
(a) Distribution of total loans
Business loans 71.3 70.7 65.4 47.6
Consumer loans 12.1 10.0 20.5 40.9
Mortgage loans 16.6 19.3 14.1 11.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Distribution of business loans
Large firms 61.7 63.6 32 29
SMEs 38.3 36.4 68 71
Total 100.0 100.0 100 100
Sources: Cho (2002) for Korea; Chilean Banking Superintendency and Román (2003) for Chile.
and the conglomerates (chaebol). Second, the chaebol themselves have
not been investing much, so there is less demand for credit on the corpor-
ate side. Third, the banks have become more concerned with profitability
and risk management than they had been in the pre-crisis period, and
lending to households helps with both. On the one hand, higher interest
rates can be charged;16 on the other hand, aggregating the large number
of households enables simple calculations of default probability.
While providing more credit to households and individual consumers
stimulated demand and (probably) contributed to increased equity, it
moved so fast that a classic bubble developed, especially among credit
card companies, frequently owned by commercial banks. Between 1999
and 2002, the issue of new credit cards grew at an annual compound rate
of 75 percent (The Economist, 8 February 2003). As is typical with credit
booms, serious problems emerged as borrowers fell behind on payments;
unpaid balances in March 2003 were $2.3 billion, up 27.5 percent from a
year earlier (New York Times, 5 April 2003). Government regulators organ-
ized a rescue operation by requesting financial institutions to cover debts
falling due on bonds issued by the nine credit card companies so as to
avoid a new crisis, but the overall growth rate of the economy fell signific-
antly as a result.
The second panel in Table 5.5 further disaggregates loans to busi-
nesses, showing the share going to large firms compared to small and
medium-sized ones. Here again we find a dramatic difference between the
two countries, both in levels and in trends. In the pre-crisis period, 62
percent of bank credit in Chile went to large firms and the remainder to
small and medium-sized ones. In Korea, the numbers were reversed: 32
percent of loans to large firms and 68 percent to SMEs. The changes
between the pre- and post-crisis measurements were not large, but the
interesting point is that they went in opposite directions. In Chile, the
share to large firms rose (to 64 percent), while in Korea it fell (to 29
percent). The latter data are for the year 2000, and there are some indica-
tions that the trend toward a greater share for SMEs accelerated after-
wards. That is, the share of bank credit going to the chaebol was 25
percent in 2000, but less than 14 percent in mid-2002 (IMF 2003: 10).
These data must be regarded as extremely preliminary, since there are
many potential problems with them.17 Nonetheless, even assuming that
the real differences are not as stark as these figures suggest, they are in
line with other evidence. First is the government priority in Korea to
promote SMEs as an alternative to the chaebol; several policies provide
subsidies to the banks to move in this direction (Nugent and Yhee 2001).
Second, as was the case with consumer loans, the banks have a market
incentive to provide more loans to SMEs because they can charge higher
interest rates. Third, as the chaebol are not investing heavily, demand for
credit has diminished. And, fourth, when large firms do invest, insofar as
they seek external finance, they are increasingly likely to tap the capital
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markets as they can get cheaper access in this way. In the Chilean case, the
government has designed a number of programs to help SMEs obtain
access to finance, and the commercial banks have also seen business
opportunities in the sector. But they have yet to make a serious dent in the
problem.18
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed differences and similarities between Chile and
Korea, which arguably have the most successful financial sectors in their
respective regions. The evidence shows a number of interesting points:
• Both economies suffered systemic crises, involving banks and corpora-
tions; although the timing was different, many of the symptoms were
similar. More important, both governments responded energetically
to clean up the problems and to prevent recurrences.
• Both countries have diversified and relatively deep financial systems;
moreover, diversification and depth rose during the 1990s and early
2000s. Nonetheless, Korea has much more active secondary markets
than does Chile.
• Chile has a larger foreign presence in the banking sector, constituted
by major international commercial banks. Foreign investment in
Korea’s financial sector has increased substantially as a result of the
crisis, although the actors tend to be investment companies rather
than banks. On the other hand, Korea has a larger government pres-
ence, some of it a result of measures to deal with the crisis. If current
trends toward privatization continue, however, these differences will
be much reduced.
• Chile’s performance on standard international indicators of asset
quality, profitability and contributions to growth was stronger than
Korea’s before the crisis. Not surprisingly, Korea’s indicators plum-
meted during the crisis, but they have improved substantially and are
now approaching the Chilean level.
• Finally – perhaps the most important difference encountered – Korea
has a much better record than Chile with respect to access to credit.
On the one hand, a greater share of available credit goes to house-
holds rather than firms. On the other hand, a greater share of busi-
ness loans goes to SMEs. Both trends have accelerated since the crisis
in Korea, while not much change has taken place in Chile.
The most interesting point to emerge from this brief comparison of Chile
and Korea is the increasing convergence between the financial systems in
the two economies. Such convergence would not have been expected a
decade ago, since we are talking about the Latin American country that
has gone furthest in the market-oriented reform process (Chile) and the
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paradigmatic case of state-led growth in Asia (Korea). Moreover, we saw at
the beginning of the paper that the broader Latin American and East
Asian financial systems continue to present quite different profiles.
What is happening here? We seem to be witnessing an important phe-
nomenon that appears precisely among the leading economies – a move
in the direction of more market-oriented, “arm’s length” practices estab-
lished earlier in the Anglo-Saxon countries as a way of promoting effi-
ciency and depth in the financial markets. Evidence of this change is
appearing in both Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Japan. Chile shifted
in this direction in the 1970s and then revalidated the move after the
financial crisis of the early 1980s. Korea has now taken the lead in Asia of
moving in the same direction. Others have been following. Even China
has taken significant steps to liberalize its financial system (García Herrero
and Santabárbara 2004).
Two sets of factors – short-term and longer-term – help explain the
change in Korea. The short-term factors focus on the financial crisis of
1997–8. The crisis and the government’s determination to stem the hem-
orrhaging rapidly and take steps to prevent future occurrences led to
some of the similarities we have found. The most obvious one is the
increased foreign ownership in Korea. At the same time, the crisis also
accounted for the temporary increase in state control of the financial
system, since the government intervened in a number of financial institu-
tions to prevent their bankruptcy. (The Chilean government went even
further in this direction in 1981–3.) The improvement in performance
indicators is also due to the restructuring process.
But the crisis cannot account for all of the convergence, since it dates
from the 1980s when Korea began to liberalize its domestic financial
sector and open it to greater international integration. Interest rates were
deregulated, barriers to entry were lowered, policy-based lending was
phased out, and the capital market was partially opened. Pressures to
move in this direction came from internal forces (especially the business
sector) as well as external ones (foreign competitors, especially after
Korea’s application to join the OECD) in the context of financial global-
ization. All of these processes accelerated after the crisis and as part of the
IMF rescue package.
Thus, both Korea’s successes and its failures pushed in the direction of
creating a financial sector that looks more and more like that of Chile, its
Latin American counterpart. An important remaining difference involves
the question of access, especially credit for SMEs. At first glance, it appears
that the large share of funds for these firms is attributable to the con-
tinuation of government controls in Korea. Special provisions at the Bank
of Korea, together with lending from the government-owned banks, are
surely part of the answer. The commercial banks’ new focus on profitabil-
ity is another factor. Since finance for SMEs is a topic of great interest for
most Latin American countries, Korea’s experience in this area might
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provide some insights for that region. Likewise, Chile’s successful manage-
ment of a market-based financial sector over two decades could offer
useful lessons for Asia.
Notes
1 This chapter is part of a larger project on “The Role of the Financial Sector in
Latin America and East Asia,” financed by the Ford Foundation. The author
appreciates this support as well as comments received at a presentation of an
earlier version of the chapter at the XI Congress of the International Federa-
tion for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (FIEALC) in Osaka, Japan.
2 See, for example, Gereffi and Wyman (1990), one of the earliest and most
influential examples of this new literature.
3 On the Latin American reforms, see Stallings and Peres (2000).
4 Of course, the relationship is complicated since the financial system is one of
the determinants of the savings rate.
5 The recent Argentine crisis greatly undermined the financial sector; data are
not yet available to evaluate the extent of the damage.
6 On the Chilean financial crisis and the aftermath, see Arellano and Cortázar
(1982); Sanhueza (1999, 2001); Budnevich (2000); Ffrench-Davis and Tapia
(2001); Held and Jiménez (2001); Stallings and Studart (2003).
7 On the Korean financial crisis and the aftermath, see Hahm (1999); Kim et al.
(2000); Cho (2002); Coe and Kim (2002); Park and Lee (2002); Ahn and Cha
(2004).
8 On recent trends in capital markets in Latin America and East Asia, see
Stallings (2003).
9 Many have feared that development of the capital markets would displace
banks. In reality, the two are generally complementary; see Hawkins (2002).
10 On the advantages of, and requirements for, capital markets, see various art-
icles in BIS (2002) and Litan et al. (2003).
11 For example, the average turnover ratio over the 1996–2000 period on the
Korean stock market was 290, while that in Chile was only ten (see Standard
and Poor’s 2002).
12 On public-sector banks, see Yeyati et al. (2004); on foreign banks, see Litan et
al. (2001).
13 During 2004, FleetBoston was taken over by Bank of America. Policy with
respect to the Latin American subsidiaries remains to be determined.
14 This share is higher than shown by some other sources. One reason is that the
data above are more recent than others have used, but different definitions of
“foreign ownership” also are important.
15 In 2004, Citibank expanded in the Korean market by buying a medium-sized
bank, KorAm, from Carlyle, JP Morgan Chase, Standard Chartered and indi-
vidual investors. In January 2005, Standard Chartered announced a deal to buy
Newbridge’s share in Korea First Bank, and it is expected that HSBC will pur-
chase Lone Star’s share in Korea Exchange Bank as soon as this is legally pos-
sible.
16 According to one estimate, the risk-adjusted return on consumer loans can be
5 percent or higher, compared to 0.2 percent for loans to large firms (The Econ-
omist, “Survey of Asian Finance,” 8 February 2003).
17 Among other problems, the source used for Korea (Cho 2002) does not
provide a definition of SME, so the cut-off may be quite different in the two
cases. The definition in Chile is any firm with sales up to $2.5 million, which
includes 99 percent of all firms. Of this percentage, micro firms represent 82.5
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percent, small firms 14.5 percent, and medium-sized firms 2 percent; see
Román (2003).
18 Interestingly, the Chilean programs seem to have been more effective with
credit to micro firms; see Román (2003).
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6 Restructuring the financial and
corporate sector
The South Korean experience
Choong Yong Ahn
Introduction
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, South Korea (hereafter Korea)
sought the largest-ever emergency financial assistance package, amount-
ing to US$57 billion, from the IMF in early December 1997 to avoid a
moratorium on its foreign debt. The financial assistance was provided to
Korea on the condition that it would undertake far-reaching structural
reforms in almost every segment of its economy. In compliance with that
condition, Korea has been simultaneously overhauling its inefficiency-
ridden financial, corporate, public and labor sectors, sometimes beyond
the IMF mandate.
Bad debts in both the financial and corporate sectors were at the core
of Korea’s financial crisis, which was triggered by contagion and currency
speculation in July 1997. In order to break a vicious circle between a
banking crisis and a corporate crisis, Korea has undertaken a series of
restructuring programs in the banking sector, while non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs) have also undertaken their own restructuring.
In the process of restructuring, it was proven that both the breadth and
the depth of corporate and financial distress in Korea was unprecedented.
The level and structure of corporate debt, the number of debtors and
creditors involved, and the weak legal environment presented large
obstacles in the restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors.
While carrying out the Korea–IMF reform program, Korea experienced
the worst economic setback in 1998 since its adoption of the export-
oriented development strategy in the early 1960s. After the outbreak of
the crisis, the unemployment rate increased continuously, peaking at 8.6
percent, more than three percentage points higher than its pre-crisis level,
with 1.8 million people out of work.
However and surprisingly, Korea’s economy in 1999 bounced back to
positive 10.7 percent growth from its lowest growth rate of negative 6.7
percent in 1998. Thanks to signs of recovery in 1999, which was astonish-
ingly faster than expected, mainly due to comprehensive economic
reforms as mandated by the IMF conditionality, a rapidly rising trade
surplus and foreign exchange reserves, as well as a bullish stock market
trend, Korea obtained an upgrade in sovereign ratings. Moody’s Investor
Services had lowered Korea’s sovereign rating from A1 before the crisis to
Ba1 on February 1999, but this rating was raised again to A3 on 28 March
2002.
However, recent economic indicators since the fourth quarter of 2000,
including the GDP growth rate, unemployment rate and managerial
indexes of both finance and banking sectors, appear to demonstrate that
the restructuring of both financial and corporate sectors is still incom-
plete. By the end of 2000, Korea’s economy began to show some “reform
fatigue,” making the remaining items on the reform agenda still serious.
Despite some important remaining reforms, on 23 August 2001 Korea was
able to repay IMF loans of US$19.5 billion, two years and eight months
earlier than the original schedule, making it the first among Asian coun-
tries which received the IMF bailout funds to complete its repayments.
The purpose of this chapter is first to describe what Korea has accom-
plished in terms of restructuring its financial and corporate sectors over
the past three and a half years, and then to address the unfinished restruc-
turing agenda and a newly emerging development paradigm with some
policy implications. Attention is given to how Korea has cleaned up its bad
debts accumulated in the financial sector. Because of the intertwined
nature of the financial and corporate sectors, the chapter also addresses
some important restructuring issues of still highly leveraged corporations,
which are so critically linked to the creation of sound and healthy finan-
cial institutions.
The next section describes a “compressed growth” process and rising
non-performing loans (NPLs), viewed from both the financial sector and
corporate sector. The third discusses various phases of restructuring in the
financial sector that have been accomplished up to date, while the fourth
discusses the restructuring of the corporate sector. The fifth section pre-
sents various disposition methods of NPLs by the financial community.
The sixth presents a post-crisis development model in addition to review-
ing the continuing agenda for financial and corporate sector restructur-
ing in the years to come. The chapter concludes with some overall
remarks and some policy implications.
“Compressed growth,” accumulated inefficiency and rising
NPLs
Intertwined NPLs
During the high growth period, and especially in the early 1990s, Korean
chaebols, large conglomerates, undertook ambitious expansion and diver-
sification drives including numerous overseas investment projects. Fur-
thermore, the Korean government supported this expansion and often
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directed chaebols into specific lines of business. The chaebols’ expansion
drives were mainly funded with aggressive borrowings, often short term,
from Korean commercial and merchant banks, and quite frequently from
foreign financial institutions for overseas projects (Ahn 2001b). Banks
relied primarily on collateral in the allocation of credit, and paid relatively
little attention to earnings performance and cash flow generation, or the
corporations’ ability to repay. In addition, chaebols generally supplied
guarantees to their affiliates and subsidiaries to secure loans. Although
most of the major subsidiaries of chaebols are publicly listed, they have
traditionally raised little in new equity in Korea’s poorly developed capital
market (Classens et al. 1998).
A vicious chain of inefficiency between the financial and the corporate
sectors has grown since the second stage of the heavy chemical industrial
drive in the early 1980s (Ahn 2001b). Chaebols have been promoted by
means of government administered credit allocation to achieve the
government’s industrial targeting in order to take advantage of economies
of scale.1 Both administered credit allocation, which often resulted in
excessive lending without prudential financial rules, while chaebols’ focus
on increasing market share and pursuing diversification through debt
financing with little attention to profitability caused an inefficiency syn-
drome in Korea’s economy. Consequently, the demise of the financial and
corporate sectors was intertwined. As corporate bankruptcies rose, finan-
cial institutions became burdened with bad debts and were no longer able
to roll over their domestic or foreign liabilities.
As Lieberman and Mako (1998) noted, this “compressed growth” policy
via aggressive, leveraged expansion through debt financing worked well as
long as the economy and exports expanded vigorously and the returns on
new investment exceeded the cost of capital. Within this environment,
high debt/equity ratios were a risky but winning strategy for Korea
(Stiglitz 1999). High leverage allowed Korean firms to grow more rapidly
than if they had had to rely on retained earnings.
In recent years, however, business group financial performance among
the top 30 chaebols worsened in terms of free cash flow, return on equity,
profit margin and interest coverage ratio, while their debt/equity ratios
recorded their highest levels by international standards (Table 6.1). Rapid
wage increases, a result of a highly unionized and strong labor force in the
wake of the democratization process in the late 1980s and onward often
outstripped productivity growth (Ahn and Kim 1997). Declining demand
and falling prices for Korea’s major export items such as semiconductors,
chemicals, shipbuilding and steel products further weakened profitability
in recent years. For example, in 1997, profitability declined substantially,
with the ordinary income/sales ratio falling to 0.3 percent and remain-
ing at a similar level, while some substantially higher positive profitability
levels were evident in the US, Japan and Taiwan (Table 6.2).
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Expanding NPLs and forward looking criteria
A crucial aspect of Korea’s financial restructuring efforts is related to the
size and disposal of NPLs. Obviously, NPLs are the result of widespread
insolvency problems in its corporate sector as well as its financial sector.
The figure for non-performing loans of banks provided by the FSC
(Financial Supervisory Commission) stood at 87.26 trillion won (US$63
billion) as of the end of March 1998. This accounted for 16.89 percent of
total bank loans, or 20.72 percent of Korea’s GDP in 1997 (Table 6.3).2
According to the data provided by the FSC, the total combined debt of the
top 30 chaebols amounted to 342 trillion won at the end of 1998.
Any attempt to restructure only the financial sector is likely to fail. For
example, over-extended firms in the corporate sector also need to restruc-
ture their balance sheets, and to increase both equity and the maturity
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Table 6.1 Debt/equity ratio in the manufacturing industry (%)
US Japan Taiwan Korea
1997   

1997   

1995   

1997 1998 2001
Debt/Equity ratio 153.5 193.2 85.7 396.3 303.0 182.2
Total borrowings and bonds 
payable to total assets 25.6 33.1 26.2 54.2 50.8 39.8
Sources: The Bank of Korea, Financial Statement Analysis for 1999 (1999: 16); The Bank of
Korea, Monthly Bulletin (May 2002: 55–77).
Table 6.2 International comparisons of manufacturing firm’s profitability (%)
US Japan Taiwan Korea
1997    

1997     

1995     

1997 1998 2001
Ordinary income/Sales 8.3 3.4 5.1 0.3 1.8 0.4
Operating income/Sales 7.6 3.5 7.3 8.3 6.1 5.5
Sources: The Bank of Korea, Analysis of Corporate Management, 1998, and Financial Statement
Analysis for 1999 (1999: 19); The Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin (May 2002: 55–77).
Table 6.3 Non-performing loans (ending March 1998) (trillion won)
Total loans Non-performing loans (% of total)
Banks 516.6062 87.2645 (16.89)
Other Fin. Institutions 256.9355 24.7611 (9.64)
Total 773.5779 112.0256 (14.48)
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission.
profiles of their debt loads, in order to become viable corporations. The
longer-term process of real restructuring will need to include improved
corporate governance, product line rationalization, increases in productiv-
ity and a fundamental change in corporate strategies and culture, focus-
ing on profitability and liquidity versus aggressive expansion at virtually
any cost (Lieberman and Mako 1998).
Indeed, the disposal of NPLs is at the heart of Korea’s financial reform
as well as corporate sector restructuring. It serves to gauge how vigorously
the sector has undergone the restructuring process, and how much
healthier both sectors have become. Accordingly, the size of NPLs will
point toward the feasibility and effectiveness of present and future reform
measures, and will predict mid- and long-term financial stability.
In July 1998, there was a major strengthening of provision require-
ments and loan classification standards based on forward-looking criteria
regarding future cash flows. In accordance with international practices,
loans in arrears of three months or more are now classified as substandard
or below, and loans in arrears of one to three months are considered pre-
cautionary loans, as shown in Table 6.4. As a consequence, most of the
emergency loans made to technically bankrupt companies are now reclas-
sified as substandard loans, instead of precautionary loans. This reclassifi-
cation has caused another serious problem for recapitalization in Korea’s
banking sector.
What appears sound and solid from the first round of restructuring can
go wrong, unless continued restructuring of the financial sector takes
place in a timely manner. Korea’s own restructuring story can be a case in
point. As the NPLs of the financial sector rose again after introducing
stricter asset classification rules based on forward-looking criteria, Korea’s
financial sector needed another injection of public funds in order to meet
the IMF’s mandate.
During the first half of 1999, major Korean commercial banks, after
restructuring with an injection of public funds equivalent to more than 50
trillion won, obtained Bank of International Settlements (BIS) capital ade-
quacy status. However, stricter capital adequacy standards and additional
loan loss provisions, due to the adopted forward-looking criteria, sharply
affected the profitability of banks that had already been exposed to
Daewoo’s huge debts, amounting to 23 trillion won.
On the corporate side, 80 corporations, including those from 15 chae-
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Table 6.4 Changes in loan classification standards
Period of overdue payment Old New
1 month to 3 months Normal Precautionary
3 months to 6 months Precautionary Substandard or doubtful
Longer than 6 months Substandard or doubtful Substandard or doubtful
bols, underwent corporate restructuring. Their aggregate debt at the end
of March 1999 exceeded 30 trillion won, the bulk of which had already
been classified as either “precautionary” or “non-performing.” Further-
more, the forward-looking loan criteria caused a substantial part of the
precautionary category of loans to be reclassified as non-performing.
Based on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy recommenda-
tions, the forward-looking criteria for NPLs became effective in January
2000. In addition, the provision requirement for precautionary loans was
raised from 1 percent to 2 percent. The new provision requirements were
introduced for commercial papers (CP), guaranteed bills and privately
placed bonds belonging to trust accounts.
In order to capture the problematic loans given to Korea’s corporate
sector, including chaebols, it is important to see the changes that have
occurred in the size of NPLs following the instruction of forward-looking
criteria as recommended by the BIS and IMF. Despite Korea’s proactive
restructuring effort, many critics argue that the 64 trillion won fiscal
support package is not sufficient to restore the health of the financial
system – at least for banks. The size of NPLs is likely to continue to rise
while corporate restructuring is being undertaken under a global asset
quality standard.
Kwon and Nam (1999) investigated the nature of loans and the impact
of NPLs on corporate restructuring based on forward-looking criteria, in
which they considered the corporate sector’s debt levels and its debt-
servicing capability, while focusing on the future size of NPLs. They used
the interest coverage ratio (computed as operating income divided by
interest expenses, hereafter referred to as ICR) as a scale to determine
whether the loans and credits to the sample corporations would be per-
forming or not, a method employed by Goldman Sachs (1998), Credit
Swiss First Boston (1998) and others.3 NPLs in their study were defined as
loans and credits extended to corporations with ICRs4 of less than 100
percent. This is a standard way of assessing the debt-servicing capability of
a corporate borrower. When a corporate borrower is incapable of generat-
ing enough earnings to cover interest expenses, loans and credits
extended to the borrowers are regarded as “problematic.” Furthermore,
the recent dismantling of Korea’s second largest chaebol, Daewoo, in
early 2000 aggravated the rising trend of NPLs.
According to Kwon and Nam’s study, NPLs, newly defined, applied to
the 1995–8 period sharply increased for two consecutive years prior to the
financial crisis. NPLs held by listed companies amounted to 32.1 percent
of their total debts in 1998. Furthermore, the number of companies whose
ICR did not reach 100 percent accounted for 37.5 percent of the total
number of listed companies (Table 6.5). Their investigation shows that
the NPL ratio of unlisted companies appears higher than that of listed
companies. Moreover, the unlisted companies’ NPL ratios had already
exceeded the 30 percent level in 1996, and substantially increased to 37.8
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percent in 1997, as they faced the economy-wide crisis. Such a large mag-
nitude of NPLs of listed and unlisted companies is convincing evidence
that the financial crisis was mainly attributable to mounting debts and low
profits in the corporate sector.
By comparing the sample estimates of NPLs based on forward-looking
criteria for the year 1998, based on the borrowers’ debt-servicing capabil-
ity, Kwon and Nam (1999) estimated that the total distressed debts of the
entire corporate sector could easily reach 260 trillion won. This is equival-
ent to 32.1 percent of the 820 trillion won worth of total credit extended
to the corporate sector in 1998. Given that the speculated NPL size is
much higher than the government’s current estimation of 118 trillion
won in 2000, Kwon and Nam’s estimation results suggest that there should
be a second phase in the financial restructuring program.
Another critical issue is related to whether banks are capable of prop-
erly assessing the future cash flows of borrowing firms. One of the many
reasons for the rise of NPLs in Korea may be the downturn in corporate
profitability, high interest rates, high tax rates and high inflation rates.5
A drastic drop in the ICR can be made through asset sales or debt restruc-
turing by creditor financial institutions. Debt restructuring includes a variety
of options such as debt-equity swaps, debt forgiveness, debt relief and others.
The choice and related prices are, of course, negotiable between debtor and
creditor. Debt–equity swaps and debt reduction will alleviate the debt
burden of corporate borrowers, thereby improving their ICRs. However, the
stock of corporate debt is so large that sustainable debt–equity ratios cannot
be achieved over a reasonable time frame, but only through the flow of new
equity, asset sales and retirement of debt (Classens et al. 1998).
Phases of financial sector restructuring
Macroeconomic background
Financial sector restructuring could be addressed more properly by
looking at changes of key macroeconomic indicators during the reform
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Table 6.5 Sample estimates on NPL ratio and NPL company (listed) ratio with
interest coverage ratio less than 100%
Year NPL ratio of sample firms (%) Ratio of sample companies with 





Source: Kwon and Nam (1999).
period. A swift economic recovery in 1999 and 2000, from the worst eco-
nomic setback in the past four decades, appeared to be evident as shown
in Table 6.6. However, 2001 witnessed a slowdown caused by the declining
information technology sector and related downturn of the US economy.
During almost four years of reform, the most positive development
occurred in Korea’s foreign exchange reserve, as shown in Table 6.7.
Overall, foreign exchange reserves swelled from US$20.4 billion at the
end of 1997 to greater than US$112 billion in June 2002. The won/dollar
exchange rate also stabilized at about 1,100 won in 1999, from an average
rate of US$1,700 in December 1997, as a completely free exchange rate
policy was adopted under the IMF conditionality. The interest rate,
denoted by yields on three-year corporate bonds, also declined from 18.3
percent in March 1998, to 8.98 in August 2000. More importantly, Korea’s
composite stock index rose more than 300 percent by the end of 1999,
compared to the level at the end of 1997.
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Table 6.6 Major economic indicators (1996–2001)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
GDP growth rate (%) 7.1 5.5 5.8 10.7 8.8 3.0
• Private consumption 96.9 3.1 9.6 10.3 7.1 1.7
• Facility investment 8.2 11.3 38.5 38.0 34.3 9.8
• Construction 3.0 2.7 10.2 9.2 3.7 5.8
• Commodity exports 14.5 5.0 15.6 16.3 21.6 12.7
• Commodity imports 13.9 3.8 24.6 28.9 20.0 12.1
Current account balance 230.0 81.7 403.6 244.8 103 86.2
(in $100m)
Trade account balance (in $100m) 149.6 31.8 413.3 283.7 167 133.9
• Exports* (in $100m) 1,299.7 1,386.2 1,321.3 1,451.6 1,767.0 1,513.7
• Imports* (in $100m) 1,449.3 1,418.0 904.9 1,167.9 1,600.0 1,379.8
Consumer price (%) 5.0 3.2 7.5 0.8 2.3 4.1
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin (March and April 2001).
Note
* Customs clearance base.
Table 6.7 Changes in foreign exchange reserves (US$ million)
End of 1997 End of 1999 End of 2000 End of 2001
Foreign exchange 
reserves 20,405.5 74,054.5 96,198.1 102,821.4
Gold 36.9 67.1 67.6 68.3
SDRs 58.9 0.7 3.5 3.3
Reserve position in IMF 599.3 286.5 271.8 262.2
Foreign exchange 19,710.4 73.700.3 95,855.1 102,487.5
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Economic Bulletin (Various Issues 2001).
However, beginning in the third quarter of 2000, Korea’s economy
started to show serious symptoms of recession, making the financial
sector’s restructuring more difficult than originally thought. Some struc-
tural warning signals in the Korean economy were not seriously addressed
prior to the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis. In this regard, inter-
twined bad debts between the financial and corporate sectors proved to be
the most serious one.
Resolution of non-viable financial institutions
Resolution of non-viable banks
The first measure to initiate the IMF mandated structural reform, which
also took into account the mounting debts accumulated during the high
growth period, was the resolution of non-viable financial institutions. The
restructuring of the financial sector was carried out in the following
manner during the first round of restructuring. First of all, the Korea
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) recapitalized Korea First Bank
and Seoul Bank, which had been in the worst trouble, in January 1998.
Next, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) had accounting firms
inspect the assets and liabilities of 12 banks that had failed to meet BIS’s 8
percent capital adequacy ratios by the end of 1997, and required them to
present management rehabilitation plans.
Upon examination of these plans, the FSC decided to order the exit of
five non-viable banks. These exits were achieved through a Purchase and
Assumption (P&A) formula, whereby each acquiring bank would pur-
chase the sound assets and assume the liabilities of the acquired banks.
The five acquiring banks were chosen on the basis of their BIS capital ade-
quacy ratios, which stood at more than 8 percent at the end of 1997.
Meanwhile, among the remaining seven banks that had their manage-
ment rehabilitation plans conditionally approved, five banks merged into
two banks, while the other two banks were not involved in merger or
takeover activity.6
By injecting public funds into severely undercapitalized but viable
banks, Korea had implemented almost 100 percent of the public support
package, completing the first round of its financial restructuring, primar-
ily in the banking sector, by the end of 1999. During the first round of
restructuring, a total of 64 trillion won of public funds were injected to
resolve the problem of non-performing loans in the financial sector, in
order to clean financial institutions through recapitalization.
During the second round of restructuring, the government again
ordered six larger commercial banks (Hanvit, Chohung, Korea Exchange,
Peace, Kwangju and Cheju), which had been recapitalized by public funds
during the first round of restructuring or whose capital adequacy ratios
were again below the BIS 8 percent guideline as of June 2000, plus Kyung-
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nam Bank, whose financial status was expected to worsen due to the real-
ization of potential bad loans, to submit their management rehabilitation
plans.
After appraising their normalization plans, the government took other
comprehensive restructuring actions for these banks in 2000. First, it
allowed Chohung Bank and Korea Exchange Bank to pursue their man-
agement improvement plans independently, including recapitalization
and resolution of NPLs. Recognizing that it would be difficult for the
Hanvit, Peace, Kwangju and Kyungnam Banks to improve their financial
status independently, the government extended public funds to them to
improve their financial positions. The government also decided to bring
them under a financial holding company, to be established by the Korea
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC).
As the government imposed harsh financial reforms during the first
phase of restructuring, the banking sector should be prepared to undergo
further restructuring spurred by newly emerging market forces. Stricter
asset quality standards, and a virtual elimination of the depositor protec-
tion policy7 implemented in 2001, may force less competitive banks to fall
prey to mergers and acquisitions. Hybrid financial services will appear to
tear down the walls which separate different financial activities. The
government must therefore address the external framework in which vol-
untary restructuring can take place, especially during the second round of
financial reform.
The government also pursued some global strategic alliances with
foreign banking institutions. In this regard, Korea sold Korea First Bank to
New Bridge Capital at the end of 1999. The foreign management of Korea
First Bank was expected to introduce a new credit culture to the Korean
banking community. The transfer of bank management of the leading
Seoul-based commercial banks to foreign authorities appears to be
another tangible result of the government’s restructuring drive.
Restructuring of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
In the second phase of restructuring the financial sector, it may be neces-
sary to overhaul the non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), specifically
the investment trust corporations. In this regard, Stiglitz (1999) pointed
out:
The NBFIs make up nearly half of the financial sector in Korea – quite
a large share by international standards. This means any approach to
restructure the financial sector that focuses only on commercial banks
is, at best, “half-baked.” The assets of the Investment Trust Corpora-
tions (ITCs) have tripled in just the past two years, as corporations –
especially the top 5 chaebols – used the trusts as a way around the
tightening of the bank credit. Use of the ITC escape hatch postponed
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the reckoning for Daewoo, allowing the chaebol to become even
more heavily indebted as it sought to grow out of its problems.
Stiglitz (1999)
The second round of restructuring followed to achieve the overall object-
ives of financial sector restructuring, including that of NBFIs. During the
year 2000, 175 financial institutions, most of them mutual savings and
finance companies and credit unions, either exited the market or merged
with other institutions. The government supported those ailing NBFIs
with public funds of 35 trillion won through recapitalization, repayments
of deposits and purchase of their NPLs.
Thus, another critical agenda item for implementing the second round
of financial restructuring should be related to the other half of Korea’s
financial sector. The NBFIs must become more transparent and should be
subject to enhanced supervision. Also, several critical measures must be
introduced without delay. First, a new governance system, similar to the
one already in existence in the banking sector, needs to be institutional-
ized to ensure a checks-and-balances system. Second, the NBFIs should be
required to report their assets at market value. By and large, they should
be covered by many of the same prudential regulations as the banking
sector. Third, it is critical that non-financial corporations’ holdings of
shares in NBFIs be regulated as their shareholdings in commercial banks
are. Fourth, ownership of the NBFIs should be regulated.8
In the past and even now, although the NBFI sector has not been
covered by explicit insurance, the Korean government has offered implicit
insurance. With the extension of the Bond Stabilization Fund by 30 tril-
lion won at the urging of the FSC to rescue ailing NBFIs, the “clean” com-
mercial banks are likely to become “unclean.” As a result, the remaining
reform drive in the financial sector must address the inefficiency chain
that penetrates the banking and NBFI sectors.
On the NBFI side, the government suspended a number of merchant
banking corporations, which were suffering from a flight of deposits, due
to their reduced credibility in the wake of the dismantling of the Daewoo
Group. As a result, the number of merchant banking corporations in
normal operations decreased from 30 before the financial crisis to just five
at the end of 2000.
In dealing with investment trust companies, the government split two
such companies, whose normal operation had been impossible due to
Daewoo’s financial problems, into two units: a securities company and an
investment trust management company. While extending public funds to
improve the financial positions of the securities companies, the govern-
ment concluded Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) concerning man-
agement normalization, and required self-rescue efforts such as disposal
of assets and rationalization of their staff and branch networks.
After evaluating the financial status of eight life and six non-life insur-
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ance companies whose payment reserve requirement ratios were below
100 percent, the government ordered three life insurers and two non-life
insurers to implement prompt corrective actions to attain 100 percent
ratios. In 2001, 41 mutual savings and finance companies and 125 credit
unions with little possibility of normalization, as a result of accumulated
bad loans and unauthorized operations, either exited the market or
merged with other financial institutions.
A rapid development of financial engineering techniques appears to
play an important role in the NBFI sector. For example, cyber trading
commissions at some brokerages that offer online stock trading have
already fallen from 0.5 percent to 0.1 percent. The advent of cyber stock-
brokers will lead to further drops in commission fees. Within this new
environment, small and medium sized securities companies without much
capital or specialty will either be closed or will have to find a means of
survival.
Table 6.8 summarizes changes in the number of financial institutions as
a result of two rounds of comprehensive financial sector restructuring
during 1998–2001. The exit of non-viable financial institutions continued
in 1999, 2000 and 2001 through mergers, debt-equity swaps and liquida-
tions. As shown in Table 6.8, a total of 446 financial institutions exited the
market over the four-year period 1998–2001.
Corporate sector restructuring
Another aspect of Korea’s major restructuring efforts is related to the
widespread insolvency problem in its corporate sector, especially during
the restructuring period. According to statistics released by the Bank of
Korea, 17,168 firms failed in 1997, a 52.53 percent increase over failures
in 1994. From January through April 1999, an average of 3,000 firms failed
each month, bringing annual bankruptcy cases to nearly 23,000 (Table
6.9). This in turn exerted great pressure on financial institutions. A total
of 188 have been either closed down or merged on their own initiative.
The corporate debt of the top 28 chaebols reached 247 trillion won at the
end of 1997, with the average debt-equity ratio reaching 449 percent per
firm.9
Given the level of corporate debt, it is evident that overcoming the
financial crisis is directly related to industrial and corporate restructuring,
the success of which, in turn, hinges upon the orderly exit of ailing firms.
A competitive market with free entry and exit would ensure that the assets
of failed firms are efficiently utilized through liquidation via cash auctions.
However, the Korean capital market is largely underdeveloped and
imperfect. For example, there may not be a market for the insolvent firm’s
assets, or these assets may be undervalued, while a firm that is funda-
mentally sound but only temporarily without liquidity may not be saved.
While liquidation of truly distressed firms releases resources for other,


















































































   
   








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































more productive activities, saving firms that are temporarily insolvent but
fundamentally sound can increase social welfare.
One way to save such a firm is for debtors and creditors to renegotiate
the terms of the debt by means of a debt-workout program.10 However,
private workouts are often difficult to achieve due to collective action
problems on the part of creditors as well as the high cost of renegotiating
the debt structure every time a debtor defaults. Due to problems related
to private workouts, most countries have developed standard legal
mechanisms within which financially distressed firms are protected from
their creditors, and are given the chance to reorganize.
Throughout the decades of government-induced growth, chaebols
became closely entwined with politicians. The government provided the
top 30 chaebols with a host of implicit guarantees. As a result, company
managers were more concerned with garnering outside influence than
they were with making their companies profitable, and their boards of dir-
ectors or minority shareholders had little power to curb the managers’
misbehavior. Moral hazards were prevalent, and conglomerates that were
“too big to fail” consequently wielded considerable power in society.
Corporate restructuring has been a major goal of post-crisis reforms in
Korea. Even before his inauguration on 25 February 1998, both President-
elect Kim Dae-Jung and business leaders agreed upon the five principles
of corporate restructuring listed in Table 6.10. Since then, Korea’s corpor-
ate sector restructuring has been carried on with a clear timetable on the
basis of these guidelines, despite short-term difficulties.
Among the concrete measures adopted so far is the requirement for
the top 30 chaebols to submit consolidated financial statements, which
link all affiliates from 1999. These financial statements will provide a more
accurate picture of chaebol management by clarifying intra-chaebol
transactions, publicizing shares held between affiliates and highlighting
cross-payment guarantees and credit trading. Out of 30 chaebols, the top
five account for about half of Korea’s total debt, equivalent to US$500
billion (150 percent of GDP), and more than a third of manufacturing
output.11
Following the complete dismantling of the Daewoo Group, Korea’s
second largest chaebol in terms of asset size, in November 1999, Korea’s
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Table 6.10 Five major principles of corporate restructuring
1 Transparency of corporate management.
2 Dismantling cross-debt guarantees.
3 Significantly improving capital structure.
4 Identifying core businesses and strengthening cooperative relationships with
small and medium-sized companies.
5 Enhancing accountability of controlling shareholders and enhancing their
management accountability.
corporate restructuring performance could best be measured by deter-
mining the extent to which the five major principles of corporate restruc-
turing were implemented by the remaining top four chaebols. As shown
in Table 6.11, these top four chaebols by-and-large succeeded in keeping
their promises as agreed upon in the restructuring MOU with the govern-
ment by the end of 1999.
Indeed, the exit of the Daewoo Group was one of the most dramatic
examples in Korea’s industrial development history. Daewoo was loaded
with an excessive debt burden totaling 60 trillion won, including nearly
US$10 billion in foreign debt, half of which would have fallen due within
1999. However, the government, after a thorough review of the group’s
financial situation, allowed an exit strategy for non-viable firms. It also per-
mitted, through market forces, the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) of
viable firms, as well as workout programs by creditor banks for those
remaining viable firms that could not be successfully merged.
The Daewoo story clearly demonstrated that the traditional belief of
“too big to fail” in Korea no longer holds. Analysts viewed the restructur-
ing program for Daewoo as a manifestation of the government’s determi-
nation to reform the nation’s family-controlled chaebols under a “convoy
management” practice.
Since the domestic macroeconomic situation has greatly improved
since the first quarter of 1999, with 10.7 percent growth prospects, and a
more than 300 percent rise in Korea’s composite stock index compared to
the level at the end of 1997, Korea’s economy is well positioned to provide
a sufficient cushion to deal with some adverse side effects of vigorous
corporate restructuring. Taking advantage of Korea’s bullish stock market
in 1999, most chaebols were able to meet the debt–equity ratio of 200
percent largely through new equity issues and asset revaluation schemes,
without having to make serious efforts to sell off their subsidiaries or
assets.
Finally, the government has adopted a special program for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) troubled in the wake of the financial crisis.
Realizing that it could not address the corporate restructuring needs of
large groups and concurrently assess the needs of SMEs, the government
decided to roll over the debts of the SMEs by extending working capital
maturities. The scope of corporate workout programs is now also being
expanded to include SMEs. Creditor banks evaluated the financial status
of approximately 22,000 SMEs with outstanding loans of 1 billion won or
more, and classified about 13,000 of these as viable. These viable SMEs
were then selected as candidate firms for workout programs.






































































































   



































































































































































































































































Disposition methods of NPLs
Injection of public funds
Because of the rise in the number of NPLs on the part of the banks that
already received public funds during the first round of restructuring, the
government needs to inject further public funds amounting to 50 trillion
won. The government requested that five banks submit rehabilitation pro-
posals to determine whether each bank could be viable through its own
self-rescue efforts. Those banks that are regarded as non-viable are subject
to regrouping or M&As. To this end, the government encouraged the
establishment of financial holding companies to ensure more efficient
and easier M&As in the financial sector.12 This might allow financial insti-
tutions to grow bigger and engage in various financial businesses with
reduced risk. A critical issue is related to what extent chaebols can
participate in the financial holding companies.
Cleaning up of bad debts accumulated in the financial sector required
a substantial amount of public funds. The total amount of public funds
injected by the end of May 2002 is presented by the sub-sector of the
financial community and support type in Table 6.12. The public funds
continue to support financial sector restructuring. Table 6.13 shows the
amount of public funds mobilized by source and support type during the
period November 1997 to May 2002. Over the same period, the Korean
government poured in a total of about 156.3 trillion won.
Rehabilitation actions
Of course, the injection of public funds into troubled banks was provided
on the condition that the banks downsize their employees and operational
units. Table 6.14 shows that more than 40 percent of bank employees have
been released, and 20.2 percent of local branches have been closed down
over the four-year period. Indeed, the financial restructuring was
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Table 6.12 Injection of public funds by end May 2002 (billion won)
Recapitalization Contribution Deposit Purchase Purchase of Total
payment of asset NPLs
Banks 33.9 13.6 – 14.0 24.5 86.0
Non-banks 26.3 2.8 26.1 0.9 11.9 68.0
Overseas financial – – – – 2.3 2.3
subsidiaries
Total 60.2 16.4 26.1 14.9 38.7 156.3
Source: The Ministry of Finance and Economy, “Public Fund White Paper” (2001) and Public
Release (25 June 2002).
accompanied by the painful action of laying off large numbers of
employees for the first time in Korea’s modern development history.
Restructuring tools
Institutions involved
An immediate focus of restructuring efforts in the corporate sector has
been on troubled large conglomerates. Various financial restructuring
methods include debt/equity conversions, asset sales, inducement of
foreign investment and new equity infusions.
The government has relied heavily on bank-led voluntary corporate
debt workouts for chaebols. Hence restructuring and recapitalization of
banks is a central element in the strategy for corporate and financial
restructuring. Eight major creditor banks, identified as leading banks,
took responsibility for negotiating workouts with 64 major corporate
groups. Each of the banks has formed its respective workout unit.
In order to facilitate the restructuring process of the corporate sector,
regulations governing foreign ownership in listed stocks have been
changed to allow 100 percent foreign ownership. The M&A regime has
been liberalized to allow hostile takeovers by foreigners; tax incentives
(e.g. on asset sales) have been introduced; the real estate market has been
opened to foreigners; financial disclosure and reporting have been
strengthened; and insolvency procedures have been improved. Changes
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Table 6.13 Use of public funds for financial sector by source and support type
(November 1997–May 2002) (billion won)
Recapitalization Contribution Deposit Purchase Purchase Total
payment of asset of NPLs
KDIC 47.5 16.4 26.1 8.6 – 98.6
KAMCO – – – – 38.7 38.7
Fiscal resources 11.8 – – 6.3 – 18.1
Bank of Korea 0.9 – – – – 0.9
Total 60.2 16.4 26.1 14.9 38.7 156.3
Source: The Ministry of Finance and Economy, “Public Fund White Paper” (2001) and Public
Release (25 June 2002).
Table 6.14 Change in number of employees at domestic financial institutions
End–97 (A) End–2001 (B) Difference (A–B) (A–B)/A
No. of employees 113,994 68.360 45.634 40.0%
No. of local branches 5,987 4,776 1,211 20.2%
Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Monthly Financial Statistics Bulletin.
have also been made to the labor law, which now allows layoffs, and meas-
ures have been taken to improve labor market flexibility.
A bridge bank has assumed distressed assets from merchant banks, and
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) has bought non-per-
forming loans from commercial banks. By the end of September 1998, 37
trillion won of such loans had been purchased by KAMCO, at a cost of 17.2
trillion won. KAMCO will have to restructure these loans and has a number
of tools at its disposal, including asset-backed securities, loan portfolio sales,
asset sales, and M&As or direct investment. By May 2002, KAMCO had
bought NPLs amounting to 38.7 trillion won. KAMCO should therefore be
viewed as an important actor in the corporate restructuring process.
Introduction of corporate restructuring vehicles (CRVs) and debt/equity
swaps
To facilitate the resolution of bad loans held by financial institutions, the
Corporate Restructuring Vehicle Act (effective from 23 October 2000) and
its associated Enforcement Decree (effective from 31 October 2000) were
promulgated. A corporate restructuring vehicle (CRV) is a paper company,
which generates profits through asset operations and distributes them to its
shareholders. The operation of its assets is done by making investments in
companies which have signed a corporate improvement planning agreement
with creditor financial institutions, or by purchasing bad loans from the
financial institutions which have concluded such agreements. To establish a
CRV, more than three promoters, including at least two creditor financial
institutions, must register it with the FSC. The minimum capital of a CRV is
500 million won and its maximum life is five years. Creditor financial institu-
tions may hold stocks of the CRV in excess of the investment limit stipulated
in business-related legislation, including the General Banking Act.
The goal of the CRV is to manage insolvent firms put under debt workout
programs in place of creditor banks, but in a more efficient and effective
manner by using specialists and investment techniques.13 Under the present
system, the role of creditor banks is limited to external supervision due to
the lack of management expertise, while the management of the workout
firms is left to the firm’s officials, who caused the mismanagement in the first
place. Some benefits of a CRV are: a) to facilitate disposal of assets by credi-
tor banks; b) to facilitate effective management and governance on com-
panies undertaking a workout process; c) to encourage foreign capital
investment; and d) to stimulate capital markets. In other countries, asset
management companies (AMCs) have played the role of absorbing dis-
tressed banks’ assets and restructuring financially troubled enterprises.
In Korea, debt–equity swaps have proved to be one of the most effective
methods in restructuring highly leveraged corporations and creditor
banks. As debt–equity swaps are employed as a method of corporate
restructuring, the government controls companies via state-run banks.
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As a result, the overall economy might be influenced by government
policy, not by market principles. Nevertheless, in practice, debt–equity
swaps are frequently used in Korea to resolve potential bad loans and to
raise capital adequacy ratios. In order to prevent moral hazards like this, it
is necessary to build a responsible management system in the financial
sector, which might lead to corporate restructuring.
Capital market development
Given the huge size of the overall debt of corporate firms in Korea, a key
strategy for corporate restructuring will have to be achieved by a substantial
conversion of debt to equity, which will bring a change in the domestic
capital market and also a shift in household savings patterns. Improvements
have to be made in the corporate financial market structure in order for cor-
porations to directly raise their necessary funds. Therefore, serious efforts
have to be made to expand the equity market in Korea by encouraging
collective investment vehicles, including mutual funds and investment and
trust business. Deeper capital markets will help shift corporate finances away
from debt and associated risks hitherto carried by the banking system.
Improvement of corporate performance
As a result of a series of corporate restructuring efforts, Korea’s corporate
debt–equity ratio has been substantially reduced over the period
1995–2001, as shown in Table 6.15. The lower debt–equity ratio has also
been accompanied by a significant improvement in corporate profitability.
Continuing agenda
From “administered restructuring” to “market induced restructuring”
In the future round of restructuring, both the institutional and the regula-
tory frameworks must be firmly established so that “market induced
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Table 6.15 Corporate performances (1995–2001) (%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Debt equity ratio 286.8 317.1 396.3 303.0 214.7 210.6 182.2
Ordinary income 
to sales 3.6 1.0 0.3 1.9 1.7 1.3 0.4
Operating income 
to sales 8.3 6.5 8.3 6.1 6.6 7.4 5.5
Interest coverage 
ratio 149.6 112.1 129.1 68.3 96.1 157.2 132.6
Source: The Bank of Korea, Financial Statement Analysis, each year.
restructuring” can replace the “administered restructuring” that was
inevitable during the crisis period. In this regard, the sequence and sched-
ule of privatizing “nationalized banks” must be clearly spelled-out in
advance.
Once both screening and exit of non-viable financial institutions are
determined by the government, a policy focus can be placed on stimulat-
ing the economy by lowering interest rates in order to facilitate the
restructuring process. It should be noted that the timely exit of non-viable
firms out of the market should be accelerated to restore more confidence
in the market. The Corporate Reorganization Law, the Composition Law
and the Bankruptcy laws were amended in 1998 to achieve this objective.
Facilitation of corporate restructuring
To facilitate the prompt disposal of financial institutions’ non-performing
loans and to avoid additional bad loans, the Corporate Restructuring
Promotion Act was passed. A system was put in place to allow the setup of
real estate investment companies for corporate restructuring and the
period of corporate reorganization proceedings was shortened.
The Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (which came into effect
on 15 September 2001; subsequent dates in parentheses are dates of
implementation) is to remain in effect as a temporary measure until the
end of 2005, together with its associated Enforcement Decree (15 Septem-
ber 2001). It empowers creditor financial institutions to initiate prompt
restructuring measures against companies displaying symptoms of insol-
vency and establishes a system for the adjustment of outstanding credit
among financial institutions. The Act calls for creditor banks to regularly
appraise the credit risk of companies that have obtained credit from finan-
cial institutions of at least 50 billion won and take appropriate measures
for post hoc management.
In particular, if a company exhibits symptoms of insolvency on evalu-
ation of its credit risks, the main creditor bank may consider its turn-
around feasible after appraising the company’s business plan. Then it may
have that company adopt measures for corporate restructuring. These
may include joint management by creditor financial institutions, joint
management by creditor banks, management by the main creditor bank
and composition of its debts or corporate reorganization. If there appears
no possibility of a turnaround, however, the main creditor bank is obliged
to submit an application to the court for the company to be declared
bankrupt or have the company file for dissolution, liquidation or bank-
ruptcy.
In the case of a main creditor bank pursuing the restructuring of a
company exhibiting symptoms of insolvency through joint management
by creditor financial institutions or creditor banks, the Corporate Restruc-
turing Co-ordination Committee should consist of creditor financial
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institutions or creditor banks. The committee makes decisions on the des-
ignation of the company as exhibiting symptoms of insolvency, the joint
management by creditor financial institutions, the period for deferment
of claims, plans for the readjustment of claims or new credit extension
and the conclusion of an agreement to implement a management turn-
around plan. The committee’s decisions should be made with the
approval of creditor financial institutions holding at least 75 percent of
gross credit outstanding to the company. Meanwhile, creditor financial
institutions opposing the decision for joint management, the readjust-
ment of claims, or new credit extension are allowed to request to the
committee that the other creditor financial institutions purchase their
loans. The main creditor bank should examine the performance of the
company on a quarterly basis concerning its implementation of the turn-
around plan after concluding an agreement with the company on its
rehabilitation.
If on the basis of the findings of the quarterly examination, the com-
mittee considers that the execution of the management rehabilitation
plan will be problematic, then the main credit bank must halt the joint
management agreement.
Strengthening the management of public funds
To enhance the fairness and transparency of the management of public
funds and push for their effective use, the Public Fund Management Act
(effective from 20 December 2000) and its associated Enforcement
Decree (effective from 14 February 2001) were passed into law. It pro-
vided for the establishment of a Public Fund Committee at the Ministry of
Finance and Economy. They were entrusted with the comprehensive over-
seeing of the operation of public funds and screening and the
coordination of their provision and collection. The Minister of Finance
and Economy must submit a quarterly report on the use of public funds to
the National Assembly, and the Public Fund Committee must publish a
white paper on the management of public funds by the end of August
every year.
As a means of preventing moral hazard on the part of financial institu-
tions, those that receive public funds are obliged to conclude an MOU for
the implementation of management normalization plans with the govern-
ment or the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC). Management
normalization plans should include details concerning the target capital
adequacy ratios, the profit to assets ratio, the bad loan ratio, restructuring
plans and the written consent of the in-house labor union for restructur-
ing.
In a bid to promote recovery of public funds, a Sales Screening sub-
committee is to be set up under the Public Fund Committee and given the
task of screening the appropriateness of the sale of assets, including
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the financial institution stockholdings of the government, the KDIC and
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO). Should a financial
institution which has received public funds become insolvent or be dis-
solved, the court is obliged to designate the KDIC or a member of its staff
as a receiver or liquidator, other pertinent legislation notwithstanding.
At the same time, the Depositor Protection Act was revised, effective 1
January 2001. In the event of designating financial institutions as non-
viable financial institutions or financial institutions showing signs of insol-
vency, the KDIC is also able to demand that the relevant financial
institutions submit documents concerning their business and property
status or to investigate them directly. In cases where the KDIC judges it
necessary to suspend the repayment of deposits or cancel the license of
financial institutions following an investigation of their business and prop-
erty status, it may request the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) to
take the appropriate actions to deal with the troubled financial institu-
tions. The Act stipulates that defaulters on debt repayments to ailing
financial institutions should be included among those bad-loan-related
persons whose relevant business and property status can be investigated by
the KDIC. The KDIC is also allowed to withhold the payment of deposit
insurance claims to those responsible for bad loans and those having a
special relationship with them.
In preparation for possible losses stemming from fraud or embezzle-
ment by the staff of financial institutions, the KDIC is allowed to require
that financial institutions buy compensation liability insurance. If financial
institutions decline to buy such insurance, the KDIC is authorized to initi-
ate an insurance contract with an insurance company on their behalf and
at their own expense.
Facilitation of bad loan resolution
In order to facilitate the resolution of bad loans held by financial institu-
tions, a CRV should operate over 50 percent of its total assets through the
purchase of securities floated by companies that have concluded corpor-
ate improvement planning agreements, the purchase of credit for loans to
such companies or the extension of loans and payment guarantees to
them. A CRV may borrow funds up to twice its equity capital and float
corporate bonds up to an amount ten times its capital and reserves.
In a parallel move, the government revised the Enforcement Decree of
the Act Concerning the Efficient Disposal of Financial Institutions’ 
Non-Performing Assets and Establishment of the Korea Asset Manage-
ment Corporation (effective from 29 May 2000). This expanded those
financial institutions from which KAMCO may acquire non-performing
loans to subsidiaries that are established by financial institutions for the
purchase and resolution of claims, and financial institutions established
under the Depositor Protection Act to resolve claims.
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By May 2002, 156.3 trillion won in public funds had been used to
support financial sector restructuring. According to the report to the
National Assembly by the government, the government had retrieved
about 24.3 percent, or 32.8 trillion won of the public funds spent so far by
early 2001.
By 19 November 2001, the government had retrieved some 32.8 trillion
won, or 24.3 percent of the total public funds injected. Of the total, about
21.6 trillion won came from the resale of non-performing loans or their
collateral while the remaining 11.2 trillion won was recovered through
equity sales and other sources.
The low recovery ratio of public funds causes a supply and demand imbal-
ance arising from the conversion of maturities. It also suggests that the delay
of repayment of public funds is inevitable for at least over a generation. As a
matter of fact, the Public Fund Overseeing Committee announced the delay-
ing of repayment of public funds up to 20 years.14 As public funds were
raised mainly through the issue of state bonds repayable in five years and
maturities for public funds converge in a short period, the government
bonds need to be placed to repay and refinance maturing debts.
Protection of investors including minority shareholders
To strengthen the protection of stock investors, including minority share-
holders, the government made it obligatory for registered corporations to
include outside members on their boards of directors and eased con-
ditions for cumulative voting requirements and the exercise of minority
shareholders’ rights in listed or registered corporations. It also made
investment trust management companies responsible for compensating
investors for damages.
Under the revised Securities and Exchange Act (1 April 2001) and its
associated Enforcement Decree (7 July 2001), registered companies,
excluding venture firms with total assets of less than 100 million won,
must have at least one quarter of their board of directors consist of
outside members. The number of outside directors for registered corpora-
tions with total assets of over two trillion won should be not less than three
and they should make up at least half of the total membership of the
board of directors. An audit committee should also be set up to oversee
the execution of their duties.
In the election of directors of listed or registered corporations with
total assets of over two trillion won, the minimum shareholding required
for the exercise of cumulative voting rights was lowered from 3 percent to
1 percent. In relation to a vote to change the articles concerning cumula-
tive voting, the voting rights of shareholders with a holding greater than 3
percent were limited to 3 percent.
When listed or registered companies give notice of a general meeting
of shareholders, they must disclose details of transactions with the largest
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shareholders or those standing in a special relationship to them. In
particular, when its transactions with the largest shareholders or those
standing in a special relationship to them surpass a certain level, a listed
or registered corporation with total assets of at least two trillion won must
receive approval from the board of directors and report the details of the
relevant transactions to the general meeting of shareholders.
Public sector and labor sector reforms
Under the IMF conditionality, Korea was also required to carry out
reforms in both the public and labor sectors. Public corporations were to
be privatized, and a new governance system was introduced to improve
profitability. Korea’s traditional labor-management relationship caused
inflexibility in the labor market. Layoffs are now allowed when a company
faces serious managerial difficulty. The government has provided a social
safety net for those unemployed as a result of restructuring. However,
Korea’s achievement in reforming the two sectors has not been as satisfac-
tory as the financial sector reforms. Privatization of public corporations
must be accelerated, and the flexibility of the labor market has to be
enhanced while seeking ways to neutralize the occasionally militant labor
union activities.
Concluding remarks
In essence, Korea’s restructuring of its financial sector has been a process
of breaking away from the vicious chain of inefficiency that exists between
the financial sector and the corporate sector. While following the IMF pre-
scriptions, the predominant sequence of major restructuring has involved
first the financial sector, and has then moved to the corporate sector, to
ensure normalization of financial intermediation.
The Korean reform story following the Asian Financial Crisis clearly sug-
gests that a serious financial sector restructuring is not a “once and for all”
matter; it requires a never-ending drive in a consistent and transparent
framework. Financial restructuring is also deeply linked to the restructuring
of the corporate sector. After breaking up the chaebol system into a series
of independent business units, Korea needs to design a new industrial struc-
ture for the coming digital economy. This calls for reinvigoration of the
economy by encouraging a climate of innovation led by SMEs and venture
start-ups in parallel with large enterprises. Product development and
continual improvements in quality should be encouraged through
sophisticated technology. Meanwhile, the industrial structure has to be
transformed to create high value-added industries, such as knowledge-
intensive industries.
As Pagano (1993) suggested, effective financial intermediation that
ensures efficient allocation of scarce capital to where it has the highest
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payoff is a critical component in the search for a new development para-
digm in Korea. In this context, as Stiglitz (1999: 15) pointed out, Korean
banks must continue working to “learn how to be banks.” They should
break away from the embedded traditions and customs, such as implicit
government guarantees as expressed in the belief that “banks should
never fail,” or tight and “friendly” long-term relationships with large bor-
rowers. In addition to the changing credit culture, banks must develop
modern management practices for risks such as liquidity risk, foreign
exchange risk and interest rate risk.
In order to make the financial sector the “brain” of any well-function-
ing market economy,15 Korea needs an injection of new managerial exper-
tise into the financial sector, especially into the banking sector, which has
been branded as a cradle of old, tradition-bound people who built their
careers during the high growth period.
In the years to come, successful structural reforms for the financial
sector could be achieved by completing the following key tasks: a) return
of “nationalized banks” to the private sector; b) restructuring of non-
banking sectors to include the introduction of a new governance system,
and separation of ownership between industrial conglomerates and finan-
cial conglomerates; c) accelerated restructuring of heavily indebted corpo-
rations; d) further improvements in accounting, auditing and financial
disclosure; e) gradual reduction of the budget deficit by tax reform and by
issuing fewer bonds to keep the budget deficit below 2.5 percent of GDP;
and f) modernization of the insolvency system.
During the period 1998 to 2002, Korea’s conglomerates have under-
taken a far-reaching restructuring program in terms of debt reductions,
downsizing, elimination of inter-unit debt guarantees, asset sales, recapi-
talization and foreign capital attraction. These efforts clearly suggest that
subsidiary companies of chaebols should become independent viable busi-
ness units. An unexpected and exuberant KOSDAQ venture market
during the reform period is signaling some important changes in the
chaebol-dominated economic structure. The advent of e-commerce and
the related knowledge-based economy is also making a clear impact. With
a newly emerging financial sector as the “brain” of a well-functioning
market economy, Korea should be able to search for a new growth engine
from newly born and viable chaebols, SMEs and venture businesses and to
succeed in establishing a sound knowledge-based economy.
Notes
1 For details on the background of the chaebol-led heavy and chemical industrial
drive within the export-led development strategy, see Ahn and Kim (1997).
2 Korean GDP in 1997 was 420.986 trillion won. The proportion of bad loans in
Korea is huge compared to that of the US during its Savings & Loans crisis; bad
loans of FDIC member financial institutions almost reached 4 percent of total
loans and 2.5 percent of US GDP in 1987.
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3 They surveyed all non-financial listed companies numbering between 600 and
662, and over 5,000 unlisted companies over the period 1995–8, which were
subject to external auditing. The sample companies accounted for about 79.5
percent of total corporate debt in Korea as of the end of 1997, or 644.9 trillion
won. The Korea Development Institute (1998) estimated total debts in the
corporate sector to be 810.7 trillion won as of the end of 1998.
4 ICR is commonly defined as the ratio of earnings before interest payment and
taxes (EBIT) to interest expense.
5 The Bank of Korea’s study (2002) demonstrated that there exists a very high
correlation between corporate debt ratio and their variables, plus the level of
autonomous management of the banking sector of the capital market.
6 The Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank merged into Hanvit Bank,
while Chohung Bank took over Chungbuk Bank and Kangwon Bank. Korea
Exchange Bank recapitalized with 350 billion won, which was contributed by
the Commerzbank of Germany. Peace Bank chose to withdraw from inter-
national business. Among the banks whose BIS ratios exceeded 8 percent at
the end of 1997, Hana Bank merged with Boram Bank, and Kookmin Bank
with Korea Long-term Credit Bank.
7 As of early 2001, a bank deposit only up to half a million won, including prin-
ciple and interest, is protected.
8 For example, chaebols with more than 50 percent of their own capital that is
related to non-financial and real sector activities are not allowed to engage in
financial businesses.
9 Korea Economic Daily, 30 March 1998. Corporate debt is approximately $177.57
billion, based on the exchange rate as of 3 June 1998 ($11,391 won).
10 The debt-workout, or workout program, is out-of-court settlements between
creditors and debtors who have defaulted, utilizing the so-called London Rules.
A Corporate Restructuring Accord (CRA) has been signed by 200 banks and
non-bank financial institutions, which commits them to follow the agreed
workout procedure. The Corporate Restructuring Co-ordination Committee
(CRCC), an arbitration committee, was created to resolve the differences
between financial institutions and a debtor in the event they cannot reach an
agreement.
11 Sri-Ram Aiyer (1999: 3).
12 The Korea Times on 5 January 2000 reported the government’s intention by
quoting a New Year’s speech by Finance-Economy Minister Kang Bong-Kyun to
the Audience of Senior Banking Officials.
13 Creditor banks are currently required to oversee the management of these
firms as well as schedule their debt.
14 See The Korea Herald, 19 November 2001, 11.
15 See Stiglitz (1999) on the “brain function” of the financial sector. He pointed
out that long-term relationships between lenders and borrowers can be a
conduit for crucial information that helps the brain function, but they can also
atrophy the ability to judge creditworthiness.
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7 Economic performance, crisis
and institutional reforms in East
Asia and Latin America
Akira Suehiro
Introduction
As many as 109 financial crises occurred between 1980 and 1999, accord-
ing to an original survey by the World Bank. This fact suggests that the
world economy has entered a stage of instability and uncertainty following
the 1980s (http://www.worldbank.org/html). Indeed, a debt crisis hit
Latin America in the early 1980s, while East Asia – Northeast Asia plus
Southeast Asia – also suffered a long-term economic recession due to the
resulting worldwide recession. In the first half of the 1990s, an economic
crisis affected Russia and Eastern Europe while they underwent institu-
tional reforms aimed at transforming their economic systems from cen-
trally planned economies to market-oriented ones. In the mid-1990s, a
currency crisis again attacked Latin America, particularly Mexico. In 1997
a currency and financial crisis took place in East Asia, ending an economic
boom that had continued since the end of the 1980s.
This chapter aims to find similarities and differences in economic
performance, government expenditure patterns, the role of private firms,
targets of economic reforms to overcome the crisis and institution build-
ing efforts in East Asia and Latin America. It pays special attention to the
questions of who has contributed as an agent to national economic devel-
opment, what were the major causes for economic crisis and which fields
became targets for reforms in the two regions during the 1980s and the
1990s. By conducting a comparative study in the two regions, this chapter
also focuses on the experience of Thailand to answer the question of how
East Asian countries have tackled economic reforms and have changed
their major targets from outward-looking institutional reforms based on
the Anglo-American model to more inward-looking social policies. By
examining these questions, the chapter hopes to identify the key elements
to be studied when constructing a possible agenda to seek stable, sustain-
able growth in the future.
Economic performance: East Asia and Latin America
Table 7.1 summarizes major economic indicators for the past two decades
(1980–99) in three major regions (East Asia, South Asia and Latin
America).1 So far as per capita GNP (or GNI) is concerned, East Asian
countries have achieved a higher level (US$8,670 in 1999) than Latin
American countries (US$4,210).2 However, we also discover a great gap in
per capita income among Asian countries themselves: between East Asia
and South Asia; old NICs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore)
and new NICs (Malaysia and Thailand); and six old ASEAN members
(Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei) and
four new ASEAN members (Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar). In
contrast to Asian countries, there is a smaller gap in per capita income
among Latin American countries, excluding Argentina which was
US$11,324 per capita in 1999.
Regarding the annual GDP growth rate during the 1980s and 1990s,
figures in East Asia (6.6 percent→5.9 percent) have decreased due to a
depreciation of local currencies against the US dollar after the currency
crisis in 1997 and the subsequent economic recession. By contrast, growth
rates rose in both South Asia, from 4.2 percent to 6.4 percent, and Latin
America, from 1.7 percent to 4.0 percent, remarkably during the 1990s
owing to economic liberalization and economic restructuring at that time.
The most marked difference in the two regions is identified by export
performance in terms of both export growth rate and the ratio of manufac-
tured exports against total exports. East Asia achieved around 11 percent
growth per annum during the 1980s and 1990s, and the ratio of manufac-
tured exports to total exports increased to as high as 76 percent in 1999. On
the other hand, Latin America quickly increased its annual export growth
rate from 4.8 percent in the 1980s to 8.2 percent in the 1990s, but its level
was still lower than that of East Asia. In particular, the ratio of manufactured
exports (36 percent in 1999) is far lower compared to that of East Asia. As a
result, the export ratio against nominal GDP in the two major regions
reveals quite different levels and very different trends: increase from 50
percent in 1990 to 64 percent in 1999 in East Asia vs. a slight decrease from
20 percent to 19 percent in the corresponding year in Latin America.
How can we explain this significant difference in export performance?
Possible answers may be connected to differences in government policies
and the role of private firms following the end of the 1960s. During the
1970s, world trade enjoyed an annual growth rate of 19.6 percent, which
was the highest sustained level ever over the past century, while the long-
term interest rate for bank loans averaged a mere 1 percent. Due to the
second oil crisis in 1979 and the collapse of the primary commodities
market boom by the early 1980s, the annual growth rate of world trade
drastically dropped to 4 percent in the 1980s, while long-term interest
rates increased to 6 percent per annum on average (Suehiro 2000a: 17).
192 Akira Suehiro
East Asia’s old NICs took advantage of this opportunity in the 1970s,
and every government made a switch in the major target industries from
import substitution policies to export-oriented ones. This covered such
labor-intensive industries as textiles, garments, sports shoes, processed
food and electronic parts.3 For instance, in South Korea, the export value
of textile goods impressively increased from US$81 million in 1970 to
US$2,937 million in 1980, while in Taiwan, the export value of electrical
goods increased from US$182 million to US$3,599 million in the corre-
sponding period. At the same time, local private firms actively moved into
export-oriented industries in response to new government policies and in
collaboration with foreign firms. They also quickly expanded their busi-
nesses to take advantage of the expansion in world trade and to secure
overseas banking loans bearing the lowest interest rates.
East Asian companies began to export their manufactured goods to the
United States and imported necessary intermediate and capital goods
from Japan. According to the survey of Twu Jaw-yann on the “triangle
trade clearing system,” NICs exported US$62,249 million (trade surplus
US$37,031 million) worth of goods to the United States in 1987, but they
had to import US$39,455 million in goods (trade deficit US$20,643
million) from Japan. On the other hand, Japan exported US$83,580
million in goods (trade surplus US$52,090 million) to the United States in
the same year (Twu 1990: 26). These figures suggest that the United States
played an important role as a giant importer or an absorber for both NICs
and Japan in this trade clearing system. At the same time, the American
market was very attractive for East Asian exporters. This was because the
US government extended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to
exportable goods from developing countries, including those in East Asia.
Up to the end of the 1980s, when the United States lifted GSP for East
Asia, they were no doubt the largest beneficiary group of the system
(Hirakawa 1992).
In addition to this preferential treatment, the United States also served
as a large absorber of manufactured goods, such as garments, electrical
products and other consumer goods. The American market was princip-
ally characterized by a multilateral structure in its consumption pattern,
which was determined by different consumer behavior accruing to varying
life cycles and income disparity by ethnic group and occupation.
For instance, American markets of imported watches were divided into
three groups: high quality mechanical watches from Europe; standardized
quality mechanical and LCD watches from Japan; and lower priced mass-
produced LCD watches from Hong Kong (Suehiro 2000a: 73). Likewise, it
was not difficult for South Korean and Taiwanese black and white televi-
sions with lower prices to find their own market among lower income
classes. Furthermore, enhanced competition between Japanese and the
other East Asian firms to expand their market shares in the United States
contributed to an improved international competitiveness for East Asian





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exporters (Suehiro 2000a: 52–5). Similar development patterns can be
seen in the case of the ICs industry in South Korea and in the case of the
machine tool industry in Taiwan (Amsden 1977). In this sense, local firms
in East Asia could enjoy the so-called “advantages of economic backward-
ness” (Gerschenkron) of late comers in the technological catching-up
process, and provided a good case for upgrading their “competitive
advantage” in the world market (Amsden 1989; Suehiro 2000a: Ch. 2).
In contrast to the East Asian experience, Latin American governments
did not change their import substitution industrialization policies or
inward-looking industrial development strategies during the 1970s.
Domestic markets for import substitution industries were protected by
high import tariffs and over-valued exchange rates. It was after the 1980s,
when private firms were hit by the debt-crisis, that Latin America gradually
shifted its economic structure from an inward-looking focus to an
outward-looking one (Koike and Nishijima eds 1997). In addition to the
conservativeness of government economic policies, local firms were chal-
lenged by strong competition from state and multinational enterprises in
the domestic market. It was very difficult for entrepreneurial local firms to
export their manufactured products directly to the United States because
American firms with 100 percent ownership had already established
strong stakes in every Latin American host country.
Therefore, the scope of the business bases and the types of exportable
products were limited for local private firms in Latin America. According to
an empirical study by Horisaka on the Brazilian economy in 1985, the busi-
ness fields where local private firms were dominant in terms of annual
turnover were confined to retail, supermarkets, construction, garment,
paper and pulp and furniture, while foreign firms controlled automobile (100
percent: the share of annual turnover in the industry concerned), pharma-
ceuticals (86 percent), toiletry (73 percent), telecommunications (66
percent), plastic products (64 percent), beverages and tobacco (61
percent), electronics (48 percent) and so on. At the same time, state enter-
prises also dominated several important fields including mining (55
percent), iron and steel (67 percent) and petrochemicals (77 percent) as
well as public services (100 percent) (Koike and Horisaka eds 1999: 35).
Both government policies and limited competition combined to contribute
to the underdevelopment of local private firms.4 For these reasons, Latin
American countries missed a good opportunity to promote their manufac-
tured exports during the 1970s. Rather, an increasing external public debt
contributed to serious crises in Latin America in the early 1980s.
Public social service expenditures: East Asia and Latin
America
Another interesting fact that we observe in Table 7.1 is a wide gap in the
proportion of social service expenditures against total public expenditures
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in the two regions in 1998: 27 percent in East Asia and 57 percent in Latin
America. In addition, the proportion in Latin America increased from 43
percent in 1990 to 57 percent in 1998. Social service expenditures here
include public expenditures in education, health, social insurance and
social assistance. Such prominent differences in public expenditures seem
closely related to differences in both the power structure and social
welfare (social security) system to support people’s lives.
For instance, governments based on populist regimes in Latin America
were required to construct good alliances with class-based organizations
such as trade unions and state enterprise employees associations, and
hence they had to allocate a large part of their national budgets for these
collaborators in the forms of social insurance or health assistance. A
detailed study by Usami on the social security system in Argentina informs
us well as to why and how the Peron government introduced a compre-
hensive scheme of social security for the people by carefully referring to
the power structure at that time (Usami ed. 2001: Introduction and 
Ch. 9).
On the other hand, East Asian governments based on authoritarian
and “developmentalist” regimes put much more priority on economic
development or accelerated industrial development rather than on
income redistribution and social development. In this area, economic
growth and development have been the main engines of welfare, and wel-
farism has been shunned. More widely, “there is a shared but generally
unspoken belief that responsibility for welfare is shared by the public and
private sector. Community, firm and family are all expected to play a part”
(Holliday and Wilding eds 2003: 166–7).5 At the same time, the govern-
ments would look at their people as members of the nation-state who
should contribute to the priority national target rather than members of
class-based organizations who focus on their own economic interests. In
addition to the difference in national targets, the governments attempted
to oppress the activity of trade unions directly as we see in Thailand after
the Sarit regime (1958), or to introduce an indirect control on workers
through the establishment of the government-sponsored workers’ organi-
zation such as the reorganization of the National Trade Union Council
(NTUC: 1968) in Singapore and the Employers-Employees Consultative
Council (1972) in South Korea (Suehiro 2000a: 118).
Differences in non-governmental social welfare (social security) systems
also contributed to this gap in social service expenditures in the two
regions. Generally speaking, a large firm in East Asian countries, like in
Japan, is expected to play a significant role in supporting the social
welfare of its employees as well as in sustaining their long-term employ-
ment. Based on this consensus, a private firm frequently provides
company-sponsored hospital and social insurance benefits, family
allowance and retirement fund. Firms also introduced a company pension
fund scheme with the financial support of employers. In turn, employees
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depend on their company-based retirement fund and company pension
fund rather than the national pension scheme for their source of income
after retirement. It was after the 1990s that the governments in East Asian
countries except Japan eventually started extending the objective of the
well organized social security system from government officers and veter-
ans to employees in the private sector and farmers: Korea in 1986 (revised
in 1995); Taiwan in 1988 (revised in 1994); Hong Kong in 1993; Singa-
pore in 1991; Thailand in 1990 (pension scheme in 1999); Malaysia in
1991 (revised in 1995); the Philippines in 1997 and China in 1996/97
(Ramesh and Asher 2000; Holliday and Wilding eds 2003; Kamimura and
Suehiro eds 2003).
Why have the governments in East Asian countries not been so active in
constructing the national social security system in the past? In order to
answer this question, we must examine not only the special role of large
private firms but also quasi-economic development policies undertaken by the
governments under the “developmentalist” regime in favor of peasants
and workers in the manufacturing sectors. Subsidies on agricultural prod-
ucts or price stabilization schemes of agricultural products (in South
Korea, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc.), subsidies on public trans-
portation services (in Thailand, the Philippines), supply of agricultural
credit with lower interest rates (in Thailand), and supply of public
housing service with special loans for workers and government officers (in
Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong) should be included in the category
of public social services.6
Traditional custom and practices have also played an important role in
supplementing the limited social security system in East Asian countries.
For instance, in rural areas, aged parents often rent their farming land at
a lower charge to their children, and the children in turn look after their
parents before inheriting land. In this case, landlordship between parents
and children supplements public social insurance for aged persons. Tradi-
tional mutual assistance practices among members of the community and
the extended family system also served as an informal social safety net sup-
plementing poor public social services in East Asia up to the 1990s.
On the other hand, in urban areas in Hong Kong and Thailand, tradi-
tional Chinese associations which were set up for the purposes of charities
and social services have for a long time served as core institutions to help
aged persons, handicapped persons and children with a single parent. It is
reported that 672 out of 756 organizations which were registered as NGOs
in Hong Kong (1998) belonged to this type of traditional association.
More importantly, these associations are now providing social services to
the people not only with their own budgets but also with financial support
from the government (Sawada 2002). In contrast to a variety of social
welfare systems in East Asia, non-governmental sources of social services in
Latin America seem to be concentrated in the activities of religious
associations.
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Ironically, following economic liberalization, the governments in Latin
America were required to privatize state enterprises or government-
sponsored hospitals, and to drastically curtail public expenditure on social
services. The comprehensive scheme of national social security system was
collapsed, and its reorganization on the basis of free competition and effect-
ive operation became more important for the governments to respond to
liberalized economy (Usami ed. 2001). However, privatization of state enter-
prises and the elimination of public expenditure will create instability in
labor relations and bring about new income disparities for the poor. As a
result, the governments are facing serious dilemmas between the recon-
struction of social stability by increasing public expenditure and the privati-
zation of social services through market forces to reduce fiscal deficits.
On the other hand, East Asian governments recently began to imple-
ment formal public social services, including national pension schemes. The
deepening economic recession after the currency crisis made it difficult for
private firms to fully sustain the social welfare of employees on their own. In
the long run, since East Asian governments had to constantly increase
public expenditure for social services and job creation, they are also facing
the same dilemma as Latin America (Kamimura and Suehiro eds 2003). At
any rate, construction of a sustainable social welfare system has now become
one of the most essential elements in formulating sustainable economic
growth under the pressure of economic globalization and liberalization.
Sequences of liberalization, economic crisis and structural
adjustment
One interesting point here is a different pattern in the two regions in the
inter-relationship among the introduction of liberalization policies, causes
of economic crisis and the implementation of structural reforms. In the
case of Latin America, economic crisis due to accumulated external public
debt took place first, followed by intensive economic liberalization (dereg-
ulation) as part of structural reforms or structural adjustment programs
initiated by international financial organizations (IMF, the World Bank
and IDA). In this case, liberalization was conducted on the basis of the
policy ideas of the so-called “Washington Consensus in the first genera-
tion,” which mainly aimed to eliminate various obstacles hindering the
sound development of a market economy and to reduce government reg-
ulations of economic activities (Williamson 1990; Williamson ed. 1994).
This type of Washington Consensus addresses four major economic
purposes: 1) inflation constraint and improvement of economic funda-
mentals; 2) economic stabilization through an equilibrium in the balance
of payments; 3) economic growth on the basis of a free market mechan-
ism; and 4) improvement of income distribution. In order to achieve
these economic purposes, new policies usually focused on lifting quantita-
tive restrictions on imports, reducing import tariffs, lifting regulations on
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industrial investment and foreign direct investment (FDI), deregulating con-
trols on foreign currency trade and foreign exchange rates, and so on
(Edwards 1995; Suehiro and Nakagawa eds 2001: see Chronology for Chile,
Mexico and Brazil). These policies are summarized as the classical approach
of economic liberalization (“getting the price mechanism right”). What
should not be overlooked here is that the World Bank ordered Latin Amer-
ican governments to privatize a large number of state enterprises. This was
done because the economic crisis in the early 1980s was understood to be a
direct result of quick increases in public external debt due mainly to heavy
investments in and huge amounts of public expenditure on state enterprises.
Similar to the cases of Latin America, the Philippines, Thailand and
Indonesia also started restructuring state enterprises in exchange for World
Bank sponsored structural adjustment loans (SALs) between 1981 and
1983. These countries introduced more moderate or partial economic liber-
alization policies that focused on trade liberalization, deregulation of
control on foreign exchange rates and reduction of government subsidies
for the agricultural sector and public transportation services. However, the
pace of policy implementation was not so fast as those taken in Latin
America, nor was its coverage so comprehensive (Suehiro and Higashi eds
2000: Ch. 1). On the other hand, South Korea (1987), Taiwan (1985 and
1989) and Singapore (1986) started new policies of privatization and liberal-
ization in selected fields without any pressure from international financial
organizations. They introduced these policies rather independently for the
sake of activating the private sector in order to overcome long-term eco-
nomic recession after the end of the 1970s (Suehiro 2000a: 172–4).
Since the end of the 1980s, most East Asian countries have embraced
liberalization in the financial sector, international capital trade, foreign
currency trade and industrial investment including FDI. An important
incentive for this switch in economic policies was not external pressure
but autonomous decisions by the governments. In particular, they geared
toward financial liberalization when they decided to change their country
statuses from Article XIV Parties of the IMF (applied to developing coun-
tries) to Article VIII Parties, which meant they had to meet conditions of
deregulation in both capital trade and foreign currency trade. At the same
time, East Asian countries enjoyed an economic boom in that period, and
they had to seek financial resources overseas (through FDI and overseas
borrowings) to finance savings and investment gaps (the investment ratio
accounted for between 35 percent and 45 percent, while the saving ratio
was between 25 percent and 35 percent).7 For this reason, it was an urgent
task for the governments to liberalize their financial sectors and FDI pol-
icies to invite fresh money from abroad.
However, the quick financial liberalization with no actual development
of domestic financial institutions, the rush of European and Japanese
banking loans seeking wide profit margins because of divergent interest
rates between the home country and East Asian countries, and the specula-
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tive movements of international hedge funds such as Robertson’s Tiger
Fund and Soros’ Quantum Fund combined to lead East Asian countries
into monetary instability and, later, serious currency crises. Therefore, eco-
nomic liberalization in East Asia preceded the crisis and was a partial reason
for the financial crisis. This was quite different from Latin America, where
the governments were forced to introduce economic liberalization after the
crisis in order to address poor macroeconomic fundamentals.
This sequential difference in liberalization and crisis naturally pro-
duced another difference with regard to the economic reform programs
set forth by governments in East Asia and Latin America. In brief, eco-
nomic reforms in East Asia no longer aimed at formulating liberalization
and deregulation on the basis of the first generation Washington Consensus,
as in the case of Latin America during the 1980s. Rather, East Asia now is
targeting reforms to create various legal and institutional frameworks to
help market forces function more effectively on the basis of the second gen-
eration Washington Consensus. Jeffrey Sachs characterized this new type of
reform as the “getting the institutions right” approach, and distinguished
it from the first generation reform target of “getting the price mechanism
right” (Woo et al. eds 2000: 42). The World Bank also addressed the same
idea, and used the title “Building Institutions for Markets” for its World
Development Report 2002 (World Bank 2002).
Major targets of economic reforms: East Asia and Latin
America
Since the East Asian currency crisis erupted in 1997, many scholars have
argued over its primary causes. Some emphasized the role of fast-moving,
short-term international capital, while others noted the decline of inter-
national competitiveness in labor-intensive industries in this area (World
Bank 1998; Haggard 2000; Woo et al. 2000). Among them, the IMF and
World Bank focused on structural weaknesses or institutional vulnerabil-
ity, particularly in local financial institutions and corporate governance.
This view is clearly presented in the 1998 World Bank Report:
The main lesson from the East Asian crisis is that it is important to
take an integrated approach to the issues of corporate governance
and financing. The poor system of corporate governance contributed
to the crisis by shielding the banks, financial companies, and corpora-
tions from market discipline. Rather than ensuring internal oversight
and allowing external monitoring, corporate governance has been
characterized by ineffective boards of directors, weak internal control,
unreliable financial reporting, lack of adequate disclosure, lax
enforcement to ensure compliance, and poor audits. These problems
are evidenced by unreported losses and understated liabilities.
(World Bank 1998: 57)
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In this context, the World Bank naturally proposed to the governments of
the crisis-hit East Asian countries two interconnected types of reform: the
restructuring of financial institutions and corporate restructuring. The
financial restructuring prescription included the introduction of the BIS
capital adequacy standard (8 percent of total outstanding loans) and
improving loan loss provisioning (standard/doubtful/loss) to global
standards, strict monitoring by commercial banks on credit loans and the
enactment of corporate bankruptcy laws to speedily resolve the non-
performing loan (NPL) problem in favor of creditors. Meanwhile, corpor-
ate restructuring mainly aimed at developing direct corporate finance (equity
and corporate bond markets), instead of indirect corporate finance (banking
loans), to improve equity to debt ratios and reforming locally listed com-
panies in line with the so-called Anglo-American model of good corporate
governance. The establishment of good corporate governance in accord-
ance with the global standard included appointment of independent dir-
ectors, establishment of independent audit committees, information
disclosure to investors and enforcement of minority shareholders’ rights
(World Bank 1998; World Bank 2000; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
Comparing these economic reforms in East Asia with those in Latin
America, which mainly aimed to restructure the public sector by privatizing
state enterprises and improving the central fiscal system, we find that the
former stressed the importance of restructuring the private sector in general
and local companies in particular. At the same time, the governments in
East Asia are expected to play a significant role in economic activities. But
their roles are no longer as conductors who directly intervene in the
market, but as coordinators who facilitate institutional and legal frameworks
for good corporate governance and sound market mechanisms. The
World Bank report concluded that: “East Asia’s development over the
next ten years will rest on three strategic initiatives for institutions and
growth: managing globalization, revitalizing business, and forcing a new
social contract” (World Bank 2000: 146–7).
By contrast, governments in Latin America hardly touched on the
reform of the private sector. They neither restructured local commercial
banks nor touched on local stock markets reform. Rather, they tried to
screen local firms by market forces through the promotion of free entry of
foreign firms into privatized state enterprises and domestic industries. As a
result, many state enterprises and large local firms were taken over by
leading European and American multinational corporations (MNCs),
while few local firms could survive in selected fields such as natural
resources-based industry, agro-industry, food processing industry, electric
power industry and so on (Ferraz 2002). For instance, a local group in the
electric power industry based in Chile successfully integrated their busi-
ness on the regional base by using an active mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) strategy, but this company was finally taken over by a European
conglomerate in 2000 (Hoshino ed. 2002: Ch. 4). Those that failed to
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adjust their corporate activities to the global economy were inevitably
forced to leave the market.
A detailed study by Ferraz et al. on the changes in ownership of private
firms in Latin America during the 1990s offers a surprising fact. According
to the study, between 1990 and 2000, M&A in Latin America amounted to
3,085 cases and accounted for US$218 billion, which were mostly initiated
not by local groups but by foreign firms. Consequently, the number of
foreign firms in the largest 500 Latin American companies quickly
increased from 149 (30 percent) in 1990–2 and 156 (31 percent) in
1994–6 to 231 (46 percent) in 1998–2000. While the proportion of com-
bined sales of foreign firms against total sales of the largest 500 companies
increased from 27 percent through 32 percent to 42 percent in the corre-
sponding years. M&A took place in East Asia after the crisis, but its size in
Latin America was far larger than that in East Asia.8 Furthermore, M&A in
East Asia were undertaken on the basis of friendly negotiation in such a
way as a foreign partner (for instance, a Japanese firm) agreed to buy local
shareholdings to help local partners, instead of through hostile takeovers.
In sum, unlike in Latin America, economic reforms in East Asia
appeared to put the first priority on institutional development in which
international financial institutions principally aimed at restructuring the
economic systems and institutions including corporate law, corporate
finance and auditing systems on the basis of the second generation Wash-
ington Consensus. But we cannot assume that each government has fol-
lowed the policy recommendation of international financial institutions
after the crisis. Then can we expect that institutional reforms adopted by
the governments will work effectively in principle? Finally, can we assume
that these reforms will lead East Asian economies to sustainable growth?
In order to answer these questions, let’s examine the case of economic
reforms in Thailand.
Economic reforms in Thailand: 1997–2004
Thailand is known as a country that triggered, or was the first victim of,
the region-wide crisis that struck East Asia in 1997. From 1988, Thailand
enjoyed an unprecedented economic expansion owing to a foreign direct
investment boom and an active strategy among local business groups to
diversify business lines. For instance, net inflow of foreign direct invest-
ment in 1990 alone (64.7 billion baht, US$2.6 billion) achieved the same
level of accumulated investment over a previous 15-year period between
1973 and 1987 (64.6 billion baht).9 The liberalization policy of the govern-
ment started at the end of the 1980s and accelerated the investment boom
both in the real sector, such as the manufacturing and telecommunica-
tions industries, and in other sectors, such as land and equities. Such an
active investment boom naturally resulted in an expanding gap between
the investment ratio against nominal GDP (35–40 percent) and the
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savings ratio against nominal GDP (23–25 percent) in the early 1990s
(Suehiro and Higashi eds 2000: 28–30).
This investment/savings gap was financed by international credit
including off-shore loans. Indeed, the total amount of foreign debt Thai-
land took on quickly jumped from US$18,321 million in 1986 to
US$90,536 million in 1996. Of this, the proportion of private sector debt
to total foreign debt quickly increased from 34.0 percent to 81.4 percent
over the same period. What was more important is the fact that short-term
credit (within one year, mostly three-month and six-month loans), used
mainly for investment in property and equities, increased its share from
15.8 percent to 41.5 percent in the corresponding period (Suehiro and
Higashi eds 2000: 31). These figures imply that the Thai economy turned
into a bubble economy, which is usually indicated by excess liquidity and
rapid growth of the non-real sector.
On the other hand, the central bank did not touch on the foreign
exchange system, which was principally linked to the US dollar. This was
because they were afraid that a depreciation of the local currency (Thai
baht) against the US dollar would directly damage the financial position
of local firms whose investment sources heavily depended on US dollar
denominated foreign loans. Then, groups of international hedge funds
began to attack the Thai baht as they expected its value to decline. They
took on significant US dollar holdings in exchange for Thai baht. The
Bank of Thailand (BOT) in turn recouped the Thai baht by consuming
foreign reserves from 1996 forward. In this process, the foreign reserves of
Thailand quickly dropped from US$23,600 million in December 1996 to
US$5,300 million in May 1997 and then to just US$1,100 million in July
1997 (Suehiro 2000a: 90). At last, the government was forced to give up
the fixed exchange rate system and changed it into a managed floating
system on 2 July 1997. The currency and financial crisis in Thailand imme-
diately spread to other East Asian countries, and resulted in a region-wide
economic crisis by the end of 1997 (World Bank: 1998; Jomo ed. 1998).
Immediately after the shift to a managed floating exchange system, the
Thai government asked the IMF for standby credit to finance the shortage
of foreign reserves, and the IMF, World Bank, Japan and other East Asian
countries agreed to provide a total of US$17.2 billion credit in exchange for
a “Letter of Intents” (LOIs) or the so-called “policy conditionality.” This
conditionality was principally based on a conventional approach to an “eco-
nomic stabilization with total demand-side control,” including three major
policies: 1) stabilization of the foreign exchange rate by inputting a standby
credit; 2) reduction of public expenditure and a tax increase in order to
finance economic reforms; and 3) strict control on the money supply in
order to constrain possible inflation and to prevent the outflow of foreign
capital due to depreciation of local currency (See Figure 7.1).
Comparing the standby credit for Latin American and Southeast Asian
countries in the early 1980s, however, we see a distinguishable difference
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Figure 7.1 Economic and social restructuring programs in Thailand
(1997–2001) (source: Drafted by the author).
Notes
METI: Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry; OECF: Overseas Economic Coopera-
tion Fund (now JBIC); JICA: Japan International Corporation Agency; JFCSB: Japan




in the IMF approach to the East Asian crisis-hit countries. This was
because the IMF forced the governments to not only implement economic
stabilization policies but also to introduce institutional reforms including
financial and corporate restructuring schemes. This new policy agenda
was employed in South Korea and Indonesia as well. As was seen earlier,
the IMF developed its policy recommendation in accordance with the
Washington Consensus in the second generation. In order to complete
the institutional reforms, the IMF changed the tenure of its credit from
one to two years to three to four years (Extended Fund Facility scheme:
EFF) (Suehiro 2000a: 98).
The new IMF policy toward East Asian crisis-hit countries was immedi-
ately followed and firmly supported by its close collaborator, the World
Bank. When the World Bank provided its structural adjustment loans
(SALs) to the Thai government, it proposed reforms similar to the IMF.
These policies included: 1) a financial restructuring scheme aimed at resolu-
tion of NPL problems and reorganization of local commercial banks in
accordance with the global standards on capital adequacy and loan loss
provisioning; and 2) a corporate restructuring scheme which targeted the idea
of “good corporate governance” which consisted of information disclo-
sure, appointment of independent directors, the establishment of an
independent audit committee and enhancement of minority sharehold-
ers’ right (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001: 45–54).
In addition to these reforms that were required by the IMF, the World
Bank tried to introduce social protection policies to alleviate the disloca-
tions caused by the deepening economic recession (see Figure 7.1).
Although the IMF’s principal purpose was to stabilize the macro economy,
strict control of the money supply and drastic curtailment of public expen-
diture inevitably resulted in a fierce credit crunch and sharp drop in
domestic consumption. According to the World Bank evaluation, East
Asian countries were experiencing an unprecedented crisis during 1998,
comparable to the economic disaster in the United States and Germany
under the Great Depression (World Bank 1999: 9). In order to overcome
this serious situation, the World Bank proposed that governments would
introduce a Keynesian type economic policy to create provisional jobs for
unemployed persons through extra public expenditure. At the same time,
the World Bank strongly recommended the restructuring of the public
sector by promoting privatization of ineffective state enterprises and a 10
percent reduction in the number of government officers.
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai strictly followed these IMF and World
Bank policy recommendations after he established a coalition government
in November 1997. For instance, his government ordered 56 of the exist-
ing 92 finance companies to close their operations in December 1997
under strong pressure from the IMF. From January to August 1998, his
government also disbanded four of fourteen existing local commercial
banks and reorganized them into the state-controlled ones. In August,
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they ordered all financial institutions to introduce the BIS capital ade-
quacy standard and to introduce a loan loss provisioning fund to tackle
increasing NPLs (Suehiro ed. 2002: Ch. 4). Concerning corporate restruc-
turing, the Stock and Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC) and the
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) announced guidance on “good
corporate governance” in January 1998, and obliged all the listed com-
panies to appoint at least two independent directors and to establish an
independent audit committee by the end of 1999 (Suehiro 2001c). In
addition to these Anglo-American type reforms, the government also
started revision of existing economic laws including the Company Bank-
ruptcy Act, the Public Limited Company Act, the Accounting Act and the
Auditing Act in line with the global standards or, to be more precise, in
accordance with an “Anglo-American” model (Suehiro ed. 2002: Ch. 2).
Apart from these policies, the Chuan government started other reforms
in collaboration with the Japanese government. These reforms consisted
of two major parts: 1) an industrial restructuring plan (IRP) which aimed
at improving the international competitiveness of export-oriented indus-
tries such as electronics and food processing and reorganizing heavy
industries which suffered from excess production capacity; and 2) the
promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which suffered
seriously from capital shortages after the crisis, but would be expected to
play a significant role in supporting industry (Suehiro 2000b, see also
Figure 7.1). The Japanese government agreed to provide US$340 million
for these schemes together with a delegation of technical experts called
the Mizutani mission. In brief, in contrast to the IMF and the World Bank-
led reforms focusing on the financial and corporate sectors, the Japanese
government-sponsored loans put top priority on the real sector, especially
the manufacturing sector to which a large number of Japanese enterprises
had committed substantial investment (Suehiro 2001b).10
Aside from these policies, the leadership of the Thai government began
working out a social protection scheme. Although the World Bank and
Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, which was integ-
rated into Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation or JBIC in 2000)
provided a sizable portion of the necessary funds, the scheme was mainly
designed by the ad hoc National Committee on Social Policy which
included leading figures of NGO groups such as Mo Prawet Wasi and
Anek Nakhabut. This scheme was named a Social Investment Plan (SIP),
and the government requested local people and local community-based
organizations to propose grass-root projects on the basis of their own
needs (Anek 2002). After screening proposed plans, the government
granted funds through nation-wide branches of the Government Savings
Bank. It was reported that as many as 70,000 projects were proposed.
However, merely 450 projects were approved because most of the projects
had no concrete plan.11 After this poor result, SIP was transferred to the
Ministry of the Interior in 1999, and was reorganized into a new scheme
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with the purpose of promoting a “community-based economy” (setthakit
chumchon) closely connected to the decentralization policy that the new
1997 Constitution required the government to implement (Prawat 1998,
1999).12
After the Chuan government’s tenure ended, Thailand held a general
election in January 2001. The Democrat Party, core political party of the
Chuan government, was completely defeated by Thai Rak Thai Party
(TRT: Thai people love Thailand) due partly to the slow economic recov-
ery and partly to its poor policy agenda. By contrast, TRT proposed a set
of new policies to the people in a nation-wide campaign. Owing to this
campaign, TRT successfully won 248 out of 500 total seats (50 percent) in
the House of Representatives, while the Chuan-led Democrat Party won
only 126 seats (25 percent). Given the result of the general election,
Thaksin Shinawatra, the party leader of TRT, became the prime minister
and eventually altered many of the institutional reforms that had been
pushed by the Chuan government. He also launched unique policies
(Thaksinomics), or the so-called dual-track policies, which aimed at enhanc-
ing international competitiveness in targeted industries on the one hand,
and reducing poverty problems through the introduction of various
schemes in favor of rural people on the other (Pasuk and Baker 2004: Chs
4 and 5).
For the financial restructuring scheme, the Chuan government had
tackled the NPL problems by employing a self-help scheme. Namely, cred-
itors and debtors directly negotiated with each other, while the Thai
Bankers Association (TBA) and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) served as
coordinators to promote debt restructuring. However, the Thaksin
government altered this time-consuming self-help scheme, creating
instead a more direct solution of the NPL problem for creditors by setting
up the government-sponsored Thailand Assets Management Corporation
(TAMC). As a result, most large-scale NPLs of commercial banks, espe-
cially those in the government-sponsored banks, were transferred to the
TAMC. Thanks to the establishment of the TAMC, the percentage of
NPLs held by local financial institutions, including state-owned banks, dra-
matically dropped from 47 percent in July 1999 to 10 percent in Decem-
ber 2001 (Suehiro ed. 2002: 11).
On the other hand, as far as stock market reform is concerned, the
Chuan government planned to conduct a complete revision of the exist-
ing Public Limited Company Act in conjunction with the Anglo-American
concept of corporate governance. According to the original plan, the new
Act would introduce three major revisions: increase of the director’s role
in monitoring companies, enhancement of minority shareholders’ rights
and prohibition of mutual credit guarantees among companies belonging
to the same business group. But the Thaksin government mutilated this
plan and enacted a new Act with a minor revision. It stressed the activa-
tion of local stock markets by giving local firms tax incentives rather than
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introducing a legal framework to promote “good corporate governance”
(Suehiro ed. 2002: Ch. 3). It also neglected the industrial restructuring
plan that the Chuan government had introduced. This plan originally
covered 13 industries, and would be carried out according to the action
plan formulated in June 1998 (Suehiro 2000b: 46–9). But Thaksin shelved
this plan, and instead he emphasized promotion of local industries and
cottage industries in rural areas as can be seen in the program of “one
village [tambon] one product” (OTOP). At the same time, he also intro-
duced a new National Competitiveness Plan, in which five industries were
strategically selected for promotion to aid Thailand’s competitive advant-
age in international economic competition (NESDB 2003: 81–3).13
The policy agenda of the Thaksin government places priority on social
protection policies that favor rural people, poor people and owners of
SMEs (NESDB 2003, 2005. See Table 7.2). These policies include: 1) a
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Table 7.2 Performance of the social protection policies under the Thaksin govern-
ment of Thailand (as of September 2004)
Programs Policy performance
1 Village fund 1.3 million farmers joined the program with a total
investment amount of 22.4 billion baht. Out of this,
farmers repaid 12.7 billion bahts.
2 People’s Bank Government provides financial supports for 850,000
cases (owners of small businesses), and outstanding
loans amounted to 17,827 million baht by
September 2004.
3 Debt moratorium for Government provides moratorium for 2 million 
poor farmers cases, amounting to 75,500 million baht.
4 One tambon (village), 26,000 villages joined the programs. Total sales by 
one product (OTOP) the OTOP accounted for 42,000 million baht
including exports (5,000 million baht).
5 SMEs finance Financial support by the government for the SMEs
amounted to 157 billion baht between 2001 and
2004.
6 30 Baht healthcare Patients can receive healthcare service from public 
scheme hospitals and health centers so long as they pay 30
baht at each first visit. Amounted to 47,075,000
persons by the end of 2004.
7 Ban Nua Arthon Project Total of 48,000 households obtained houses 
(special housing project through this project.
for low income groups)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Thailand (2004) (in Thai).
village (tambon) fund scheme in which the government provides one
million baht to all the villages (71,507 villages) and urban communities
(4,040 communities) in a metropolitan area to create new projects; 2) the
“one village one product” movement in which the government provides
financial and technical support to the local community for the develop-
ment of specific products such as natural silk fabric and traditional ceram-
ics; 3) a three year moratorium on debt repayment for poor farmers; 4)
the establishment of a People’s Bank in which borrowers are not required
to offer collateral and surety; 5) the reorganization of the Small Industries
Finance Corporation (SIFO) into an SME Development Bank for the
purpose of helping the owners of SMEs; 6) a 30 baht healthcare scheme in
which all people who have not belonged to any social security scheme can
receive health care in government-sponsored health centers or clinics.
It is surprising that all of these schemes came into existence within one
year after the establishment of the Thaksin government. By February
2002, the government completed providing village funds to 70,439 villages
in the whole country, while as many as 2,360,000 farmers applied for the
debt moratorium scheme, which amounted to 75.5 billion baht (Prime
Minister’s Office 2002). Between October 2001 and August 2002, the
government issued a certification card (gold card) for the 30 baht health-
care scheme to 45,900,000 individuals (the total population of Thailand
was 62,800,000 in 2002), and it was reported that 35,000,000 people
already had medical service in 4,200 health centers across the country
(Krunthep Thurakit, 27 August 2002). The coverage of this scheme
increased to 47,075,000 individuals by the end of 2004 (NESDB 2005:
6–8). According to the latest evaluation by the Ministry of Finance on the
Thaksin government performance, the percentage of the population
below the national poverty standard dropped from 15.9 percent in 1999 to
9.8 percent in 2002, while the ratio of unemployed persons also dropped
from 4.19 percent to 2.24 percent in the same period (Ministry of Finance
2004). As for the social protection policies such as the village fund project,
we can see noteworthy results under the leadership of Prime Minister
Thaksin between 2001 and 2004 (see Table 7.2).
Carefully looking at the various policies of the governments to over-
come the crisis, we see notable changes in reform targets from an
outward-looking focus on globalization to an inward-looking focus on
domestic matters.14 The Thaksin government chose a different path from
the East Asia economic model (a catch-up type industrialization through
manufactured export promotion), which the Japanese government pro-
moted in the industrial restructuring prescriptions it advised.15
What is the final target for economic reforms?
What should be noted here is the fact that such a counter-balancing move-
ment against both the Anglo-American model and the East Asia economic
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model is not confined to the case of Thailand. Rather, this movement
spread to other East Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. It is
true that the East Asian crisis-hit countries strictly followed the policy
recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank in the initial stage of
the economic crisis. But each government began to recognize that the
Anglo-American model and the East Asian economic model do not always
contribute to economic recovery in a real sense, or to social stability. As a
result, they are now turning their eyes from the economic sector to the
social sector and from global standards to their own style of policy auto-
nomy. We may say that such a movement consists of a part of the local
response of East Asian countries to ongoing economic globalization and
liberalization.
Another new movement may be seen in the political arena in East Asia.
As is shown typically in Thailand, Prime Minister Thaksin has attempted
to implement his policy ideas on the basis of his strong leadership and
high national popularity. He prefers strategic meetings to public hearings
when formulating concrete plans. He prefers direct dialogue with the
people to time-consuming discussion in parliament to solve various prob-
lems. He also tries to introduce a “top-down” system into Thai politics
against the “bottom-up” system that had steadily developed in line with
the democratization movement during the 1990s (Pasuk and Baker 2004:
135–44).
In sum, he is going to introduce a “Thaksinocracy” instead of demo-
cracy. Thaksinocracy is principally derived from his own experience as the
top manager of the largest business empire (SHIN Corporation group) in
the Thai telecommunications industry. In a speech in 1997, Thaksin said
that: “A country is a company. A company is a country. They are the same.
The management is the same.” In this context, he identified himself as a
“CEO Prime Minister” (ibid. 101–2). Based on this unique political idea,
Thaksin asks all the ministers and all the heads of departments in govern-
ment offices to make their “vision, mission and goals” clear and he asks
them to implement policies more quickly and efficiently, just as in the
management of a private company.
At the same time, Thaksin puts the priority on his personal popularity.
This is because he believes the national popularity of the prime minister is
the best indicator of the quality of the government, just like the stock
price is seen as the best tool of measuring the quality of a company. On
this account, he prefers direct dialogue with the people to discussion in
parliament due to its contribution to this popularity, and prefers a “top-
down” system to a “bottom-up” system for the sake of speed and efficiency
in policy implementation. It is true that the prime minister is selected
through the general election on the basis of political parties, and a variety
of institutions to promote democracy such as a Constitutional Court and
an Election Committee have been introduced into Thai politics. But the
Thaksin government is different to a textbook parliamentary democracy
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because its legitimacy is basically sustained by the prime minister’s distin-
guished leadership, his unchallenged economic power and his widespread
popularity.16
Conventional argument frequently presupposes that political democrat-
ization and economic liberalization will combine together to develop a
country into a civil society-based state. But in the real world, East Asian
countries since the crisis have moved in a different direction in terms of
socio-political structure, away from a civil society model. Rather, they are
moving toward a populist regime characterized by individual political
leadership and inward-looking policies. Thailand provides a good case
study, as its evolution follows, more or less, the same patterns as Malaysia,
the Philippines and Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is likely that no one will be
able to stop the long-term globalization, liberalization and democrat-
ization of the world. In this sense, both East Asian countries and Latin
American countries are facing a fundamental problem of how to coordi-
nate their internal needs with the given external conditions.
Notes
1 Since 2000, three major regions have shown different patterns of economic
performance: strong recovery in East Asia in general and in South Korea and
Thailand in particular; rapid increase of exports related to IT industries from
India; and relatively lower growth in Latin America.
2 These figures are averages and so neglect population size. Taking population
size into consideration, Latin America and the Caribbean have US$3,680 GNI
per capita and US$7,030 PPP GNI per capita in 2000. This is larger than similar
figures in East Asia and the Pacific where GNI per capita is US$1,060 and PPP
GNI per capita is US$4,120 in the same years (World Bank 2002: 233).
3 Bela Balassa (1981), who was an economic advisor to the World Bank in the
early 1980s, called this type of government policy an outward-looking industrial
development strategy.
4 For an interesting account of the changing status of local big family businesses,
state enterprises and multinational corporations in Latin America after the
middle of the 1990s, see Hoshino ed. (2004).
5 Holliday and Wilding eds (2003: 173) characterized such development-ori-
ented social policy as “productivist subordination of social policy to economic
policy” and divided the four East Asian countries or regions into three major
classifications: facilitative (Hong Kong), developmental-universalist (South
Korea and Taiwan) and developmental-particularist (Singapore).
6 For more accounts for housing policies in East Asia, see Holliday and Wilding
eds (2003: Ch. 5).
7 For the saving and investment ratio gap in East Asia and Latin America by the
early 1990s, Hosono (1994) provides informative data and suggests a different
pattern of investment financed by high domestic savings and FDI in East Asia
and lower investment with low domestic savings in Latin America. See also
Table 7.1 of this Chapter.
8 Looking at the extent of M&A activity in the three-year periods from 1995 to
1997 and from 1998 to 2000, we see, in Latin America, increases from
US$10,115 million to US$35,080 million in Argentina, from US$29,361 million
to US$61,750 million in Brazil and from US$5,188 million to US$12,855
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million in Chile. Likewise, in crisis-hit East Asian countries, the increase was
from US$1,592 million to US$20,489 million in South Korea, from US$1,671
million to US$2,666 million in Indonesia, and from US$1,058 million to
US$7,789 million in Thailand (Ferraz and Hamaguchi 2002: 389).
9 Computed from Bank of Thailand, Economic and Financial Statistics (Quarterly),
various issues.
10 Since the mid-1980s, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
(which later changed its name to the Ministry of Economy, International Trade
and Industry, or METI) proposed to ASEAN countries a package of technical
assistance for industrial restructuring based on the Japanese experience.
However, ASEAN countries showed hardly any interest to this proposal. It was
only after the 1997 crisis that ASEAN countries requested such type of assistance.
11 Based on the author’s interview with an official in Bangkok in March 1999.
12 Increased experience and various other information accumulated in the
process of SIP were transferred to the National Economic and Social Develop-
ment Board (NESDB). The NESDB started a new project for poverty reduction
in collaboration with the World Bank in 2001.
13 These five industries include automobiles, food processing, fashion (garments-
gems and jewelry-leather products), the tourist industry and software.
14 Such change in policy does not imply that Thaksin neglects the world-wide
trend toward liberalization and globalization. Rather, Thailand is one of the
most active countries in East Asia promoting region-based free trade agree-
ments (FTA) as well as bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) as we
see in the cases of the Thailand–China agreement on free trade of agricultural
products in October of 2003 and the Thailand–India FTA agreement in July of
2004.
15 The Fortune Global Forum in Hong Kong portrayed “Mr. Thaksin as a maver-
ick populist and nationalist who could steer Thailand away from an open
economy, embracing international trade and capital to an inward looking
development path.” Likewise, a Morgan Stanley analyst characterized Thaksin’s
strategy as a first step in dismantling the East Asian economic model (Lian
2001: 2).
16 According to public opinion polls, Prime Minister Thaksin’s approval rating
was at its peak of 71.9 percent in May 2001. But it dropped down to 48.1
percent in September 2004 due to his political one-man show and problems
with Islamic separatists in the south.
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While Berle and Means (1932) discussed the rise of managerial capitalism
a long time ago, a recent survey by La Porta et al. (1999) observes that the
classical separation of ownership and control observed in it is rather an
exception, and that it is more common around the world to have family-
controlled firms often taking the form of business groups. Khanna (2000)
and Granovetter (1995) provide good surveys of several issues regarding
business groups, including the very essential question of how to define
these groups. One of the issues is dynamic performance and the efficiency
of the business group. Actually, the business groups, like Korean chaebols,
have been subject to political scrutiny as the financial crises swept Asia,
perceived as the home of “crony capitalism.”
The concept of the controlling minority structure (CMS) firms pro-
posed by Bebchuk et al. (2000) helps us understand why the business
groups tend to fall into the serious agency problem which led to unjustifi-
able investment drives and the moral hazard problem. In the CMS firms, a
shareholder exercises control while retaining only a small fraction of the
equity claims on a company’s cash flows. Such a radical separation of
control and cash flow rights, which is the cause of the agency problem,
can occur in three principal ways: through cross-ownership ties, a dual-
class share structure and stock pyramids. These methods are used by busi-
ness groups in many countries, including chaebols in Korea.
Then, two questions surface; first, why the business groups are develop-
ing in so many countries, and, second, what went wrong in many of them.
This chapter tries to tackle these questions. Of course, the first question is
not new, and there are old answers. That is, the business groups develop
in the settings with market failures, like in emerging economies (Leff
1978; Goto 1982; Khanna and Palepu 1997). The fact that the business
groups abound in such emerging and/or transition economies as Korea
(Chang and Choi 1988; Steers et al. 1989), India (Ghemawat and Khanna
1998), Hong Kong (Au et al. 2000), Latin America (Khanna and Palepu
2000; Guillen 2000; Strachan 1976), China (Lee and Woo 2002; Peng
2000; Keister 1998) and in Russia (Freinkman 1995) should be evidence
of their association with market failure or “institutional voids.” However, if
we see the business groups simply as an evolutionary response to the insti-
tutional environment of the economy, there is no interesting policy or
strategic issue involved.
This chapter will look at the first question from a new perspective,
namely the economic catch-up perspective. We will see the business
groups as an organizational device for economic catch-up, and suggest
that the business groups not only just emerge in response to market
failure but also serve as a vehicle for economic catch-up. In this light, we
call attention to the phenomenon that the business groups facilitate affili-
ate firms to enter new markets by providing cross-subsidy during their
initial phase of business and that the business group firms, often enjoying
lower than average profitability, tend to settle down with lower variation of
profitability.
Regarding the second question, namely why they tend to fall into
trouble, we argue that while business groups are effective in response to
market failure and/or catch-up, the benefits come with long-term caveats
in three dimensions. The following three potential dangers are discussed
in sequence. First, the benefits of economic value creation by the business
groups tend to decline over the long run as institutions evolve and
markets become mature. Second, family-controlled business groups,
taking the form of the CMS firm, tend to be subject to increasingly serious
agency problems resulting in an value-destroying, inefficient investment
drive. Third, the existence of the big players such as business groups in an
economy might hamper the sound development of a competitive market
economy by distorting or manipulating the course of liberalization, dereg-
ulation, or opening-up.
The two questions raised above will be dealt with, with primary refer-
ence to the Korean chaebols for which we have some new evidence and
data, although examples from other countries will be used too. The
following section discusses the first question, namely two alternative per-
spectives to the business groups, market failure and economic catch-up
perspectives. The third section addresses the three long-term dangers with
the business groups. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and
remarks.
Fulfilling the institutional voids and the task of economic
catch-up
Filling the institutional voids
It was since as early as works by Leff (1978) and Goto (1982) that the exist-
ence of business groups became associated with the underdeveloped
nature of the market mechanism in developing countries. This “market
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failure” story regarding the emergence of business groups has further
developed into the “institutional voids” argument by Khanna and Palepu
(1997; 2000).
Their argument is that since many of the institutions that support busi-
ness activities are absent in many parts of the world, the business groups
emerge to fill the institutional voids. Below let me provide a brief
summary of their argument. First, in product markets, given the lack of
information about products and transaction-related claims-processing
institutions, companies in emerging markets face much higher costs in
building credible brands than their counterparts in advanced economies.
Thus, a conglomerate with some reputation can use its group name to
enter a new business and it can also spread the costs of maintaining brand
names. In capital markets, without access to information, investors refrain
from putting money into unfamiliar ventures. In such a context, estab-
lished diversified groups have superior access to capital markets.
In labor markets, given the lack of well-trained business people and
educational facilities, the groups can create value by developing promising
managers within the group, and can spread the fixed costs of professional
development over the businesses in the group. Also, when the labor
market is rigid, running an internal labor market within a group can
provide additional room for flexibility. Finally, given that the governments
in emerging economies intervene much more extensively in business
operations, diversified groups can create value by acting as intermediaries
when their affiliate companies need to deal with the regulatory bureau-
cracy. The larger the group is, the easier it is to carry the costs of maintain-
ing government relations.
The fact that so many emerging economies have seen and saw the
development of various forms of business groups is evidence in support of
this market or institutional failure argument. Also, there exists a large
volume of empirical research that has confirmed the positive contribution
of the business groups in terms of financial performance, internal capital
market and so on in emerging markets, whereas the literature finds the
opposite results with the American case (Berger and Ofek 1995; Lang and
Stulz 1994).
Thus, the important matter to remember, as Khanna and Palepu (1997;
2000) observe, is that groups compensate for a variety of missing institu-
tions in an environment, so that such benefits of group affiliation as do
exist may manifest themselves in quite different ways in different contexts
and at different times. To put it slightly differently, we should also note
that the specific forms business groups take in each country vary depend-
ing upon the economic, political and legal condition of the country.
Actually, no single firm in the developing or transition economies has
taken the form of the business group as an outcome of intentional stra-
tegic decision-making. The firms evolve to be a group or others. The
famous story of the LG group in Korea, introduced in Milgrom and
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Roberts (1992), well illustrates the evolutionary nature of the firm
growing out of a single U-form firm into a business group. If we see the
business groups as an evolutionary response to the institutional environ-
ment of the economy, there is no interesting policy or strategic issue
involved. Fortunately, in the next subsection, we will argue that the busi-
ness group is not simply a passive response to the environment but serves
as an organizational device for economic catch-up.
Device for economic catch-up
Most catch-up economies face the problem of capital scarcity unless they
have enough domestic savings even from the early stage of industrializa-
tion, like Taiwan and China. When Korea started on the course of indus-
trialization in the early 1960s, it was evident that its growth potential was
seriously constrained by savings available for investment. Given the limited
size of the financial resources available, it was a reasonable solution to
pool the capital into several big hands in the business. In other words, the
government wanted to promote a small number of big businesses to expe-
dite economic growth.
Since then, the rapid economic growth achieved in Korea has often
been associated with the growth of big business groups, so-called chaebols,
whose Chinese characters are the same as zaibatsu, namely the pre-war
ancestor of keiretsu in Japan. Gerlach (1989) and Steers et al. (1989) take
an active position such that Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebols are
the organizational basis for the rising strength of their economies, and
that this form of industrial organization makes it more difficult for foreign
firms to penetrate the Japanese or Korean markets. We call this view a
catch-up device view of the business groups, and contrast this with the
market failure view originated with Leff (1978) and Goto (1982). It is also
interesting to see that in China, another catching-up economy, the
government promoted the development of the big business groups, while
there was also a very strong and bottom-up voluntary emergence of more
small scale business groups, too (Chi 1996; Hahn 1997; Lee and Woo
2002).
If we see the business groups as a device for economic catch-up, the
main function or benefits of such an organization should be something
beyond merely filling the “institutional voids.” We observe that the main
strength of the business groups in catch-up is to facilitate entry into new
markets or lines of business that were formerly monopolized by the fore-
running companies. The business groups can facilitate market entry by
mobilizing financial resources into new affiliates and helping them during
the initial period of business by providing markets, capital, technology
and brand names.
As a matter of fact, Lincoln et al. (1996) find that the keiretsu ties go
beyond the main bank-based network, and that there is a redistribution
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effect reducing variability of the keiretsu firms. In other words, weak com-
panies, like those in their starting period, benefit from group affiliation
(they recover or grow faster), while strong ones do not (they are subse-
quently outperformed by independent firms).
In a similar context, Lee, Ryu and Yoon (2001) examine the variation
in productive efficiency of chaebol and non-chaebol firms to investigate
the observation that chaebols are constantly engaged in the launching of
new ventures but that they try to maintain a certain level of efficiency at
the group level. This observation translates into a hypothesis that there
would be a higher “within-chaebol” variation in inefficiency but a lower
“between-chaebol” variation. Actually, they found that the variation
among the chaebol affiliates is 0.013, while that among the independent
firms is only 0.0045 or even 0.0021.1 In sorting out the “between-chaebol”
efficiency, after assigning an inefficiency index for each chaebol group,
they calculate the inefficiency variation among the top 22 chaebols. The
variation in this case turns out to be only 0.0022, a value similar to that of
the non-chaebol firms. So we confirm that the “between-chaebol” ineffi-
ciency variation is a lot smaller than its “within-chaebol” counterpart.
The group-level initiative to launch new business by setting up a new
firm and covering its losses during the initial period was a well-known phe-
nomena in Korea. A famous example would be Samsung’s memory chip
business. This business is now Samsung’s biggest cash cow, although it
made huge losses during the initial period. This kind of collective catch-
up strategy is especially effective when the involved technology shows a
rapid learning curve such that efficiency improves rapidly with the accu-
mulation of production experience.
The finance literature also finds the so-called “socialism” in internal
capital markets of the business groups such investment flows into loss-
making or under-performing affiliates or division in the group or con-
glomerates (Shin and Park 1999). While the literature tends to interpret
this as an inefficient behavior, an alternative interpretation would be that
this is market entry strategy by the group level endeavor and it makes
sense in dynamic context.
Long-term danger with the business group
Reduction of the group premium with institutional changes
As discussed above, value creation by unrelated group diversification is pos-
sible as there are diverse institutional voids that could be filled by the busi-
ness groups. However, as market institutions evolve over time, such
diversification premiums can decrease. Khanna and Palepu (2000) provide
an empirical verification of such reasoning using the long-term data of
Chilean firms. Evolution of institutions in general means maturing of market
mechanisms characterized by a gradual emergence of intermediaries and a
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gradual reduction of ambient transaction costs. Therefore, it becomes
increasingly difficult for the business group to create value through running
internal (labor and capital) market across their diverse affiliates.
There is some literature trying to measure the diversification premium
or discount by comparing group firms with non-group firms. Some of
them use the “chop-shop” approach.2 If a firm is composed of multi-indus-
try segments/divisions, the value of the firm is assumed to be the sum of
the several segments’ values. Then, the excess value of the firm is defined
by the difference between the firm’s actual value and the imputed value.
In US multi-segment firms, Berger and Ofek (1995) found negative value
creation or diversification discount. The diversification discount of the US
firms in Berger and Ofek (1995) was 13 percent to 15 percent during the
1986–91 period. However, Fauver et al. (1999) reported that the different
diversification effects on firm value depends on the income level and legal
systems, and found that no diversification discount or premium exists in
low income countries and in countries whose legal system is of German
origin.
G. Lee (1999) confirms the decline of diversification premium over the
long run using the data of the Korean firms. He also uses the “chop-shop”
approach. To calculate the imputed value, he uses two alternative vari-
ables: sales revenues and earnings-before-income taxes (hereafter EBIT).
He first calculates the industry median of capital-to-sales ratio (capital to
EBIT ratio) for the stand-alone companies in each industry. Here, capital
is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt.3
Then, the imputed value of a group-affiliated company is obtained by mul-
tiplying this median (or mean) ratio to the actual sales revenues or EBIT.
This way, the imputed value represents the hypothetical value of a group-
affiliated company, assuming that it was operated as a stand-alone busi-
ness.
G. Lee finds positive value creation by the group formation, but thinks
that the value premium of the group-affiliated companies may be due to
other firm-specific characteristics than the group-induced diversification.
To check this possibility, he has also run the regression model for the two
excess value measures, controlling for various firm characteristics, such as
size, profitability and growth potentials. The regression results also
confirm the positive value premium of group-affiliated companies as
showing significantly positive coefficients of the group dummies. The
premium using the sales multiplier is 6.3 percent and that using the EBIT
multiplier is 7.5 percent.
To check the changes in the premium, he divides the sample period
into four sub-periods, and runs the regressions. He finds that the diversifi-
cation premium decreased over the years, finally turning to a negative
value during the 1994–6 period. In 1984–7, the premium was about 10.5
percent. However it decreased to about 8.9 percent in 1988–90, 6.3
percent in 1991–3 and finally 4.7 percent in 1994–6.
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With the continuing decrease of diversification premium in the 1990s,
we finally had the financial crisis in 1997, which was triggered by the suc-
cessive collapses of chaebols. Based on our framework, we think that the
fundamental change in the nature of the institutional environment lay at
the bottom of the crisis of the chaebols. As clues to the declining perform-
ance of chaebols, we note the following two important changes (Lee
2002).
First, the government has gradually stopped the explicit promotion of,
or giving favor to, specific industries and firms. This does not mean that
the government stopped intervention in the private sector, but it means
that many kinds of once legal promotional policies of the government
have disappeared. These policies included the so-called “policy loans”
which were given to designated firms in the target industries at interest
rates much lower than market rates, special export credits given at lower
interest rates and arbitrary tax exemptions to the target industries.4 Since
the big business groups had been the main beneficiaries of such preferen-
tial treatment, these changes in the government attitude and its actions
toward the private sector contributed to the lowering of the rents enjoyed
by the chaebols.
Second, we should note the rising wave of globalization and the WTO
spirit of free trade in the 1990s. The 1990s was the decade in which the
Korean economy saw the fulfillment of most of its liberalization programs,
including both trade and capital markets. Such liberalization measures
caught further momentum following the Korean entry into the OECD in
1996. There had been a steady downward trend of effective protection
rates over the 1963–90 period. Toward the end of the 1980s, the effective
protection rates for manufacturing goods were reduced to less than 10
percent or even fell to negative levels. Furthermore, the tariff rates for
imported goods decreased from more than 20 percent in the early 1980s
to about 5 percent in the mid 1990s.
With the domestic market opened and liberalized, Korean firms,
including chaebols, have faced increasing competition from foreign firms.
In the world markets, on the one hand, Korean comparative advantages as
a low wage country have disappeared with the rise of ASEAN and Chinese
exporters, and, on the other hand, Korean products cannot afford to
compete with the products from an advanced country, like Japan, in terms
of quality and product differentiation. In general, this trend of globaliza-
tion and liberalization has contributed to the lowering of the rents and
decrease in profit rates enjoyed by the Korean chaebols. Since chaebols
were the dominant players in the protected domestic markets and the
main exporters of Korea under the government support, we can reason
that chaebols were hit more badly than the small and medium-sized com-
panies. As a matter of fact, according to Yoon’s estimation (Yoon 1998) of
the long-term trend of the profit rates (ROE: net income to stock holders’
equity) over the 1980 to 1996 period, the profit rates for the large-sized
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firms, namely largely chaebol firms, tend to be consistently lower than the
small or medium-sized firms since the mid-1980s when the trend of prof-
itability passed its peak.5
What do these changes mean for the balance sheet of the costs and bene-
fits of the chaebol-type firms and their diversification strategy? It is clear that
the benefits side has lost. With lower benefits, balancing the costs and bene-
fits of the chaebol has become difficult, and now the costs side has started to
loom largely. In other words, the costs of over-diversification are suddenly
felt much more strongly than before. As mentioned above, diversification
was a somewhat rational response of the chaebols to the environment.
But, now that the environment had changed, it was not easy to make
money in many industries. Unfortunately, the chaebols did not command
enough flexibility to meet the new challenge, or were too big to change
quickly. The source of the inflexibility has to do with both the seemingly
M-form like over-diversified organization with few exit possibilities and the
unchanged mind of the top management.
The founder-managers of chaebols were succeeded by their sons, who
often did not have verified managerial talents. The challenge to the inher-
ited management was in general more demanding as the size of the firms
had grown bigger and the entry into the global business environment was
more complicated as well. In other words, the burden on the top manage-
ment had become much heavier and the need for decentralization was
evident. Decentralization was necessary as the member firms in the
Korean chaebols enjoyed much less autonomy than the division in the M-
form and because the necessary separation of the strategic and opera-
tional decision-making processes was not made. In short, the chaebols’
problem was that they pursued a diversification strategy while their struc-
ture was a quite centralized one. In other words, the tension between
“strategy and structure” had become serious as the institutional environ-
ment had changed.
In sum, the above discussion suggests that the business groups should
try to find the optimum level of diversification as the external institutional
environment changes, and that pursuit of the same level of diversification
is value-destroying, rather than value-creating.
Inefficiency of investment drive in a leveraged CMS firm
The literature on corporate organization tends to perceive two kinds of
firms. One is the firm of concentrated ownership where there is an owner
of the firm with a controlling share of the firm, and the other is the firm
of dispersed ownership where ownership is quite dispersed over a large
number of shareholders, each with only a negligible share of the firm.
The literature finds that the firm with concentrated ownership is free
from agency costs of hired management while it is exposed to the danger
of management entrenchment. In contrast, the firm with dispersed owner-
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ship could enjoy the benefits of professional management whereas it is
potentially exposed to the agency costs of the hired management. It is not
hard to notice that neither form of firm can command a priori domi-
nance over the other, and so many empirical papers have ended up with
conflicting results over the relative performance between the two types of
the firms.
What, then about the business group? What kind of firm is this? Con-
centrated ownership or dispersed ownership? Of course, ownership of
business groups can be concentrated or dispersed. But, we contend that
there is great possibility that ownership of the business group can be in
between the two extremes. Bebchuk et al. (2000) propose the controlling
minority structure firms as the third kind of firm, and find that the firms
of controlling minority structures are widespread around the world, espe-
cially in the form of business groups. In CMS firms, a shareholder exer-
cises control while retaining only a small fraction of the equity claims on a
company’s cash flows. Such a radical separation of control and cash flow
rights can occur in three principal ways: through cross-ownership ties, a
dual-class share structure, and stock pyramids. All three of these methods
are used by the business groups in many countries, including the Korean
chaebols.
What, then is the problem with the CMS firm? The CMS structure
resembles controlled structure insofar as it insulates the controller from
the market for corporate control, but it resembles dispersed ownership
insofar as it places corporate control in the hands of an insider who holds
a small fraction of equity. Thus, the CMS threatens to combine the incen-
tive problems associated with both the concentrated structure and the dis-
persed ownership in a single ownership structure.
Theoretical models in Bebchuk et al. (2000) explain why inefficient
projects are chosen and unprofitable expansion is pursued under the
CMS. Suppose that there are projects which can produce a value (V) that
includes cash flow (S) available to all shareholders and private benefits of
control (B). Then, between the two alternative projects that generate dif-
ferent cash flow and private benefits, the model shows that the probability
that the project generating a bigger private benefit is chosen increase at a
sharply increasing rate as  decreases ( is cash flow rights of the control-
ling minority shareholder). For example, with a value of  as 10 percent,
which is roughly the average value in the top 30 chaebols, a controller will
reject the efficient project unless the value gap between the two projects is
more than 27 percent.
Another model in Bebchuk et al. (2000) also explains that given any dis-
tribution of opportunities to expand and contract, the likelihood that a
CMS firm will make an inefficient decision – and thus the expected
agency cost – grows larger as the controller’s equity stake  becomes
smaller. In their model, a controller will prefer to expand (or not to con-
tract) a firm if (VB)BP, where P is the buying or selling price of
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the asset. For example, with a value of  as 10 percent, the controller will
refuse to sell the asset unless the firm receives a price 45 percent higher
than the real value of the asset to the firm. Equivalently, the controller will
acquire the asset unless the price is more than 45 percent higher than its
real value to the firm.
In this model, too, the deciding factor is the magnitude of private bene-
fits accruing to the controller when he keeps or acquires the asset, and
private benefits tend to come from self-dealing or appropriation
opportunities. In the Korean context, typical private benefits also took the
form of arbitrary and preferential borrowing from the firms and many
kinds of outright cash payments to the controlling shareholders. These
models suggest that the unique agency costs structure of the chaebol as a
CMS firm pushes chaebols to pursue more growth than otherwise.
Bebchuk et al. (2000) find that a similar kind of agency cost happens to
the borrower-controller of the firms as the debt-equity ratio increases. In
other words, the higher the debt-equity ratio, the more likely the con-
troller is to take risky projects which provide more return upon success.
This is the agency cost of the highly leveraged firm. Milgrom and Roberts
(1992) also observe that an unjustifiable expansion drive can prevail when
the controller of the firm expects that the costs of any failure would be
shared or transferred to the lenders, whereas the benefits of any success
are monopolized by the incumbent management.
Relative performance comparison between the business groups and
stand-alone firms has been one of the important issues in both academia
and practices. In the Korean context, the debate has been the comparison
between the chaebols and non-chaebols. In this debate, chaebols are con-
sidered to be firms under concentrated ownership since researchers find
a controlling family in each chaebol group. This chapter does not
accept this perception of the chaebol and argues that it is misleading and
cannot explain the observed behavior of chaebols. We observe that a
chaebol is neither a dispersed ownership firm nor a concentrated owner-
ship firm, and is rather a kind of CMS (controlling minority structure)
firm. If we perceive chaebols as a kind of CMS firm, it becomes quite easy
to explain several important features of chaebols, including aggressive
expansion which is often unjustifiable in terms of the interests of the
shareholders.
If we look at the growth of chaebols in terms of artificial rents associ-
ated with institutional voids or state intervention in terms of domestic
market protection and preferential loans, it would be natural for chaebols
to take advantage of these rents in pursuing growth with diversification.
However, the existence of rents does not seem enough to explain the
expansion tendency of chaebols, especially given the fact that there has
been a substantial degree of market liberalization and reduction of subsi-
dized loans since the 1980s. As a matter of fact, the chaebols were per-
ceived to acquire, or enter into, businesses which were not justifiable in
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terms of rate of return of investment even in the 1990s. In other words, we
need to look at the intrinsic mechanism leading to the unjustifiable invest-
ment drive which had contributed to the declining financial performance
of the business groups. This is the reason we need to resort to the concept
of CMS firms. According to this model, a CMS firm like a chaebol tends to
pursue “unjustifiable” growth since the actual share of the controller is so
small. Such an investment drive should lead to over-capacity and low pro-
ductive efficiency as confirmed by the regression analysis of the produc-
tion functions done in Lee et al. (2002). Joh (2003) also finds that the
separation of control rights and cash flow rights in Korean chaebols led to
lower profitability.
Lee et al. (2002) have examined the controller’s share in the chaebol
and non-chaebol firms to find that the owner-controller’s shares are
significantly higher in non-chaebol firms. It confirms that in the chaebol
firms, the owners’ share continued to decline over the sample period,
which is confirmed by a simple regression using time-trend as an explana-
tory variable. We can thus infer that the decreasing share of the owner-
controller aggravated the agency costs of the controlling-owner, and led to
the inefficient investment drive in the chaebol firms.
To verify this argument, Lee et al. (2002) have run the regressions
where the difference in the investment rate between chaebols and non-
chaebols is specified as a function of cash flow of the firm, the difference
between chaebols and non-chaebols in the share of owner-controller and
a proxy for Tobin’s Q measured by the market value divided by the book
value of the firms. The model is similar to the model used in Sharfstein
(1998) and Kim (2002). They find that the coefficient of the ownership
difference variable was negative and significant in the 1990s, while it was
negative and not significant in the 1980s. It shows that the investment rate
difference between chaebol and non-chaebol firms in the 1990s can be
explained by the difference in the shares held by the owner-controller,
and that the smaller the owner-controller’s shares is in each firm, as in
chaebol firms, the more the firms invest. As a matter of fact, the chaebol
firms started to invest much more in the 1990s, compared to non-chaebol
firms.6
This result with long-term trend of controller’s share and investment
drive has important implications for the business group as a device for
development and transition. We know that the controller’s share tends to
decrease with firm growth over time unless he/she has enormous personal
financial resources to keep up his/her share at a certain level. Given the
CMS structure in place, the continuing decrease of the share of the con-
trolling family implies the aggravation of the agency costs and the increas-
ing possibility of inefficient investment decision and firm expansion. What
would be the final consequences of this dynamic process had already been
shown by the sad story of the Korean chaebols. The strategic implication is
then that the business groups should act to correct the CMS structure of
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the firm. Various things are to be done. The first is to reduce the private
benefits of the controller by making the management more transparent
and accountable since it is this private benefit that the controller is aiming
at. Formation of stock pyramids itself might not be regulated. As long as
there is active participation of non-controlling shareholders and high pro-
tection of their rights, for instance, by derivative suits and class actions,
any expropriation of non-controlling shareholders in the CMS firm may
be checked better. Enhanced checks and balance with better corporate
governance would also help solve the problem of inefficient investment
decisions by the controller.
The vested interests of the big business hampering liberalization
As explained above, while it was good to have big business groups for the
purpose of a fast track approach to economic development, it might
become a hurdle in further economic development in the long run. In
other words, as Khanna (2000) and Kali (1999) point out, the mere exist-
ence of a group might hamper the development of the market. The expla-
nation goes like this. Since groups rely on internal sources of financing,
the demand for analyst services might be attenuated. Analysts might find it
difficult to evaluate groups. In this context, we would like to illustrate the
case of Korea where the existence of big players like chaebols distorted
the course of financial liberalization.7
In the early phase of Korea’s economic development, when the govern-
ment was in a position to select chaebols for subsidized credit, the quasi-
internal organization was efficient as it could economize on the cost of
information gathering and policy implementation (C. Lee 1982). Thus,
the role of its financial system was largely that of financing the growth of
chaebols at the behest of the government. It was the state that made the
decision in allocating subsidized credit, and the commercial banks, which
were nationalized, served in effect as a channel of government-directed
credit allocation.
The success of the quasi-internal organization, however, planted the
seeds of its own demise as chaebols grew and became a dominant force in
the national economy. This system encouraged chaebols to pursue a
heavily indebted growth strategy, and as long as the state was in control of
credit allocation and chaebols had no major alternative source of credit,
the state was able to use them as an effective instrument for economic
development. In time, however, chaebols grew and their power vis-à-vis
the state increased as their place in the economy expanded. In con-
sequence, the government could no longer unilaterally change its finan-
cial policy, freeing interest rates, as the resulting higher rates would have
put a heavy debt burden on chaebols.
Thus, even after the big business grew beyond “small infants,” the
government tended to find it difficult to initiate policies that would affect
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the big business adversely. For example, in the early 1980s the govern-
ment began undertaking several measures of financial liberalization
under the influence of rising free-market ideology and pressures from
abroad to open financial markets. Actually, throughout the 1980s the
government undertook several measures of financial liberalization, but
they did not change its basic stance of low interest rate policy. Rather, the
government had to allow the chaebols to acquire and/or start several non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) as they wanted to have alternative
financial sources other than the commercial banks that were under
government control.
Thus, one of the byproducts of the limited financial liberalization in
the 1980s was the growth of NBFIs, many of which were owned by chae-
bols and were used by them as a source of external financing. This access
to an alternative source of finance gave chaebols greater independence
from the government, and this independence plus their importance in
the national economy gave them the political power to influence govern-
ment policies, especially various liberalization matters. Granted that free-
market ideology and the increasing pressure from the outside world set
the stage for financial liberalization in Korea, it was the interest politics of
chaebols that shaped the final outcome of Korea’s post-1993 financial lib-
eralization.
Economic liberalization, if correctly carried out, is supposed to estab-
lish a competitive market in which many sellers of financial instruments
compete in an open, rule-based manner. But, in an economy where there
are a few dominant players with a strong stake in controlling their sources
of finance, the course that economic liberalization takes may not be what
many of its advocates had in mind. It will be manipulated to reflect the
interests of big players, and its outcome is likely to be different from a
competitive market.
We can point out at least two abnormalities in the course of economic
liberalization in Korea. First, it is natural and desirable that liberalization
and inducement of foreign direct investment should go first before the
liberalization of portfolio investment is enacted. However, in the case of
Korea, even until the late 1990s, the amount of FDI was very small. The
multinational corporations (MNCs), that could pose a potential threat to
chaebols playing in oligopolistic domestic markets, were not much either
welcomed or encouraged by the dominant policy coalition between the
government and chaebols.
Second, “inward” financial liberalization should go first, so as to allow
foreign banks and financial institutions to come into Korea and compete
against local financial institutions. However, in the case of Korea, it was
done in reverse order; in other words, “outward” financial liberalization
was carried out first so that chaebols and chaebol-owned banks and NBFI’s
may go abroad to borrow at much lower interest rates than the local rates.
Actually, it was a kind of “give-and-take” between the government and the
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chaebols; the government wanted to initiate full-scale financial liberaliza-
tion which was expected to increase interest rates, and, in return, had to
give chaebols alternative and attractive sources for financial transactions,
that is, offshore banking. But, neither the government nor the chaebols
wanted to open fully the domestic financial markets for foreign financial
players. The outcome was simply “asymmetric” financial liberalization.
Our analysis of the Korean experience clearly demonstrates that simply
removing the state from financial markets in an economy dominated by a
few large players will not necessarily lead to the establishment of a well-
functioning financial system. In such an economy, as in Korea with its
chaebols – a legacy of the earlier development strategy – a few dominant
players will manipulate financial liberalization to achieve their parochial
objectives that are not necessarily in the nation’s interest. Thus, unless this
structural problem of a few players dominating the economy is first
resolved, deregulation – simply removing state intervention from markets
– will not necessarily bring about an outcome beneficial to the nation.
Worse, it may plant the seeds for a financial crisis at a later date.
Summary
There is a growing number of research papers on business groups as they
are now found in numerous economies around the world. The majority of
the literature looks at the business groups as a response to market failure or
institutional voids in emerging economies. However, if we see business
groups as an evolutionary response to the institutional environment of the
economy, there is no interesting policy or strategic issue involved. This
paper has argued that the business group is not simply a passive response to
the environment but can serve as an organizational device for economic
development and transition. We observe that the main strength of the busi-
ness group in catch-up is to facilitate entry into new markets or lines of busi-
ness that were formerly monopolized by the forerunning companies. The
business group can facilitate market entry by mobilizing financial resources
into new affiliates and helping them during the initial period of business by
providing markets, capital, technology and brand names.
This paper also addresses the important question of why business
groups tend to fall into trouble. In this regard, it is argued that while the
business group is effective in response to market failure and/or catch-up,
the benefits come with long-term caveats in three dimensions. The follow-
ing three potential dangers are discussed in sequence. First, the benefits
of economic value creation by the business groups tend to decline over
the long run as institutions evolve and markets become mature. Second,
family-controlled business groups, taking the form of the CMS firm, tend
to be subject to increasingly serious agency problems resulting in value-
destroying, inefficient investment drives. Third, the existence of the big
players like business groups in an economy might hamper the sound
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development of a competitive market economy by distorting or manipulat-
ing the course of liberalization, deregulation or opening-up.
Notes
1 To see whether this difference arises from the fact that in the sample many of
the Chaebol affiliates are not listed companies, while all of the non-chaebol
firms are listed, they also tried the same method using the listed companies to
get the same results.
2 For the “chop-shop” approach, see Lang and Stulz (1994).
3 To get the market value of equity, we multiply a total number of stocks by the
year average of the stock price.
4 It was actually during the 1980s that the government itself first declared it was
switching from the policies of selective intervention to those of functional inter-
vention. Since then, this policy line has been basically maintained.
5 The estimated profit rates are the adjusted measures, which are different from
the profit rates measured in terms of the book values; they are estimated using
the market values of the assets of the firms. In general, they show a decreasing
trend over the period concerned. For the large-sized firms which include most
of the chaebol firms, the profit rates have changed from 0.3 percent during the
1980–4 period and 13.3 percent during the 1985–8 period to 0.2 percent during
the 1990–6 period.
6 Lee, Lee and Yoo (2001) also find that chaebols’ investment was inefficient
compared to non-chaebols, and this has to do with the ownership problem.
7 For more details, see Lee et al. (2002).
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9 Will inward internationalization
foster economic development in
Latin America?
João Carlos Ferraz, Airton Valente Jr. and 
Mariana Iootty
Introduction
This chapter covers three related subjects, taking Latin America as the
focus of analysis: the general and recent trend towards economic liberal-
ization; the ongoing process of ownership change; and the policy chal-
lenges associated with a process of inward internationalization which is
the outstanding structural feature of these economies. Following this
introduction, where the primary questions of this article are posed, a styl-
ized account of recent Latin American history is given, focusing on
changes in the national regimes of incentives and regulations, in order to
provide the framework of conditions facing the region. In the third
section a comparative account (developed countries in Asia and Latin
America) of the process of capital internationalization is made. Following
from there, the process of ownership change in Latin America and in
Brazil is analyzed. The sixth section discusses the nature of investments
carried out by foreign firms in developing countries. In the last section
policy challenges and implications are derived.
For the purposes of this chapter, departing from definitions found in
Schlegel (1977), development is to be understood as a process of growth,
with structural change and wealth distribution, intensive in learning. Con-
ditioning factors and determinants of development are region/period
specific and, looking back in history, few regularities prevail.
In terms of determinants of progress, innovation is the direct cause of
structural change; the process of competition is an important innovation
driver, and entrepreneurs are the relevant agents of competition (Dosi et
al. 1990). Where progress was observed, corporations linked up with
innovation networks composed of other firms, and research institutions
were capable of increasing competences in order to explore expanding
markets (Dosi and Fabiani 1994; OCDE 1999). In fact, as proposed by
Boulding (1992), learning processes constitute a basic pillar of economic
development. The State has had a proactive role in every process of
national transformation even though its format, size and forms of inter-
vention change among countries and over time. For analytical and norm-
ative purposes the relevant issue is not whether the State has a role to play
in development, but how it is involved, and to what degree of success
(Evans 1995).
Looking back in history and to the performance of nations, according
to Maddison (1994), it is possible to observe a trend towards intra-leaders
convergence and increasing distance between leaders and laggards. In this
context, while only a few nations achieved productive catching-up, scien-
tific and technological catching-up is an accomplishment for very few
nations in very narrow areas of knowledge and expertise.
Given the increasing economic importance of innovation for develop-
ment and the approximation between science, production and markets,
are (dominant) economic agents in Latin America willing to develop local
technological capabilities? This constitutes the core of the questions to be
addressed in this article.
This is an exploratory analysis of ownership change and the main argu-
ment is as follows. In the recent past, through privatization and mergers
and acquisitions, the ownership landscape of Latin American countries
has been significantly internationalized, opening relevant questions in
relation to the style of and possibilities for future development. It is
argued that inward internationalization – an extensive process of one-way
ownership change – is a very important recent phenomenon in the
region, with long-lasting consequences. These new structural conditions
pose important challenges. Within a context of liberalized economies,
policy-makers of developing countries face the task of producing a new
regime of incentives and regulations aimed at minimizing negative effects
and maximizing benefits of internationalized economies.
Economic liberalization in Latin America
The most well known and relevant structural and framework conditions of
Latin America are as follows:
• Rich natural resources and large potential markets, marked by strong
regional and social inequalities;
• Insufficient and concentrated infrastructure conditions;
• Strong propensity towards generating low skilled jobs;
• Macroeconomic stabilization cum low investment rates as well as
strong dependence on foreign resources;
• Economic liberalization as the main feature of national regimes with
regard to incentives and regulation, meaning an increasing import-
ance of private decision-making in the process of allocation of
resources.
Given the importance of private competences for development, their
main features are:
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• Willingness to do business. There is a deep-rooted culture of negotiat-
ing and implementing contracts, within a capitalist framework. The
vitality of the private sector is very remarkable;
• National and transnational companies occupy different spaces. Trans-
national companies (TNCs) are found in all areas/sectors/segments
where the technical base is marked by wide opportunities and prod-
ucts are sensitive to income elasticity;
• Relative to international benchmarks, fragile competitiveness prevails;
advantages are particularly noted in resource intensive industries;
• Companies are good at routines but weak in research activities. That
is, local technological efforts are very low and firms extensively rely on
external technologies.
Between 1930 and 1994 the region attained high growth but with a low
contribution of technical progress (Abreu and Verner 1997). In the last 20
years macroeconomic instability and low rate of structural change pre-
vailed in Latin America (Ferraz et al. 1999; Katz 1999). During the 1990s
the main features associated with the productive sector were trade deficits,
product and services updating and asymmetric modernization (CEPAL
1999).
During the 1980s Latin American economies were facing difficulties
due to: (1) the debt crisis, which limited the access of local economies to
growing international liquidity; (2) the disorganization of public finances,
weakening the intervention capacity of the State and, (3) lack of eco-
nomic dynamism, attendance to inflation, low growth and investment
rates, increasing difficulties in accessing export markets and increasing
obsolescence of productive systems.
These difficulties made clear the fragility of the so-called “inward ori-
ented” or “import substitution” model: exports concentrated in the
primary sector, protectionism for local economic activities, State presence
in infrastructure and intermediate goods production and expansion of
public expenditures.
External constraints, macroeconomic instability and low policy
response capabilities proved to be a fertile ground for policy alternatives
aimed at reverting the vicissitudes of the prevailing regime. Reforms were
facilitated by the emergence, in international forums, of a new reference
model, best summarized by what became known as the “Washington Con-
sensus” (Williamson 1993).
Policy proposals were aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and eco-
nomic liberalization and included: fiscal discipline, trade and financial lib-
eralization, increasing reliance on market mechanisms, privatization and
the heightened role of the private sector. Table 9.1 shows, in detail, the
evolution of structural reforms in different countries of the region.
In terms of ownership regulations, the Latin American context is not
different from international trends. Table 9.2 indicates that since 1991, an
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FDI-friendly trend has consistently increased. The number of countries
that introduced changes in their investment regimes has increased from
35 in 1991 to 69 in 2000. This means that, in 2000, 147 countries all over
the world were explicitly concerned with this issue, having adopted meas-
ures towards facilitating the entry and the operations of foreign firms on
local grounds.
CEPAL (1996) suggests that differences in depth, breath and pattern of
reforms are to be explained by countries’ circumstances such as the
following: economic conceptions of governmental technical teams,
characteristics of local political systems and size of markets and the
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Table 9.1 Evolution of structural reforms in Latin America 1970–95
1976–9 1980–5 1986–90 1991–5
ARGENTINA
Import liberalization R A G R
Export promotion R *
Exchange liberalization R A R
Deregulation of capital account R A * R
Deregulation for FDI R
Deregulation of exchange rate R
Privatization R
BRAZIL
Import liberalization G R
Export promotion *
Exchange liberalization R
Deregulation of capital account G
Deregulation for FDI G
Deregulation of exchange rate
Privatization G&P
CHILE
Import liberalization R * * R
Export promotion P
Exchange liberalization R
Deregulation of capital account P
Deregulation for FDI R




Export promotion R *
Exchange liberalization R
Deregulation of capital account R
Deregulation for FDI R




R: radical reform; G: gradual reform; A: reversion of process; P: partial reform; *: suspension.
existing productive and technological basis of countries. Argentina and
Chile were already experimenting a first wave of liberal reforms during
the 1970s, marking them as pioneers of a process that only later acquired
a concerted format. Mexico inaugurated reforms during the first half of
the 1980s, while in Brazil policy actions was undertaken during the 1991–5
period. During this last period most countries either entered a second
wave of reforms or reinforced existing policy directions, showing a defi-
nite commitment to a regime of incentives and regulations favorable to
economic liberalization. From the institutional perspective of globaliza-
tion, the above evidence indicates a close approximation of the region to
recommendations found in international organizations like the IMF and
the World Bank or the liberal policy practices of most developed coun-
tries.
In these countries, with the exception of Chile, institutional changes
were preceded by or introduced simultaneously with macroeconomic pol-
icies aiming at inflation control, through a combination of monetary or
exchange anchors and import liberalization. Table 9.3 indicates that, in
this area, all countries achieved significant success.
However, sustained economic growth was not attained and external vul-
nerability remained high. The regional current account remained nega-
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Table 9.2 National regulatory changes, 1991–2003
1991 1995 2000 2003
Number of countries that introduced 35 64 69 82
changes in their investment regimes
Number of regulatory changes: 82 112 150 244
more favorable to FDI 80 106 147 220
less favorable to FDI 02 06 03 24
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2001, 2004).
Table 9.3 Latin America: evolution of consumer price index (December to 
December % variation)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Latin America 199 414 877 333.1 25.8 18.2 10.4 10.3 8.6
Argentina 84.0 17.6 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.3
Brazil 475.8 1,149.1 2,489.1 929.3 22.0 9.1 4.3 2.5 3.1
Chile 18.7 12.7 12.2 8.9 8.2 6.6 6.0 4.7 3.7




tive throughout the 1990s, at around 2.6 percent (CEPAL 2002). The
Argentinean crisis of 2001 onwards is an example; the expected negative
growth rate for 2002 (between 15 and 20 percent) will be double that
observed in the US during the 1929 Great Depression.
The analytical question to be addressed is as follows: if economic liber-
alization is becoming an important feature of national regimes with
regard to incentive and regulation, what is the best way to aim at,
simultaneously, (1) regulations capable of ensuring a pro-innovative
competitive environment and (2) effective incentives to attract economic
agents to invest in local technological capabilities?
The internationalization of capital
The increasing internationalization of the world economy can be seen in
Table 9.4. Since 1982 FDI inflows have increased twenty times, reaching,
in 2000, US$1.2 trillion. During these years, M&A, not greenfield invest-
ment, became the prevalent mode of expansion of foreign firms: from
26.7 percent of total FDI inflow in 1990 in Latin America, to 52.5 percent
in 2000 (Table 9.5). This is a recent phenomenon, most probably associ-
ated with the worldwide liberalization of national economies. The special-
ized literature has always placed emphasis on the contribution of FDI
investment to host economies, the most important being the opening up
of new and modern operations. However, the panorama of the new mil-
lennium is very different from the past, as foreign firms are acquiring
existing assets and market power in host countries. Although acquisitions
imply organizational changes in acquired firms, and probably some
degree of modernization, the net gains for local economies are smaller,
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Table 9.4 Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1982–2000
(US$ billion)
1982 1990 2000 2003
World FDI inflows 57 202 1,271 559
Cross border M&A n.a. 151 1,144 296
Sales of foreign affiliates 2,465 5,467 15,680 17,580
Employment of foreign affiliates
(thousand employees) 17,454 23,721 45,587 54,170
Exports of foreign affiliates 637 1,166 3,572 3,077
Exports of goods and non-factor 
services (world) 2,124 4,381 7,036 9,228
Gross product of foreign affiliates 565 1,420 3,167 3,706
GDP at factor cost (world) 10,612 21,475 31,895 36,163*
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2001, 2004).
Note
*at current prices.
relative to greenfield investments. At the same time, as the market power
of acquiring firms expands, consequences for the competitive environ-
ment and consumer welfare are still unclear. The meaning and implica-
tions of this process are still to open to interpretation.
With the expansion of investment there was a corresponding increase
in sales of foreign affiliates, from US$2.4 trillion in 1982 to US$17.58 tril-
lion in 2003. Total employment has also increased, but at a slower pace:
from 17 million to 54 million since 1982. Export of foreign affiliates shows
a similar trend, expanding at a higher rate in world exports. This means
an increasing share of foreign affiliates in world exports: from 30 percent
in 1982 to 51 percent in 2000. The net result of ownership inter-
nationalization is economically very relevant: the share of foreign affiliates
of TNCs in world GDP increased from 5 to 10 percent between 1982 and
2003.
The internationalization of capital by means of FDI can be further
examined in terms of investment flows and their contribution to capital
formation in national economies and regions. As shown in Table 9.6,
among developed countries between 1989 and 2000, FDI inflow and
outflow have increased practically tenfold, from US$137 billion to
US$1,046 billion. This means that investments by foreign companies in
2000 came to represent 19.4 percent of gross fixed capital formation of
developed countries, up from 3.7 percent just ten years before. By all
accounts, this expansion is phenomenal, with long lasting consequences,
even taking into consideration that, after 2001, the rate of expansion
apparently has been receding.
Among developed countries there are different FDI patterns: besides
being the world leader in FDI, with 20 to 25 percent of total share, the
USA showed a balanced pattern between inflow and outflow. Even
though, in 2000, the capacity to attract investments was higher than the
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Table 9.5 M&A to FDI ratio (%)
Region 1995 2000
% asset sales % asset % asset sales % asset
to inward FDI acquisition to to inward FDI acquisition to
outward FDI outward FDI
Developed Countries 80.9 56.1 105.2 104.6
Developing Counties 14.1 26.1 29.0 42.3
Latin America 26.7 54.1 52.5 138.5
Argentina 33.3 132.0 47.3 74.0
Brazil 31.4 170.6 15.7 22.6
Mexico 7.5 – 30.1 264.4
Asia 9.2 21.3 15.5 29.9
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































willingness to invest abroad, in 2003, the outflow surpassed the inflow. It is
also notable that in the UK, in 2000 and 2003, the willingness to invest
abroad was much higher than the capacity of that economy to attract FDI
investment, reinforcing the previously established outward trend of that
economy. In fact, the role of the UK is similar to that of Hong Kong in
Asia; as a financial center to other economies, it captures resources and
channels them worldwide. The Japanese case is very peculiar and opposite
of the UK’s. There, not only is the role of FDI in the economy much lower
than that of other developed countries but also, most importantly, the will-
ingness to invest abroad is much higher than the capacity to attract
foreign firms. However, from 1995 onwards, there are important changes:
outflow has stabilized while inflow has expanded.
For developing countries, as expected, the volume of FDI inflow is
higher than FDI outflow; roughly a 2:1 ratio has persisted over the years.
But, more recently, FDI inflow has expanded, coming to represent, in
2003, 10.0 percent of the region’s capital formation. In that year US$172
billion was invested in developing regions while residents of these regions
invested US$35 billion abroad. It is important to note that of this, US$3.7
billion of these investments originated solely from Hong Kong.
Latin America takes up one third of FDI inflows to developing regions,
amounting, in 2003, to US$49 billion. This means that, during that year,
11.2 percent of the region’s capital formation came from foreign com-
panies while only 3.3 percent, or US$10.6 billion, was invested abroad.
Capital inflow to the region increased in particular because of the role of
Brazil; while in the period 1989–94 the country attracted only US$1.5
billion on average, inflow amounted to US$33 billion in 2000. As will be
shown later in further detail, this sharp increase is associated with the return
of price stabilization, economic liberalization and, most importantly, privati-
zation. The interesting case in Latin America is that of Mexico; there FDI is
relatively less important to capital formation (8.9 percent in 2003) despite
the country’s integration with the USA and Canada.
In Asia FDI has increased from an annual average of US$37 billion
between 1989 and 1994 to US$107 billion in 2003. China and Hong Kong
take up most of the resources: US$53 billion and US$13 billion respec-
tively. FDI has increased substantially in Korea: from US$869 million on
average, between 1989 and 1994, to US$10 billion in 2000. The pattern in
Malaysia has not changed significantly over the years; it attracts between
US$2.5 and US$5 billion of FDI annually. As stated above, the differing
pattern is that of Hong Kong. In fact the region is the financial power-
house of China and, perhaps, of other economies of the region.
As mentioned above, the new feature of the recent FDI upsurge is the
increasing importance of M&A as the mode through which firms are
investing abroad. Table 9.5 shows that the size of these operations is, in
some cases, even greater than the amount of FDI inflow or outflow. In
developed countries the ratio of asset acquisition to FDI outflow has
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increased from 56.1 percent to 104.6 percent, between 1995 and 2000. In
developing regions, where capital inflow is more important, the absolute
size and relative importance of inward M&A is lower than in developed
regions, but it has increased from 14.1 percent of total inflow to 29
percent. In Latin America this trend is even more pronounced, as the
ratio of M&A to FDI inflow increased from 26.7 percent to 52.5 percent.
The exception is Brazil, because of the FDI upsurge in 2000. In Asia,
however, although the trend is similar, the importance of M&A is less pro-
nounced, reaching, in 2000, 15.5 percent of total FDI inflow.
The result of this recent expansion of internationalization is shown in
Table 9.7. When the FDI stock data is taken into account, differences
among regions and countries emerge more clearly. For developed coun-
tries internationalization is a dual carriageway, with prevalence of outward
stocks over inward stocks, especially in the case of the UK. Presently the
US shows a relatively balanced position, thanks to the increasing import-
ance of inward investment. Japan demonstrates relatively low levels of
asset internationalization in both directions.
For developing regions inward internationalization prevails; that is, the
importance of inward FDI stocks is greater than outward stocks, represent-
ing 31.4 percent of 2003 GDP. But, even among developing regions,
important differences exist: Latin America plays more of a host role than
Asia. In the former, in 2003, inward stocks represented 36.8 percent of
regional GDP while 10.7 percent of their assets were held elsewhere. Dif-
ferences among the main countries of the region are not significant. In
Asia, although the recipient position is higher than that of the investor
(30.3 percent and 13.6 percent respectively), since 1980, the trend has
been towards an increasing willingness of local firms to own assets else-
where. Again, the explanation of this Asian pattern is to be found in the
role Hong Kong has played in channeling increasing investment funds to
the region, especially to China.
In short, this paper illustrates a relatively well-known economic fact. As
shown in Table 9.8, developed countries do concentrate economic power
over international transactions, being responsible for the majority of FDI
inflow and outflow, exports, imports and technology payments. Develop-
ing countries perform better on exports and imports (27.5 percent and
26.2 percent of total) and as the recipient of FDI (21.4 percent of inflows
and 31.3 percent of FDI stock). Latin America’s share is higher on these
last two items, while the Asian region performs better on exports and
imports. Central and Eastern Europe are responsible for 4 percent of
trade transactions and around 2 percent of FDI inflow. Africa is the region
that shows least benefit from the internationalization of capital.
When the data for FDI inward stock is disaggregated into major eco-
nomic activities, some interesting general and regional trends are
revealed. As shown in Table 9.9, the relative importance of major eco-
nomic sectors does not change: tertiary sectors are those into which FDI






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mostly flows, followed by secondary and primary activities. However, between
1988 and 1999 these differences increase. By 1999 tertiary sectors had taken
up 55.5 percent of total inward FDI stocks in developed countries, 52.2
percent in Latin America and 33.6 percent in Asia. Within tertiary activities,
the financial sector is the outstanding internationalized economic activity.
The importance of FDI stocks in the primary sector decreased every-
where, with the exception of Latin America, where it increased from 9.6
percent in 1988 to 12.0 percent in 1999. In Asia emphasis is on manufac-
turing; it represented 68.9 percent and 60.2 percent of total FDI stock in
1988 and 1999 respectively. In Latin America and in developed regions,
these activities took up approximately a third of total FDI stock, and
changes are not pronounced. Chemical and electronic related sectors are
the most internationalized; investments there are expanding, although
their relative share decreased, especially in Asia.
There is an interesting contrast between Asia and Latin America in
terms of size and rate of growth of investments in these two sectors,
between 1988 and 1999. In Asia, FDI stocks in chemicals went up from
US$8.3 to US$32.5 billion, a four-fold increase; in Latin America they
increase two-fold, from US$6.7 to US$13.1 billion. In electrical and elec-
tronics, as expected, relatively to Latin America, Asia is ahead, but differ-
ences are very significant. While in Asia FDI stocks increased from US$9 to
US$42.2 billion, in Latin America they remained stagnant, at US$3 billion,
between 1988 and 1999. However, when tertiary activities are taken into
account, the situation is reversed: FDI stocks are larger in Latin America.
This data shows, clearly, that FDI in Asia is directed towards tradable
goods and in Latin America towards non-tradable goods. Consequently
trends in trade and current accounts of the two regions are diametrically
opposite. Asia is a potential exporter of high-income elasticity of demand
goods, while Latin America is a net importer.
As mentioned above, in the world, the financial sector is the leading
internationalized economic activity. For this sector, in 1999, FDI stocks in
developed countries amounted to US$518 billion, up from US$160 billion
in 1988. In Latin America expansion is even greater, from US$3.1 to
US$23.8 billion. In Asia there is also a sharp increase – from US$1.7 to US
$14.0 billion, but the relative importance of FDI stocks is lower, around 2
percent of total stock.
For Latin America, Table 9.10 provides further detail on the general
picture given above. When the 500 largest firms of the region are taken
into account, the relative share of firms from the service sector increases
from 34.4 percent in 1990–2 to 42.2 percent in 1998–2000. Correspond-
ingly, there is a decrease in the number of firms belonging to the manu-
facturing industry. But, in economic terms, the picture is slightly different;
the relative importance of firms from the primary sector decreased
through the years, although they remained responsible for 22 percent of
sales in 1998–2000. The contribution of firms from manufacturing
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Table 9.10 The largest 500 Latin American companies, 1990–2000, by sector of
origin (number, sales in US$ million and %)
1990–2 1994–6 1998–2000
Value %            

Value %        

Value %
Number 500 100.0 500 100.0 500 100.0
Primary 50 10.0 46 9.2 51 10.0
Manufacturing 278 55.6 264 52.8 239 47.8
Service 172 34.4 190 38.0 211 42.2
Sales 361.0 100.0 601.8 100.0 686.8 100.0
Primary 100.1 27.7 143.5 23.9 150.8 22.0
Manufacturing 153.0 42.4 259.9 43.2 277.9 40.5
Service 107.9 29.9 198.3 33.0 258.1 37.5
Source: CEPAL (2001, Cuadro I-A.4).
remained above 40 percent, and those from the tertiary sector increased
their relative importance from 30 to 37.5 percent. During this same time
period, firms from the primary sector increased sales by 50 percent, those
from manufacturing by 80 percent, while those belonging to the service
sector expanded sales from US$107 billion to US$258 billion.
Ownership change in Latin America
The 1990s was a period when Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico liberal-
ized their national regimes of incentives and regulation. Over the course
of the decade, as microeconomic liberalization – including privatization –
accompanied macroeconomic stabilization, confidence levels increased
and, following international trends, there was a marked acceleration of
capital inflows into the region, leading to significant ownership restructur-
ing and changes in corporate control. Inward internationalization – a
historical feature of the region – has been made even more pronounced.
Table 9.11 indicates the size of the privatization process in the largest
Latin American countries between 1990 and 1999. To a great extent priva-
tization programs are associated with the size of these economies; in
Brazil, the largest country, privatizations in the 1990s amounted to US$61
billion, while in Argentina and Mexico they reached US$23 billion. The
smaller amount in Chile is probably due to the fact that privatizations
there occurred earlier on.
M&A operations were economically more significant, amounting to
US$217 billion, during the 1990s. In fact the economic importance of
M&A transactions is much higher, as not all transactions recorded in
Table 9.12 registered information on values.
Figure 9.1 below confirms and gives an idea of the internationalization
of ownership in Latin America. During the 1990s, in Argentina, Brazil and
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Table 9.11 Privatizations in Latin America 1990–9 in numbers and US$ million
Country Number of Number of Total value of
transactions transactions transactions
with declared values (US$ million)
Argentina 98 95 23,385
Brazil 113 113 61,568
Chile 17 15 2,070
Mexico 101 96 22,837
Total 329 319 109,860
Source: authors’ elaboration based on IE-UFRJ Latin America M&A and Privatization Data-
base.
Table 9.12 M&A in Latin America 1990–9 in numbers and US$ million





















Figure 9.1 FDI in privatizations and M&A, percentage over value of transactions,
1990–9, by target country (source: IE-UFRJ Latin America M&A and Pri-
vatization Database).
Chile foreign capital had a dominant presence in privatizations and M&A
transactions. The exception is Mexico, where the role of local capital was
dominant.
Table 9.13 allows for further understanding of the internationalization
process in Latin America. Among the elite of Latin American firms, it is
■ □ 
possible through the years to observe a decrease in the relative import-
ance of state owned companies, stability of local companies and an
important expansion of foreign owned firms. In terms of sales, the gains
in economic importance of foreign firms is even more pronounced as
they expanded from US$99 billion in 1990–2 to US$285 billion in
1998–2000. Locally owned firms expanded sales by approximately 80
percent but their relative importance remained practically unchanged.
State owned firms, however, while decreasing in relative importance in
numbers (from 17.4 to 7.6 percent) remained economically more import-
ant. Their combined sales represented 33.2 percent of the group in
1990–2 and 20.6 percent in 1998–2000. These figures indicate that the rel-
ative size of locally owned firms is not as high as the other two groups.
The data suggests that Latin America is substantially different from
developing countries in other regions, especially Asia. Although large
diversified local groups are prominent in Latin America, they have not
been able to block inward internationalization. On the contrary, emerging
opportunities, especially those arising from privatization, were, by and
large, exploited by foreign companies.
Table 9.14 provides evidence of the process of ownership change in
chemical industries. The most interesting feature is the changing pattern
of establishing business alliances, from joint ventures in the years preced-
ing economic liberalization to asset acquisition afterwards.
Most importantly, though, when the origin of partners are taken into
account in M&A operations in chemical industries in Argentina and Brazil
(Table 9.15), it is possible to observe that transactions among foreign
companies prevail. Taking into account the context of regional economic
liberalization on one hand and the active process of international M&A
on the other, ownership changes in Latin America are, to a certain extent,
a reflex process of that occurring elsewhere.
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Table 9.13 The ownership of the largest 500 Latin American companies,
1990–2000 (number, sales in US$ million and %)
1990–2 1994–6 1998–2000
Value %           

Value %        

Value %
Number 500 100.0 500 100.0 500 100.0
Foreign 149 29.8 156 31.2 231 46.2
Local 264 52.8 280 56.0 231 46.2
State 87 17.4 64 12.8 38 7.6
Sales 361.009 100.0 601.794 100.0 686.776 100.0
Foreign 99.028 27.4 193.335 32.1 285.627 41.6
Local 142.250 39.4 246.700 41.0 259.784 37.8
State 119.731 33.2 161.759 26.9 141.365 20.6
Source: CEPAL (2001, Cuadro I-A.4).
Inward internationalization in Brazil
Foreign firms have historically played a key role in the industrialization of
Brazil, and recent trends point out an increasing importance of such com-
panies to the economy. A survey conducted by the Brazilian Central Bank
in 2000 identified 11,404 companies with foreign ownership interests in
excess of 10 percent of the voting capital, which indeed characterizes
these firms as foreign corporations, many of them TNCs. Of these com-
panies, 9,712 had over 50 percent of assets controlled by non-residents. In
1995, there were 6,322 companies with foreign ownership interests in
excess of 10 percent of the voting capital, of which 4,902 had over 50
percent control by non-residents.
In 1995, these companies employed 1.3 million workers, 71.8 percent
of which engaged in manufacturing activities. In 2000, foreign companies
employed 1.7 million workers. Total assets expanded 67 percent in five
years, from US$280 billion in 1995 to US$467 billion in 2000. In that year,
total sales amounted to US$424 billion, or 39 percent of the GDP. As
shown previously, this substantial increase in the importance of foreign
firms to the Brazilian economy took place mainly through acquisitions of
local firms.
Their presence in foreign trade is also quite significant. Even though
the domestic market has been the primary focus of foreign companies in
Brazil, exports increased from US$21.7 billion in 1995 to US$33.2 billion
in 2000, or 46.7 percent and 60.4 percent of total Brazilian exports in
Inward FDI in Latin America 251
Table 9.14 The role of M&A and joint ventures in chemical industries in the Mer-
cosul
1985–90 1991–9
M&A Joint ventures    

M&A Joint ventures
Number of operations 121 107 462 116
% 53 47 80 20
Source: Sá (2002).
Table 9.15 Participants in M&A in chemical industries, by ownership (1985–99)
Country Local/local Foreign/foreign Local/foreign Number of M&As
(%) (%) (%)
Brazil 30 57 13 346
Argentina 4 60 0 107
Source: Sá (2002).
those years, respectively. Import coefficients of foreign firms are quite
high, at US$19.3 billion in 1995 and US$31.5 billion in 2000, or 39.0
percent and 56.6 percent of total Brazilian imports in those years, respec-
tively. As shown in Table 9.16, the trade balance of foreign firms reached
US$2.4 billion in 1995. Companies in basic metals, pulp and paper and
food and beverages were net exporters while those from automotive, elec-
tronics and chemicals were net importers.
As expected, intra-firm trade prevailed, being associated with 42
percent and 63 percent of exports in 1995 and 2000, respectively or
US$9.1 and US$19.8 billion. On the import side, intra-firm trade
amounted to US$8.5 billion and US$18.2 billion, in 1995 and 2000,
respectively. Earnings and dividends received by investors in companies
with foreign ownership in Brazil totaled US$6.1 billion in 1995 and
US$6.6 billion in 2000, of which approximately 50 percent was remitted
abroad.
The importance of foreign firms can also be examined in relation to
the largest economic groups. In 2000, among the 500 largest private com-
panies in Brazil, 232 were of foreign origin while 268 were locally owned
national. The sales of these 500 companies amounted to US$283 billion;
the sales of foreign firms reached US$129 billion in 2000. The share of
sales of foreign firms among the 500 largest Brazilian companies
remained around 30 percent up to 1995, increasing thereafter. During the
period 1998–2000 their share reached 44.6 percent (Table 9.17).
Presently, the importance of TNCs in Brazil goes beyond the manufac-
turing production chains. A substantial amount of the “new wave” of FDI
into Brazil in the 1990s has been channeled to the service sector. In the
past, manufacturing was the favorite destination of FDI in Brazil but, as
shown in Table 9.18, 76 percent of FDI inflows in 1996/2002 was directed
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Table 9.16 Exports and imports of foreign firms – 1995, in US$ billion
Sector Exports Imports Trade balance
US$ billion % US$ billion % US$ billion
Basic Metals 2.7 12 0.9 5 1.8
Automotive 2.7 12 3.1 16 (0.4)
Food/beverages 2.3 11 1.2 6 1.1
Chemicals 2.0 9 4.4 23 (2.4)
Machinery 2.0 9 1.4 7 0.6
Pulp and paper 1.7 8 0.3 1.5 1.4
Tobacco 1.0 5 0.1 0.5 0.9
Electronics 0.2 1 1.6 8 (1.4)
Other sectors 7.1 33 6.3 33 0.8
All sectors 21.7 100 19.3 100 2.4
Source: Central Bank (2002).
to service related activities. To the service sector an FDI inflow of US$97
billion was observed between 1996 and 2002, while FDI in industry and
primary sectors amounted to US$26.1 and US$3.4 billion, respectively.
Within the service sector, telecommunications, business services,
finance and public utilities have been the major FDI destinations. Indeed,
these four activities have now a stock of US$91.7 billion, that is, over 50
percent of the entire Brazilian FDI stock. It is important to note that in
1995 the FDI stock of these four activities amounted to US$12.7 billion, of
which US$11.4 billion in business services. At that time, finance and
telecommunications had a meager FDI stock of US$1.3 billion, while
public utilities had no FDI stock. The liberalization of policy instruments
that supported the import substitution industrialization model, the launch
of an extensive privatization program, the worldwide M&A trend and the
expansion of the international integrated production were crucial factors
propelling this “new wave” of foreign investments into the service sector.
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Table 9.17 Share of foreign companies in the sales of the largest companies of
Brazil (%)
Year Foreign Private national State
1990–2 31.1 42.3 26.6
1994–6 33.1 43.2 23.7
1998–2000 44.6 37.6 17.8
Source: Exame Magazine, various issues.
Table 9.18 FDI stock and inflows by sector
Sector 1995 FDI % FDI inflows %
stock (1996–Feb. 2002) 
(US$ billion) (US$ billion)
Total 42.2 100 126.5 100
Agriculture and Mining 0.7 1.7 3.4 2.7
Industry 23.3 55.1 26.1 20.7
Food 2.3 5.4 3.4 2.7
Automotive 2.9 6.9 6.5 5.1
Machinery 2.1 5.0 1.5 1.2
Chemical products 4.7 11.1 5.1 4.1
Others 11.3 26.7 9.6 7.6
Services 18.2 43.2 97.0 76.6
Commerce 2.9 6.7 10.8 8.5
Finance 1.2 3.0 18.1 14.3
Telecommunications 0.1 0.5 27.3 21.5
Business services 11.4 26.9 18.7 14.8
Public utilities 0 0 14.9 11.8
Others 2.6 6.3 7.2 5.7
Source: Central Bank (2002).
As a result, by book value, presently the services sector has now the
majority of FDI stock in the country. FDI stock in the service sector
accounts for over 68 percent of total stock, industry 29 percent and the
primary sector 2 percent. In contrast in 1989, before economic liberaliza-
tion, over 70 percent of foreign investments was located in the industrial
sector (Laplane 2000). Its present structure is similar in comparison to
those of developed countries (Table 9.19).
A large number of foreign companies participating in the new FDI
cycle are newcomers to the Brazilian economy, having origins in coun-
tries, like Spain and Portugal, that up to now were not major investors.
The United States remains the most important source of FDI to Brazil,
while Germany, Switzerland and Japan lost their relative positions,
although they have continued to invest in the country.
As shown in Table 9.20, the United States accounts for barely 25
percent of total FDI stock. Other important investors – Germany, Switzer-
land and Japan – whose joint participation on the Brazilian FDI stock was
over 25 percent until 1995, saw their joint share diminish to 12 percent
recently. Spain and Portugal, whose investments were marginal in Brazil
until 1995, increased their share to 10 and 4 percent, respectively, in the
last years, through the privatization process. Netherlands and France are
the third and fourth investors in Brazil. Canada, United Kingdom and
Italy decreased their relative participation. Investments from Latin Amer-
ican countries have come mainly from Chile and Argentina taking advant-
age of the privatization program. This trend is not unusual considering
that commercial flows within Latin America and within the MERCOSUR
have increased in the last years.
The nature of investments by foreign firms
During the 1990s, direct investment aimed at privatization and mergers
and acquisitions was instrumental in reorganizing public finances and to
finance national current accounts. From a macroeconomic perspective,
their contribution was quite relevant. But most privatization and M&A
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Table 9.19 FDI stock by industry, 2002 (%)
Country/Region Primary Manufacturing Services
Brazil* 2.4 29.0 68.6
Developed countries 10.0 40.8 49.2
Developing countries 6.7 45.5 47.7
World 9.4 41.6 48.9
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2001, 2004).
Note
*Data from 1999.
were carried out in non-tradable sectors, with new actors buying positions
into local markets. Given the extension of internationalization, an open
macroeconomic issue for the future is the extent to which financial remit-
tances to home bases are likely to affect national current accounts. To a
great extent this depends on the nature of investments carried out by
firms. The higher the commitment, the more likely they will be to remain
in the country, regardless short-term disturbances.
In the region, the recent wave of ownership change has accentuated an
important structural feature of the region: the co-existence of firms from
diverse origins. The process of inward internationalization was already a
feature of the Latin American region, and it was reinforced during the last
decade. Thus foreign firms are relevant for the region’s economic devel-
opment in the future, especially because they tend to control positions in
any market segment where high-income elasticity of demand and high
technological opportunities prevail.
The recent wave of acquisitions and investment will be associated with
the implementation of productive and technological strategies by new
actors in specific markets. Whether these new actors are willing to consoli-
date and further expand their presence in the region, through new invest-
ment and implementation of pro-competitive strategies based on
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Table 9.20 FDI stock in Brazil, by home country
Home country FDI stock % FDI inflow %
in 1995 1996–Feb. 2002 
US$ billion US$ billion
United States 10.8 25.5 29.5 23.3
Spain 0.2 0.6 24.3 19.2
Netherlands 1.5 3.6 12.2 9.6
France 2.0 4.8 9.9 7.8
Portugal 0.1 0.3 9.3 7.3
Germany 5.8 13.7 2.8 2.2
United Kingdom 1.8 4.2 2.5 2.0
Japan 2.6 6.3 2.3 1.8
Italy 1.2 3.0 1.9 1.6
Belgium 0.6 1.3 1.7 1.4
Sweden 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.3
Canada 1.8 4.3 1.5 1.2
Switzerland 2.8 6.6 1.3 1.0
Argentina 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0
Financial centers* 4.7 11.0 16.7 13.2
Others 5.4 12.7 8.5 6.7
Total 42.5 100.0 127.0 100.0
Source: Central Bank (2002).
Note
*Caribbean Financial centers: Cayman Island, Virgin Island, The Bahamas, Panama and the
Bermudas.
innovation and quality job creation, remains to be seen. Thus, the relevant
questions the region is facing are as follows. What are the likely con-
sequences of inward internationalization and ownership change? Will the
region observe a (positive) local reproduction of international patterns of
competition? Are firms likely to concentrate operations in specific
regions/clusters? Will firms reinvest or remit profits? Will foreign firms
carry out technology-related investments?
Although only time will reveal the nature of investments to be carried
out, after this wide-raging process of ownership change, it is possible to
speculate on the difficulties the region will be facing on the basis of the
preliminary data presented below.
In terms of the nature of economic activities, Table 9.21 indicates that
Japanese firms have different strategies according to host countries. In the
USA decision-making activities are balanced with other functional activi-
ties of corporations, and there is a particular emphasis on operating R&D
and design centers in that country. Mexico is clearly a production base
from which to penetrate the North American markets, not as an R&D
center. The Brazilian pattern is slightly different to the Mexican pattern:
the ratio of decision-making offices to final production sites is higher, as
well as the number of R&D centers. Taking into account that in Argentina
and Chile the emphasis is basically on sales activities, this evidence may
suggests that Brazil plays a role as a decision-making/design center for the
South American region.
Table 9.22 provides further information upon which discussions on
these subjects may be taken up.
The evidence is quite straightforward and expected. First, US parents
concentrate value at home: the sales ratio of affiliates to parents is 38.5
percent, the investment ratio is 31.7 percent and the R&D ratio is 14.9
percent. The higher the strategic value of operations, the more likely
firms are to implement them from home grounds. Second, other
developed regions are the favorite destination of operations but, even
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Table 9.21 Corporate networks of Japanese affiliates in selected American coun-
tries, 1999
Country Regional Sales offices Final Parts and R&D and 
headquarters production materials design centers
and managerial sites production
officers
USA 897 877 887 446 580
Argentina 18 33 29 1 –
Brazil 53 94 77 10 40
Chile 1 8 1 – –
Mexico 57 138 136 62 26
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2001).
there, R&D efforts are comparatively lower: while US parents spend 2.2
percent of sales in technological activities at home, in Europe these
expenditures reach only 1.0 percent, in the UK 1.2 percent and in Japan
1.3 percent. Third, developing regions are considered as markets to be
supplied from the home base, as far as strategic inputs are concerned.
R&D to sales ratio in Latin America is 0.2 percent and, in Asia, 0.8
percent, nearly the same ratio as Europe.
Policy challenges
In Latin America, after decades of inward-oriented industrialization, the
1982 debt crisis and a long process of uncontrolled inflation, most coun-
tries went through structural and institutional reforms, oriented towards
inflation control, liberalization, deregulation and privatization. But, even
after such radical turnaround, sustained growth has not been attained in
most countries.
Structural and macroeconomic instabilities are regularities in the
region. Nature, direction and duration of economic and institutional
instability define levels of uncertainty and confidence prevailing among
economic agents, thus affecting their willingness to invest in exploring
new business opportunities, in new plants, in innovation.
Structural change produces uncertainty and the need for adaptation.
However, adaptive capabilities of agents and organizations differ. The
recent evolution of Latin America has shown that this is a process generat-
ing winners and losers. More interestingly, though, since the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis, the recent process of change has not induced modifications in
the relative position among different actors, organizations or countries.
Those that were relatively stronger in the pre-crisis period have shown
better adaptive capacity and vice versa.
As a result these economies are now even more internationalized than
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Table 9.22 Sales, investment and R&D: US TNCs and affiliates in 1999 (US$
billion)
Sales Investment Inv/sales R&D R&D/sales
US parents 5,709.5 357.8 6.3 123.5 2.2
All affiliates 2,195.3 113.4 5.2 18.4 0.8
Europe 1,201.5 53.9 4.5 12.4 1.0
UK 340.2 20.4 1.7 4.1 1.2
Japan 125.1 4.0 3.2 1.6 1.3
Latin America 245.6 18.6 7.6 0.6 0.2
Brazil 55.2 3.7 6.7 0.3 0.5
Asia 425.4 20.9 4.9 3.3 0.8
Source: Survey of Current Business: Operations of US MNCs companies – preliminary results
from the 1999 Benchmark survey, R. Mataloni Jr. and D. Yorgason (2002: 24–54), mimeo.
before, and this is a long-term and structural feature of Latin America.
However, the region is facing a development paradox since history tells us
that local capital and local innovation capabilities have been outstanding
features of successful and sustained economic and social development. If
ownership internationalization is to remain and local innovation capa-
bilities must be pursued, then Latin American policy-makers are facing
challenges associated with how to attract investments of this nature. To a
great extent, this will mean an important departure from established
policy practices, to new ways of regulating and inducing firms towards
local value creation. So, it is very likely that public agencies will go
through periods of intense transformation and adaptation, until the dif-
fusion of a new set of practices – including methods of detecting, control-
ling and solving problems – take place.
Policy-wise, the challenges Latin American countries are facing is how
to promote a national regime of incentives and regulations inductive to
activities that generate qualifying jobs, in a context of open economies
and ownership internationalization. Qualifying jobs mean the continuous
creation of work opportunities that have the capacity to enhance the skill
base of the labor force, thus potentially expanding the welfare of the
population.
The region is facing a context marked by a higher degree of freedom
of private decision-making in the process of resource allocation and an
increasing power of international corporations in different markets. Thus,
from a regulatory perspective, it is necessary to build up policy-making
capabilities in specialized agencies oriented towards facilitating invest-
ment and restraining anti-competitive market structures and behavior.
From the incentive perspective, the challenge is to promote national
attractiveness for innovation. The proposition for discussion is to develop
agencies and instruments oriented towards a double strategic movement.
It is necessary to increase investments, aiming at, on one side, company
efforts towards modernization and, on the other, expanding the local S&T
infrastructure. For that policy-makers must identify and actively support
those few companies and research institutes that implement innovation-
based strategies.
Sustained increases in S&T financial resources aimed at these goals will
increase the chances that in the future a specific region/country may
attract economic agents (especially foreign firms/research institutes) to
internalize technology-related activities. Taking Brazil as an example, if
the country is to reach 2.5 percent of S&T expenditures in 2010, Table
9.23 below provides an idea of the extent of the necessary efforts.
Regardless of the extent of success in the above areas, a permanent
challenge is to root innovation as one of the strategic and praised beliefs
entrenched in any society. All economic, social and political actors must
be convinced and have faith; must convince and convert others that S&T
is beneficial to social and economic development. For that end, private
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and public policy-makers must engage, with tenacity, in permanent mobil-
ization aiming at objective and ambitious goals. But, beware: we all will be
sailing against the wind!
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10 Determinants and effects of
foreign direct investment in
transition economies
Yuko Kinoshita and Nauro F. Campos1
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become one of the most prominent
forms of private capital flows in many developing countries following the
decline in official capital flows in the 1980s.
The sudden collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980s opened up
numbers of opportunities for the Central and Eastern European and
former Soviet Union countries. These economies were initially more
industrialized and open than many other developing countries. They
could also count on a relatively cheap and highly qualified workforce.
It is generally argued that FDI is an important catalyst of technology
transfer for a recipient country. It would bring not only capital but also
the technology and management know-how necessary for restructuring
firms in the host economies.2 Thus, one of the important policy questions
is what the host government can do to attract FDI.
In this chapter, we examine the location determinants of FDI into 25
transition economies by utilizing the panel data between 1990 and 1998.
In the empirical analyses, we take into account both host country
characteristics and agglomeration economies as determinants of FDI loca-
tion. In order to incorporate the past stock of FDI as a proxy for agglom-
eration economies, we use the standard generalized method of moments
(GMM) in explaining a spatial distribution of FDI across these countries.
In the last part of the chapter, we examine whether or not FDI con-
tributed to an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) growth by repli-
cating the models in the past studies. Throughout different specifications,
we find that FDI has a positive and robust effect on the productivity
growth of these countries.
There is a vast literature on the locational determinants of FDI. Trade
theory argues that the location choices by investing firms are influenced
by the classical factors of comparative advantages specific to the country:
market size, low wages, skilled labor force and infrastructure.3 Another
perspective suggests that the investment location choices can be explained
by agglomeration economies (e.g. positive externalities by co-locating to
others).4
Many policy makers in the transition countries are aware that FDI
plays a key role in encouraging successful transition and many countries
in the region offered various incentives to attract FDI in the country.5
However, FDI inflows in the region have been disappointingly low
despite the initial expectation compared to those into China, Mexico
and some East Asian countries. In recent years, the increasing trend of
FDI inflows was set in some transition economies. But the distribution of
FDI stock across the transition countries remains uneven6 with high con-
centration on three Central and East European (CEE) countries
(Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic).7 The other countries are
struggling to encourage the first wave of large investment to arrive.
The concentration of FDI in these three countries may be explained by
initial differences prior to 1989. Three countries were different in some
respects such as privatization process, the price level and the debt-GDP
ratio. However, these three countries are relatively more open to trade
than other transition economies. This favorable condition drew an initial
rush of investment at the time of disintegration of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1991 and many more new investments
followed the first investors, as their presence worked as the signaling of
good local conditions to other investors, which magnified the differences
in FDI flows even further.
Once agglomeration economies set in, there will be a snowballing
effect of FDI inflows in successful countries. On the other hand, if classical
factors of comparative advantages are more dominant than agglomeration
economies as locational determinants, it is still possible for the remaining
countries to reverse the trend.
In light of the above framework, the close look at the role of agglomer-
ation economies in relation to classical factors of comparative advantages
is all the more important in understanding the drivers of FDI flows into
these countries. Despite its importance, the empirical analyses on FDI in
transition economies8 has been limited to a set of Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEEC) countries due to paucity of data. This study
attempts to fill this gap by utilizing data on a full sample of 25 transition
economies.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the
classical theoretical framework on the location determinants of FDI. In
the third, we discuss the variables to be tested as the determinants of FDI
in our empirical setting, the estimation method and data we use. The
fourth reports regression results on the locational determinants of FDI
and the fifth sheds light on the effects of FDI on economic growth. The
last section concludes the chapter and outlines directions for future
research.
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Conceptual framework
A firm becomes multinational mainly for three reasons. The so-called OLI
paradigm proposed by Dunning summarizes them as Ownership advan-
tages, Location-specific advantages and Internalization. Firms endowed
with ownership advantages or intangible assets expand operations abroad
to internalize the benefits arising from ownership advantages and to
match their strengths with location-specific comparative advantages.
In this study, we focus on the location-specific advantages of the host
country as determinants of FDI in order to account for the geographical
distribution of FDI inflows across transition economies. Large market size,
proximity to home market, low-cost labor and favorable tax treatment in
the host country are all considered as location advantages. At the same
time, we also address transition-specific issues such as changes in macro-
economic and institutional environments.
Location-specific advantages are further classified by three types of
motives of FDI. First, market-seeking investment is undertaken to sustain
existing markets or to exploit new markets. For example, due to tariffs
and other forms of barriers, the firm has to relocate production to the
host country where it had previously served by exporting. Because the
reason for this type of investment is to better serve a local market by local
production, market size and market growth of the host economy are the
main factors that encourage market-seeking FDI. The impediments in
serving the market such as tariffs and transport costs also encourage this
type of FDI.9 Japanese FDI in automobiles in the US in the late 1980s is an
example of this type of FDI.
Second, when firms invest abroad to acquire resources not available in
the home country, the investment is called resource- or asset-seeking.
Resources may be natural resources, raw materials or low-cost inputs such
as labor. An example is investment made by the US and Japan in export
assembly in electronics in Asia in search of cheap labor.10 Unlike market-
seeking FDI, this type of FDI is intended to serve not only the local market
but also the home and third country markets. Availability of resources,
cheap and skilled labor and physical infrastructure are the main attractors
of resource-seeking FDI.
Third, the investment is rationalized or efficiency-seeking when the
firm can gain from the common governance of geographically dispersed
activities in the presence of economies of scale and scope. In this respect,
prospective membership of the European Union conducive to the estab-
lishment of regional corporate networks and the presence of high
transport and communication costs will encourage more of efficiency-
seeking FDI.
There are also other factors that could influence the choice of invest-
ment locations in the region. Favorable macroeconomic conditions of the
host country such as stable prices, low national debt and sustainable budget
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deficit are attractive to foreign investors. Social and political stability also
encourage FDI inflows. The progress of economic reform is particularly
important in the transition economy context. Other non-economic factors
are the degree of corruption, legal enforcement and administrative effi-
ciency, all of which facilitate business operating conditions.
The above framework of FDI gives guidance in identifying the set of
economic, political and institutional variables to be tested as determinants
of investment locations, which is discussed in detail in the next section.
There is much empirical evidence that FDI is spatially clustered.
Agglomeration of FDI may be explained by differences in classical com-
parative advantages such as factor endowment and market size. Also,
agglomeration is induced by the investors’ tendency to herd. Especially
when investors have insufficient information about the host country con-
ditions, the existing stock of foreign investment made by others may work
as a signal of favorable investment environments.11 Alternatively, agglom-
eration economies emerge when there are positive externalities by co-
locating near others due to the presence of knowledge spillovers,
specialized labor markets and supplier network.12 In our analysis, we
include the agglomeration effect as a determinant of location choice
together with the above economic and policy variables.
Data and methodology
There are typically two approaches to analyzing the location determinants
of FDI. The first class of studies13 explains the location choice made by
investing firms by investors’ perceptions or ratings of location-specific
factors such as labor cost, corporate tax rates and market size. Namely,
they regress the probability of locating in a certain location on various
location-specific factors. In other studies,14 the dependent variable is the
actual amount of FDI flow or stock. The choice between the two
approaches depends on what type of data is available for the analysis. If
firm-level data is available, then the first approach will be employed. If
investment data is available only at the aggregate level, then the second
approach is viable.
The data we use in this study covers the period 1990–8 for 25 transition
countries. The number of observations in the panel is 225 (259). The
definitions and summary statistics of the variables are found in appen-
dices.
The panel data is meaningful for our study for several reasons. First,
the agglomeration or self-reinforcing effects of FDI at the aggregate level
can be addressed only if there is a time-series of FDI. Due to positive exter-
nalities by localization of industry, FDI in the past will lead to more FDI
today. Second, during the time period covered in our data, transition
economies had undertaken and completed economic reforms. Cross-
sectional data would not allow us to assess changes of the reform variables.
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Transition from planned to market economy started in the early 1990s
in many of these countries but foreign investors were cautious in the
beginning, with a few exceptions in Hungary and Poland. Due to the diffi-
culty of obtaining FDI data sufficiently long enough, the past studies on
FDI in transition economies are confined to the set of CEEC countries
that are the major recipients of substantial FDI in the region. A recent
study by Resmini (2000) examines the location determinants of FDI into
ten CEEC countries. Bevan and Estrin (2000) use the data on FDI flows
from 18 investing countries to 11 transition economies in explaining the
determinants of FDI from both home and host country viewpoints.
In this study, we expand to the set of 25 transition economies. With
additional countries in the data, we are hoping to introduce more hetero-
geneity as well as to incorporate different motives of investment in order
to provide a more complete and detailed picture of the reasons for locat-
ing FDI in transition countries. The countries excluded in the past studies
are Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. These are the
countries that receive FDI mainly in non-manufacturing such as service
and oil industries. A picture for the complete set of countries may differ
from the ones obtained for the subset of the countries in the past studies
because of differences in the areas in which they receive FDI.
Classical sources of comparative advantages
Investors choose a location of investment according to the expected prof-
itability associated with each location. Profitability of investment is in turn
affected by various country-specific factors as well as a type of investment
motive. For example, market-seeking investors will be attracted to a
country with a large local market and fast-growing market. Resource-
seeking investors will look for a country with abundant natural resources.
Efficiency-seeking investors will give more weight to geographical proxim-
ity to the home country to minimize the transportation cost.15
Thus, the location of FDI is closely tied with the comparative advan-
tages of the country, which in turn affects the expected profitability of
investment. The classical sources of comparative advantages are input
prices, market size, growth of the market and relative abundance of
natural resources.
For market-seeking FDI, the determining factor is the size of the host
country market. We use GDP per capita as a measure of market size
(YPC).16
Availability of cheap labor is crucial for vertical FDI. To exploit low cost
of labor input, firms can justify relocating a part of the production process
in foreign countries. We use nominal wage rate WAGEN as a proxy for
labor cost. If vertical FDI is dominant, we expect a negative sign on the
coefficient (e.g. the host country with lower labor cost attracts more FDI).
Investing firms should be concerned not only with the cost of labor but
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also the quality of labor. A more educated labor force can learn and adopt
new technology faster and the cost of training local workers is less for
investing firms. Labor quality is introduced as general secondary school
enrollment rate (SS3).
Some CIS countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia have
been receiving FDI mostly in resource-based industries as they are rich in
oil and natural gas. This is considered to be an example of resource-
seeking FDI. Natural resource-rich countries may attract foreign invest-
ment in those industries while they may divert investment from the
manufacturing sector.17 The variable we use is NATRES that indicates if
the host country is “poor” (0), “moderate” (1) or “rich” (2) in
natural resources.18
Proximity to the home country is empirically an important factor for
explaining the volume of trade flows between countries. The gravity
model predicts that the closer the country is to the home country, the
more trade flows between the two countries will be observed. The analo-
gous argument may apply for FDI as FDI flows are closely related to trade
flows. The sign of proximity to the home country can go either way
depending on the type of FDI undertaken. In the case of market-seeking
FDI, a further distance between the home and host country markets
implies a higher transportation cost. A fixed cost of transporting goods
would encourage production in a foreign market to exploit economies of
scale. On the other hand, if goods produced abroad are shipped back to
the home or the third country markets, then the closer the production
site is to the home or the third country, the more efficient it is for Multi-
national Corporations (MNCs).
It would be best if we could measure the distance between the home
and host country for this purpose. However, the data we use only contains
the information on the host country of FDI flows and we use a proxy for
geographical distance to the major investor in the region, say, Germany.
The variable we use is DIST that measures the distance between Düssel-
dorf and the capital city of each country in kilometers. Also, Germany has
historically close ties with transition economies in the region.19 In particu-
lar, efficiency-seeking FDI in light of EU enlargement to the region will be
encouraged if the country is closer to the major Western markets as prox-
imity reduces communication and coordination costs.
Availability of good infrastructure is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for foreign investors to operate business locally regardless of the
type of FDI. There are several candidates for the infrastructure variable.
One is a percentage of paved roads in the country and the other is a
number of main telephone lines. The first figure may be misleading. For
instance, if there is one main road in the country and it is paved, then it is
reported as 100. This is indeed the case in many countries in the sample.
Thus, we use the number of main telephone lines (TELEPHON) as the
infrastructure variable.
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Other things being equal, we expect that the more FDI will be made in
the countries with larger market size, lower labor cost, better educated
labor force, abundant natural resources, and better infrastructure.
Policy variables
Investment decisions in emerging markets are also influenced by eco-
nomic and political risks. Successful implementation of economic reform
by the host government is a good signal to investors as stable macroeco-
nomic performance implies less investment risk.
A record of price stability is a good indicator for sound macroeconomic
management by the host government. For example, a history of low infla-
tion and manageable fiscal deficits signals to investors how committed and
credible the government is. For this, we use the average inflation rate
(INFAV). At the onset of transition, as the countries liberalized prices and
underwent structural changes in economic activities, all countries experi-
enced the increase in the price level. As the countries proceeded with
structural reforms and stabilization policies, the price level also subsided.
The sustainability of moderate or low inflation tells investors how success-
ful the host government is and thus the prospect of further growth. Thus,
the lower the average inflation rate is in the host country, the more
foreign investment will be attracted to the country.
Another indicator of economic reform is external liberalization index.
We use the variable CLIE for a removal of trade controls and quotas, mod-
eration of tariff rates and foreign exchange rate restrictions.20 The more
liberalized regime means the more successful reform and the more
foreign investment flows.21 In other cases, the more restrictive external
regime may also induce FDI. If FDI is for tariff-jumping, FDI flows may
negatively correlate with the external liberalization index.
Business operating conditions
Non-economic factors also influence returns to investment. The cost of
investment consists of not only the actual costs of inputs but also non-eco-
nomic costs such as bribery and time lost in dealing with local authorities.
To assess the business operation conditions of the host country for
investing firms, we use two institutional variables, “rule of law”
(RULELAW) and “quality of bureaucracy” (BUROQUAL).22 The rule of
law is a composite of three indicators: (i) sound political institutions and a
strong court system,23 (ii) the fairness of the judicial system over property
rights, and (iii) the substance of the law itself.24 The higher score in the
rule of law implies the more sound and the better enforced the legal
system is in the host country.
The quality of the bureaucracy is based on two indicators: (i) the extent
to which the national bureaucracy enjoys autonomy from political
FDI in transition economies 267
pressure in a stable manner and whether or not it has an effective
mechanism for recruiting and training, and (ii) the ease of regulations
concerning licensing requirements and labor, environmental, consumer
safety, and worker health. If this score is high, then the investors perceive
less cost in dealing with the local bureaucracy.
Agglomeration economies
Agglomeration economies emerge when there are some positive externali-
ties by co-locating near other economic units due to the presence of know-
ledge spillovers, specialized labor markets and supplier network.25
Various empirical studies present evidence on the presence and
importance of such a self-reinforcing effect of foreign investment. Inter-
estingly, FDI is found to agglomerate more often than mere financial
investment partly because FDI is a long-term capital investment that is irre-
versible in a short run. For instance, Head, Ries and Swenson (1995) find
industry-level agglomeration benefits play an important role in the loca-
tion choice of Japanese manufacturing plants in the US. Wheeler and
Mody (1992) confirm the importance of agglomeration for investors’ loca-
tion decisions using qualitative data on US firms. More recently, Chen and
Kwan (2000) in the study of the determinants of FDI in Chinese regions
also report the positive feedback effect of FDI. If there is a positive feed-
back effect, once the initial flow of FDI sets in, it should perpetuate itself
and attract further FDI.
In this study, we use one-year lagged stock of FDI in the country as an
independent variable to capture these agglomeration effects. A positive
and significant coefficient of lagged stock of FDI means the presence of
agglomeration economies. The inclusion of the lagged dependent vari-
able on the right hand side of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regres-
sion introduces the endogeneity problem. We address this issue in detail
in the next section.
Estimation method
In order to test the presence of agglomeration effects, we have to relate
current FDI to past FDI along with other explanatory variables. We follow
the model proposed by Cheng and Kwan (2000) in which they formulate
the role of past FDI values as the process of partial stock adjustment. They
assume that it takes time for FDI to adjust to equilibrium or desired level.
Our empirical specification is based on the assumption of the presence
of such an adjustment cost. We postulate a reduced form of the following
equation:
Yit Yit1 Xit it
it 	i uit
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where Yit is the stock of FDI in country i in year t, Xit is a vector of other
explanatory variables such as market size, labor cost, labor quality,
resource abundance, distance from Düsseldorf, infrastructure, policy vari-
ables and business operating conditions, and it is an error term that
includes the unobservable country-specific attribute, 	i. If there is any
agglomeration effect or a positive feedback effect, then  is expected to
be positive. When there is a country-specific effect that is time invariant
and unobservable as in the above specification, then the lagged depend-
ent variable will be correlated with the error term and OLS will lead to
asymptotically biased estimates. To get consistent estimates, we choose to
use the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). In this approach, we first remove the country-
specific effect by first-differencing equation set out above and estimate the







Yit Yit Yit1. In the above equation, 
Yit1 is correlated with 
uit.
Valid instruments in this case are lagged levels of dependent variables,
Yits where s2 and t3,4, . . .,T. As the length of panel progresses, the
number of valid instruments increases. If Xit is predetermined, then 
Xits
(for all s) can be used as additional instruments to increase the efficiency
of the estimates. The validity of instruments is checked by the Sargan test.
The second-order correlation of the error term in the first-differenced
equation is checked by Arellano-Bond statistics for autocorrelation, which
is distributed as N (0,1) asymptotically.
For a small number of samples relative to a number of parameter esti-
mates, however, we are concerned with a possible bias introduced in the
GMM estimation. Because the data set we employ may suffer from such a
bias, we also estimate in fixed-effects model and compare with those
obtained from GMM where appropriate.
The dependent variable Yit is per capita FDI stock in constant million
USD in year t. We constructed the series by using figures on FDI inflows
taken from World Development Indicators (WDI).
Determinants of FDI inflows
Host country characteristics
Table 10.1 reports OLS regressions with fixed effects.26 First, we look at
the roles of host country characteristics without agglomeration effects.
How much of variations of FDI inflows across transition economies are
explained by classical factors? Column I in Table 10.1 answers this ques-
tion. With no policy and risk variables and agglomeration economies
being taken into account, most classical sources of comparative advantage
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bear statistical significance. Column I indicates that FDI into transition
economies is mainly driven by the host country’s market size, availability
of skilled workers (or the level of human capital) and sufficient infrastruc-
ture. All regressions include time dummies.
Since natural resources and distance from Düsseldorf are both invari-
ant over time in the data set, after taking first-differences, they both drop
out. In order to recover the estimates of these variables, we transform
them by multiplying by a time trend.
The positive and significant coefficient of DIST indicates that the
further away the country is from Germany the more FDI it attracts. In
other words, FDI is not gravitated towards Germany. There are a few pos-
sible explanations for this result. Horizontal FDI or intra-industry FDI is
induced by the presence of transportation cost. If the motive for FDI is to
serve the export (local) market, then the greater distance from the home
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Table 10.1 Determinants of FDI: fixed effects (dependent variableper capita FDI
stock)
I II III IV
FDI stock (t1) – – – 0.93***
(0.04)
ypc 0.08*** 0.05** 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
wagen 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06)
ss3 20.33*** 15.02*** 18.33*** 2.84
(4.43) (4.43) (4.52) (2.16)
natres 8.30 2.78 2.55 0.44
(7.13) (6.88) (6.71) (3.25)
dist 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
telephon 5.25*** 5.09*** 5.57*** 0.36
(0.59) (0.56) (0.59) (0.37)
infav – 0.006 0.003 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
clie – 123.34*** 102.44*** 21.77
(31.71) (31.88) (15.73)
rulelaw – – 26.27* 1.74
(13.91) (6.56)
buroqual – – 49.47* 28.29**
(25.42) (13.33)
N 148 148 148 140
R-squared 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.96
Notes
a Parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
b Time dummies included in all regressions.
country justifies more FDI flows. The other possibility is a bias in a coeffi-
cient due to omitted variables such as the agglomeration effect.
Labor cost is found to have a negative but insignificant effect on FDI
inflows. Note that, without adjusting for labor productivity, low wage rate
alone is not a good indicator for labor cost advantage. In fact, investors
are attracted to the site with more educated workers than low cost labor as
SS3 shows.
Abundance of natural resources is another rejected variable as a deter-
minant of FDI. Richness in natural resources is not a main reason for FDI
flows. Total cumulative FDI stock in CIS countries is greatest in resource-
based industries. (e.g. Russia is in the third place in total FDI stock in the
region.) However, once we take into account a scale effect by using per
capita FDI stock, natural resources become no longer important.
In sum, column I indicates that FDI in these transition economies is
seeking to sell in the local market rather than exploiting cheap inputs and
factor endowments. Availability of skilled workers and sufficient infrastruc-
ture are a plus while abundance of natural resources and cheap labor do
not help attract more FDI. In particular, the increasing importance of
human capital as an attractor of FDI is also confirmed in a broader set of
developing countries in Noorbakhsh and Youssef (2001) as more FDI is
tilted towards the manufacturing sector than in the primary sector.
In column II, we add two policy variables. One is the average inflation
rate to control for the success of macroeconomic reform. The other is the
external liberalization index to measure how open the country is. The
results are quantitatively very similar to column I. The explanatory power
of the model is strengthened somewhat by the inclusion of an external lib-
eralization index (CLIE). A positive and large coefficient of CLIE says that
the progress of external liberalization is valued much by foreign investors.
Inflation rate is negatively related to FDI flows but not statistically signific-
ant. This should not undermine the importance of price stabilization in
the transition period. Rather, as the price stabilization is typically intro-
duced in the initial stage of transition and external liberalization in the
latter stage, investors may distinguish the winner of economic reform by
looking at the outcome of external liberalization.
Similar results are found in column III after adding the institutional
factors that facilitate business operations. Both the rule of law and quality
of bureaucracy are positive and significant: the better perceived the judi-
cial system is and the less corrupted is the local bureaucracy, the more FDI
the country can attract. In Russia and CIS countries, corruptions and red
tapes are often quoted as impediments to new foreign investment. The
result here is consistent with this anecdotal evidence.
The results in columns I–III without the agglomeration effect consis-
tently show that FDI in the region is driven by access to local market
rather than by cheap labor. This observation is more relevant for the
earlier comers of investment in the region when there is no prior
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investment made. Once a volume of investment reaches a critical mass,
potential investors may simply follow the herd of other investors: more
FDI today leads to more FDI tomorrow. Investors wondering whether to
invest will flock to the countries that have already received much FDI
because they believe that past FDI stock reflects favorable local conditions
that are perceived by existing investors but not yet known to them.27 Such
agglomeration effects are proxied as a one-year lagged FDI stock per
capita in this study.
Once we include the agglomeration effect (Column IV), there is a large
increase in R square. Interestingly, the importance of the lagged depend-
ent variable replaces the significance of other variables. One exception is
the quality of bureaucracy. This implies that there is a strong tendency for
foreign investors to agglomerate in certain locations. Attributes of other
location-specific factors such as market size, labor cost and even policy
variables become relatively less important for the choice of investment
locations once the agglomeration effect sets in. The quality of bureaucracy
yet remains.
However, it is well known that OLS often yields biased estimates in the
presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the
regression since the lagged dependent variable is endogenous by con-
struction. This endogeneity problem has to be dealt with in the next sub-
section.
Agglomeration of foreign investors
Lagged dependent variable is not only non-random but also endogenous
in the presence of an unobservable fixed effect and OLS estimates will be
biased and inconsistent. Following Anderson and Hsiao (1981), we use
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Instrumental Variable esti-
mator for dynamic panels that yields consistent estimates.28
Table 10.2 compares the result from OLS and that of GMM. All regres-
sions include year dummies to control for time variation due to changes in
external economic environment common across countries. The sizes of coef-
ficients are similar in both regressions. The agglomeration effect and quality
of bureaucracy remain significant in GMM. The main difference is observed
in the external liberalization index. It becomes significant in GMM.
The p-value of the Sargan test is very small. Thus, we reject the null
hypothesis at 1 percent level that there is no misspecification with the set
of instruments we use in GMM. Second-order serial correlation is not
detected according to the SOC test. However, as the Sargan test shows, the
validity of instruments is questionable. Overall, a comparison between
OLS and GMM results shows a bias in estimates in most variables is not
great as seen in similar sizes of coefficients in both specifications. But the
reform policy variable CLIE may have been biased in OLS.
Both results confirm the presence of agglomeration of FDI that over-
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rides other location-specific factors such as market size and labor cost.
The fact that both infrastructure and human capital variables are affected
by an inclusion of agglomeration suggests that the agglomeration effect
tends to be triggered by “created” comparative advantages (e.g. skilled
labor force, availability of telephone lines) rather than indigenous ones
(e.g. oil, gas and cheap labor).
After correcting for possible bias in OLS, we still see that the agglomer-
ation effect plays a dominant role in guiding investors in choosing the
investment location.
Is FDI into CIS countries driven by different factors?
We argue that different types of FDI are motivated by different factors.
Market-seeking FDI goes to countries with large local market while
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Table 10.2 Determinants of FDI (dependent variableper capita FDI stock)
OLS GMM


























a Parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significance level,
respectively.
b Time dummies included in all regressions.
c Sargan and SOC tests show the p-value for overidentifying restrictions and second-order
serial correlation, respectively.
resource-seeking FDI goes to countries with abundant natural resources.
As Resmini (2000) reports, the locational determinants of FDI in trans-
ition economies vary greatly across different sectors. However, a sectoral
breakdown of FDI is not available in the data we compiled. Generally, the
sectors in which CIS countries29 receive FDI are mainly in light manufac-
turing industries (e.g. food, tobacco) and resource-based industries by way
of privatization whereas the sectoral distribution of FDI in other transition
economies is more evenly spread with a slight skewness towards heavy
manufacturing industries (e.g. automobile and machinery in the CEECs)
and finance.
To introduce sectoral differences with the paucity of sectoral data, we
divide the sample into non-CIS and CIS countries. As discussed before,
sectoral differences in FDI inflows in non-CIS and CIS countries are large
and we expect to see different factors driving FDI in these two groups.
Table 10.3 shows the estimates from GMM for these two groups. Some
differences are observed in the results. First, the agglomeration effect is
present in both but more pronounced in CIS countries. Second, another
important determinant of FDI flows is availability of skilled labor for CIS
countries and the external liberalization index for non-CIS countries.
Somewhat puzzling is the positive coefficient on distance from
Germany. CIS countries are located further from the West than non-CIS
countries. The main market they serve is Russia instead of Western
Europe for historical and geographical reasons. In fact, when we replace
DIST with distance from Moscow instead of Düsseldorf, the sign of the dis-
tance variable becomes negative and significant for CIS countries. This
evidence shows that CIS countries gravitate towards Russia rather than the
West.
For non-CIS countries, however, the Sargan test indicates the invalidity
of the instruments. Due to small samples, GMM estimates may be asymp-
totically biased. In Table 10.4, we run fixed-effects model instead to
compare with the results from Table 10.3.
In the first column in Table 10.4, non-CIS countries yield results similar
to those obtained from GMM in Table 10.3. This implies that a bias in
GMM for non-CIS countries is not so severe. For non-CIS countries, the
agglomeration effect and human capital remain main drivers of FDI
inflows. Note that DIST is no longer significant in OLS and that the rule
of law becomes more crucial in explaining FDI inflows. In these variables,
GMM in Table 10.3 might have introduced bias in that table.
Summarizing the results from Tables 10.3 and 10.4, we find that the
agglomeration effect seems to be the most important variable in explain-
ing FDI inflows. This is particularly so for CIS countries because there is
less direct information about business operating conditions than in non-
CIS countries. For investors, the signaling effect of other investors weighs
more than classical economic factors of comparative advantages.
For non-CIS countries, the degree of external liberalization is a key
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factor for promoting FDI. For CIS countries, favorable business operating
conditions such as well-enforced rules and reasonable judicial systems
encourage more FDI inflows. Availability of skilled labor force is another
important determinant.
These differences stem from the fact that the two groups are in a differ-
ent stage of economic development and that they attract FDI in different
sectors. Non-CIS countries had a head-start in industrialization as they
swiftly privatized nationally owned enterprises and they are more successful
in accessing the global knowledge base via a relatively open trade regime.
CIS countries are still lagging behind non-CIS countries in the level of
industrial production and they are still shy of attracting substantial FDI
flows. Our results suggest that the main impediments to FDI flows in CIS
countries are a lack of skilled labor force and sound legal infrastructure.
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Table 10.3 Determinants of FDI: GMM (dependent variable = per capita FDI
stock)
Non CIS countries CIS countries






















N 67 49 
Sargan test 0.06 0.98
SOC test 0.93 0.22 
Notes
a Parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10% significance level,
respectively.
b Time dummies included in all regressions.
c Sargan and SOC tests show the p-value for overidentifying restrictions and second-order
serial correlation, respectively.
The effects of FDI on growth
In this section, we investigate whether or not the impact of FDI is positive
as the theory predicts. We estimate five specifications that are standard in
the growth and FDI literature.
We pay particular attention to endogenizing FDI. The specifications are
aggregate production functions derived from the augmented Solow
model (Mankiw et al. 1992), from the model developed by Borensztein et
al. (1998) and that from Easterly (2001). Let us comment on each of
these.
The model developed by Borensztein et al. (1998) yields the following
basic specification (BGL1):
y f (y0, hk, fdi, infl, govc, war, buroqual)
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Table 10.4 Determinants of FDI: FE model (dependent variableper capita FDI
stock)
Non CIS countries CIS countries

























a Parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10% significance level,
respectively.
b Time dummies included in all regressions.
where y is real GDP growth, y0 is initial GDP, hk is human capital, fdi is
foreign direct investment, infl is the inflation rate, govc is government
consumption as a percentage of GDP, war is a dummy variable for war and
buroqual is an institutional variable capturing the quality of the bureau-
cracy.30 The model predicts that the effects of initial income, inflation,
government consumption and war are negative, while those of human
capital, FDI and institutions are positive.
We estimate two variants of the Borensztein et al. (1998) model. One is
as follows (BGL2):
y f (y0, hk, fdi, infl, govc, war, buroqual, inv)
where investment is included. This allows us to examine the relationship
between foreign and domestic investment. As noted, these authors report that
the coefficient on FDI itself is not statistically significant, even when an inter-
action term between FDI and human capital is introduced (the latter is statis-
tically significant and forms the basis for their result). The second variant we
report is the specification that includes this interaction term (BGL3).
The augmented Solow specification from Mankiw et al. (1992) will have
the following form (MRW):
y f (y0, inv, pop, hk, fdi)
where, for the variable not defined above, pop is population growth.
Notice that because FDI is absent from the original formulation we have
to modify it in the standard way by specifying technological change as a
function of FDI.31 The model predicts that the effects of initial income
and of population growth are negative, while those of investment, human
capital and FDI are positive.
The last econometric model we use in this paper is the outcome of a
search for a specification that is able to highlight the main determinants
of economic growth in the cross-country setup. The model postulated by
Easterly (2001) is as follows (EAST):
y f (y0, hk, fdi, infl, infra, oecdgrowth)
where, for the variables not defined above, infra is a proxy for the quality
of the infrastructure in the host economy and oecdgrowth is a proxy for
international activity.32 The predictions are that the effects of initial
income and inflation are negative while those of human capital, FDI and
infrastructure and OECD growth are positive.
As noted, the determinants of FDI vary a great deal across transition.
We thus proceed by estimating the specifications above using as instru-
ments for FDI: the lagged stock of FDI (as a proxy for agglomeration
effects), the quality of the bureaucracy, the number of telephone lines (as
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a proxy for the quality of infrastructure), the external liberalization index
and OECD growth.33
In Table 10.5 columns BGL1 and BGL2 show that the positive and statis-
tically significant effect of FDI on real GDP growth obtain with or without
the inclusion of the interaction term between FDI and human capital. The
negative sign on the initial income coefficient supports the prediction of
convergence from the neoclassical model. It can also be seen that stabiliza-
tion policies (as proxied by the inflation rate) have played a role in generat-
ing faster rates of economic growth. We also find that political stability (as
proxied by the dummy variable for armed conflict) has also contributed to
higher growth rates during the transition period.
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Table 10.5 The impact of FDI on growth in transition economies, 1990–8 (FE
model with instrumental variables) (dependent variableGDP growth)
BGL1 BGL2 BGL3 MRW EAST
Constant 142.42*** 80.96** 171.74*** 234.51*** 177.03***
(54.62) (41.35) (55.11) (52.19) (44.21)
Initial income 8.75*** 5.66** 10.27*** 12.25*** 9.45***
(2.82) (2.22) (2.85) (2.98) (2.69)
Human capital 0.996** 0.594 1.27*** 1.83*** 1.34***
(0.484) (0.392) (0.491) (0.49) (0.42)
Foreign direct 1.53*** 0.862*** 1.52*** 1.79*** 1.561***
investment (0.4059) (0.302) (0.399) (0.318) (0.342)
Interaction term 0.0001
(FDI*HK) (0.001)
Inflation rate 0.0009 0.0009** 0.0008 0.0009**
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Government 0.117 0.0009 0.067
consumption (0.331) (0.2939) (0.328)
Dummy for war 19.17*** 21.31*** 18.62***
(6.265) (5.38) (6.208)
Quality of the 0.501 3.61* 0.143







Average growth in 2.72***
OECD (1.04)
No. observations 157 157 156 156 164
R-squared 0.069 0.331 0.104 0.124 0.042
Notes:
a ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively.
b Standard errors in parenthesis. Dummy variables for countries and years are not reported.
Instruments for FDI are: lagged stock of FDI, quality of the bureaucracy, telephone lines,
external liberalization index and OECD growth.
In column 3 (BGL3), the inclusion of domestic investment does not
affect the positive impact of FDI on growth. As can be seen, the coefficient
of FDI in BGL3 is very similar to that in BGL1 and domestic investment
alone has a positive coefficient. This implies that a positive effect of FDI is
independent of the presence of domestic investment and that FDI is
complementary to domestic investment in increasing the growth rate.
The same pattern is detected in MRW. FDI remains an important deter-
minant for faster economic growth and the size of the FDI coefficient is
more pronounced in IV estimation. The remaining explanatory variables
are the same as before. Low initial income level and high investment rate
lead to higher rates of economic growth.
The last column of Table 10.5 shows the specification proposed by East-
erly (2001). Again, the coefficient on FDI is positive and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. The results also show that the effects on
the growth rates of transition economies of their initial income levels,
inflation rates and of the level of economic activity in the OECD countries
are all statistically significant and carry their expected signs. We find that
the quality of the infrastructure does not seem to be an important deter-
minant of growth rates in the transition economies.34
In summary, we find that for the transition economies FDI had a posi-
tive impact on economic growth. This finding remains robust after we
instrument FDI in order to account for the variety of determinants in dif-
ferent transition economies. Regardless of the main determinants of FDI
(e.g. good policies or favorable initial conditions), the positive effect of
FDI on growth rates seems to prevail.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the factors explaining the geographical distribution
of FDI inflow across 25 transition economies by utilizing panel data between
1990 and 1998. The location determinants we test consist of three cate-
gories: the first country-specific advantages such as low-cost labor, large local
market, skilled labor force, sufficient infrastructure and proximity to the
West. The second group of variables tested is macroeconomic policy and
policy that facilitates business-operating conditions. The third is the agglom-
eration effect of foreign investment. We explain FDI stock per capita in
each country as a function of the above variables in the GMM estimation.
In regression results, we find the role of agglomeration economies the
most significant determinant of foreign investment inflows in the trans-
ition economies. This result is robust throughout alternative speci-
fications. The model without the agglomeration effect seems to show that
FDI in the region is sought by market-seeking investors rather than
resource-seeking investors. Once we introduce the agglomeration 
effect, however, market size becomes no longer an important location
determinant.
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Nevertheless, poor quality of bureaucracy in the host country is found
to be a deterrent to foreign investment decisions even after controlling for
the agglomeration effect. This suggests an interesting policy implication.
Improving institutional governance such as bureaucratic quality is a strong
signal of a favorable investment environment for many foreign investors.
Economic and political stability is a necessary condition in order for a host
country to attract foreign investment. Once it secures macroeconomic
stability in the earlier stage of transition from a centrally planned to a
market economy, the institutional dimension of the transition process
becomes more important, particularly when a country tries to promote
FDI.
The other determinant of FDI inflow is “openness” to trade measured
as external liberalization index. Our results show that the more liberalized
the country is towards external trade, the more FDI it will attract. This
confirms the findings in earlier studies that trade and FDI are
complementary to each other.
CIS and non-CIS countries (e.g. CEECs and the Baltic states) differ in
the sector in which they attract FDI. The location determinants reflect
such differences when we divide the samples into two groups. For CIS
countries, there is a greater effect of agglomeration at work perhaps due
to insufficient information about local conditions as a destination of
investment. For these countries, securing the first wave of foreign invest-
ment flows is all the more important because this will lead to a cascading
effect of investment in subsequent periods. Other factors that contribute
to FDI inflows in CIS countries are availability of human capital and good
rule of law, or a sound judicial system. For non-CIS countries, the agglom-
eration effect is present but to a lesser extent than in CIS countries. One
determining factor in attracting FDI in these countries is a more liberal-
ized trade regime.
We also investigate the effect of FDI on the economic growth rate of
these countries during the same period and find that the impact of FDI
on growth is positive and significant, which remains robust to various
specifications.
Using a broader set of transition countries and a longer time span than
in existing studies, we hope to introduce heterogeneity both in time and
country in analyzing the location determinants of FDI. We confirm the
presence of agglomeration economies as a dominant factor in explaining
the pattern of geographical FDI distribution across these countries. Also
important are the extent of trade liberalization and the quality of bureau-
cracy. An educated workforce is particularly important for CIS countries
as it might reflect a change of direction in the areas of FDI they receive.
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A10.6 Definitions of variables
per capita FDI stock Per capita cumulative FDI stock (constant million USD)
[source: World Development Indicator]
lagged FDI stock One-year lagged per capita FDI stock
ypc GDP per capita (USD)
wagen Gross nominal wage (USD) [source: UNECE “Economic
Survey of Europeqa”]
ss3 General secondary school enrollment (%)
natres Natural resource endowment: 0 if poor, 1 if moderate
and 2 if rich [source: DDGT]
dist Distance from Düsseldorf (km)
telephon # of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people
infav Average inflation rate (%)
clie Cumulative external liberalization index, i.e. trade
liberalization
rulelaw Extent of law enforcement [source: Campos (2000)]
buroqual Quality of bureaucracy [source: Campos (2000)]
A10.7 Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI stock 188 164 295 0 1,771
Lagged FDI stock 163 131 250 0 1,572
ypc 220 2,134 1,784 219 9,850
wagen 151 167 217 0.02 1,247
ss3 221 26 7.7 8.8 45.6
natres 225 0.52 0.75 0 2
dist 225 2,237 1,476 559 5,180
telephon 219 162 88 0 374
infav 225 434 1,304 0.8 15,606
clie 225 2.74 2.45 0 9.5
rulelaw 225 6 2.46 2 10
buroqual 225 2.45 1.63 0.83 8.33
Notes
1 We thank Gordon Hanson, Boyan Jovanovic, James Levinsohn, Gérard Roland,
John Sutton, Bernard Yeung and seminar participants at the University of
Tokyo, MDT Meetings and CEPR/WDI Transition Conference for valuable
comments. We also thank Aurelijus Dabus̆inskas, Anna Ratcheva, Evis Sinani
and Dana Z̆lábková for excellent research assistance, and the William Davidson
Institute at the University of Michigan for financial support and hospitality.
The usual disclaimer applies.
2 See Estrin et al. (1997) and Lankes and Venables (1996).
3 Kravis and Lipsey (1982) find market size and openness to be important
determinants for the location choices of US multinationals. Lucas (1993) finds
FDI inflows into seven Southeast Asian countries are sensitive to relative wage
differentials.
4 See Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Kinoshita and Mody (2001).
5 See section 5 for further discussion on the benefits of FDI. Empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of subsidies and tax holidays for foreign-owned firms is
rather mixed. See Hanson (2000) for further discussions.
6 A standard neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that capital always
flows from rich to poor countries, which is contradicted by empirical evidence.
One way to reconcile them is to introduce the role of human capital in an
input of production as in Lucas (1990).
7 The ranking of major recipients of FDI in terms of cumulative FDI inflows
between 1989–99 is Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Russia in
descending order (see Transition Report 2000: 74 (EBRD 2000)).
8 Resmini (2000) and Bevan and Estrin (2000) study the determinants of FDI
flows into 10 and 11 transition economies, respectively.
9 This is also called “horizontal FDI” as a firm duplicates the production process
in foreign locations. See Markusen and Venables (1998).
10 This is “vertical FDI” as a firm relocates part of the vertical chain of production
to a low-cost location.
11 See Kinoshita and Mody (2002).
12 The sources of externalities are identified differently in different models.
Lucas (1988) argues that the accumulation of human capital generates positive
spillovers while, in Krugman’s (1991) model, transportation costs and fixed
costs in production lead to the demand linkages of firms, which increases the
incentives to agglomerate. See Fujita et al. (1999) for recent surveys of theories
on agglomeration.
13 Coughlin et al. (1991), Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Head et al. (1995).
14 Lucas (1993), Singh and Jun (1996), Cheng and Kwan (2000), Resmini (2000)
and Bevan and Estrin (2004).
15 See Dunning (1993) for further discussion.
16 Another variable to measure market potential is annual GDP growth.
17 Gylfason and Zoega (2001) find that abundant natural resources may crowd
out physical capital and inhibit economic growth. See also Robinson et al.
(2002).
18 This variable is constructed by De Melo et al. (1997).
19 We experimented with other distance variables such as distance from Brussels.
But the results obtained are very similar.
20 The index is constructed by De Melo et al. (1997).
21 See Caves (1996) and Singh and Jun (1996), for example.
22 The variables are taken from Campos (2000).
23 It reflects the degree to which citizens are willing to accept the established
institutions for making and implementing laws and adjudicating disputes.
24 This measures whether a post-communist constitution has been adopted,
whether the constitution provides for property and human rights, whether the
criminal code has been subject to reform, whether judges rule fairly and impar-
tially and whether they were appointed during the communist era, whether the
courts are free of political control, whether the state provides public defenders
and whether ethnic minority rights are protected.
25 The sources of externalities are identified differently in different models.
Lucas (1988) argues that the accumulation of human capital generates positive
spillovers while, in Krugman’s (1991) model, transportation costs and fixed
costs in production lead to the demand linkages of firms to agglomerate
further. See Fujita et al. (1999) for recent surveys of theories on agglomeration.
26 The Hausman test rejects random effects model.
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27 See Kinoshita and Mody (2001) for further discussion.
28 The efficiency of estimates can be improved by adding more moment con-
ditions. For the system GMM estimation, see Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn
and Schmidt (1995), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998).
29 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
30 Due to data availability, there are some differences between the original specifi-
cation and the one we use in this paper. There were dummy variables for Latin
American and African countries that are not present in our specification.
Originally, it also contained variables reflecting the number of assassinations
per capita, the extent of political freedoms and the occurrence of civil wars. To
substitute for these, we use a dummy variable for internal and external armed
conflicts (war). The institutional variables in the original specification are not
available, thus here we use a measure of the quality of the bureaucracy. We
were not able to find panel data for the black market premium on the
exchange rate for our sample of transition economies.
31 The same modification is done for the Easterly (2001) specification.
32 The Easterly specification also contains two variables, the black market
premium on the exchange rate and the real exchange rate. We were unable to
obtain these in the current data.
33 The results do not change after a dummy for the countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States is introduced. In particular, the coefficient on
FDI remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
34 It should be mentioned that this latter result might be due to the poor quality
of the data and the lack of alternative measures of infrastructure quality in
these countries. We found data on another proxy for the quality of infrastruc-
ture, the percentage of roads paved, but quality was very poor.
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Part III
Social policy in transition

11 Latin American social security
reform in the 1990s
Koichi Usami
Introduction
Latin America’s high levels of external debt were the cause of high infla-
tion and negative economic growth in the 1980s, a period known as “The
lost decade.” As a solution to the crisis, many Latin American countries
adopted a neoliberal policy which emphasized market mechanisms in the
1990s. The main elements of this policy program involved abolition of
industrial protection, trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization
of state-owned companies. With the implementation of these measures,
import substitution industrialization (ISI), a model of economic growth
before the 1980s, came to an end completely.
In this process, the contract of urban formal sector workers that were
generally full-time and permanently employed was criticized for provoking
a rise in labor costs, under keen market competition. The reduction of
industrial sector protection and the hypertrophied public sector meant
the abolition of guarantees of wages and employment conditions that
urban formal sector workers had enjoyed institutionally. The social secur-
ity system, implemented in Latin America during the period of import
substitution industrialization and developed primarily for formal sector
urban workers, was largely reformed in the context of economic liberaliza-
tion and as a result of changes in industrial relations during the 1990s.
This chapter gives an outline of social security reform achieved in the
1990s in Latin America, focusing on pension and health care systems, and
mentions the primary factors leading to this reform. In the next section, I
describe the characteristics of the social security system and the primary
factors leading to its formation before the 1980s. In the third, the outline
of the social security reform, implemented in the 1990s, is explained. In
the fourth, the political and economic factors that promoted social secur-
ity reform in the 1990s are discussed. The final section briefly synthesizes
the findings.
The social security system before the 1980s
Diversity in social and economic situations among Latin American
countries
Latin America consists of a diverse group of countries with regard to eco-
nomic, political and social characteristics, from Brazil, with a population
exceeding 160 million, to the Caribbean countries, each with a population
of several tens of thousands. A great difference can be seen in the region
with regard to economic development and social security expenditures.
Table 11.1 shows a great diversity in the per capita GDP, from $9,070 in
Argentina, to $431 in Nicaragua, in 1997. Examining public social expen-
diture, there is a great difference between Uruguay, where it represented
22.8 percent of the GDP, and El Salvador, where it represented 4.3
percent, in 1998–9. Wilensky indicates that there is a strong correlation
between economic development and increase in social expenditure
(Wilensky 1975). This theory is known as the “industrialization hypothe-
sis.” In Latin America, most countries with a low per capita GDP expend
lower public social expenditure, while countries with a high per capita
GDP exhibit a tendency for high public social expenditure. However, in
the case of Mexico, with a per capita GDP reaching $4,265, public social
expenditure represents only 9.1 percent of GDP. In contrast, in the case
of Costa Rica, with a per capita GDP of $2,540, it reaches 16.8 percent of
GDP. This shows that there is no absolute correlation between economic
development and the level of public social expenditure. Moreover, the
social security system differs from country to country, and, as Esping-
Andersen and many other researchers point out, it is also necessary to
take into consideration political factors affecting the social security system
in Latin America (Esping-Andersen 1990).
In countries where public social expenditure represents a high percent-
age of GDP, such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica,
coverage of social insurance, mainly the pension system, is relatively exten-
sive. In addition, social insurance services are improving, and the ratio of
the population covered by the system is high. This paper examines coun-
tries with high public social expenditure, such as Argentina and Brazil,
and also examines Mexico, the country with the largest Spanish-speaking
population in the region. However, we must note that there is a compara-
tively large informal sector existing parallel to the formal sector in the
region. This is also true of the “advanced countries” in the region, a point
that cannot be overlooked. In contrast, though there are some exceptions,
in countries with low levels of economic development and low public
social expenditure, such as Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, the ratio of
poor and indigent households is high, and the coverage of social insur-
ance is low (see Table 11.1). It is commonly accepted among researchers

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































security systems in these countries. In Latin American countries the term
“social security” is often used synonymously with “social insurance.” In this
paper, the term “social security” is used in its broad sense, including social
insurance social assistance and health care.
Development of social security systems prior to the 1980s
The characteristics of social security systems in “advanced countries” in
Latin America can be summarized as follows: 1) compared to East Asian
newly industrialized countries, the implementation of the system started
earlier, 2) the main beneficiaries of the social system were formal sector
workers, 3) the social assistance policy available to informal sector workers
who were not covered by social insurance was of a residual character, so
that 4) there are differences in social insurance between the formal sector
and the informal sector. There are also differences in social insurance
benefits within the formal sector.
In “advanced countries” such as Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, the
pension system for government workers was established prior to World
War II. After World War II, the expansion of the social insurance system
continued so that in the period from the 1960s to the 1970s almost all cate-
gories of workers were covered by social insurance in these countries.
However their real coverage was limited to formal sector workers.
Mesa-Lago considers Uruguay, Chile and Argentina as pioneers in the
region in adopting a social insurance system. He observes that “The pio-
neers were the ones who first introduced social security systems (especially
pensions), and these are the most developed countries in this sense; in
other words, they have all the range of social insurances (pensions, dis-
eases, maternity, labor and employment risks), as well as family allowance
and social assistance covering almost the whole population, or at least the
great majority of the population” (Mesa-Lago 2000: 19) (also see Table
11.2). He includes Cuba and Costa Rica among “advanced countries” of
the region, but Brazil should be included within this group as well.
However, as shown in Table 11.1, even in the “advanced countries” of
the region, the coverage rate of pensions varies from 89 percent in
Uruguay to 42 percent in Costa Rica, and a considerable number of the
elderly people are outside this coverage. Most of the elderly people
without pensions belong to the informal sector, and it may be inferred
that either they did not join the pension system or they did not pay contri-
butions to the system. Moreover, in 1999, the rate of poor and indigent
population in “advanced countries” cannot be considered low, with rates
of 19.7 percent in Argentina and 37.5 percent in Brazil. Though this poor
and indigent population was receiving social assistance such as food assis-
tance, this could not meet their needs either from the viewpoint of quan-
tity or quality. Grassi et al. take Argentina as an example to describe the
characteristics of social security policy of these countries as “The wide and
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simultaneous development of worker category and his specific rights to
protection favored at the same time the residual character of public assis-
tance” (Grassi et al. 1994: 15).
Thus, it can be said that the characteristics of the social security system
established before the 1980s in “advanced countries” of Latin America
are: 1) the system centered on social insurance, 2) a great gap existed
between the formal sector and informal sector and 3) in the social insur-
ance system there was a difference in the conditions of contributions
made and benefits received by workers depending on whether they
belonged to the formal or informal sector. Figure 11.1 made by Londoño
and Frenk shows the general health care system in Latin America, and
indicates the difference in the structure of the health care system accord-
ing to the social stratum. Poor people in the informal sector are users of
public hospitals, and as a rule, they are not charged at all or they are
charged a minimum amount for the service. The non-poor population is
divided into two groups; workers in the formal sector are registered in the
social insurance system, and covered by this system. On the other hand,
the urban middle and upper classes are users of high quality private
health care services/insurance. They are not covered by the social
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Table 11.2 Comparison of social insurance systems in Latin America
First Other social insurances Coverage
program
Pension Sickness Work Unemployment Family Total Active
injury
1977 1989–98
Argentina 1930s X X X X 80 82
Bolivia 1956 X X X 21 13
Chile 1924 X X X X 93 80a
Colombia 1945 X X X 16 35
Costa Rica 1943 X X X 86 60a
Cuba 1920 X X X 100b 93b
El Salvadorc 1953 X X 16 26
Mexico 1941 X X 58 44
Peru 1936 X X 24 32
Uruguay 1919 X X X X 88 80
Source: Mesa-Lago (2000: 55).
Notes
X: existence of some kind of system.
Pension includes old age, disability and death. Sickness includes sickness and maternity.
Family means family allowances. Active means economically active population.
a Coverage increases highly if pension assistance is added.
b Legal coverage. Statistics are not available.
c There is a great age variation among multiple programs in 1979.
insurance system, or sometimes even if they are covered by the social
insurance system, they prefer to use private health care services/insurance
(Londoño and Frenk 2000: 33–4).
As we have seen above, the social security system in Latin America was,
on the whole, social insurance centered, with a dual gap. In the case of
Costa Rica, a social insurance model was implemented with a universal
medical system. Moreover, in this country under the social democratic
PLN administration, social assistance has been extended, including uni-
versalization of social security, creation of a national health plan, and
introduction of family allowances (Wilson 1998: 102). Costa Rica, an
“advanced country” in regard to social security in Latin America, has a
relatively universal system, which makes the country an exception in the
region, along with socialist Cuba.
Main factors contributing to the development of a Latin American social
security model before the 1980s
The following factors can be identified as influencing the creation of the
above mentioned social security system in Latin America before the 1980s:
1) the import substitution industrialization process started early and con-
tinued for a long period, 2) due to active intervention by the state in the
economic sector, there was an expansion of the state sector, 3) as a result,
there was an expansion of urban workers and the middle class, and labor
unions came to have a certain political power, 4) the coming into power
of populism, of which urban workers were the principal constituency and
5) even during military regimes, due to several reasons, there was an
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Figure 11.1 Most common health model in Latin America (source: Londoño and
Frenk (2000: 33)).
Compared to East Asian countries, implementation of the import substi-
tution industrialization model in Latin America started earlier, during the
world economic crisis of the 1930s. Then, after World War II, the Latin
American states started a full-scale promotion of import substitution indus-
trialization policy, which continued for a long period, until the collapse of
the model due to the economic crisis of the 1980s. In this process, the states
protected the development of national industries by several measures, from
imposing high tariff rates to establishing state-owned companies in the
heavy and chemical industries and mineral resources sector. Expansion of
the state sector was accompanied by the nationalization of the infrastructure
sector, which had been owned by foreign capital, under the exaltation of
economic nationalism of the post-World War II period. There was thus a
strong participation of the state in economic development through import
substitution industrialization in the post-World War II period.
As Huber asserts, “The development of social policy in Latin America
has to be understood in the context of the political economy of import
substitution industrialization” (Huber 1996: 144). Employment and
salaries of urban workers in the formal sector were institutionally guaran-
teed by the import substitution industrialization protection measures and
the large-scale employment favored by state expansion. Moreover, formal
sector workers organized labor unions and held political influence.
Those countries with labor legislation favorable to formal sector workers
and a social insurance system were under populist governments, as in the
case of the Perón administration in Argentina, the Vargas administration in
Brazil and the PRI (Partido Revolución Institucional) administration in
Mexico. These governments, as was common to state corporatism, held
workers of the urban formal sector as their principal constituency, and tried
to exercise control over labor unions. (In the case of Mexico, farmers’
unions were also part of the constituency.) Though there were differences
from country to country in the provision of the social insurance system and
unionized worker-oriented labor legislation, one characteristic was shared
by these countries: the existence of governmental control over workers.
However, it cannot be asserted that labor unions in these countries under
populist administration were completely under state control. Because labor
unions had a certain influence, social security policies were decided
between the state corporatist oriented government and relatively influential
labor unions. On the other hand, in the case of Chile, labor unions joined
political parties such as the Communist, Socialist and Radical Parties, and
became a strong pressure group (Mesa-Lago 1978: 28). In Costa Rica, even
though the labor unions’ power weakened after the civil war, the PLN
(Partido Liberación Nacional), a newly organized social democrat party,
came into power repeatedly and expanded the social security policy (Wilson
1998: 81–109).
Moreover, contrary to what may generally be expected, when military gov-
ernments came into power after the collapse of populist administrations,
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there were cases in which social insurance was expanded in Latin
America. Two groups of interpretation of this phenomenon are provided.
The first refers to the emphasis upon the role performed by technocrats
in the authoritarian regime. Malloy refers to Brazil as an example, and
states “the orientation and goals of the military regime converged with
those of social insurance technocrats to create an alliance willing and able
to impose a systematic reform of the social insurance system” (Malloy
1979: 144). The second states that labor unions could preserve a certain
influencing power against pressure from the military government, so that
the military regime had to accept an expansion of social insurance as a
concession. For example, in Argentina, during the Onganía administra-
tion in 1970, a compulsory social medical insurance law (ley de obras
sociales) was approved, which covered all employed workers. In addition,
labor unions could take over the administration of this medical insurance.
This is considered the result of the 1969 large-scale riot led by labor
unions and students in Córdoba. Pérez Irigoyen observes: “This conces-
sion made to labor unions was influenced by the political circumstances of
the time” (Pérez Irigoyen 1989: 178).
Social security reform in the 1990s
Pension reform
After undergoing economic crisis in the 1980s, Latin American countries in
the 1990s came to adopt a neoliberal economic policy, which emphasized
market mechanisms. At the same time, social security reforms were imple-
mented; for example social insurance reform, especially the pension system,
became the central issue of reform. The former public system (a pay as you
go system) was criticized for the deterioration of the pension system’s liq-
uidity, due to such factors as evasion of contribution, aging of the popu-
lation, poorly defined payment conditions and the early retirement system.
Thus, the pillar of the reform was the adoption of an individual capitaliza-
tion system, which would contribute to the formation of the capital market
and establish a close relationship between the contributions paid and bene-
fits received. The first country to implement a drastic pension system
reform was Chile, during the military administration in 1981. The pension
reform in Chile constitutes the model of conversion to the capitalization
system, as the new system was “the only one that includes a capitalization
system with contributions made exclusively by workers and administrated by
private entities” (Barreto de Oliveira 1994: 3).
However, among major countries in the region, Mexico has been the
only one to implement a conversion to the capitalization system as a major
part of its system. Other countries chose combinations of former systems
with partial introduction of the capitalization system. Mesa-Lago classifies
pension reforms implemented in Latin America during the 1990s into
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three types: a) Substitutive, a system that closed the public system and
replaced it with a new system of fully funded individual accounts (FFI), as
seen in Chile (1981), Bolivia (1987), México (1997) and El Salvador
(1998); b) Compound, which did not close the old system but reformed
the public system and integrated it as a basic-solidarity component with a
new FFI component, as seen in Argentina (1994) and Uruguay (1996); c)
Parallel, a system that did not close the public system but reformed it
either partially or completely, and abolished a monopoly regime through
the creation of a new FFI system that competes with the public system,
seen in Perú (1993) and Colombia (1994) (Mesa-Lago 2000: 22).
Other social insurance reform
There was a trend towards incorporating the private sector in the reform
of social security systems other than pension programs, especially health
care services reform. However, similar to what happened in pension
reforms, reforms implemented in health care systems varied from country
to country, from the case of Brazil, where a universal health care system
was adopted, to the case of Chile, where after urging the incorporation of
the private sector into the health care system during the military adminis-
tration, there was a trend toward strengthening the public sector with the
onset of a democratic government (Barrientos 2000).
In Argentina, in addition to pension reform, an unemployment insur-
ance plan was established for the first time in 1991, and significant reform
was implemented in the medical insurance system in 1997. The adoption
of unemployment insurance in 1991 was simultaneous with the enactment
of an employment law which enabled flexible labor contracts, and consti-
tuted an answer to the increase in employment instability. In Argentina,
the right to administer the medical insurance system “obras socials” was
also granted to labor unions and, as a result, most “obras socials” are
managed by labor unions. In this type of medical insurance system,
workers automatically become enrolled in the medical insurance of their
workplace. This procedure has been criticized for limiting competition
among medical insurance and health care service providers and for pro-
ducing excessive service and an increase in contributions paid
(Panadeiros 1991: 13–27). In order to stimulate competition among
providers of insurance and health care services, a new system allowing a
free choice of insurers has been adopted. However, due to labor union
opposition, it was decided not to include private medical insurance ser-
vices in the range of options (Usami 2001). In addition, the public hos-
pital system, which aids low-income individuals, has undergone a process
of decentralization and is at present on its way to self-management (auto
gestión).
In Brazil, social insurance relies heavily on the pension system; in fact,
the expression “social insurance” is used to denote “pension.” The
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pension system was divided into a system for private workers (a pay as you
go system) and a non-contributory system for government workers. With
regard to contributions and benefits, the pension system for government
workers had been more favored than that of the private workers. Pension
reform in Brazil was slow, and was limited to introducing restrictive con-
ditions to the benefits of the private worker pension system (Koyasu
2001). After prolonged debates in Congress and Courthouse, pension
reform for public employees, which includes levying contributions on
public employees, was achieved by constitutional amendment in 2003.
Contrary to the slow progress in pension system reform, Brazil imple-
mented a substantial reform in the health care system in 1990. This
included the adoption of a completely universal system. The former
system was divided into a social insurance system for the workers in the
formal sector and a free health care service system for the workers in the
informal sector. The latter failed to meet the needs from both quality and
quantity perspectives. The new system, called “sistema único de salud”
(sole medical system), consists of a free health care system offered in
public health institutions to all citizens. However, problems still remain, as
the middle and upper class populations, not satisfied with public health
care facilities, turn to private health care institutions and insurance. More-
over, there are regions with no access to public medical institutions
(Takagi 2001).
Health care reform in Chile experienced a parallel evolution with its
pension reform. Medical insurance had been the main pillar of the
former health care system, oriented to white-collar and blue-collar
workers. As a result of the 1981 reform, those enrolled could choose
between public medical insurance and private medical insurance. In addi-
tion, public hospitals are on their way to decentralization. However, since
a democratic center-left administration came to power, there has been a
tendency toward strengthening the public health care sector (Barrientos
2000).
Similarly, there has been a parallel evolution of pension and health
care system reform in Mexico. The former Mexican system consisted of
three components: 1) a medical insurance system for workers in the
formal sector, 2) a public hospital system under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Health oriented principally toward the informal sector not
covered by insurance and 3) a private sector. The largest form of social
insurance was the Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) (Mexican
Institute of Social Insurance) for private sector workers. When pension
reform was implemented in 1995, the medical insurance system was sepa-
rated from pension accounts, so that contributions to the medical insur-
ance system from public funds increased, and the proportion of
contribution funds decreased. Moreover, the IMSS created a new system
oriented to non-participants, consisting of government assistance and con-
tribution funds, and urged public enrollment in an IMSS medical insur-
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ance system. In addition, the public hospital system under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Health is moving toward decentralization (Gómez-
Dantés 2001; Tani 2001).
Background of the social security reform in the 1990s
Dismantling the ISI systems and its effects on social welfare
Neoliberal economic policies, which emphasized market principle and
were adopted as a break away from the economic crisis of the 1980s and
its aftermath, can be indicated as one of the circumstances in which social
security reform was carried out in the 1990s. With the exception of Chile,
where a military regime implemented a neoliberal economic reform and
social insurance system reform, measures such as economic liberalization,
deregulation and privatization of state-owned companies were carried out
by democratic administrations. This was seen in the Menem administra-
tion in Argentina (1989–99), the Collor de Mello administration in Brazil
(1990–2), the Salinas administration in Mexico (1988–94) and the Fuji-
mori administration in Peru (1990–9). Implementation of these measures
meant a complete replacement of the import substitution industrialization
model by a market economy model. It can be pointed out that the global-
ization of the economy was taking place simultaneously with the imple-
mentation of a neoliberal economic policy in Latin America.
The shift to the market economy model meant the abolition of the pro-
tections given to wages and employment for formal sector workers by
means of protectionist measures and the oversized state employment
system implemented during the period of the import substitution industri-
alization. Moreover, economic liberalization and deregulation meant the
intensification of domestic and foreign competition, and exerted pressure
toward reduction of labor costs. Accordingly, full-day, permanent labor
contracts were criticized as increasing labor costs. So industrial relations
tend to be more flexible. Encouragement of market competition con-
tributed to the improvement of competitiveness, but, on the other hand,
it produced destabilization of employment (CEPAL 2000a: 20). In addi-
tion, there has been an increase in informal employment (those with no
labor contract), and industrial relations in general have become unstable.
Social insurance system reform, mainly consisting of the change from a
pay as you go pension system to a private capitalization system, is part of
the conversion process to a market economy model. It was assumed that
the inclusion of the private sector into the pension would allow the imple-
mentation of an efficient and high-quality service. Moreover, it was
expected that the introduction of a private capitalization method in the
pension system would produce the formation of capital markets and
would contribute to economic development. Individual pension accounts
in a private capitalization system clearly indicate the relationship between
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contributions and benefits, and it was believed that this would mitigate the
contribution evasion problem. Moreover, it was asserted that individual
accounts of the capitalization system were suitable to deal with the
increase in job mutability that was considered the basis of flexible indus-
trial relations.
However, during the economic growth of the 1990s, countries such as
Argentina and Uruguay showed economic growth without an employment
increase or a rise in unemployment. Unemployment rates in 2001 were
17.4 percent in Argentina, 15.4 percent in Uruguay, 16.9 percent in
Panama and 18.5 percent in Colombia (CEPAL 2001a) (see Table 11.3).
When high unemployment rates become constant and there is significant
growth in informal employment, social insurance policies such as pension
systems and medical insurance systems face the problem of decreasing
enrollees and increasing contribution evasion.
Political factors of social security reform
The weakening of labor unions that received benefits from the former
social security system can be seen as a political factor that allowed the
implementation of a market oriented model of social security. In the past,
labor unions feared that social security system reform would reduce their
benefits. Thus, they would frequently stand against such reform. However,
employment became unstable with economic liberalization, and thus,
labor unions started to lose political influence due to decreasing member-
ship. The trade union density in wage and salary earners decreased by
42.6 percent in Argentina (1986–95), by 28.2 percent in Mexico
(1989–91) and by 42.6 percent in Venezuela (1988–95) (ILO 1997: 239).
Thus corporatist political structures weakened under the market oriented
economy model during the 1990s.
Latin American governments that implemented social security reform
in parallel with neoliberal economic reform in the 1990s were all demo-
cratic governments. Some scholars ascribe the peculiarity of democracy in
these governments as a factor allowing the implementation of large-scale
reform. O’Donnell calls this type of democracy a “delegative democracy”
(“democracia delegativa”). He states “delegative democracy consists in
producing, through clean elections, a majority authorizing somebody to
become an exclusive interpreter of the highest interests of the nation”
(O’Donnell 1997: 294).
However, the results of market-oriented social security reform have not
been uniform in the region. As shown above, the content of reforms
implemented have been varied among the countries. It may be said that
these differences reflect the differences in political situation and political
system among them. Murillo takes the examples of Argentina, Mexico and
Venezuela and explains “the interaction between labor unions and their


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and partisan coalitions” (Murillo 2001: 196). According to Murillo, differ-
ences in the reforms implemented are the results of these factors.
On the other hand, Takahashi (2001: 20–5) maintains that the political
system is the reason why government worker pension system reform had
not advanced in Brazil. She points out that “pensioner cum politicians
trying to protect acquired benefits, functioned as potential veto players,
and that Brazil’s highly fragmented party system provided the RJU
(Regime de Previdência do Serviço Público: Social Security Regime for
Public Sector Workers) coalition with opportunities to veto policy
change.” In the case of Argentina, as medical insurance is closely related
to labor union interests, labor unions have opposed its reform. This is why
medical insurance reform has been slower than pension reform. In
general, labor unions are losing their influence, but not entirely. In the
Argentine political context, corporatism still maintains certain political
viability. In these two countries, political legacies partially have con-
strained social security reform.
Meanwhile, governments which have a social democratic tendency
came into power in South America, as in the case of Brazil in 1995,
Argentina, with the de la Rua Alianza administration in 1999 and Chile,
when Lagos from the socialist party became president in 1999. These
administrations mitigated social problems caused by neoliberalism, and
aim at economic and social models similar to the European social demo-
crats’ “Third Way,” which aims at the coexistence of social equity and
market mechanisms. Thus, their goal is to implement a more impartial
and universal social security policy. Part of this has already been imple-
mented. However, there exist a considerable number of public commit-
ments that cannot be fulfilled due to financial limitations.
That is one of the reasons why the activities of civil society organizations
were increasing in the 1990s. There are many reports of a rapid increase
in the number of civil society organizations which advocated social assis-
tance during the 1990s (e.g. Verduzco 2001). International financial
organizations like the World Bank also supported this trend in improving
the efficiency of social assistance. On the other hand, not a few scholars
pointed out that social, political and economic transformation is part of
the background of growth of civil society organizations. For example,
Garretón stated that it is required for the third sectors to reconstruct the
society in order to connect the political elites with the popular sector,
when politics was oppressed by authoritarian regimes or society was atom-
ized by neoliberal economic reform (Garretón 2001: 36).
Conclusion
Social security reform, especially pension reform implemented in Latin
America in the 1990s, allowed the incorporation of the private sector into
the former public social insurance system. The reform also tried to intro-
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duce market principles into social security policy. This process went in the
same direction as the change of the economic model as it shifted from the
import substitution industrialization model to the market-oriented model.
Moreover, labor unions, weakened politically, lost their ability to sustain
the former social insurance policies. At the same time, international finan-
cial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank recommended structural
reforms to the countries of the region. Under these circumstances, social
security reforms have been achieved by strong “delegative democracy”
type governments.
However, there has not been a complete change in the Latin American
social security system to a market model. In the case of pension systems, most
countries adopted a combination system, which introduced a private capital-
ization system into a reformed public pay as you go system. Some authors
(e.g. Pierson 1994) contend that preexisting political systems and institutions
influenced the social security reform process and produced differences
among them. Moreover, there are examples, as in the cases of medical insur-
ance in Costa Rica and health care in Brazil, where policymakers maintained
or introduced a universal system. It may be that this has been the product of
differences in political circumstances and political systems among countries.
Concerning health care reform, more research is required from a political
science point of view, especially in the case of Brazil.
On the other hand, in the 1990s, industrial relations in some countries
became unstable as unemployment rose, producing stagnation or a
decrease in social insurance coverage. In this situation, social assistance
policy increased in importance. Especially, as observed in Argentina’s eco-
nomic crisis in late 2001, implementation of urgent anti-crisis social assis-
tance has been especially important. Similar to social insurance, urgent
social assistance in the 1990s pursued efficiency and demanded strict tar-
geting in most cases. In Argentina, there is a coexistence of targeting-
oriented programs, such as implementation of a non-contributory pension
system for elderly persons from a fixed age onwards, and universal
characteristics programs such as food assistance for poor people. More-
over, NGOs have an active role in different fields, monitoring institutions
responsible for the implementation of social assistance. The role of civil
society as regards social assistance is on the rise.
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12 Welfare states in East Asia




An international debate on the welfare systems of East Asia was sparked by
the 1997 economic crisis. Although domestic reforms had started in the
early 1990s, what made them an international issue were the unprece-
dented economic crisis and the consequent social anxiety in the wake of
the crisis. Because international agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank joined in the discussion, an arena has
formed for debating welfare policy in the region, rather than country spe-
cific policy. These agencies have come to be influential in shaping the
social policies of each country, not only by providing financial support,
but also by offering knowledge and innovation.1
From emergency measures to long-term issues
It was the emergency measures that appeared first. The objective was miti-
gating the impact of mass unemployment and inflation brought about by
the crisis. Gupta et al. (1998) produced an IMF working paper that
summarized these measures. The measures discussed there, however, were
limited to short-term policies such as provision of subsidies for food and
fuel, distribution of medicine, job creation by expanding public works
program and scholarship to minimize student dropouts. On the other
hand, they did not examine such measures as the coverage expansion of
social insurance, which might lead to long-run financial burdens.2
While the IMF took a short-term approach as above, the World Bank
favored another approach. In recent years, the World Bank has come to
recognize the importance of “social protection” and set up the Social Pro-
tection Unit in 1996. Professor Holzmann, who is the Sector Director of
the Social Protection Unit, has proposed to reposition labor market inter-
vention, social insurance and social safety nets within the framework of
“social risk management.” He suggested that the World Bank should cope
not only with the emergency issues, but also with longer-term risk preven-
tion (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999; World Bank 2001). There is also a
report titled “Towards an East Asian Social Protection Strategy,” prepared
for applying this framework to East Asia (World Bank 1999). Such “new”
concepts from the World Bank have had a considerable effect upon the
direction of the international debate on the welfare systems of East Asia.
Although the economy is recovering, the vulnerabilities of the East
Asian welfare systems revealed by the crisis have not yet been overcome.
Considering this situation, many international agencies have set up
research projects for strengthening the welfare systems of East Asia, based
on a long-term perspective.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has published Social Protection in
Asia and the Pacific (Ortiz ed. 2001). According to Isabel Ortiz who organ-
ized the project, “social protection,” a concept that includes labor market
policies, social insurance, social assistance, area-based schemes and child
protection, is essential for the ADB’s mission to help the member coun-
tries achieve poverty reduction (ibid. 41). The document proposes
guiding principles for each item of social protection.
On the other hand, the seminar titled “Lessons Towards a New Social
Policy Agenda: Beyond the East Asia Socio-Economic Crisis,” which was
financed by the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM)3 Trust Fund and
coordinated by the World Bank, have published New Social Policy Agendas
for Europe and Asia (Marshall and Butzbach eds 2003). In this document,
many European researchers give suggestions for countries like Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, based on the knowledge of
European welfare states. According to Katherine Marshall who organized
the project, the seminar has discussed social policy issues that affect virtu-
ally every resident. These efforts go beyond the World Bank’s traditional
objectives like poverty alleviation and social development (ibid. 4).4
Needs for comparative welfare state studies
As sketched above, it became an international issue to strengthen the welfare
systems of East Asia based on a long-term perspective. This region, however,
has not been properly explored by comparative welfare state studies until
recent years. There are many overgeneralizations about the whole region, on
the one hand, as well as specific studies of particular countries, on the other.
Our historical and comparative understanding of the issue remains very
poor. Lacking a cohesive framework to understand the variety, the policy
prescriptions of international agencies seem to split between the transcen-
dental one-size-fits-all approach and the ad hoc country-specific approach.
To find a way to overcome this shortcoming, comparative studies of East
Asian welfare states are more seriously needed than ever before.5
What I would like here to accomplish is to present challenges and ten-
tative visions, rather than to provide the full answers. I would like to
organize the rest of this chapter in correspondence to the following three
questions.
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1 Why have the social expenditures of East Asian countries been kept
much lower than those of the advanced welfare states? Does it mean
that the welfare systems of East Asia are “embryonic”? (next section)
2 While we often talk about the “East Asian model” of economic devel-
opment, can we also identify a single trajectory of welfare develop-
ment that can be labelled as the “East Asian welfare model”? (third
section)
3 Which direction(s) are the welfare systems of East Asian countries
marching in? How are they located in relation to the reform traject-
ories of the advanced welfare states? (fourth section)
Are they embryonic?
Why have the social expenditures of East Asian countries been kept much
lower than those of the advanced welfare states? Does it mean the welfare
systems of East Asia are “embryonic”? Let us start with a summary of avail-
able data.
Young population and modest expenditure
Figure 12.1 shows the trends of government expenditure on social security
and welfare as a proportion of GDP in each country.6 It illustrates three
points. 1) As is often pointed out, the expenditures are generally lower
than those of non-Asian advanced countries.7 2) Korea, Taiwan and Hong
Kong are relatively generous. Taiwan has consistently been more generous
than other countries. There is a marked increase in Korea from the late
1980s and in Hong Kong from the early 1990s. 3) Other countries (Singa-
pore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) have not shown
any substantial changes within this period.





















































Figure 12.1 Government expenditure on social security and welfare (as % of GDP).
care. It presents three things. 1) Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are
relatively high. All of these countries share the legacy of British colonial
rule. 2) There is a marked increase in Hong Kong from the early 1990s. 3)
Again, these figures are lower than those of non-Asian advanced coun-
tries.
Figure 12.3 displays the trends of government expenditure on educa-
tion.8 We notice that: 1) Most countries spend more money on education
than on social security and health. 2) Malaysia and Singapore are relat-
ively high spenders.
We shall turn now to the correlation between expenditure and its pre-
dicted determinants. Figure 12.4 is a scatter diagram of economic level
and social expenditure.9 The two variables are roughly correlated. But














































































































there are outlier countries like Singapore, where the level of social expen-
diture is not high given its economic level.10 At the opposite end, there are
also countries like Poland, where social expenditure is fairly high in rela-
tion to its economic level. It is also obvious that there is a considerable
range of variation among the rich countries. Obviously it would be wrong
to conclude that the GDP per capita is the only determinant of expendi-
ture level.
Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6 show the apparent correlation between
expenditure and the ageing ratio.11 Here we can find the tentative answer
to the question of why social expenditures of East Asian countries are low.
As Wilensky (1975) pointed out, we may tentatively say that the economic
standard and ageing level of a country are still major factors that deter-
mine its efforts in the sphere of welfare.12 In Figure 12.5, Taiwan seems to
be situated at the takeoff point.
Initiation and coverage
But then, is it correct that the East Asian governments have not made any
efforts in the field of social welfare? That is certainly not the case. As
shown in Table 12.1, all ten countries examined here have introduced
plans that manage old age, sickness and work injury. Four factors stand
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Figure 12.5 Aging and social expenditure.
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Table 12.1 Introduction of social security schemes in East Asian countries
Japan Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore
Old age First law: First law: First law: First law: First law:
1941. Current 1973 (not 1950. Current 1971 (social 1953. Current
laws: 1944 implemented law: 1958, as assistance). law: 1985, as
(employees’ until 1988). amended Current law: amended in
pension Current law: 1988 and 1993 1991.
insurance); 1986, as 1994. (Comprehen– Provident
1959 (national amended Social sive Social fund (Lump-
pension 1989, 1993, insurance Security sum benefits
program); 1995 and (Lump-sum Assistance, and annuity
and 1985. 1998. benefits CSSA). payments).
Social Social only). Social. Contributors/
insurance. insurance. Contributors/ assistance Labour force:
Contributors/ Contributors/ Labour force: (There is also 65.3%
Labour force: Labour force: 79.8% Mandatory
57.9% (There 46.5% Provident





Sickness First laws: First law: First law: First laws: First laws:
1922 (health 1963 (Medical 1950. Current 1968 1968
insurance; Insurance law: 1958, as (employer (employer
implementation Law amended liability) and liability); 1983
delayed until Implemented 1988; 1994 1971 (social (provident
1927) and 1938 in 1977) and (National assistance). fund).
(national health 1997 Health Current law: Current laws:
insurance). (National Insurance). 1997. Dual 1996
Current laws: Medical Social employer (employer
1958 and 1998 Insurance insurance. liability and liability); 1983
(national health Law). social (provident
insurance); Current law: assistance fund).
and 1994 and 1998 (Medical system. Multiple
1997 (health Insurance employer
insurance). Law) and liability,
Social insurance. 1998 provident
Public expenditure (National fund and







Work injury First law: First law: First laws: First laws: First law:
1911. Current 1953. Current 1929, 1950. 1953 1933. Current
law: 1947, law: 1963 as Current law: (employer law: 1990.
1980, 1986 amended 1958, as liability) and Employer
and 1995. through 1997. amended 1971 (social liability/
Social Compulsory 1988 and assistance). compulsory
insurance. insurance 1994. Current law: insurance
with public Social 1995. Dual with private
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Thailand Malaysia Indonesia Philippines China
First and First law: First law: First and First law:
current law: 1951 1951. Current current law: 1951. Current
1990. Revised (provident law: 1977. 1954, as laws: 1953,
1999. fund). Provident amended 1978, 1996
Social Current law: fund (lump- 1997. Social and 1997.
insurance. 1969 sum benefits insurance. Local
Contributors/ (disability only). Contributors/ government
Labour force: insurance); Contributors/ Labour force: social


















First and First law: First law: First and First law:
current law: 1951. Current 1957. Current current laws: 1951. Current
1990. Revised law: 1991. law: 1992. 1954 as laws: 1953,
1994. Dual Social amended in 1978, 1986,
Social provident insurance. 1997 (sickness 1988, 1994
insurance. fund (lump- Public benefits); 1969 and 1998.
Public sum benefits expenditure as amended Local
expenditure and periodic ratio: 46.7% in 1996 government
ratio: 31.7% payments). (medical social
Public care); and insurance
expenditure 1977 as (medical fund








First law: First law: First law: First and First law:
1972. Current 1929. Current 1939. Current current law: 1951. Current
law: 1994. law: 1969. law: 1992. 1974, as laws: 1953,
Compulsory Social Social amended 1978, 1986.
insurance insurance. insurance. 1996. Social. Local













out. 1) As for work injury compensation, every country has introduced it
in the early period. 2) Most countries have also introduced certain kinds
of health security policies. But in some countries (Thailand and Singa-
pore, especially), the ratio of public expenditure to the total cost for
health care is low. 3) As for old age income security, many countries adopt
provident fund systems, which often provide only lump-sum benefits. Only
Japan has a universal pension system. 4) Only four countries have an
unemployment insurance system. Except for Japan, however, these were
only recently introduced.
We can classify the countries according to the characteristics of their
pension systems.
1 Early introduction and extensive coverage: Japan, Taiwan, Singapore,
Malaysia.
2 Late introduction and extensive coverage: Korea.
3 Early introduction and minimal coverage: Indonesia, the Philippines,
China.
4 Late introduction and minimal coverage: Thailand.
The extent of coverage must be determined by the size of the agricultural
sector in each country. Indonesia, the Philippines, China and Thailand all
have large agricultural sectors. Meanwhile, what determines the timing of
introduction? I will explain this point in the next section.
314 Yasuhiro Kamimura
Table 12.1 continued
Japan Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore
Unemploy- First law: First law: First law: First and none.
ment 1947. Current 1995. 1968. Current current law:
laws: 1975 law: 1968, 1977.
and 1998. effective Social
Social January 1999. assistance (not
insurance. Social specialized in
insurance. unemploy-
ment).
Family First law: none. none. First and none.
allowances 1971 current law:
(children’s 1971.
allowance). Social
Current laws: assistance (not








Sources: U.S. Social Security Administration (1999), Social Security Programs Throughout the World 1999;
as for Contributors/Labour force (1996): World Bank, 2000, Pension Systems in East Asia and the Pacific: 
Challenges and Opportunities, 65; as for Japan’s Contributors/Labour force: Japan Statistical Yearbook 2002; as 
for Taiwan’s Contributors/Labour force: Statistical Yearbook of The Republic of China 2000; as for Public 
expenditure ratio (as % of total health expenditure, 1998): UNDP (2001), Human Development Report 2001.
A single trajectory?13
While we often talk about the “East Asian model” of economic develop-
ment, can we also identify a single trajectory of welfare development that
can be labeled as the “East Asian welfare model”?
Differences with the three worlds
As we have seen in the previous section, although East Asian countries
(except Japan) are roughly similar in that they have relatively young popu-
lations and low social expenditure, we also observe considerable variation
among them. How can we understand this diversity?
As for the diversity among Western countries, Esping-Andersen (1990) dis-
tinguished the three welfare models, that is, liberal, conservative and social
democratic. Learning much from Polanyi (1944), he argued that the patterns
of historical class coalition determined the characteristics of each welfare
state. According to Polanyi, in the nineteenth century, the trading class sup-
ported economic liberalism which was aimed at the establishment of a self-
regulating market, while the working and the landed classes supported the
principle of social protection against the destructiveness of the market (ibid.
138). While the landed classes sought a solution in the maintenance of the
past (i.e. conservatism), the workers borrowed a solution from the future (i.e.
socialism) (ibid. 162). Esping-Andersen also examined the classes that led the
formation of welfare states. But he noted that the structure of class coalitions
in parliament, rather than the power of any single class, is decisive (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 30). According to him, in the Nordic countries, the coalition
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of the working class and farmers led to the formation of the “social demo-
cratic” welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards
with the principles of universalism. In contrast, in the continental European
countries, the conservative forces successfully formed “reactionary” alliances,
which developed the “conservative” welfare state that preserved status differ-
entials in the labor market. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, such a coalition did
not appear. Thus, there emerged the “liberal” welfare state, in which only a
modest level of benefits would be provided (ibid. 27).
Unfortunately, this kind of story does not fit the reality of East Asia. I
argue this, stressing the cases of the Asian NIEs (Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore). First, in the regime formation14 period of all four
countries, there were no strong capitalists who favored the formation of
“liberal” welfare states. Since Korea and Taiwan were still very much agri-
cultural countries, powerful industrial capitalists had not yet emerged.
While there were commercial capitalists in Hong Kong and Singapore
who were engaged in transit trade, they never took the initiative in poli-
tics. As happened in Korea, capitalists in the Asian NIEs were created in
the process of state-led industrialization, and did not create the regime by
themselves. Second, there were no powerful landed classes to favor the
formation of “conservative” welfare states. Since Hong Kong and Singa-
pore were city states, and therefore had minimal agricultural sectors,
there were no landed classes from the very beginning. While there had
been landed classes in Korea and Taiwan, early land reforms effectively
removed them. Third, there was no possibility in the Asian NIEs of a coali-
tion combining the working class and farmers, which might have favored
the formation of “social democratic” welfare states. As Hong Kong and
Singapore had insignificant agricultural sectors, this hypothesis was unre-
alistic for them. In Korea and Taiwan, the state incorporated farmers in
order to block the influence of communists. In all cases, there were no
opportunities for labor parties to lead welfare regime formation. In sum,
it is hard to apply Esping-Andersen’s model to the Asian NIEs.
Relationship between state and labor
What then, led welfare regime formation in these countries? And, what
factors determined the character of their welfare systems? My answers to
these questions are that state-labor relations are decisive. It was the state,
relatively independent of any social forces, that nurtured capitalists, dis-
missed the landed classes, suppressed workers’ excessive demands and at
the same time could introduce some measures for people’s welfare. State-
labor relations were crucial then, because other social forces, such as capi-
talists and landlords, were weak. I shall argue in the rest of this section
that the difference in state-labor relations in the regime formation period
explains the character of the social security systems (stressing pensions for
workers) of each country during its rapid industrialization.
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When we examine the state-labor relations in the regime formation
period of each country, we notice that three countries other than Hong
Kong had the character of “state corporatism” in Schmitter’s terminology
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979).
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of
[1] singular, [2] compulsory, [3] noncompetitive, [4] hierarchically
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, [5] recognized or
licensed (if not created) by the state, and [6] granted a deliberate rep-
resentational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange
for [7] observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and
articulation of demands and supports.
(Schmitter 1979: 13. The numbering was added by me.)
According to this definition, state-labor relations in each country could be
described as follows (also see Table 12.2).
First, in the case of Taiwan, 1) there was only the Chinese Federation of
Labor (CFL) of Taiwan Province as the national center of labor unioniza-
tion. 2) Unions joined the CFL as a matter of course, though not by legal
obligation. 3) There were no organizations that could rival the CFL. 4)
The CFL was established to be centralized upon the federations of each
prefecture and city, the Federation of Industrial Unions of Taiwan
Province and the prefectures and the Federation of Occupational Unions
of Taiwan Province and the prefectures (Wakabayashi 1992: 114). 5)
The CFL was not only established by the government, but also subsidized
by it (ibid.). 6) The leaders of the CFL were also executive members of
the Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party). Most of the officials of
lower level unions were also members of the KMT (ibid.). 7) Although
the CFL was the quasi-governmental organization for controlling unions, it
certainly had the monopolistic privilege of direct interaction with the
government.
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Table 12.2 State–labor relations in the regime formation periods
Taiwan Singapore Korea Hong Kong
1 Singular yes yes yes no
2 Compulsory yes yes yes no
3 Noncompetitive yes yes yes no
4 Hierarchically ordered yes yes no no
5 Recognized by state yes yes yes/no no
6 Representational monopoly yes yes yes no
7 Controls on leadership 
selection and interest articulation yes yes no no
Source: Kaminura 1999: 239.
Second, in the case of Singapore, 1) although there had been two
national labor centers, the leftist one was weakened by the government. By
1965, unions were integrated by the National Trade Union Congress
(NTUC). 2) Unions were expected to join the NTUC as a matter of course
and did, though not by legal obligation. 3) There were no other organi-
zations that could oppose the NTUC. 4) The NTUC was highly centralized
to the extent that lower level unions could not oppose it. The NTUC also
developed grassroots movements like a cooperative society of consump-
tion for penetrating into the rank and file member communities (Rodan
1989). 5) The NTUC was not only established by the government, but was
also subsidized by it, even being given civil servants as staff (Kimura 1990:
12). In the late 1960s, about 80 percent of the NTUC’s revenue was from
government subsidies (Kobayashi et al. 1993: 30). 6) The leaders of the
NTUC were also executive members of the People’s Action Party. In those
days Devan Nair was the secretary general of the NTUC. He had converted
from the leftist labor movement, then was a member of the Party’s central
committee, and eventually became the third president of Singapore in
1981 (Takeshita 1995). 7) The NTUC was the monopolistic representative
of labor’s interest. Later the NTUC joined the tripartite National Wage
Council, established in 1972, from which they extracted some social pol-
icies from the government in exchange for agreements on wage restraint
and cooperation in the improvement of productivity (ibid.; Shimodaira
1986: 44).
Third, in the case of Korea, 1) there was only the Federation of Korean
Trade Unions (FKTU) as the national center of labor unionization. 2)
Unions were expected to join the FKTU as a matter of course, though not
by legal obligation. 3) Anti-mainstream factions that might rival the FKTU
were made illegal. 4) The FKTU had, however, a decentralized character,
the leaders of which could not control the lower level unions fully. Presid-
ent Park saw the FKTU as a target of repression, rather than as the coun-
terpart of cooperation, because it was not a monolithic organization. 5)
The FKTU was developed from its predecessor, which was reorganized by
President Park. So he only used the existing structure, but did not create
the new body by himself. His government provided money for the FKTU
(Choi 1989: 83), but the police sometimes interfered in the establishment
of new unions (Shin 1993: 183). 6) The leaders of the FKTU were selected
from among labor movement activists, and trained by the government.
But they were not sent from within Park’s circle. That is, none of them
were military personnel who had joined the revolution, nor executive
members of the ruling party (Choi 1989: 233). 7) Although the FKTU cer-
tainly represented labor’s interest to the government monopolistically, it
did not have a strong say. It could not join deliberative councils of the
government through the 1960s, nor could it send its representatives to the
national assembly until 1972 (Choi 1989: 233).
Finally, the situation in Hong Kong was quite different from the other
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three countries. 1) There were two national labor centers, the Federation
of Trade Unions (FTU) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). The
former was affiliated with the Communist Party of Mainland China, while
the latter with the KMT (the Nationalist Party) of Taiwan. 2) There were
many unions that did not join either of these organizations. 3) The FTU
and the TUC were in a competitive relationship. 4) There were myriad
craft unions arising from their guild origin, which the national centers
could not control fully. The FTU and the TUC were more political groups
than integrated bodies of lower level unions. Thus, the nature of Hong
Kong’s labor movement was highly decentralized and fragmented
(England and Rear 1981: 136). 5) Although the FTU and the TUC were
legitimized by the Colonial Office, they developed with the aid of the
Communist Party of mainland China and the KMT of Taiwan respectively.
They were not established or subsidized by the Colonial Office (England
and Rear 1981: 136, 141). 6) The Colonial Office strictly controlled the
political activities of the national centers, but did not care about their
selection of leaders or expression of opinions. 7) Neither of the two
national centers was regarded as the counterpart of negotiation by the
Colonial Office. That means they did not have any representational right
before the Office.
Inclusionary corporatism
Thus we can see that, while Taiwan and Singapore fulfil all the features of
corporatism, Korea’s corporatism seems to be different. How can we sub-
categorize these cases? Stepan (1978) developed Schmitter’s concept, and
distinguished two “policy poles” within state corporatism by examining
several Latin American regimes. He says,
Near the “inclusionary pole” the state elite can attempt to forge a new
state-society equilibrium by policies aimed at incorporating salient
working-class groups into the new economic and political model. Near
the “exclusionary pole” the attempt to forge a new state-society equi-
librium can rely heavily on coercive policies to deactivate and then
restructure salient working-class groups.
(Stepan 1978: 74)
He also noted that the same regime can shift from one pole to another.
The state elite attempts to exclude from the political arena a variety of
relatively autonomous, largely working-class based, institutional struc-
tures capable of resisting their political design, and then seeks to rein-
tegrate the excluded groups into associational organizations designed
and controlled by the state.
(ibid. 79)
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And he observes that in inclusionary corporatism, distributive, symbolic and
group-specific welfare policies are used to encapsulate salient worker and
peasant groups into state corporatist associational structures (ibid. 76).
As for Taiwan, Singapore and Korea, each state’s elites seemed to
choose an “exclusionary” policy at first. The Taiwanese and Singaporean
governments harshly eradicated anti-governmental labor unions, and
established their own conformist labor organizations. The Korean govern-
ment was also antagonistic to labor organization, but could not eradicate
it. This is the line that divides Korea and the other countries. Since the
Taiwanese and Singaporean governments effectively excluded anti-govern-
mental unions, they inevitably shifted to “inclusionary” policies. On the
other hand, the Korean government could not do that, and therefore it
remained near the “exclusionary pole.” As for Hong Kong, although there
were two major labor organizations, the colonial government of Hong
Kong did not see them as partners in negotiation. So we may describe
Hong Kong’s regime as “exclusionary pluralism.”
Thus we see that only Taiwan and Singapore shifted to “inclusionary”
corporatism, in which pension schemes for workers were introduced
prior to full-scale industrialization. In Taiwan, Labor Insurance was set
up in 1950, which included sickness, disability, maternity, death and old
age benefits (only in lump sum). While those who were covered were
mainly workers in public enterprises in the beginning, coverage was
gradually extended to workers in the private sector, which included
medium-sized and small businesses. In Singapore, the Central Provident
Fund (CPF), which was founded before independence, was improved
after 1968 when the People’s Action Party monopolized parliament. CPF
was a mandatory saving scheme for old age income security, which was
later extended to other purposes, including housing, medical care and
education.
In Korea and Hong Kong, in which a shift to the “inclusionary” pole
did not occur, pension schemes for workers were not adopted until recent
years. Most workers in Korea and Hong Kong, therefore, had to survive
the industrialization period without a reliable social security system. In
Korea, although Industrial Injury Insurance was introduced in 1964, and
Medical Insurance was implemented in 1977, these were not extended to
a wide range of workers until the late 1980s. Moreover, the pension
scheme was not started until 1988. In Hong Kong, welfare had been left to
charity and mutual aid until the social assistance system was set up in 1971.
After long discussion, the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) was finally
legislated in 1999.
To sum up, we can distinguish at least two paths in regard to welfare
state formation of the Asian NIEs. One is the early introduction path of
Taiwan and Singapore, which results from “inclusionary corporatism.”
The other is the late introduction path of Korea and Hong Kong. There-
fore, one can hardly maintain that there is only one trajectory in East Asia.
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Where are they headed?
Which direction(s) are the welfare systems of East Asian countries march-
ing in? How are they located in relation to the reform trajectories of the
advanced welfare states? In this section, I will continue to focus on four
countries – Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – though I can only
outline a story as to the recent situation.
Beyond democratization and economic crisis
East Asian countries were pushed toward the construction (or restructur-
ing) of their welfare systems by democratization from the late 1980s and
by the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The circumstances of democrat-
ization, however, were considerably different across countries. As for Asian
NIEs, it was Korea and Taiwan that underwent typical democratization.
The colonial office of Hong Kong also promoted a certain degree of
“democratization,” while regime shift did not occur in Singapore. The
impact of the economic crisis also differed among countries. Korea was
hardest hit, while the influence on Hong Kong and Singapore was also
considerable. Considering this variation, I would like to sketch out the
character of changes that were brought about by democratization and the
economic crisis.
In Korea, the introduction of a social security system was delayed
because of the absence of inclusionary corporatism. However, the change
came dramatically during the process of democratization in the late 1980s.
The government of President Chun Doo-hwan announced the “Three
Measures for the Promotion of Social Welfare” just before the presidential
election, against a surging democracy movement pushed by the opposi-
tion party, labor unions and students. These measures included 1) the
implementation of the minimum wage law, 2) the introduction of the
national pension scheme, and 3) the expansion of the medical insurance
scheme to the entire nation (Chung 1992: 295). This was the preemptive
concession of the Chun government, for the democracy movement had
not yet pushed the introduction of specific social security schemes. These
policy commitments were implemented around the 1987 Declaration of
Democratization.
Korea was hit directly by the East Asian economic crisis. The crisis,
however, turned out to be a promoter of welfare reform in Korea. Presid-
ent Kim Dae-jung, who was inaugurated soon after the outbreak of the
crisis, spurred welfare reform, putting forward his idea of “productive
welfare.” According to him, productive welfare is comprised of four
factors, that is, 1) primary distribution through the establishment of fair
market order, 2) redistribution by government, 3) social investment for
self-reliance support in the realm where the state and the market overlap,
and 4) enhancement of people’s quality of life (Kim Dae-jung 2002: 35).
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Based on these ideas, the Kim government made considerable achieve-
ments, such as 1) accomplishment of universal pensions by extending
coverage to urban self-employed workers, 2) solidaristic reform of medical
insurance integration, 3) an expanded employment insurance scheme,
which had been introduced in 1995, and 4) enactment of the National
Basic Livelihood Security Law.
In Taiwan, the social security system was introduced prior to full-scale
industrialization because of the formation of inclusionary corporatism.
This system, however, has come to be criticized along with democrat-
ization in the late 1980s because of the unfairness of the various schemes,
for the schemes vary according to occupation, like Labor Insurance for
workers, Military Servicemen’s Insurance, Government Employees Insur-
ance, Insurance for Teachers and Staff of Private Schools and Farmer’s
Insurance. As for health, National Health Insurance was introduced in
1995. As a result, all people have come to be covered by the same scheme.
And, because of electoral competition between the KMT (the Nationalist
Party) and the DPP (the Democratic Progressive Party), income security
for social groups, which had been left in the cold, was partly realized by
the introduction of the Living Subsidy for Low-Income Seniors in 1993
and Old-age Farmers Allowance in 1995.
Recently, unemployment problems have come to be aggravated in
Taiwan with the change of the global economic environment and the shift
of production bases to mainland China, though Taiwan was not directly
hit by the economic crisis. The KMT government coped with the problem
by adding an unemployment benefit scheme to Labor Insurance in 1999.
Then, Chen Shui-bian, whose Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has
long advocated the establishment of a welfare state, won the 2000 presi-
dential election, which was the first instance of partisan alternation in
Taiwan’s government. The Chen government reformed the unemploy-
ment benefit scheme to Employment Insurance in 2003, which put stress
on support for reemployment (Tsen 2003). On the other hand, a National
Pension Scheme has also been discussed, but has not yet been introduced.
The reasons may be as follows (Kamimura 2002; Huang 2003). 1) It is dif-
ficult to coordinate the existing schemes which are divided by occupation.
2) There already exist various allowances that have been introduced
through the election campaign. 3) The economic climate is worsening. 4)
The DPP’s minority government cannot pass bills effectively.
In Hong Kong, the introduction of a social security system was delayed
because of the absence of inclusionary corporatism. After the Sino–British
Joint Declaration of 1984 that started the process of returning Hong Kong
to China, the Colonial Office promoted “democratization” of its territory,
gradually increasing the directly elected seats of the Legislative Council.
As the last Governor, Christopher Patten, who arrived at his post in 1992,
instituted the electoral reform. As a result, social workers and union
leaders gained a greater voice in politics (Sawada 1997: 251). Subse-
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quently, the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) scheme,
which had been implemented in 1971, was expanded in terms of benefit
amounts and the number of recipients in 1993. In addition, the Manda-
tory Provident Fund, which is an individual account scheme for compul-
sory saving, was enacted in 1995 and implemented in 2000.
The impact of the Asian economic crisis on Hong Kong was second
only to Korea in severity among the Asian NIEs. The Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which succeeded the British
administration in 1997, tried to address the crisis principally with existing
schemes. The number of recipients of CSSA amounted to 230,000 in
1998–9 as a consequence of deepening unemployment. Among them,
120,000 were elderly, and 30,000 were unemployed. In 1999, the govern-
ment implemented the Support for Self Reliance Scheme, which obliged
unemployed recipients of CSSA to go to an employment agency every two
weeks, and to participate in community service at least once a week. As a
result, the number of unemployed recipients has declined (Chan 2001).
On the other hand, the government is considering introducing the
Health Protection Account, which is a compulsory individual saving
scheme for health expenses after the age of 65, for the purpose of
reducing public expenditure (ibid.).
Lastly, in Singapore, the social security system, which was introduced
before independence, was expanded prior to full-scale industrialization
because of the formation of inclusionary corporatism. As the inclusionary
corporatism of Singapore’s PAP government continues to operate, the
development of the social security system has taken the form of a func-
tional extension of CPF. In 1984, CPF added the Medisave scheme, which
allows individual members to withdraw money from their own accounts to
pay for hospitalization expenses incurred by family members. In 1987, the
Minimum Sum scheme was introduced to encourage members to keep
the minimum old age provision in their accounts or to buy private 
life annuities after reaching maturity at the age of 55 (Low and Aw 1997:
24, 58).
The impact of the economic crisis to Singapore was also significant,
though it was not at the same level as in Korea and Hong Kong. Nonethe-
less, the PAP government did not push radical reforms like Korea and
Taiwan, nor did it permit unintended expansion of public assistance like
Hong Kong. The number of recipients of public assistance benefits in Sin-
gapore is severely limited in comparison with other countries. In Septem-
ber 2002, only 8,000 people received public benefits. In the 2001 general
election, the Singapore Democratic Party, which did not have any seats in
parliament, advocated the following policies but lost the election:15 1)
establishment of a minimum wage system, 2) introduction of an unem-
ployment allowance, 3) limitation of CPF to old age provision, and 4)
extension of government subsidies for medical expenses. On the other
hand, in the same year, the PAP government implemented the Economic
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Downturn Relief Scheme for a one year trial, which provided needy
people with 200 Singaporean dollars per month for three months only.
As observed above, the situation in each country looks considerably dif-
ferent when we examine the welfare reforms in the Asian NIEs. First of all,
in Korea, the development of a welfare system started quite dramatically
in line with democratization, and the later economic crisis promoted con-
solidation of the welfare system. Second, in Taiwan, the restructuring of
the welfare system started with democratization, but the pace of reform
was not as quick as in Korea, being trapped in the legacy of inclusionary
corporatism. Third, in Hong Kong, even limited democratization pro-
moted the development of a welfare system, though it took a passive atti-
tude in response to the economic crisis. Finally, in Singapore, as
inclusionary corporatism continues to operate, the restructuring of the
welfare system has made little progress, even during the economic crisis.
In essence, the change was substantial in the countries 1) which became
democracies, and 2) where the legacy of inclusionary corporatism did not
exist. Combining these two factors, we can order the countries according
to the magnitude of the change. That ordering is Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore.
Future of welfare state and civil society
Do the evolving welfare systems in these countries represent a common
march towards a European-type welfare state, though with some degree of
variation in pace? Here I would like to switch gears to examine how the
idea of the “welfare state” is discussed in the political discourse of each
country.
We should consider the influence of new philosophies developed
within the advanced welfare states. For, in the context of these advanced
countries, “welfare state” has already become a negative phrase in some
literature. The welfare state has been criticized by new social democrats
and by advocates of “the Third Way” during the late 1990s, in addition to
suffering harsh attacks from neoliberals during the 1980s. Civil society is
replacing the notion of the “old” welfare state. The ideas of Professor
Anthony Giddens, leading advocate of the Third Way, echo through the
political spaces of East Asia. For example, one can feel undisputed input
from Giddens in the book of Korea’s ex-President Kim Dae-jung, The Road
to Productive Welfare16 (Kim Dae-jung 2002). Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-
bian was honest when he wrote that his “New Middle Road” was inspired
by Tony Blair’s New Britain and Giddens’ The Third Way (Chen 2000).
Here I would like to summarize Giddens as his arguments pertain to
the present discussion (Giddens 1994, 1998). First, he declares that “the
welfare state cannot survive in its existing form” (Giddens 1998: 174). He
makes three key points. 1) The welfare state assumes the permanent full-
time employment of male workers in an industrial society. This assump-
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tion obviously contradicts the present condition of post-industrial society,
where women have entered the paid labor force in very large numbers
and modes of work organization have been diversified. 2) The welfare
state is inextricably connected with the consolidated nation state and
undemocratic bureaucracy. These are altogether undermined gradually
by the tide of globalization. 3) The welfare state is based on the risk man-
agement and ex-post benefits of social insurance. This kind of approach
cannot deal with the new risks, which arise from various factors like
technological innovation, social exclusion and the growth of single parent
families. Therefore, according to Giddens, in place of the traditional
welfare state we should construct the “social investment state,” operating
in the context of a “positive welfare society.” Concretely speaking, we
should work out policies to enable people to recognize risks as opportun-
ities, rather than constructing policies only for redistributing income. He
says that we need to foster an “active civil society” and a partnership
between government and civil society.
I will not examine here whether his diagnosis and prescription for the
advanced welfare states is right or wrong. A noteworthy point is the impact
of his idea on the emerging countries. These countries, while just about
building a welfare state, are strongly influenced by his argument that the
traditional welfare state is no longer sustainable as the role of civil society
becomes more important. It may be said that it is an example of “the intel-
lectual precocity common to all backward countries to a certain extent”17
(Maruyama and Kato 1998: 172). We should recognize that the welfare
reforms underway in East Asian countries cannot be immune from the
ideologies transmitted from the advanced welfare states, whether consid-
ering it as an advantage or a disadvantage of backwardness.
Moreover, one must clarify what kind of welfare state or civil society
one is talking about, when talking about moving “from the welfare state to
civil society” or “a partnership between the welfare state and civil society.”
For these terms can imply several different meanings. I would like to
sketch out the four models of this relationship between the welfare state
and civil society by pairing two models of each.
First, as for welfare state, it is well known that there are two contrasting
concepts: the “residual model” and the “institutional model”18 (Wilensky
and Lebeaux 1965: 138; Titmuss 1974: 30). The residual model holds that
the welfare state should provide minimum benefits only when the normal
structures of satisfying the needs of individuals, the family and the market,
break down. The institutional model, by contrast, sees the welfare state as a
formal function of modern complex society, which provides services accord-
ing to the needs of individuals with the objective of realizing social equality.
Second, I turn to civil society. According to Professor Takeshi Ishida,
Masao Maruyama seldom used the term civil society, though he has long
been regarded as a proponent of the “civil society school” in post-war
Japan. Professor Naoaki Hiraishi, though accepting this point, explained
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that Maruyama used this term with two different meanings. The first
example is civil society as a translation of bürgerliche Gesellschaft, which is a
system of needs (System der Bedürfnisse) that Hegel (1770–1831) described
as the character of modern society. The second example is civil society as a
phrase that indicates a dynamic society in which intermediate groups
independent of the state compete with each other, which Guizot
(1787–1874) described as the character of European civilization. The
former is an image of a market society based on exchange and contract
among atomic individuals, while the latter is an image of democratic
society in which people are organized in various types of voluntary groups.
I would like here to call the former the “Hegelian model” of civil society
and the latter the “Guizotian model” (Hiraishi 2003: 184).
Figure 12.7 presents a combination of the above models. First, the
upper left is what Giddens criticized as the traditional welfare state. It can
be said that this resembles the “iron cage” in which atomic individuals are
entrapped in the paternalistic protection of bureaucracy, the coming of
which Max Weber pessimistically predicted. Second, the lower left is the
model in which the market, with rare exceptions, is dominant. One may
find at the edge of this quadrant the “satanic mill” which crushes the
people’s communal life into crumbs, which was how Karl Polanyi charac-












Vertical:    welfare state
Horizontal:  civil society
Figure 12.7 Diagram of welfare state–civil society trajectories.
people help each other without relying on the state. It may be illustrative
to imagine a friendly society or the “fraternity,” which flourished in
Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In this model there
inevitably emerges a divide between those who have enough resources to
help each other and those who do not.19 Finally, the upper right is the
model in which competitive complementarity is established between the
welfare state that aims at social equality and the voluntary organizations
that secure people’s freedom and spontaneity. I would like to tentatively
call this the “solidarity” model.20
We can place some thoughts from the advanced countries on this chart
as follows. First, ideas like those that Thatcherism has advocated, the dis-
mantlement of the welfare state and the revival of market, or neoliberal-
ism that has spread among governments all over the world, can be
represented as the arrow from the upper left to the lower left (I). Second,
the proponents of the Third Way insist on moving the transition from the
upper left to the lower right (II). The reasons why they do not want to
move to the upper right are, on the one hand, that they have no sympathy
for the traditional welfare state (what the “old” social democrats want to
preserve), and on the other hand that they have to counter
neoliberalism.21
How, then can we locate ex-President Kim Dae-jung’s idea of “produc-
tive welfare” in Korea or President Chen Shui-bian’s policy of the “New
Middle Road” in Taiwan within this chart? Their starting points are
undoubtedly not the consolidated welfare state like the iron cage of the
upper left. Their course should be more like the arrow from the lower left
towards the upper right. The arrow seems, however, to be bent downward
by the influence of new beliefs sent out from the advanced welfare states
(III). In fact, Kim detaches himself from “the advanced welfare states of
the West,” though he advocates the expansion of state welfare (Kim 2002:
6, 107). He emphasizes “the role-sharing between government and the
private sector by voluntary participation of the people, as well as the prin-
ciple of the government’s responsibility” (ibid. 115). Chen also says “the
ideal of social welfare should not be too high” in the era of global capital-
ism (Chen 2000: 230), pushing forward the idea of “Volunteer Taiwan”
(ibid. 185), while he advocates the establishment of social security system.
On the other hand, the “welfare state” (that is, the “institutional
model” of the welfare state in this text) is still taboo in the politics of
Hong Kong and Singapore. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa of Hong
Kong spoke on the issue of social policy at unusual length at the policy
address of 2000. After a few days, however, he made a speech at the Busi-
ness Community Luncheon and said, “Yet do let me assure you that we are
NOT going down the slippery slope towards a welfare state.” By contrast,
he emphasized that “the Third Sector” is welcome, and said, “It is
only when the Third Sector is strong, aside from the market being free,
that the government really can be small.”22 Former Prime Minister Goh
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Chok-tong of Singapore, when he was talking at the Swearing-In Cere-
mony of Mayors in 2002 about increasing the resources of the Community
Development Councils which are responsible for regional welfare activ-
ities, declared “This does not mean that we are moving toward becoming
more of a welfare state.” As for civil society, he made very favorable com-
ments in a speech in 2000, saying “The more the people can organize
themselves to look after their own interests, the better it is for Singapore.
Self-reliance will contribute to an enduring Singapore.”23
Appreciation for civil society coincides with a negative attitude toward
state welfare within the political discourse of Hong Kong and Singapore.
So that means the idea is represented as arrow IV in the chart.
In conclusion, I would like to summarize the points of this chapter. 1)
The East Asian economic crisis promoted debate on welfare systems across
the region. The policy prescriptions of international agencies, however,
split between the one-size-fits-all approach and the country-specific
approach. To overcome this problem, we should develop a comparative
framework. 2) It was because of their young population structure that East
Asian countries have been able to keep the cost of social welfare low. Low
expenditure does not mean that the welfare systems are embryonic. There
have been a variety of social security schemes in East Asian countries. 3) It
is, however, difficult to identify an “East Asian model” connecting all
countries in the region. Taking Asian NIEs before the 1980s as an
example, there was a wide difference in the development of social security
schemes. This division essentially was determined by whether inclusionary
corporatism had been established or not. 4) The welfare systems of East
Asian countries are changing, stimulated by democratization and eco-
nomic crisis. The magnitude and direction of the change, however, seems
to vary considerably across countries, depending on the character of
democratization and the legacy of inclusionary corporatism.
Notes
1 The direct attention of these international agencies was initially directed to the
five hardest hit countries, that is, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the
Philippines.
2 On the other hand, the ILO discussed the long-term issues in the same period
of time, such as the introduction of unemployment insurance, in its report
titled The Asian Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Social Policy (Lee 1998).
3 The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) was started in 1996 for strengthening the
partnership between East Asian countries and European countries. Thereafter,
the summit meeting is held every other year.
4 There are also ADB and World Bank (2000), UNESCAP (2001), and OECD
(2002).
5 There are already a considerable amount of books on the issue. See Goodman,
White and Kwon eds (1998), Jacobs (1998), Tang (2000), Tang ed. (2000),
Ramesh and Asher (2000), Aspalter ed. (2002), Holliday and Wilding eds
(2003), Rieger and Leibfried (2003) and Ramesh (2004).
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6 Based on ADB (Asian Development Bank), Key Indicators of Developing Asian and
Pacific Countries 2001. It seems that it does not include the expenditure for
pension payment.
7 Note that prior to 1995 the figure for Thailand includes education, health,
housing and community amenities, which means it is not comparable with
other years and other countries.
8 This kind of international statistics often excludes the expenditure of local gov-
ernments. For more accurate comparison, we should explore the national data
sources of each country.
9 Real GDP Per Capita (in constant US dollars, international prices, base year
1985) is based on World Bank (William Easterly and Mirvat Sewadeh), 2002,
Global Development Network Growth Database (http://www.worldbank.org/
research/growth/GDNdata.htm). Social expenditure is based on ILO, Cost of
Social Security 1990–96 (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/socsec/
publ/css/cssindex.htm). Note that the definition of expenditure is different
from those of Figure 12.1. The amount of CPF withdrawals in Singapore is
based on Asher (2000: 35). As for Taiwan, the figures are taken from DGBAS,
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2000.
10 The case of Singapore is complicated. If we include the withdrawals of the Central
Provident Fund into “social expenditure” (indicated as “Singapore (CPF)” on
the diagram), the amount is fairly high. It must be noted, however, that the CPF
scheme is based on individual accounts, and have neither the function of income
redistribution among rich and poor, nor that of social risk pooling.
11 The ageing ratio is based on UN, Demographic Yearbook 1997. As for Taiwan, the
figures are taken from DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2000.
Public health expenditure is taken from UNDP, Human Development Report 2001.
12 The differences among rich countries remain, however.
13 This section is based on Kamimura (1997; 1999).
14 Here, “regime formation” means the establishment of power which preceded
the industrialization of each country; Park Chung-hee’s military government of
Korea in the 1960s; the Kuo Ming Tang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) govern-
ment of Taiwan in the 1950s; the People’s Action Party government of Singa-
pore in the 1960s; and in Hong Kong, we find that the new state-labor relation
formed around 1949.
15 See the website of the Singapore Democratic Party (http://www.singaporede-
mocrat.org/informations/ge2001).
16 The author also admitted that “the idea of productive welfare basically shares
an interest with the Third Way, [which is being proposed in the advanced
welfare states like Sweden, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany]” (Kim Dae-
jung 2002: 21).
17 This phrase is used by Masao Maruyama, when he points out the fact that the
dangerousness of socialism and communism Japanese elites had already been
well-informed about in late 1870s, long before its industrial revolution.
18 Titmuss (1974) proposed three models, adding the “industrial achievement-
performance model.” Esping-Andersen (1990) also follows the three models in
his famous comparative study. I would like here to omit the third model to be
able to make a two-dimensional diagram.
19 The sharpest criticism of this model is found in the volume of Ralph M.
Kramer, who compared voluntary agencies helping disabled people in the
Netherlands, England, the United States and Israel.
Voluntarism is no substitute for services that can best be delivered by
government, particularly if coverage, equity, and entitlements are valued.
. . . there is a danger that those who have jumped on the bandwagon of the
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era of limits, signaling the end of the welfare state by advocating more vol-
unteerism, are being coopted by others who have less concern with social
justice than with tax reduction.
(Kramer 1981: 283)
20 This diagram somewhat reflects European taste. In reality, both “welfare state”
and “civil society” are conceptualized differently according to the local context
of each country.
21 The arrows indicate the direction of policy ideas. Therefore, an actual policy
which is led by one of these ideas will not necessarily reach the tip of the arrow.
22 See “2000 Policy Address by Chief Executive” (http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/
general/200010/11/1011140.htm) and “CE’s speech at Hong Kong Business
Community Luncheon” (http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200010/16/
1016122.htm).
23 See “Speech by Prime Minister GOH Chok Tong at the Swearing-In 
Ceremony of Mayors of Community Development Council Districts”
(http://www.cdc.org.sg/data/speeches/speeches1.html) and “Speech by Prime
Minister GOH Chok Tong at the NUSS Millennium Lecture”
(http://app10.internet.gov.sg/data/sprinter/pr/2000110404.htm).
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There are different perspectives on the emerging social policy and welfare
system in Central Europe. While some authors emphasize their inclina-
tions to neoliberal residualism, others point to their similarities to the
European model. There is also a view that stresses the still-existing legacies
of the communist era in the present Central European welfare system.
This chapter attempts to characterize the present Central European
welfare systems, that is, those of three countries, Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. It also deals with the issue of globalization in a limited
dimension: the impact of international organizations on the Central Euro-
pean welfare system.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The next section summa-
rizes the main features of the communist social policy and welfare system.
The third section traces the process of formation and transformation of
welfare systems in the three Central European countries since the political
change of 1989, examining several determinants of the emerging welfare
system in the region. The fourth, concluding section defines the present
Central European welfare system. The subject of the impact of inter-
national organizations on the region is examined in the final two sections
as well.
Social policy and welfare system in the communist era
Until 1989 a similar social policy and welfare system existed in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former USSR. To summarize Deacon’s accurate
view (Deacon 2000), its basic features could be enumerated as follows:
• The welfare system was an inseparable part of the whole political and
economic system, which was controlled by monopolized power, that is
the communist party-state, and had minimal market mechanism 
and political democracy. In return for political subjugation, people
were provided by the party-state with highly subsidized food, housing,
transportation and basic necessities, as well as free education and
health care services (although patients actually had to pay a gratuity to
doctors to receive good treatment).
• The communist regime (party-state) also guaranteed employment and
an egalitarian wage system with hidden privileges of the power elite,
that is nomenklatura. Thus, there existed a distribution according to
job status as well as political status. Regarding gender issues, females
received favorable treatment such as a three-year childcare leave with
partial wages (grants) and the right of resumption of their previous
job, but the communist regime did not guarantee gender equality.
Among other things, only females – not both genders – had the
double burden of maintaining a paid job in the workplace and provid-
ing unpaid family care.
• The party-state monopolized decision making on the allocation of the
national product and freely shifted resources between accumulation
and consumption, and between individual consumption and social-
ized provisions such as pensions and health care. Universal social
insurance funds for pension and health care were not separated from
the state budget. The pension system guaranteed subsistence for the
elderly; however it was eroded due to the lack of a suitable index-
linking benefit system.
• Pensions and other benefits were related to a wage system in which
some categories of workers (in particular, employees in the heavy
industry sector) were given privileges.
• Another feature of the communist welfare system was that state enter-
prises provided several cash and in-kind benefits and services to their
employees, employees’ families and retirees, such as several sorts of
allowances, subsidized recreational facilities, vacations and day-care
facilities. Trade unions played a role in the provision of benefits and
services.
Esping-Andersen simply summarizes the above features of the communist
welfare system: “the old communist regime was characterized by three
basic pillars: full and quasi-obligatory employment; broad and universalis-
tic social insurance; and a highly developed, typically company-based,
system of services and fringe benefits” (Esping-Andersen 1996: 9).
In defining the communist welfare system, Deacon et al. call it a “state
bureaucratic collectivist regime,” and take it to be “a particular product of
the expropriation of capital and the paternalistic management of the
state” (Deacon et al. 1997: 42–3). At the same time, they suggest that the
communist welfare system had, to some extent, common features with
“the European conservative corporatist tradition” in which “the workplace
and a contract between government and trade unions dominated the enti-
tlement system” and “the benefits reflected acknowledged status differ-
ences between workers” (ibid.: 91). Moreover, the communist welfare
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system, in our view, had common features with the social democratic
regime too, because it brought a high degree of decommodification and
female participation in the workforce (regarding the well-known classifica-
tion of welfare regimes into liberal, conservative and social democratic,
see Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999).
The communist welfare system had its achievements and defects. With
regard to the former, Ferge, a well-known Hungarian expert on social
policy, indicates that:
[D]espite all its inhuman features and tragic failures, state socialism
was not unqualified evil. Unlike its political or economic system, its
social (societal) policy was not an artificial construct, forced in an
inorganic way on the country . . . By developing, and assuring access
on a mass scale to the health system, to education, and to stable
incomes, it contributed to the eradication of practically feudal social
distances, the very significant reduction of utmost poverty, and the
development of human capital.
(Ferge 1997a: 108)
At the same time, she refers to the defects of the communist welfare
system:
The main defect of social policy in these states [state socialism] was
that it was permeated with the totalitarian logic of the former political
system. To mention just a few corollaries, because the legal system was
arbitrarily dominated by politics, (1) rights remained illusory; (2)
social policy, like everything else, was ideologically loaded, and; (3) all
measures were developed without citizen’s participation or control or
any attempts of consensus building.
(Ferge 1997b: 301)
Kornai, the best-known Hungarian economist, criticizes the “premature
welfare state” created in his country. He argues:
What I meant and still mean by premature welfare state is a country
ahead of itself by comparison with its realistic economic potentials . . .
The [Hungarian] welfare state has outgrown its desirable extent. It
needs cutting back and reforming, and at the same time preserving to
the extent that [it] is desirable and needful . . . Underlining the prin-
ciple of need means that the state should refrain if possible from
giving money to those who are not in need.
(Kornai 1997: 95–6)
Kornai criticizes not only the “premature welfare state” but also the
monopolistic welfare state:
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The trouble with the welfare system developed in this country is that it
has a monopoly. It used to be an exclusive state monopoly . . . I am
convinced that monopolies are not a good thing, for several reasons.
First they reduce efficiency . . . The individuals supplied by monopo-
lies are at their mercy, without any freedom of choice.
(Kornai 1997: 95–6)
Although both scholars mainly describe the communist welfare system in
Hungary, seemingly they present their own evaluations of the communist
welfare system in general. In relation to those evaluations, some (mainly
experts of social policy) proposed democratization of the welfare state,
while others (mainly neoliberalism-oriented economists) insisted on a
reduction of the welfare state in the transformation period following the
collapse of communism.
Changes to social policy and the welfare system after 1989
in Central Europe
The characteristics of the communist social policy and welfare system
described above were also essentially valid for three Central European
countries: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Since 1989, several factors have influenced the formation and trans-
formation of social policy and the welfare system in Central Europe.
Among them, important determinants existed, as follows:
• social costs of transformation,
• traditional European welfare system,
• neoliberalism as the dominant orientation in the world before and
after 1989,
• advice and commitments of international organizations such as the
World Bank and the International Labor Organization (ILO),
• legacies of the communist era.
This part analyzes the social policy and welfare system in Central Europe
after 1989, examining these determinants.
Social cost of transformation and “emergent” social policy
The Central and East European countries have replaced the communist
party-state system with a system governed by the rules of market and
parliamentary democracy since 1989. Politics with freedom and demo-
cracy is, to varying degrees, now in operation across almost all post-
communist countries. In general, three Central European countries,
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, are the top runners of
democratization among post-communist countries.
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On the other hand, after a heavy depression due to economic trans-
formation (“transformational recession”), the countries have entered onto
the path of growth, starting in 1992 in Poland, and in 1994 in Hungary
and the Czech Republic. Economic growth has continued in Hungary. In
Poland the GDP growth rate was moderate in 2001 and 2002, but then it
went up to 3.8 percent in 2003. The Czech Republic, despite having once
overcome the transformational depression in 1994, experienced recession
again from 1997 to 1999, but then resumed economic growth (KOPINT-
DATORG 2002; 2004).
As a result of a relatively smooth transformation of the political and
economic system, Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic gained mem-
bership in the EU in May 2004 together with seven other countries: Slova-
kia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and (south) Cyprus.
However, from the viewpoint of social policy-making it is important that
social (societal) costs of transformation, that is negative phenomena or
“sacrifices” due to the system change (Szamuely 1996: 55), have been
heavy in all post-communist countries, including those of Central Europe,
and they required “emergent” social policy in the region. The main social
costs of transformation were represented in such phenomena as excessive
mortality, mass unemployment, an increase in the economically inactive
population, a rise in poverty and an increase of income inequalities.
Life expectancy had already been declining since the 1960s in the
USSR and across Central and Eastern Europe, mainly due to insufficient
funding and inadequacy of the medical systems, and underdevelopment
in the preventive approach to health care (Ellman 1997: 356–62). In addi-
tion to those defects, stress brought about by the drastic system change
caused high mortality and a decline in life expectancy, particularly for
males of working age, after the collapse of communism in the region.
While life expectancy at birth of males drastically fell in Russia from
64.2 to 58.2 years, it fell slightly also in Hungary from 65.4 to 64.8 years
during the period of 1989–94. Also, it fell slightly in Poland during the
years 1990–2. In the Czech Republic, the same phenomenon occurred,
but only in 1990 (Szamuely 1996: 66).
The transformational depression caused unemployment in post-com-
munist countries, and negated a basic component of the communist
welfare system, full employment. In Poland, after the unemployment rate
peaked in 1993 (16.4 percent), it gradually declined until 1998 (10.4
percent); however it had risen again to 19.8 percent by 2003. During the
years of transformational depression of 1990–3 in the Czech Republic, the
unemployment rate was relatively low (3.5 percent, 1993), and it rose
significantly from 1997 and reached 9.4 percent in 1999. However, it had
slightly decreased to 7.8 percent by 2003 (KOPINT-DATORG 2002; 2004).
In Hungary, the unemployment rate registered 12.1 percent in 1993,
and then it gradually declined to 5.9 percent in 2003 (KOPINT-DATORG
2002; 2004). However, the recovery of the employment rate is slow in
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comparison with the decrease in unemployment. It means that there are
many economically inactive people, more than 2 million, among the 6
million of working age in Hungary. The Roma ethnic minority, unskilled
and less educated workers and the inhabitants of undeveloped areas are
over-represented among the unemployed, while the economically inactive
population is mainly composed of students, early retired pensioners and
housewives withdrawn from the labor market and provided with child-care
allowance in the country (Frey 1998: 4–17).
While the percentage of females in the total unemployed is higher than
that of males in Poland and the Czech Republic, it is less than 50 percent
in Hungary (ECE 1996). However, the decline of the economically active
population was more drastic among females than males after 1989 in
Hungary. Thus, it could be said that the gender gap (bias) in the labor
sphere that already existed in the communist era (see above) has grown,
to varying degrees, in the respective post-communist countries.
Poverty is not a new phenomenon in the region. It already existed
under the communist regime. Sociologists dealt with the issue of poverty,
for instance, in the Czech Republic and Hungary (Adam 1999: 155–6;
Andorka 1997: 75–6). In Hungary, the dissidents set up SZETA, the Foun-
dation to Support the Poor, to assist the poor in 1978 (Lomax 1999: 175).
Andorka reveals that about 1 million Hungarians, 10 percent of the popu-
lation, lived on a per capita household income lower than the subsistence
minimum (a poverty line which is defined as the value, per capita house-
hold income, of a basket of certain goods and services needed by an
average household in order to maintain a minimum standard of living) in
the 1980s (Andorka 1997: 76).
The poor in communist Hungary were composed of unskilled workers,
peasants and inhabitants of villages and small towns. In addition to the old
poor, the new poor appeared; both strata increased rapidly during the
years of economic transformation in the 1990s. The proportion of 
the poor to the total population increased threefold by the middle of the
1990s in Hungary, applying the subsistence minimum as the poverty line.
Even if another poverty line such as classifying as poor those with 50
percent of the average net income is used, the existence of increasing
widespread poverty could not be denied. The new poor were families with
three or more children, the unemployed and the economically inactive
population. The Roma ethnicity, whose majority fell into unemployment,
also was over-represented among the poor after the economic trans-
formation in the country (Andorka 1997: 81–2).
Likewise, poverty spread rapidly in Poland and the Czech Republic
during the years of system change. The proportion of the poor to the total
population is higher in Poland than in the other two countries (Adam
1999: 155–70).
As system change, including marketization and privatization, was in
motion in post-communist countries, the social structure changed, as
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reflected in the growth of income differentials. In the case of Hungary, in
1988, the year preceding the system change, the income of the highest
household decile was 5.8 times higher than that of the lowest household
decile, while in 1994–5 the former was 7 times higher than the latter
(Kolosi and Sági 1999: 52–4).
Likewise in the Czech Republic, the income ratio between the lowest
and highest household deciles increased from 2.6 in 1988 to 3.2 in 1996
(Potůc̆ek 2001: 86). According to a report by the World Bank, the income
differential on the basis of Gini coefficient was widest in Poland in 1993
(World Bank 1996: 68).
Some researches suggest that quite a number of the new rich (or new
elite) appeared from the old elite, at least in the first stage of system
change, and the winners, in general, were persons with “cultural capital,”
or the well-educated (Eyal et al. 1997; Kolosi and Sági 1999).
Unlike economic policy which was carried out on the basis of ex ante
designed and more or less systematic programs, which were strongly influ-
enced by Bretton Woods institutions inspiring neoliberalism, social policy
of the first stage of the system change had the character of “emergency
responses” in the region (Cichon ed. 1995; Cichon et al. 1997: 19). To put
it another way, emergency measures were introduced to deal with the
social costs of transformation such as mass unemployment, widespread
poverty and deteriorating living standards.
All the countries in the region rapidly introduced unemployment bene-
fits and social assistance benefits and modified their pension provision
strategy to fight rampant inflation.
In the three countries under discussion, decrees on employment were
enacted and unemployment insurance was introduced in the beginning
phase of the system change. The unemployment benefit plans were ini-
tially generous and wage related, but later became limited in terms of the
replacement rate and length of entitlement because of budgetary pres-
sure, as well as permeating neoliberalism in the region. For instance, in
Hungary the length of entitlement of benefits was reduced from two years
to one year in 1993 (and then to nine months in 2000). Likewise, in the
Czech Republic unemployment benefits were paid for one year in 1991:
90 percent of salary for the first six months and 60 percent of salary for
the next six months in 1991. Later, the length of entitlement of benefits
was reduced to six months, and in 1999 only 50 percent of salary was paid
for the first three months and 40 percent of salary for the next three
months (Potůc̆ek 2001: 90).
The Czech Republic, from the beginning stage of the system change,
attached much importance to its active employment policy, including
organizing professional training and requalification programs and sup-
porting small-scale business. Thus the proportion of expenditure on active
employment policy to total expenditure on employment policy was more
than two-thirds in 1994 in the Czech Republic, while in Poland, this
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proportion was only 12 percent on average in 1993–5 (Adam 1999: 100).
Such a difference in policy approach could be explained partly from the
different unemployment rates in two countries in the early stage of the
system change. At the same time, it could be speculated that the Czech
Republic drew lessons from the experiences of active employment policies
in advanced countries, for instance in Sweden.
Pension provision strategies were modified, mainly aimed at improving
the living standard of pensioners and preventing an increase in unemploy-
ment in the early stage of the system change in Poland and Hungary. In
Poland, automatic indexation of old-age benefits to wage increases was
introduced in 1990, while in Hungary pensions were adjusted twice a year,
following wage levels, as a result of parliamentary action in 1992. More-
over, both countries applied generous eligibility conditions to old-age and
disability pensions in order to promote early retirement. Early retirement
was considered to be an alternative to unemployment. But this measure
had a side effect of increased system independency ratio due to the
increase in the number of pensioners of working age, and led to financial
difficulties in the pension system in both countries.
All three countries, in the early stage of the system change, enacted
decrees regulating social assistance that were intended as a safety net for
those who were no longer able to support themselves. Social assistance is a
means-tested benefit for poor people. Ferge, analyzing the practice of
social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe, argues:
There are also widespread shortages of funds at local level. Respons-
ibility for some types of assistance may be shared with central authori-
ties, but very often the locality is solely responsible . . . Since there are
many competing claims for these funds, the locality may not be able
to provide for all needy . . . [A]s many as 50 to 60 percent of the eli-
gible poor are not receiving assistance.
(Ferge 1997b: 305–6)
In Hungary, a new subsidy for parents, in addition to the existing family
allowance and childcare leave, was introduced in 1992. This was means-
tested support, directed at families that had three or more children and
lived below the poverty line. Although it was also a component of the
social assistance system, at the same time it created disincentives for
mothers to work outside the home (Goven 2000: 291).
To sum up, the initial social policy after 1989 could be characterized to
be an “emergent response” to the social costs of transformation.
Shift to a traditional European welfare system
According to a publication of ILO-CEET (the International Labor Organi-
zation, Central and Eastern European Team), the social security system in
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Central Europe by the mid-1990s was characterized by an emergent
response to the outcomes of economic transformation, while developing a
shift to the three-tier social security system prevalent in Western Europe,
which had existed in the region prior to 1950 (Cichon ed. 1995; Cichon et
al. 1997: 10).
The three-tier system consists of social insurance plans, universal bene-
fits and social assistance policies. Certainly, such a shift occurred, to
varying degrees, in the region by the mid-1990s. Alongside the creation of
the three-tier system, European-style tripartite institutions were also estab-
lished. Thus, it could be said that, in parallel with the emergent response,
to some extent, the Europeanization of social policy occurred in the
region.
With regard to social insurance policies, Hungary was the most
advanced example of a social insurance-based social security system in the
region by the mid-1990s. In Hungary, the social insurance fund was sepa-
rated from the state budget in 1989 and an employment insurance fund
was introduced, following the enactment of the Employment Act in 1991.
After the legislation of another law, which established elected boards for
pension and health care funds, the representatives of the employees were
elected by vote in 1993. The board of the pension fund was composed of
the representatives of contributors, that is the employer and the
employee, and also delegates of the retired. Ferge notes, “The establish-
ment and election of the social security self-governments is one of the
most important achievements” (Ferge 1995: 156), although the right wing
cabinet abolished self-government of social insurance in 1998.
The Czech Republic (the then Czechoslovakia) introduced a health
care insurance system with competing insurance funds in 1991. There,
besides one general insurance company, a number of NPO-style insurance
funds were created on the basis of industrial sector, profession and firm.
Although the main contributors are the employer and the employee, the
government also pays contributions for the unemployed, the retired,
women on maternity leave and children without support (Adam 1999:
144–5). Because hospitals, except some small ones, have not been priva-
tized, the government has financed their investment costs and medical
education. Therefore, health care funding in the Czech Republic is a com-
bination of the Bismarckian style of insurance and Beveridgean style of
state funding. One problem that occurred by the mid-1990s in the country
was the growth of expenditure in health care. Its percentage of GDP rose
from 5.4 percent in 1991 to 8.1 percent in 1995 (OECD 1996: 93).
Poland also introduced a health care insurance system with a number
of insurance funds. However, unlike the Czech Republic, the reform of
the health care insurance system was delayed and not carried out until
1999. As for pension funding in Poland, although the pension fund was
separated from the state budget in 1986, the state budget transferred
resources into the pension fund to balance its account in the 1990s. The
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same occurred in Hungary. Such financial situations and the strong pres-
ence of the World Bank in both countries (Poland and Hungary) caused
the partial privatization of the pension system in the late 1990s (see
below).
The shift to an insurance-based social security system in the region is
considered to be a return to the Central European (or European) tradi-
tion as well as an easy way of institutional restructuring for ex-communist
countries. Deacon notes:
The logic of post-communist development was towards a conservative,
corporatist kind of welfare policy. Workplace entitlement to welfare
and existing workplace status differentials inherited from state-social-
ist days could be readily converted into insurance-based, wage related
and differentiated benefit entitlements of the Austro-German, Bismar-
ckian kind.
(Deacon 2000: 151–2)
As for universal benefits, there were legacies of the communist era.
Through the retention of the family allowance and childcare leave with
partial wages, the principle of universal provision was maintained (or
enhanced, as in the case of Hungary where the family allowance was made
universal in 1990) in the early stage of the system change in the region.
On the other hand, the right to return to one’s previous job after child-
care leave was eroded by the narrowing labor market and often strength-
ened gender-bias. Moreover, universal benefits were converted into
means-tested ones as a result of permeating neoliberalism and strong pres-
sure from the World Bank in the mid-1990s in the region (see below).
The ILO, whose branch was established in Budapest in 1992, has pro-
vided post-communist countries with the technical assistance to set up the
institutional framework of industrial relations and social dialogue preval-
ent in continental Europe. Tripartite bodies at the national level were
established in the three countries in the early stage of the system change.
In Hungary, the Interest Reconciliation Council was established in 1990
as an institution for social dialogue among the government, employers
and employees. Likewise, a tripartite body was established in the Czech
Republic (then Czechoslovakia) in 1990 and in Poland in 1993–4. These
bodies were initially established to mitigate social tensions such as the
Hungarian taxi drivers’ demonstration against inflation and the massive
and chaotic wave of strikes in Poland. Nevertheless, these bodies have not
always functioned well because of the frequent antagonism between the
government and trade unions or among rather fragmented trade unions
(especially in Hungary and Poland).
In the Czech Republic, a tripartite body functioned relatively well even
under the neoconservative Klaus government. This can be attributed
partly to the tactics of the government to keep wages low in return for low
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unemployment through negotiation with trade unions (Orenstein 1996:
177–8) and partly to the less fragmented structure of the trade unions.
Moreover, a publication of the ILO considers that the tripartite dialogue
in the Czech Republic has become an integral part of government since
1998, the year when the social democratic party came into office (Casale et
al. 2001: 14–15).
The number of workers and employers covered by collective bargaining
at the sectoral level has recently increased in the Czech Republic, while
the decentralization of bargaining at the firm level is one of the recent
developments in Hungarian industrial relations. The latter development
could be considered a sign of the shift of industrial relations toward the
Anglo-Saxon model.
Last but not least, some parts of German or other Western European-
style corporate governance were introduced in the Czech Republic (par-
ticipation of employees’ representatives on the supervisory board) and
Hungary (work councils at the firm level). This is another example of a
certain degree of Europeanization of the institutional setting in the
region.
While some international organizations, especially the ILO and
UNICEF, encouraged post-communist countries to establish a European-
style welfare system, the European-based actors did not necessarily play
such a role (except the Council of Europe).
UNICEF has provided post-communist countries with technical advice
for child welfare. It proposed the maintenance of universal benefits and
services and opposed the residual approach to welfare policy.
The EU directed a part of its PHARE program to advise on social secur-
ity policy (Fagin 1999: 189), but its policy advice to post-communist coun-
tries did not have a systematic orientation toward the European style of
welfare. Deacon et al. maintain that the battle between the Euroliberals
and the Eurocorporatists within the EU was one reason for its inconsistent
policy recommendations to the East (Deacon et al. 1997: 98). Rys notes
that in the enlargement process the EU generally gave Central and
Eastern European countries policy recommendations in which social pro-
tection issues were reduced to their economic aspect (Rys 2001: 185).
Although the EU required improvements in the protection of human
rights (e.g. those of ethnic minorities) to post-communist countries, it
didn’t necessarily stress the safeguarding of social rights (Ferge 2001: 14).
Orenstein and Haas (2002) note that the “Europe Effect” made Central
Europe maintain relatively high levels of welfare spending. In our view,
there is no clear evidence that the EU itself intentionally intensified this
effect, even if the concept of the “European social model” gave “indirect”
influence to social policy making of national governments in the region
(Guillén and Palier 2004: 204).
The EBRD initially attempted to play a role in the sphere of social
security in post-communist countries. But in order to avoid overlapping
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with the role of the World Bank, it was limited to providing assistance to
the private sector in the region.
The OECD, which the three Central European countries joined in the
mid-1990s, took a stance seeking to reconcile economic and social
requirements. Its stance is, to some extent, similar to the idea of “the
Third Way” (Giddens 1998; 2000; Giddens ed. 2001) in terms of policy
emphasis on social investment. (Its stance is called social-liberalism: see
Deacon et al. 1997.)
To sum up, the European-based actors such as the EU and EBRD
didn’t exert direct influence on the Europeanization of the welfare system
that occurred in the early stage of system change in Central Europe. It was
the World Bank that had the strongest influence on the restructuring of
the ex-communist welfare system, as revealed below.
Permeation of neoliberalism into the Central European welfare system,
with the World Bank as its promoter
Widespread neoliberalism was one of the remarkable phenomena from
the beginning of the system change in the post-communist region. Its
signs were seen in economic policy more than in social policy and welfare
systems in the early stage of system change.
Orenstein and Haas attribute this time lag to the lower priority of social
policy among a set of transformation policies for domestic decision-
makers in the region, and for Bretton Woods institutions by the mid-1990s
(Orenstein and Haas 2002). Their explanation is partly true. It is certain
that the domestic decision-makers in the region and the Bretton Woods
institutions, in particular the IMF, gave the highest priority to economic
policies in which economic stabilization and privatization were the main
purposes.
On the other hand, one of the neoliberalism-inclined Bretton Woods
institutions, the World Bank, imposed social conditionality such as tight-
ened eligibility conditions for social security on post-communist countries
in return for granting structural adjustment loans. For instance, the World
Bank advised Hungary to scale down maternity and childcare benefits in
1992 (Goven 2000: 291).
Accordingly, Orenstein and Haas do not adequately describe social
policy-making in the early period of the system change, because their
description omits the above fact. Another fact to be noted was that the
first post-communist governments in the region hesitated in drastically
reducing social expenditures, out of fear of losing popularity.
Ferge expressed well such a complexity of the early period of the
system change in Hungary:
It is to the credit of the Antall government [the first post-communist
government] that welfare benefits did not deteriorate faster . . . The
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entire period [1990–94] was characterized by a contradictory mixture
of gaining ground of neoliberal ideals enhanced by conservative ele-
ments, the inadequate fulfillment of needs growing as a result of
impoverishment, the temporary patching up of problems and ad hoc
popularity seeking ideas.
(Ferge 1995: 157)
Around the middle of the 1990s, the neoliberal approach to social policy
became more visible than before in the region. It occurred in the environ-
ment of a rapidly deteriorating state budget and external balance both in
Hungary and Poland. Even in the Czech Republic, which did not face a
severe imbalance, social policy shifted toward neoliberalism by the middle
of the 1990s.
The core of the neoliberal social policy inspired by the World Bank was
comprised of the following two elements: first, limiting the provision of
welfare benefits to the “truly needy,” thus reducing social expenditure,
and second, privatization of the pension system (Deacon 2000: 154).
Around the mid-1990s, universal benefits and services such as family
allowance and paid childcare leave were converted into means-tested
benefits, and the principle of free education and health care was eroded
by the introduction of co-payments for dental care and university tuition
in Hungary. The austerity program, including these measures, was called
the “Bokros Package” after the then financial minister of Hungary. Kornai
supported this austerity program and criticized the “premature welfare
state.” In his view, overspending on welfare continued under the first post-
communist government in Hungary (Kornai 1997: 95), while the Hungar-
ian majority stood against the “Bokros Package.” Although this “package”
was modified to some extent and Bokros was forced to resign in 1996, the
essential parts of the austerity program were put into operation in the
country. As a result, the percentage of welfare expenditure in the budget
in GDP decreased to 20.9 percent in 1996, from 26.3 percent in 1994
(Andorka and Tóth 1999: 66).
Likewise, in Poland the universal family allowance was converted into a
means-tested one in 1995. Then, only families whose household incomes
per capita were less than 50 percent of the average were entitled to the
allowance. Also, in the Czech Republic, those whose income was above 1.8
times more than the established minimum were not entitled to a family
allowance after a conversion to means-tested benefits.
As noted above, eligibility for unemployment benefits was also gradu-
ally narrowed in the region. Thus, the number of benefit recipients as a
percentage of the unemployed declined in Hungary from 77 percent in
1991 to 29 percent in 1996; in Poland from 79 percent to 54 percent; and
in the Czech Republic from 72 percent to 50 percent (Adam 1999: 98).
As for the pension system, its reform was carried out with the paradigm
shift in Hungary in 1998 and in Poland in 1999. The original idea of
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pension reform was suggested to both countries by the World Bank. The
reform process was led by each country’s Ministry of Finance, which coop-
erated with the World Bank. The main concern of the World Bank was to
limit the public PAYG scheme to a minimum scale (first pillar), to intro-
duce the mandatory and individually funded, privately managed and non-
solidaristic second pillar, and to establish the additional voluntary third
pillar as well. Hungary introduced such a new pension system, composed
of three pillars, in 1998, but the proportion of the second pillar to total
contributions was smaller than initially proposed by the Ministry of
Finance. The reason for this was that the Ministry of Finance was obliged
to a compromise with the Welfare Ministry that, at least initially, stuck to
the Bismarckian–Beveridgean tradition (Müller 1999: 76). A number of
social policy experts also stood against the idea of the World Bank con-
cerning the pension reform, as expressed in a publication entitled “Avert-
ing the Old Age Crisis” (World Bank 1994). The new Polish pension
system introduced in 1999 was essentially similar to the Hungarian one,
but it had more insurance elements because, in addition to having an
individually funded second pillar, the “notional defined contribution”
(NDC) plan was also arranged in the first pillar to enhance the contribu-
tion–benefit link.
In contrast with the Hungarian and Polish cases, the Czech Republic
maintained its public PAYG scheme, although voluntary pension funds
were allowed after 1993. Müller explains this bifurcation in the pension
systems of Central Europe from the constellation of the main actors (the
World Bank, the Ministries of Finance and the Welfare Ministries) and the
structural conditions (the pension funds, state budgets and external bal-
ances) in the three countries concerned. On one hand, the deteriorating
financial situation of the existing PAYG plan led to its dependence on
budgetary subsidies as well as to the commitment of the Ministry of
Finance to pension reform. Moreover, the fiscal crises made the Ministries
of Finance strong actors in pension reform in Hungary and Poland. On
the other hand, the high external debt in both countries created a situ-
ation in which the World Bank imposed social conditionality in return for
funding. In such an environment, both the World Bank and the Ministries
of Finance, which were inclined toward neoliberalism, could carry out
pension reform with the paradigm shift in Hungary and Poland. As the
Czech Republic, where a PAYG plan was sustainable, did not face serious
problems regarding the state budget and external imbalance, the main
driving force of pension reform was the Welfare Ministry, which was
traditionally inclined toward Bismarckian–Beveridgean paradigms. Thus,
the Czech Republic maintained its public PAYG structure (Müller 1999:
149–74).
The ILO-CEET supports pension reform within a PAYG structure and
gathers research on pension reform (Cichon et al. 1997; Fultz ed. 2002a;
2002b; 2004). Interestingly, the former Senior Vice-President and the
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Chief Economist of the World Bank suggest that a shift to an individually
funded and privately managed pension system is not always the best solu-
tion (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001). And the following description by Deacon
et al. is also noteworthy:
Within the World Bank it is perhaps most evident that a heated and
hard fought struggle of ideas and policy prescriptions is under way.
Here we identified a “camp” associated with European wage related
state funded social security systems and a “camp” associated with a flat
rate – possibly means and assets tested – residual pensions policy.
(Deacon et al. 1997: 148)
Legacies of the communist era in post-communist welfare systems
Although neoliberalism has become a notable element of post-communist
social policy, especially since the mid-1990s, it has failed to permeate
deeply into society due to the legacies of the communist era. Esping-
Andersen describes how:
East and Central Europe is clearly the most under-defined region, a
virtual laboratory of experimentation. If it is at all possible to general-
ize, there is at least clear one trend: where neoliberal welfare policies
(often inspired by the Chilean model) were pursued most vigorously,
they were punished in subsequent democratic elections . . . [S]o neo-
liberal welfare policies in Eastern Europe seem to revitalize socialism.
(Esping-Andersen 1996: 267)
Certainly, neo-liberal economic policy “revitalized” socialism and helped
ex-communist (presently the Social Democratic or Socialist) parties regain
office in Poland (1993) and Hungary (1994). But the Social Democratic
and Socialist Party-led coalition governments were also punished by
people in “subsequent elections” in 1997 (Poland) and 1998 (Hungary)
and lost their majorities because their governments adopted policies redu-
cing welfare expenditures.
In Hungary, the subsequent conservative government abolished tuition
at the universities and re-universalized the family allowance to maintain its
popularity among the electorate. Nevertheless, in the 2002 general elec-
tion, the conservative parties were defeated by the Socialist Party that was
in cooperation with a liberal party, the Alliance of Free Democrats. The
Socialist party promised the electorate many welfare measures such as an
extra provision for pensions and an increase in wages for public
employees, including low-paid school teachers and health care providers.
As in Hungary, the Social Democratic Party came back into office in 2001
in Poland. In the Czech Republic, the Social Democratic Party, which is
more generous with welfare expenditures than conservative parties, has
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remained in power since 1998 (Potůc̆ek 2004: 254). All the examples
described above show that the majority of the population in the region
expect a deep commitment from the state with regard to social protection.
According to Ferge, people in the ex-communist region “would turn more
willingly to public authorities when in need than to churches, non-govern-
mental organizations, or charitable institutions” (Ferge 1997b: 315).
Kornai refers to the relation between such an attitude and (lack of) “tax
awareness” in the region (Kornai 1997: 240). Without details, it could be
confirmed that the vast majority of the people in post-communist coun-
tries expect a strong welfare commitment from the state and that this atti-
tude is a legacy of the communist era.
As already noted, Orenstein and Haas attribute a significant level of
social expenditure in contemporary Central Europe to the “Europe
Effect” (Orenstein and Haas 2002). However, we consider the above
legacy as a more important factor in explaining the relatively strong
welfare commitment of the state in Central Europe.
Thus, the weak movement toward privatization of health care and edu-
cation in the region could be considered as a “Legacy Effect.” In fact, the
primary care (GP) facilities have almost exclusively privatized, but the hos-
pitals have been predominantly managed by the central and local govern-
ments in the region. Privatization of education was mostly concentrated
on the tertiary level and the percentage of secondary school pupils
enrolled in private schools was still 8 percent in Hungary, 7 percent in the
Czech Republic and 4 percent in Poland in 1996–7 (Deacon 2000: 155).
The informal sector (hidden economy) and, in general, informality are
also legacies from the past regime, especially in countries where the
second economy prevailed, as in the case of Hungary. While the informal
sector plays the role of a hidden safety net for the unemployed, for the
involuntarily economically inactive population and lower income earners,
it narrows the taxation base. Equally important, those working only in the
informal sector are not entitled to social insurance benefits such as public
pensions and health care.
The informal sector, to some extent, is related to the dual structure of a
labor market, which reflects a gender gap in the region:
[T]he labor market is bifurcating in multiple ways: into public and
private, to be sure, but within this into regular and secure jobs, coded
as male, and into unstable, part-time work and multiple jobs occupied
mostly by women. While equally a part of the private sector and poten-
tially lucrative, these latter jobs offer neither security nor social bene-
fits.
(Gal and Kligman 2000: 61)
Social capital or social network resources also play the role of a safety net.
But distribution of social capital is dependent on the past social structure
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(legacy from the communist era). As already described, many representa-
tives of the old elite became the new rich on the basis of the old social
network resources. Likewise, the old poor are largely overlapped with the
new poor. It should be noted that the new poor tended to be excluded
from social networking in the 1990s (Angelusz and Tardos 1999). This
suggests that there exist those who can access neither a formal nor an
informal safety net.
Conclusion
We could sum up the above description as follows:
• The transformation of the welfare system in Central Europe was deter-
mined by several factors: the social costs of the economic trans-
formation, the traditional European model of welfare, neoliberalism,
the influence of international organizations and legacies from the
communist era.
• Social policy in the early years of the system change in Central Europe
had the character of “emergent response” to the social costs of the
economic transformation such as mass unemployment, widespread
poverty and decreasing living standards. Emergent policy measures
were composed of the establishment of unemployment benefits and
social assistance, and the adjustment of pension benefits to wage
increases.
• The process of instituting emergent social policy overlapped with a
transition to the traditional European model of welfare. By the mid-
1990s, three tiers of welfare system were established in Central
Europe: social insurance, universal benefits and social assistance. In
addition, the European model of corporatism, tripartism, was intro-
duced to promote social peace. The ILO and UNICEF encouraged
Central Europe to introduce a traditional European-style welfare
system. The European or Europe-based organizations had a minimal
impact on the creation of the traditional European-style welfare
system in Central Europe. Advice of the EU to post-communist coun-
tries focused on the economic aspects of social policy and not much
on safeguarding social rights.
• Although the permeation of neoliberalism and the presence of
Bretton Woods institutions were significant from the beginning of the
system change in Central Europe, their influence on social policy-
making has been enhanced since the mid-1990s. Neoliberal social
policy was promoted by the Ministries of Finance in cooperation with
the World Bank. The key to the neoliberal social policy was the con-
version of universal benefits into means-tested ones and the privatiza-
tion of the pension system. The principle of universal provision was
eroded in the three Central European countries. The privatization of
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the pension system was partially implemented in Hungary and
Poland, while the Czech Republic maintained its PAYG pension
system.
• The legacy of the communist era still remains. People continued to
expect a strong commitment to welfare from the state and have
resisted attempts by post-communist welfare regimes to move toward a
more residualist welfare state.
The above summary leads to two questions: first, what type of welfare
system has appeared or is appearing in Central Europe? Second, to what
extent could we attribute the formation or transformation of Central
European welfare systems to external factors such as the intervention of
international organizations?
As for the first question, there are several answers whose differences are
caused by the complexity of the features of the welfare systems after the
political change. As noted above, the ILO-CEET suggests that the welfare
systems of Central European countries have come to resemble those of
traditional systems in Western Europe. Orenstein and Haas stress the
“Europe effect” in the formation of post-communist Central European
welfare systems (see above).
On the other hand, some experts of social policy such as Ferge (Ferge
1997a) and Standing (Standing 1996) – the latter was the first director of
the ILO Budapest office – maintain that neoliberalism has largely influ-
enced social policy-making in the region. Ringold (Ringold 1999) and
Kornai (Kornai 1997) emphasize the large effect of the legacies of the
communist era on post-communist welfare systems.
In our view, the welfare systems in Central Europe are now still in their
formative stage and it is too early to define their type. Nevertheless, our
view is close to Deacon’s well-balanced one:
[S]ome of the countries were slowly reforming their social policies in
the direction of one or other variant of Western welfare policy. A
tension between the aspiration towards a European-style social market
economy (or conservative corporatism) and a budget-induced and
IMF–World Bank-backed residualism was evident and continuing in
the late 1990s. There was remarkable continuity and stability in the
provision of state social security, health and education services,
although in some countries some private provision was appearing at
the margins.
(Deacon 2000: 156)
In our view, the Central European welfare system in the early stage of the
system change resembled that of continental Europe, and since the mid-
1990s it has developed into a (neo-) liberal model. But it has not become
a residualist welfare system yet due to the resistance of the majority of
350 Takumi Horibayashi
society, in which the legacy of the communist era still remains. The
tension between “a European-style social market” and “IMF–World Bank-
backed residualism” was expressed in the tension between “budget-
induced” austerity plans by the governments and resistance of the people
to these plans, resulting in repeated power (governmental) alternations.
As for the degree of the effect of international organizations on the
welfare system in Central Europe, Bretton Woods institutions were most
influential. Deacon calls this increasing, ideologically motivated, influence
by global actors on national welfare policy “political globalization,” and
distinguishes it from economic globalization (Deacon 2000: 157–9). To
use this terminology, the main actors of “political globalization” were the
Bretton Woods institutions, and the ILO emulated them in Central
Europe.
The strength of intervention of the World Bank varied from one
country to another. It depended on the degree of foreign debt of the
respective countries. While Hungary and Poland, having faced serious
external imbalances, were exposed to strong intervention from the World
Bank in the formation of their welfare systems, the Czech Republic was
not so strongly influenced by it. The attempts of the World Bank faced
resistance from the people. It sometimes accomplished its policy object-
ives, but sometimes failed, or at least, was obliged to compromise with the
people’s wishes in the region. It could be said that the World Bank was a
very strong actor but not always a winner in the region. As already pointed
out, attention should be paid also to different views on welfare policies
within the World Bank.
The impact of the EU was weak on welfare system transformation in
Central Europe in the 1990s, in spite of increasing economic relations,
and geographical and cultural closeness between them. This resulted
partly from policy priorities and partly from a change of the EU social
policy (or model). The policy priority of the EU was to establish a single
market and to introduce a single currency in the 1990s, which resulted in
enhanced economic competition and restricted fiscal policy within its
member countries (Chapon and Euzéby 2002).
On the other hand, under the new situation of the creation of a single
market and a single currency, the corresponding “European social model”
has not been clearly conceptualized (Rys 2001). Guillén and Palier argue:
While Brussels was more oriented towards the development of public
social policies in 1980s, the discourse of “economically-oriented
actors” . . . who were partially in charge of the accession procedure for
the CEE countries, has become more similar to the discourse of the
international financial organizations . . . At the current stage, there is
no clear European social model promoted at the EU level, but con-
flict between “economically oriented actors” . . . and “socially oriented
actors” trying to find new perspective for a productive approach to
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social policy, linking them positively to economic and employment
policies.
(Guillén and Palier 2004: 206)
In such circumstances, the World Bank tended to be involved with the
preparations for Central Europe’s entry into the EU (Orenstein and Haas
2002; Funck and Pizzati eds 2002). However, in Central Europe, social
impact from the EU has strengthened over recent years. The EU began to
influence the debate and some policies such as gender equality and anti-
discrimination policies as well as the fight against social exclusion in the
region (Guillén and Palier 2004: 205; Ferge and Juhász 2004).
Now the three countries under discussion are members of the EU. The
future social policy and welfare systems of these countries depend not
only on their own choices but also on the EU’s choices: whether they seek
a “European social model” or aim only to be the winner in global eco-
nomic competition.
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